New York Sues the Trump Administration Over “Trusted Traveler” Eligibility

MICHAEL C. DORF

Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf comments on New York’s lawsuit against the federal government over the Department of Homeland Security’s decision to exclude New York residents from eligibility for Trusted Traveler programs. Dorf describes some of the interesting legal questions the lawsuit raises in terms of administrative law, judicial standing, and constitutional law.

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DH-1, LLC v. City of Falls City

Citation: 305 Neb. 23

Opinion Date: February 14, 2020

Judge: Freudenberg

Areas of Law: Contracts

In this case concerning the interpretation of a contingency fee for legal services between the City of Falls City, Nebraska and two law firms, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that no fees were due under the agreement or on the firms' equitable claim and granting summary judgment for Falls City as to the claims under the fee agreement, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing both the contract and equitable claims. This appeal centered around a fee dispute between Falls City and the attorneys representing Falls City in prior litigation. The district court concluded that the contingency under the fee agreement was not met and that, thus, the first were not entitled to a fee under the agreement. The district court further concluded that the firms had no equitable rights to assert against Falls City. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no merit to the firms' claim that they were entitled to a fee under the agreement and that there was no merit to the firms' equitable claim.

Western Ethanol Co. v. Midwest Renewable Energy

Citation: 305 Neb. 1

Opinion Date: February 14, 2020

Judge: Funke

Areas of Law: Contracts

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying Midwest Renewable Energy, LLC's motion to quash execution of a judgment, holding that there was no merit in Midwest Renewable's appeal. In 2010, a judgment against Midwest Renewable, the judgment debtor in this case, was transcribed. This was the second appeal brought by Midwest Renewable challenging the ownership of that judgment. Midwest Renewable argued in the first appeal that the original judgment creditor, Western Ethanol, had no interest in the judgment because it had been assigned to Douglas Vind, the managing member of Western Ethanol who requested execution after Western Ethanol dissolved. Here Midwest Renewable argued that there was no valid assignment to Vind. The district court agreed, finding that the judgment had been assigned to Vind. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Midwest Renewable's assignments of error were without merit.

State v. Amaya

Citation: 305 Neb. 36

Opinion Date: February 14, 2020

Judge: Stacy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting the State's motion to dismiss Appellant's motion for DNA testing under the DNA Testing Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-4116 to 29-4125, holding that the district court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous, and the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the motion for DNA testing. Defendant entered no contest pleas to aiding and abetting second degree murder and aiding and abetting first degree sexual assault. Defendant later filed a motion seeking DNA testing of numerous items of evidence under the DNA Testing Act. The court authorized testing on four items of evidence. After receiving the DNA test results the State moved to dismiss the proceeding, alleging that the results neither exonerated nor exculpated Defendant. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly dismissed the proceeding.

State v. Jedlicka

Citation: 305 Neb. 52

Opinion Date: February 14, 2020

Judge: William B. Cassel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in sustaining Defendant's motion to quash an information for revocation of probation, holding that a probation violation allegation asserting a law violation from a new charge of possession of methamphetamine is not a "substance abuse" violation having a prerequisite of ninety days of cumulative custodial sanctions. Defendant was convicted of possession of methaphetamine. The court imposed a sentence of specialized substance abuse supervision probation. One of the conditions of probation required Defendant to "not use or possess any controlled substance." Eight months later, the State filed an information for revocation of probation alleging that Defendant intentionally possessed methamphetamine. Defendant moved to quash the information for revocation of probation, claiming that, under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-2267(3), revocation proceedings could not be instituted for a substance abuse violation because the State did not allege or show that she had served ninety days of cumulative custodial sanctions during the probation term. The Supreme Court sustained the State's exception and remanded the cause for further proceedings, holding that Defendant's alleged violation was not a substance abuse violation but a law violation, and therefore, the district court erred in quashing the information for revocation of probation.