Incorrigibility of the Juvenile Offender

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on a case the U.S. Supreme Court will consider this term that presents the question whether the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment prohibits sentencing a juvenile offender to life without the possibility of parole. Colb considers the wisdom and constitutionality of imposing such a sentence on a person who was under 18 at the time of his crime.

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Hassoun v. Searls

Docket: 20-2056

Opinion Date: September 22, 2020

Judge: Menashi

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Immigration Law

After the government removed petitioner from the United Stated, the removal mooted the government's appeal of the district court's order directing the government to release petitioner from immigration detention. The government now moves to dismiss the appeal as moot and requests vacatur of the district court's decisions related to 8 C.F.R. 241.14(d), a regulation that the government had invoked to detain petitioner. Petitioner opposes the government's request for vacatur and separately requests vacatur of the Second Circuit's opinion granting the government's motion for a stay pending appeal. The Second Circuit held that because the district court's decisions related to 8 C.F.R. 241.14(d) could have legal consequences in future litigation between the parties, those decisions should be vacated so that "the rights of all parties are preserved." However, this court's opinion granting the government's motion for a stay pending appeal does not warrant vacatur because it does not have legal consequences for the parties. The court held that a decision concerning a stay is not a final adjudication on the merits of an appeal and lacks preclusive effect. Therefore, the court denied petitioner's motion to vacate this court's opinion granting the government's motion for a stay pending appeal, granted the government's motion to vacate the district court's decisions related to section 241.14(d), dismissed the appeal as moot, and remanded with instructions to dismiss petitioner's challenge to his detention as moot.

Butcher v. Wendt

Docket: 19-224

Opinion Date: September 22, 2020

Judge: Raymond Joseph Lohier, Jr.

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the individual defendants conspired against him in arbitration and judicial proceedings arising out of an employee compensation dispute. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint based on failure to state a claim and declined to address the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to his claims. In this case, plaintiff's claims against Justice Farneti are barred by absolute judicial immunity; plaintiff's allegations of a corrupt agreement, which rest on rank speculation, are inadequate to support his conspiracy claims under RICO and section 1983; and plaintiff's allegations that the private defendants made false statements in their various filings and in the course of testifying in the arbitration and Article 75 proceedings cannot support a claim of a substantive RICO violation. Furthermore, the court stated that it may assume hypothetical statutory jurisdiction in order to resolve this appeal on the merits because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not implicate Article III jurisdiction. The court explained that doing so is particularly appropriate in this case, where the jurisdictional issue is both novel and arguably complex, while plaintiff's claims are plainly meritless.

United States v. Kosinski

Docket: 18-3065

Opinion Date: September 22, 2020

Judge: Korman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of two counts of insider trading in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b–5. The court held that defendant had a duty to refrain from trading on nonpublic inside information and that the evidence was sufficient to convict him. In this case, defendant served as a principal investigator for a clinical trial of a cardiac drug developed by Regado Biosciences, a publicly traded biopharmaceutical company, that was designed to prevent blood clotting. After defendant learned that patients suffered adverse effects during the trial, he traded on that nonpublic inside information to avoid a loss and earn a profit in the shares of the company. The court concluded that, taken together, the evidence of defendant's deceptive activity was sufficient for the jury to find that he was a sophisticated investor that knew his actions were unlawful under the charge given by the district court. Finally, there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's evidentiary rulings.

Aleutian Capital Partners v. Pizzella

Docket: 17-3810

Opinion Date: September 22, 2020

Judge: Susan Laura Carney

Areas of Law: Immigration Law, Labor & Employment Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision affirming the Board's conclusion that Aleutian violated certain statutory and regulatory requirements governing the H-1B temporary foreign worker program, and order requiring Aleutian to pay back wages to two Program workers. The court held that agency regulations duly promulgated under the statute unambiguously require H-1B employers to make wage payments in "prorated installments," "no less often than monthly." Therefore, the court concluded that an employer's failure to satisfy this requirement constitutes a failure to comply with the Immigration and Nationality Act's overall "required wage obligation"—a conclusion that supports DOL's award of back wages to Employee Gangjee. The court declined to adopt the proposed limitations on DOL's investigatory authority by holding that DOL's investigation into an H-1B Program complaint may not exceed the specific allegations of misconduct made in that complaint. Rather, the court affirmed DOL's authority to investigate Aleutian's compliance with the H-1B Program's wage requirement as to Employee Horn, as well as to Gangjee. The court stated that such an inquiry was reasonably within the scope of DOL's investigative authority into the allegations made in Gangjee's complaint and is lawfully contemplated by Program regulations.