Before She Died, “Jane Roe” Said She Was Never Really Pro-Life: Does It Matter?

MICHAEL C. DORF

Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on the revelation that before she died, Norma McCorvey—the woman who was the plaintiff in Roe v. Wade and who had subsequently become a prominent spokesperson for overturning the decision—said she was never really pro-life after all. Using this example, Dorf explains why, in some ways, the individual plaintiff’s identity does not matter for the purpose of deciding an important legal issue, yet in other ways, the plaintiff’s underlying story can be very important for other reasons.

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Dees v. County of San Diego

Dockets: 17-56621, 17-56710

Opinion Date: May 27, 2020

Judge: Dorothy Wright Nelson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

The county appealed the district court's post-verdict grant of judgment as a matter of law on Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims regarding the alleged seizure of a minor, L, by a social worker. Plaintiffs, L and her mother, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on their Fourteenth Amendment claims regarding the county's false letter allegedly impairing their right to familial association. The Ninth Circuit held that this circuit's precedent requires that, to establish a Fourteenth Amendment claim based on a minor being separated from his or her parents, plaintiffs must establish that an actual loss of custody occurred; the mere threat of separation or being subject to an investigation, without more, is insufficient. In this case, plaintiffs' allegations failed to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation. Furthermore, mother's allegation that her Fourteenth Amendment familial association right was violated as a result of L's 5-minute seizure at her school also failed to establish a claim given that she never actually lost control over L. The panel also held that substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict in favor of the county on L's Fourth Amendment claim arising from the school seizure. The panel reversed the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs' respective Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims regarding the seizure; reversed the district court's conditional grant of a new trial to mother on her seizure claim; affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the county employees on plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claims involving the false letter; and affirmed the district court's conditional grant of a new trial on L's Fourth Amendment claim.

United States v. Grey

Docket: 18-50328

Opinion Date: May 27, 2020

Judge: Tashima

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence. The panel held that where, as here, law enforcement officers are asked to assist in the execution of an administrative warrant authorizing the inspection of a private residence, they violate the Fourth Amendment when their "primary purpose" in executing the warrant is to gather evidence in support of a criminal investigation rather than to assist the inspectors. The panel need not address defendant's argument that the warrant itself was invalid under state law nor whether LASD exceeded the scope of the warrant. The panel only held that the LASD's execution was unreasonable and thus the district court properly granted defendant's motion to suppress.

Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Department of the Interior

Docket: 18-16830

Opinion Date: May 27, 2020

Judge: Ronald Murray Gould

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Gaming Law, Government & Administrative Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the Secretary's issuance, under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), of Secretarial Procedures which authorize the North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians to operate class III gaming activities on a parcel of land in Madera, California. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary and intervenor. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part as to plaintiffs' Johnson Act claim, holding that Secretarial Procedures are an exception to the prohibitions of the Johnson Act and thus they comply with the Administrative Procedure Act. The panel vacated and remanded in part as to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) claim, holding that the IGRA does not categorically bar application of NEPA because the two statutes are not irreconcilable and do not displace each other, and because a contrary result would contravene congressional intent and common sense. Finally, the panel vacated and remanded in part as to the Clean Air Act (CCA) claim, holding that Secretarial Procedures are categorically exempt from the CAA's requirement of a conformity determination.

Club One Casino, Inc. v. Bernhardt

Docket: 18-16696

Opinion Date: May 27, 2020

Judge: Murguia

Areas of Law: Gaming Law, Government & Administrative Law, Native American Law

Plaintiff cardrooms, filed suit challenging the Secretary's approval of a Nevada-style casino project on off-reservation land in the County of Madera, California by the North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians, a federally recognized tribe. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department and Secretary. The Ninth Circuit held that the Tribe's jurisdiction over the Madera Parcel operates as a matter of law and the Tribe clearly exercised governmental power when it entered into agreements with local governments and enacted ordinances concerning the property; because neither the Enclave Clause nor 40 U.S.C. 3112 are implicated here, neither the State's consent nor cession is required for the Tribe to acquire any jurisdiction over the Madera Parcel; and the Indian Reorganization Act does not offend the Tenth Amendment because Congress has plenary authority to regulate Indian affairs. Therefore, the Secretary's actions were not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.