Latest 4 Cases: Hinojos v. State Farm Lloyds (Contracts), In re State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (Contracts), Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v. ...

The Dreadful Failure of Lethal Injection

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost and Associate Dean of the Faculty and Professor of Jurisprudence & Political Science at Amherst College—comments on the decomposition of the legal injection paradigm over the past few decades, since it was first adopted in Oklahoma in 1999. Professor Sarat observes the evolution of the procedure over time and points out that none of the changes has resolved lethal injection’s fate or repaired its vexing problems.

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JOANNA L. GROSSMAN

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman comments on a Texas bill that would allow teens to access birth control without parental involvement. Professor Grossman describes the current state of reproductive health laws and policies in Texas and explains why the proposed bill is so important.

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Hinojos v. State Farm Lloyds

Docket: 19-0280

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Bland

Areas of Law: Contracts, Insurance Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Insurer in this insurance dispute, holding that payment of an appraisal award does not absolve the insurer of statutory liability when an insurer accepts a claim but pays only the part of the amount it owed within the statutory deadline for payment. Homeowner reported a claim to Insurer for damage to his home. Insurer accepted Homeowner's claim and paid part of it before the statutory deadline. Dissatisfied with the amount, Homeowner sued, seeking full payment of the claim plus interest and attorney's fees under the Teas Prompt Payment of Claims Act, Tex. Ins. Code Chapter 542. While the suit was pending but after the statutory deadline had passed, Insurer invoked the policy's appraisal process, and the appraised awarded Homeowner more than Insurer paid. Insurer paid the difference then moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Insurer did not pay the amount that "must be paid" before the statutory deadline, it was not entitled to summary judgment.

In re State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.

Docket: 19-0792

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Blacklock

Areas of Law: Contracts, Insurance Law

In these original proceedings arising from suits by holders of underinsured motorist (UIM) insurance seeking recovery against their insurers following traffic accidents the Supreme Court held that insureds who bring only Insurance Code claims seeking policy benefits as damages must also succeed in an initial "car crash" trial in order to lay the predicate for their statutory claims. Following traffic accidents, holders of UIM insurance sought recovery against their insurers. The insureds, however, did not sue for breach of their insurance companies and brought only extracontractual Insurance Code Claims. In both cases, State Farm filed motions for bifurcated trial under Rule 174(b). After the trial courts denied State Farm's motions, State Farm petitioned for mandamus relief. In response, Petitioners argued that because they brought only statutory claims and because there were no breach of contract claims to try first, no bifurcation of trial was required. The Supreme Court granted mandamus relief, holding that although Petitioners' claims were not labeled breach of contract Petitioners nevertheless just establish State Farm's liability under their insurance policies as a prerequisite to recovery on their Insurance Code claims.

Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v. TRO-X, L.P.

Docket: 18-0983

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Debra Lehrmann

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Real Estate & Property Law

In this second action arising out of a joint effort by TRO-X, L.P. and Eagle Oil & Gas Co. to acquire and sell oil-and-gas the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Eagle, holding that Eagle did not conclusively establish the affirmative defenses that were the basis of its summary judgment motion. In its first suit, TRO-X alleged that Eagle deprived TRO-X of its right to acquire its share of mineral leases that Eagle retained as part of the leases' sale. The court of appeals determined that TRO-X had not been deprived of equitable title to those interests because TRO-X had always held them. In this second suit, TRO-X claimed that Eagle failed to remit its share of income generated from production on the interests that commenced after the first trial's conclusion. The trial court granted summary judgment for Eagle, and the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Eagle did not conclusively establish the affirmative defenses of res judicata, statute of limitations, or waiver.

In re Panda Power Infrastructure Fund, LLC

Docket: 18-0792

Opinion Date: March 19, 2021

Judge: Jeffrey S. Boyd

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law

The Supreme Court dismissed these two petitions - one for writ of mandamus and the other for review - arising from a lawsuit that thirteen Panda Power companies (collectively, Panda) filed against the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Inc. (ERCOT), holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitions. Panda sued ERCOT and three of its officers for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. ERCOT filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the Public Utility Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over Panda's claims. The trial court denied the motion. ERCOT appealed and, as an alternative, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that sovereign immunity barred Panda's claims. The court of appeals (1) dismissed ERCOT's interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that ERCOT was not a governmental unit under the Tort Claims Act; but (2) granted ERCOT's mandamus petition, holding that sovereign immunity applied and barred Panda's claims. The Supreme Court dismissed both the mandamus petition and the petition for review, holding that the trial court's entry of a final judgment rendered this causes arising from the interlocutory order moot.