The Dreadful Failure of Lethal Injection

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost and Associate Dean of the Faculty and Professor of Jurisprudence & Political Science at Amherst College—comments on the decomposition of the legal injection paradigm over the past few decades, since it was first adopted in Oklahoma in 1999. Professor Sarat observes the evolution of the procedure over time and points out that none of the changes has resolved lethal injection’s fate or repaired its vexing problems.

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Let’s Talk About Sex, Baby: State Representative Ana-Maria Ramos Introduces Bill to Repeal Parental Consent Requirement for Birth Control

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman comments on a Texas bill that would allow teens to access birth control without parental involvement. Professor Grossman describes the current state of reproductive health laws and policies in Texas and explains why the proposed bill is so important.

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Agstar Financial Services v. Northwest Sand & Gravel

Docket: 47140

Opinion Date: March 22, 2021

Judge: Stegner

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure

In 2007 and 2008, AgStar Financial Services (AgStar), now Compeer Financial FLCA (Compeer), loaned substantial sums of money to Northwest Sand and Gravel, Inc., Gordon Paving Company, Inc., and Blackrock Land Holdings, LLC (collectively, "Gordon Paving.") As a result of financing these loans, AgStar became a secured creditor of Gordon Paving. In 2012, Gordon Paving defaulted on its $10 million obligation to AgStar, which then resulted in AgStar obtaining a judgment of foreclosure on various parcels of real property Gordon Paving owned. The district court also entered an order allowing the sale of virtually all of Gordon Paving’s business equipment to further satisfy the debt. Gordon Paving appealed the district court’s decision which allowed AgStar to sell the business equipment. In "AgStar I," the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order allowing AgStar to liquidate Gordon Paving’s business equipment, but this decision came long after the business equipment had already been sold at auction. On remand, the district court determined that the correct remedy for Gordon Paving was an award of restitution in the amount of the gross proceeds of the sale plus interest from the date of the sale based on its interpretation of Idaho Code section 28-22-104. Compeer appealed the district court’s order denying it an offset for expenses its predecessor, AgStar, incurred in liquidating Gordon Paving’s business equipment. Compeer also appealed the district court’s order awarding Gordon Paving prejudgment interest on the restitution award from the date the collateral was sold. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order denying Compeer an offset for the auctioneer’s expenses incurred which were never received by AgStar. The Court affirmed the district court’s order awarding Gordon Paving prejudgment interest; however, the district court’s decision allowing prejudgment interest to run from the date of the sale was vacated.

Secol v. Fall River Medical PLLC

Docket: 47149

Opinion Date: March 22, 2021

Judge: Roger S. Burdick

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice

Plaintiff-appellant Cassie Secol and her four minor children (collectively “the Secols”) challenged several evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and the denial of their motion for a new trial. In late 2016, Damian Secol passed away from a rare form of cancer, T-cell lymphoblastic lymphoma (“T-LBL”). Following his death, the Secols brought a medical malpractice action against Damian’s primary care providers: Kelly Dustin, D.O., Austin Gillette, M.D., and Fall River Medical, PLLC (collectively “Fall River”). At trial, the district court questioned Dr. Jeffery Hancock, Damian’s treating oncologist, in front of the jury concerning the treatment and diagnosis of T-LBL. The Secols moved the district court for a mistrial, arguing the questioning prevented a fair trial. The district court denied the motion. After the jury returned a verdict in Fall River’s favor, the Secols moved the district court for a new trial, which was also denied. The Secols appealed, challenging the district court’s evidentiary rulings, delivery of jury instructions, and the denial of their motion for a new trial. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court, vacated the judgment following the jury verdict, and remanded for a new trial to be conducted by a new district judge. Specifically, the Court determined the district court abused its discretion in denying the Secols’ motion for a new trial because its questioning of Dr. Hancock denied the Secols a fair trial. "Such questioning was an abuse of discretion and necessitates a new trial." Further, the district court abused its discretion in permitting Dr. Hancock to testify as to matters for which no foundation was laid and which were outside the scope of his expertise. And in addition, the district court erred in admitting irrelevant testimony about Dr. Gillette’s and Dr. Dustin’s families and hobbies, and the district court erred in delivering a modified jury instruction on medical negligence, which included prejudicially confusing language concerning direct expert testimony as compared to expert testimony. The district court was affirmed as to the admission of Fall River two experts' testimony on the standard of care because its decision on Fall River’s motion for reconsideration was not part of the record.

Brockett Company LLC v. Crain

Docket: 47138

Opinion Date: March 22, 2021

Judge: Roger S. Burdick

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

This case arose from an Idaho company’s attempt to bring an action in Idaho against a resident of Oklahoma and a business located in Oklahoma. Brockett Company, LLC appealed a district court order setting aside a default judgment entered against Scott Crain and Texoma MFG., LLC (collectively, Respondents). The district court set aside the default judgment after determining that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Crain or Texoma. On appeal, Brockett Co. argued that the district court erred in setting aside the default judgment by inappropriately considering an affidavit submitted by Crain, failing to consider facts in the record, and determining that it did not have personal jurisdiction over Crain and Texoma. After review of the trial court record, the Idaho Supreme Court determined he district court erred in granting Respondents’ motion to set aside the default judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s order granting Crain and Texoma’s motion to set aside the default judgment, vacated the district court’s judgment dismissing Brockett Co.’s claims, and remanded with instruction to reinstate the previously entered default judgment against Crain and Texoma.

Citizens Against Linscott v. Bonner County Board of Commissioners

Docket: 47909

Opinion Date: March 22, 2021

Judge: Roger S. Burdick

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Citizens Against Linscott/Interstate Asphalt Plant (“CAL”) challenged a conditional use permit (“CUP”) issued by the Bonner County, Idaho Board of Commissioners (“the County”). The CUP was based on a recent amendment to Bonner County zoning ordinances (“the Amendment”) and authorized Interstate Concrete and Asphalt Company (“Interstate”) to operate an asphalt batch plant within Frank and Carol Linscott’s gravel mine in Sagle, Idaho. In its petition for judicial review by the Bonner County district court, CAL challenged both the validity of the Amendment and the County’s decision to issue the CUP. The district court determined that CAL had standing to file its petition for judicial review of the CUP and that CAL had timely filed its petition. However, the district court concluded that it could not declare the Amendment invalid in a proceeding for judicial review under Idaho Local Land Use Planning Act (“LLUPA”) and the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (“IDAPA”). Accordingly, the district court upheld the County’s decision to grant the CUP, giving the County deference in applying its own land-use ordinances. During the pendency of this appeal, CAL filed an action for declaratory relief before another district court judge to have the Amendment declared void. In that proceeding, the County admitted that the Amendment had been adopted without proper public notice and stipulated to a judgment and order declaring the Amendment void. On appeal of the administrative decision to the Idaho Supreme Court, CAL argued, among other things, that the subsequent voiding of the Amendment also invalidated the CUP or that the CUP was not issued in conformity with Bonner County zoning laws. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court found the CUP authorizing the relocation of the Interstate asphalt batch plant to the Linscotts’ gravel mine was invalid because it was based on a void amendment to Bonner County Code. Further, the County acted in a manner that was arbitrary and capricious in refusing to address the gravel pit’s compliance with the nonconforming use provisions of BCRC.