Religions Harm People

LESLIE C. GRIFFIN

UNLV Boyd School of Law professor Leslie C. Griffin points out ways in which religions harm people—manifested today as an insistence on exemptions to social COVID-19 distancing orders. Griffin argues that telling the truth about religion should not be viewed as a form of discrimination and endorses Katherine Stewart’s recent book, The Power Worshippers: Inside the Dangerous Rise of Religious Nationalism, which provides a detailed explanation of how the Religious Right has used its power to advance religion-based government in harmful ways.

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Conservative Authoritarianism Comes Out of the Shadows

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost, Associate Dean of the Faculty and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science at Amherst College—comments on Harvard Law Professor Adrian Vermeule’s essay “Beyond Originalism,” which Sarat argues brings conservative authoritarianism out of the shadows. Sarat describes Vermeule as a modern-day Machiavelli, offering advice to the governing class and laying out a theory of governance Vermeule calls “common-good constitutionalism” but which in reality elevates the “common good” above individual goods in a manner antithetical to freedom, pluralism, and democracy.

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Anthony v. Li

Docket: A156640(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 13, 2020

Judge: Petrou

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics

In 2016, Anthony filed suit seeking to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in a car accident between him and Li. The parties unsuccessfully participated in voluntary private mediation and paid the requested fees. Anthony served a Civil Code 998 offer, seeking to compromise the action for $500,000.00, “each side to bear its own fees and costs.” Li did not accept. Li later made a section 998 offer to settle all claims against him for $175,001.00, with “each party bearing their own attorney fees and costs.” Anthony did not accept the offer. The parties jointly hired a court reporting service to record the trial proceedings. Counsel signed an agreement to share equally the fees for court reporting services. Anthony was billed and paid his share of court reporter fees. A jury returned a verdict finding Li negligent and awarding Anthony damages of $650,235.00., Anthony served a memorandum of costs for $83,048.06, seeking: $62,082.50 for section 998 post-offer expert witness fees; $2,650 for mediation fees, and $6,561.62 for court reporter fees. The court of appeal affirmed an order striking the motion. The parties agreed to share mediation and court reporter fees equally, without providing for the later recovery of those shared fees by a prevailing party.

Nuno v. California State University, Bakersfield

Docket: F077889(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 13, 2020

Judge: Donald R. Franson, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's action under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act in light of Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276. In Gamet, the court set forth the principle that self-represented litigants are not entitled to special exemptions from California's procedural rules, but they are "entitled to treatment equal to that of a represented party." In this case, the trial court's statements at a case management conference about the filing of an amended complaint were not clear and understandable. Therefore, plaintiff was misled into believing he had until the next case management conference to seek counsel and file an amended complaint and, relying on this belief, he left the country to attend an educational conference. While plaintiff was out of the country, defendants obtained an ex parte order dismissing the action withe prejudice under Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (f)(2). Therefore, the court held that the trial court (1) prejudicially abused its discretion by failing to provide clear and understandable instructions to plaintiff that the setting of another case management conference did not extend the deadline for filing an amended complaint and (2) dismissing plaintiff's action with prejudice prior to that conference.

People v. Perlas

Docket: A152806(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 13, 2020

Judge: Peter J. Siggins

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Perlas, age 17, and his friends shoplifted alcohol and drank in the park; Perlas assaulted the victim, who was found dead the next day. In 1996, Perlas was convicted of second-degree murder. In 2015, Perlas was released to life-term parole, with an agreed-upon condition that he would not consume alcohol. Perlas had been on parole for more than two years without incident when San Francisco police officers responded to reports of a woman in distress and, outside Perlas’s apartment building, met Perlas’s wife, holding their 10-week-old daughter. She stated that Perlas, who was drunk, threw her cell phone out of their window, then attempted to leave on his motorcycle. Perlas’s wife blocked his exit. He “became enraged.” When she tried to take away his keys, Perlas shoved her and gave her a bloody nose, then left. The next day, officers arrested Perlas for spousal battery, child endangerment, and vandalism. Perlas met with his parole officer and signed a form admitting he had been drinking. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation petitioned to revoke Perlas’s parole, stating: “Intermediate sanctions have been considered. However, they have been deemed not appropriate.” The trial court ultimately dismissed the petition “for failure to appropriately consider intermediate sanctions.” The court of appeal reversed. The petition sufficiently alleged that the Department considered and rejected intermediate sanctions before seeking revocation and why intermediate sanctions were not appropriate.

Marriage of Mohler

Docket: E071314(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 13, 2020

Judge: Raphael

Areas of Law: Family Law

The sole issue in this appeal was how to allocate the value of a Rancho Cucamonga residential property lived in by plaintiff-respondent Jodie Mohler and defendant-appellant Greg Mohler during their marriage. Greg entered the marriage owning a home that the parties lived in as spouses for over 12 years. The parties agreed that application of the "Moore/Marsden" rule through the date of their separation resulted in the community beneficially owning 33.66 percent of the property. However, by the time of their dissolution trial, the husband had lived in the property for more than six years post-separation, paying the mortgage with his separate income. At the wife’s request, the trial court found that the community’s interest in the property continued to increase throughout those years, just as if community funds had been used to pay the mortgage during that time, resulting in the community obtaining a 64.9 percent interest in the property. The Court of Appeal concluded that was error: the Moore/Marsden rule applied only insofar as community funds were used to build equity in an asset, a situation which often terminates, as it did here, upon separation. "Watts" charges equitably compensate the community for one spouse’s use of a community-owned home. Therefore, as a matter of first impression, the Court held Watts charges could be levied against a spouse for his or her post-separation occupation of a property where the property is not entirely community property, but rather was treated as partially community property due to the Moore/Marsden rule. The trial court's judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for the proper application of Moore/Marsden and calculation of any Watts charges.