Latest 4 Cases: Heshejin v. Rostami (Business Law), Gomez v. Smith (Civil Procedure), People v. Redus (Criminal Law)

Incorrigibility of the Juvenile Offender

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on a case the U.S. Supreme Court will consider this term that presents the question whether the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment prohibits sentencing a juvenile offender to life without the possibility of parole. Colb considers the wisdom and constitutionality of imposing such a sentence on a person who was under 18 at the time of his crime.

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Heshejin v. Rostami

Docket: B297037(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 22, 2020

Judge: Feuer

Areas of Law: Business Law, Civil Procedure

Plaintiffs' second amended complaint alleged derivative causes of action on behalf of ALI against AIG for conspiracy to commit fraud, fraud by concealment, breach of fiduciary duty, declaratory relief, conversion, and accounting. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order of dismissal entered as to the AIG defendants after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the AIG defendants' demurrer to plaintiffs' second amended complaint. The court held that, although plaintiffs' appeal is timely, their derivative claims are barred by the compulsory cross-complaint rule under Code of Civil Procedure section 426.30, subdivision (a). In this case, ALI may not assert against AIG the related causes of action not pleaded in the AIG v. Mahdavi action. Because ALI is barred from asserting the related causes of action against AIG, so are plaintiffs. The court explained that, because plaintiffs stand in the shoes of ALI in seeking redress for ALI's injuries, they are generally subject to the procedural rules that would apply to ALI as plaintiff in a direct action. The court stated that it would be inequitable to AIG to allow plaintiffs to assert claims ALI failed to assert by compulsory cross-complaint in the earlier-filed action, subjecting AIG to the precise piecemeal litigation section 426.30 was designed to prevent.

Gomez v. Smith

Docket: C089338(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 22, 2020

Judge: Ronald B. Robie

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Trusts & Estates

Frank Gomez and plaintiff Louise Gomez rekindled their love over 60 years after Frank broke off their first engagement because he was leaving to serve in the Korean War. Frank’s children from a prior marriage, defendants Tammy Smith and Richard Gomez, did not approve of their marriage. After Frank fell ill, he attempted to establish a new living trust with the intent to provide for Louise during her life. Frank’s illness unfortunately progressed quickly. Frank’s attorney, Erik Aanestad, attempted to have Frank sign the new living trust documents the day after Frank was sent home under hospice care. Aanestad unfortunately never got the chance to speak with Frank because Tammy and Richard intervened and precluded Aanestad from entering Frank’s home. Frank, who was bedridden, died early the following morning. Louise sued Tammy and Richard for intentional interference with expected inheritance, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and elder abuse. Tammy filed a cross-complaint against Louise for recovery of trust property. A trial court issued a statement of decision finding in favor of Louise as to her intentional interference with expected inheritance cause of action and in favor of Tammy and Richard as to the remaining causes of action. The trial court also ruled against Tammy on her cross-complaint. Tammy appealed the judgment in favor of Louise; she did not appeal the trial court’s ruling with regard to her cross-complaint. Tammy argued the judgment should have been reversed because: (1) Louise admitted she did not expect to receive an inheritance; (2) Tammy’s conduct was not tortious independent of her interference; (3) the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in its capacity analysis; (4) there is no substantial evidence to support the finding that Frank had the capacity to execute the trust documents; (5) the trial court’s finding that Tammy knew Louise expected an inheritance is contradicted by the evidence; and (6) alternatively, the constructive trust remedy is fatally ambiguous. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed.

People v. Redus

Docket: A157368(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 22, 2020

Judge: Kline

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Redus was committed to the Department of State Hospitals in 1975, after being found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) of murder in the stabbing death of his common-law wife. In July 2017, the San Francisco County District Attorney filed a petition under Penal Code 1026.5 to extend Redus’s civil commitment for two years. In 2019, the court found that the petition had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and ordered Redus’s commitment extended until December 2019. On appeal, Redus argued that substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that his mental illness causes him serious difficulty controlling potentially dangerous behavior, and double jeopardy principles preclude retrial or further commitment extensions and that the commitment extension order must be reversed because the trial court failed to advise him of his right to a jury trial and to ensure that he knowingly, intelligently, and unconditionally waived that right. The court of appeal found the appeal moot. Redus’s most recent commitment extension has now expired. Redus’s substantial evidence claim is, however, an issue that is likely to recur, but evade review. The court stated that its analysis may be relevant as guidance in future proceedings related to Redus’s potential recommitment. The court concluded that the evidence did not provide the required link between Redus’s ongoing mental illness and his purported difficulty in controlling his potentially dangerous behavior.

Doe v. Google, Inc.

Docket: A157097(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 22, 2020

Judge: Tucher

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law

The defendants require their employees to comply with various confidentiality policies. Current and former employees sued under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, 2698), alleging the employers’ confidentiality policies restricted their employees’ speech in violation of California law. The claims fall into three subcategories; restraints of competition, whistleblowing, and freedom of speech. The trial court dismissed, concluding the claims were preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151. In a settlement in a separate NLRB proceeding, defendant Google agreed to post a notice informing employees that they had the right “to discuss wages, hours, and working conditions,” and that “Google would “NOT prohibit [employees] from discussing or sharing information relating to [their] performance, salaries, benefits, discipline, training, or any other terms and conditions of employment.” The court of appeal reversed. Although many of the’ claims relate to conduct that is arguably within the scope of the NLRA, the claims fall within the local interest exception to preemption. The complaint does not mention union organizing or other concerted activity; it alleges violations of state law that can be proven without considering whether the actions violated the NLRA. The statutes protecting competition, whistleblowing, and free speech fit comfortably within California’s historic police powers and address conduct affecting individual employees, as distinct from the NLRA’s focus on concerted activity. This state-court action poses no threat to the NLRA’s exercise of its own jurisdiction.