Latest 4 Cases: Collins v. County of San Diego (Civil Procedure), Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Superior Court (Civil Procedure), ...

The Upside-Down Treatment of Religious Exceptions Cases in the Supreme Court

MICHAEL C. DORF

Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision last week to reject an emergency application from the State of Alabama to lift a stay on the execution of Willie B. Smith III. Professor Dorf observes the Court’s unusual alignment of votes in the decision and argues that, particularly as reflected by the recent COVID-19 decisions, the liberal and conservative Justices have essentially swapped places from the seminal 1990 case Employment Division v. Smith, which established that the First Amendment does not guarantee a right to exceptions from neutral laws of general applicability.

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Collins v. County of San Diego

Docket: D077063(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 17, 2021

Judge: Judith McConnell

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

Plaintiff-Respondent David Collins suffered serious injuries following his arrest by San Diego County Sheriff's Deputies for public intoxication. After a three-week trial, a jury found in favor of Collins on his negligence claims against the two deputies involved in the arrest and two nurses employed by the County of San Diego (County) who attended to Collins while in jail. On appeal from the subsequent judgment and the denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), the County raised five claims of error: (1) the jury’s finding that the deputies had a reasonable basis to arrest Collins foreclosed his claim of negligence against the deputies; (2) the court erred by instructing the jury it could find the deputies liable for injuries caused by private physicians who treated Collins after he was released from custody; (3) the court erred by failing to instruct the jury it could not hold defendants liable for an injury Collins sustained while in jail; (4) governmental immunity requires reversal of the judgment against one of the nurse defendants; and (5) the court erred in its calculation of the amount of setoff the defendants were entitled to based on Collins’s prior settlement with the private physicians and their employer. The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments and affirmed the judgment.

Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Superior Court

Docket: A160523(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 17, 2021

Judge: Burns

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

Fragoza filed suit under the Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code 2698) in Alameda County Superior Court, alleging that she formerly worked for Crestwood in Solano County and that Crestwood systematically violates the Labor Code at its treatment centers located throughout California by neglecting to properly compensate non-exempt employees for all hours worked; failing to provide accurate and itemized wage statements; failing to allow non-exempt employees to take rest/meal breaks or to pay premiums for missed breaks; and failing to timely pay wages owed on termination. She sought civil penalties (Lab. Code 2699(a), (f)) on behalf of the state and aggrieved Crestwood employees. Crestwood moved to transfer venue to Sacramento County (where its principal place of business is located), arguing that venue is not proper in Alameda County because Fragoza worked only in Solano County. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Alameda County is a proper venue under either Code of Civil Procedure section 3931 or section 395.5 because Crestwood is a corporation and operated two facilities in Alameda County, which “is a county 'where the obligation or liability arises.” The court of appeal denied Crestwood mandamus relief. The allegations regarding Fragoza’s employment with Crestwood are necessary to establish standing, not venue.

California v. Valliant

Docket: G058568S(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 17, 2021

Judge: Goethals

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Alexander Valliant petitioned to recall his sentence and be resentenced pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.91(b), a statute which authorized such relief for military veterans who suffered from military-related trauma and substance abuse, and who did not have those factors considered as mitigating factors when they were originally sentenced. The trial court denied his petition on the basis that section 1170.91(b)(1)(B) authorized resentencing relief only for persons who were sentenced before January 1, 2015. On its face, this provision did not apply to Valliant who was sentenced in March of 2015. Valliant argued to the Court of Appeal the trial court erred in its interpretation of subdivision (b)(1)(B), contending the subdivision extended resentencing relief to all veterans whose military-related trauma was not considered at their initial sentencing, without regard to when that sentencing took place. Valliant suggested this broad construction was the only reasonable interpretation of subdivision (b)(1)(B), while amicus claimed the language was “poorly drafted” and ambiguous, and urged the Appellate Court to resolve the purported ambiguity by examining the statute’s purpose and legislative history. The Court affirmed the order, finding (b)(1)(B) unambiguously specified its resentencing relief was limited to cases in which “[t]he person was sentenced prior to January 1, 2015.” It further specified that “[t]his subdivision shall apply retroactively, whether or not the case was final as of January 1, 2015.”

People v. Dryden

Docket: H043029(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 17, 2021

Judge: Grover

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2013, Dryden, 51 years old, homeless, and intoxicated, had an altercation with several young men. He used a bamboo stick in the fight and was charged with two counts of assault with a deadly weapon. The information alleged three prior felony convictions under the Three Strikes law; three prior serious felony convictions; and two prior prison terms. A jury convicted Dryden of the assaults; the court found true the prior convictions, denied a motion to reduce the counts to misdemeanors and to strike the prior convictions in the interest of justice, and imposed sentences of 25 years to life consecutive to 15 years. The court of appeal reversed. The denial of Dryden’s motion to strike his prior convictions and the strict application of the Three Strikes law resulted in a sentence so out of proportion to the offenses as to be an abuse of discretion. The trial court also abused its discretion admitting 2007 and 2012 uncharged acts but the court of appeal found no due process violation and that the errors were harmless and not cumulatively prejudicial. The court found no ineffective assistance of counsel and no abuse of discretion in the denial of Dryden’s request to reduce the convictions to misdemeanors. On remand, the court should implement sentencing reforms enacted during the pendency of Dryden's appeal affecting the enhancements.