Rethinking Retroactivity in Light of the Supreme Court’s Jury Unanimity Requirement

MICHAEL C. DORF

In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision Monday in Ramos v. Louisiana, in which it held that the federal Constitution forbids states from convicting defendants except by a unanimous jury, Cornell law professor Michael C. Dorf discusses the Court’s jurisprudence on retroactivity. Dorf highlights some costs and benefits of retroactivity and argues that the Court’s refusal to issue advisory opinions limits its ability to resolve retroactivity questions in a way that responds to all the relevant considerations.

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Huff v. Brown

Citation: 305 Neb. 648

Opinion Date: April 23, 2020

Judge: Lindsey Miller-Lerman

Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the district court's order granting in part a writ of mandamus requiring Doug Brown, the sheriff of Furnas County, to provide records to Herchel Huff pursuant to the public records statutes, holding that the district court erred when it determined that Huff had shown that Brown had a clear duty to provide the requested records. Huff, an inmate, sought, among other documents, the criminal history records of jurors who had convicted hims. Furnas County sheriff Kurt Kapperman required a deposit of $750 before fulfilling the request. Huff subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandamus naming Kapperman as the defendant and seeking an order compelling Kapperman to release all requested documents. The court permitted Huff to substitute Brown, the current sheriff, in the caption of the case in place of Kapperman and granted in part mandamus. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err when it substituted Brown's name for Kapperman's; but (2) erred in issuing mandamus because Huff failed to demonstrate a prima facie case that he had been denied a request for public records that the sheriff had a clear duty to provide under Neb. Rev. Stat. 84-712.

Schaefer Shapiro, LLP v. Ball

Citation: 305 Neb. 669

Opinion Date: April 23, 2020

Judge: William B. Cassel

Areas of Law: Consumer Law, Contracts

In this case where a judgment creditor sought to garnish the judgment debtor's bank account, which, at one time, contained funds both exempt and nonexempt from garnishment, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the county court finding that the bank account consisted solely of exempt funds, holding that funds exempt from garnishment remain exempt, even when commingled with nonexempt funds, so long as the source of exempt funds is reasonably traceable. Plaintiff obtained a judgment against Defendant and sought to garnish Defendant's bank account. The court ordered that the non-exempt funds in the account be transferred to the court. Defendant requested a hearing, asserting that the funds were exempt from garnishment because the only funds in the account were Social Security payments. Plaintiff stated that at one point the account held non-exempt funds commingled with the Social Security funds but that the non-exempt funds had been spent. The county court ruled that the funds were exempt. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant met his burden to prove that the remaining funds in his account constituted exempt Social Security funds.

In re Application No. C-4973 of Skrdlant

Citation: 305 Neb. 635

Opinion Date: April 23, 2020

Judge: Lindsey Miller-Lerman

Areas of Law: Energy, Oil & Gas Law, Government & Administrative Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeals from orders of the Nebraska Public Service Commission (PSC) that granted applications requesting changes to existing boundaries so that the applicants could receive advanced telecommunications services from another service provider in lieu of service from Appellant, holding that Appellant's notices of intention to appeal were not timely filed with the PSC. The PSC entered orders in both cases on July 10, 2018. Appellant subsequently submitted motions for rehearing requesting that the PSC reconsider its orders. Each motion was file stamped as having been received by the PSC on July 23. On August 21, the PSC entered orders denying the motions for rehearing. On September 13, in each case, Appellant filed a notice of intention to appeal with the PSC. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction, holding (1) based on the file stamps, the motions for rehearing were not filed within ten days of the effective date of the respective orders; (2) under Neb. Rev. Stat. 75-134.02, the motions did not suspend the time for filing a notice of intention to appeal; and (3) therefore, Appellant's notices of intention to appeal were filed beyond the thirty-day time limit allowed under section 75-136(2) to perfect appeals from the July 10 orders.

Jones v. Jones

Citation: 305 Neb. 615

Opinion Date: April 23, 2020

Judge: Stacy

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals finding sufficient evidence to support modifying legal custody of the minor child in this case but not physical custody, holding that the court of appeals erred in finding that Father did not prove a material change in circumstances justifying modification of physical custody. Upon their divorce, Mother was awarded legal and physical custody of the child. The court later entered a modified decree awarding the parties joint legal and physical custody. Father then filed the instant complaint to modify, alleging that there had been a material change in circumstances warranting a change in the joint custody arrangement. After a trial, the court gave Father physical custody subject to Mother's parenting time and found it unnecessary to modify the parties' joint legal custody. The court of appeals found insufficient evidence to warrant modifying physical custody but sufficient evidence to modify legal custody. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Mother's continuous unemployment and chronic housing instability was a material change in circumstances that affected the child's best interests, and the district court's custody arrangement was in the child's best interests.