The Oprah Interview as a Truth Commission

LESLEY WEXLER

Illinois Law professor Lesley Wexler explains how Oprah’s interview with Prince Harry and Meghan Markle might illuminate how a formal truth commission to deal with legacies of racism and colonialism might function in the British empire. Professor Wexler describes the purpose and function of state-operated truth commissions and notes the similarities and differences between those and the interview.

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Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc.

Docket: B298003(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 9, 2021

Judge: Wiley

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics

After plaintiff filed suit against defendant and won a judgment for $133,792.11 plus postjudgment interest, plaintiff sought attorney fees of $271,530, which were later increased to $287,640 in the trial court and now to $292,140 in this court. The trial court awarded $90,000 in attorney fees. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award of attorney fees, concluding that the trial court used sound discretion to limit the attorney fees to $90,000. The trial court began with the conventional lodestar calculation and gave good reasons for concluding that 600 plus hours was reasonable. However, the court reversed the trial court's ruling that plaintiff had no basis to collect the $90,000 award from an insurance company called Wesco that had posted a surety bond for defendant. Rather, the court concluded that the liability of the surety is commensurate with the liability of its principal. In this case, by statute, the court concluded that defendant must pay the attorney fees as a matter of costs and so too must Wesco. Accordingly, the court remanded for the trial court to amend the judgment to make surety Wesco liable for the $90,000 fee award as an item of costs.

People v. Washington

Docket: B296437(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 9, 2021

Judge: Nora M. Manella

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of three controlled substances while armed with a firearm, possession of the three controlled substances for sale, possession of a firearm as a felon, and possession of ammunition as a felon. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of appellant's prior conviction for possession for sale of cocaine base; nor did Evidence Code section 352 compel exclusion of the evidence; the evidence was sufficient to prove that appellant had knowledge of the narcotics found in the garage; and, having reviewed the sealed portion of the search warrant affidavit, the court found no error in the trial court's denial of appellant's motions to unseal, quash, and traverse the search warrant and to suppress all evidence found during the search of the garage. However, defendant's sentence violates Penal Code section 654's proscription against multiple punishments for a single act. The court explained that, under People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, and its progeny, appellant's single possession of each item of contraband (methamphetamine, cocaine, cocaine base, and the firearm) constituted a single act, subject to only one punishment. Therefore, appellant's unstayed sentences for possessing controlled substances while armed imposed additional punishment for the same acts punished by his sentences for possession of the substances for sale and the possession of a firearm by a felon. Accordingly, appellant's sentence was unauthorized and the court vacated it, remanding for resentencing. The court otherwise affirmed.

Coachella Valley Water Dist. v. Super. Ct.

Docket: E074010(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 9, 2021

Judge: Slough

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law

The tax at issue in this case related to the State Water Project ("SWP"): California’s vast system of storage and conveyance facilities designed to provide water to its millions of residents and farmers. In 2013, the Coachella Valley Water District (the water district) passed a resolution adopting a two-cent increase to the rate of its ad valorem property tax, which the water district levies annually to satisfy its contractual financial obligations to the SWP. In 2018, Randall Roberts filed a lawsuit against the water district and the County of Riverside, seeking to invalidate the tax under the Burns-Porter Act of 1960, and the California Constitution, and to obtain a refund. The water district demurred, arguing the entire action was time-barred because Roberts was required under the validation statutes to present his claims in a “reverse validation action” no later than 60 days after the water district adopted the tax, which it does annually by resolution. The trial court concluded the validation statutes did not apply to the SWP tax and overruled the demurrer. The Court of Appeal concurred with the water district that the validation statutes applied to the SWP tax by operation of the County Water District Law, which made the validation statutes applicable to any action to determine the validity of a county water district's "assessment" (and defined a property tax as an "assessment").

Husain v. California Pacific Bank

Docket: A159067(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: March 9, 2021

Judge: Richman

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Willow property, south of the Apartments, contains a duplex, a concrete parking area, and a large undeveloped area in the rear. In 1964 the then-owners of both properties obtained a variance from Burlingame that allowed four off-site parking spaces for the Apartments to be located on the Willow property. They never expanded the Apartments as planned. The variance became void. The properties changed hands several times, remaining jointly owned. In 2005, both properties were acquired by Shiheiber, who allowed tenants of the Apartments to use the Willow property for access, parking, storage of garbage, and recreational purposes. In 2011, the properties ceased to be under common ownership. The Bank took title to the Apartments; Husain took title to Willow, aware that the Bank claimed a prescriptive easement. Tenants in the Apartments continued to use the Willow property. Husain sued the Bank to quiet title. The Bank cross-complained for a prescriptive easement. The trial court entered judgment for the Bank. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the use of the Willow property was permissive. The Bank never requested or received permission to use the Willow property, and simply used the property in a manner that was open, notorious, continuous, and hostile for more than five years.