Latest 4 Cases: Lee v. Kotyluk (Civil Procedure), People v. Choi (Criminal Law), Phelan Piñon Hills Community Services District v. California ...

One More for the Road: Why Congress Must Impeach Donald Trump (Again)

DEAN FALVY

Dean Falvy, a lecturer at the University of Washington School of Law in Seattle, makes the case for impeaching Donald Trump again, after the failed insurrection of January 6. Falvy describes three possible ways to disempower Trump from undermining democracy in our nation and explains why immediate impeachment by the House and removal by the Senate is the most appropriate course of action.

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Lee v. Kotyluk

Docket: G058631(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 7, 2021

Judge: Moore

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Landlord - Tenant

Plaintiffs Johnny Ki Lee and Un Joong Lee sought to evict a commercial tenant, defendant Sean Kotyluk, for selling marijuana without a license. They filed an unlawful detainer action against him based on Code of Civil Procedure section 1161 (3). Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine requesting judgment on the pleadings, claiming plaintiffs’ three-day notice (the notice) was defective because it was served on June 4, 2019, but plaintiffs had not become owners of the property until June 20, 2019. In response, plaintiffs explained that the prior owner of the property, Rosemarie Haynes, had served the notice before transferring ownership of the property to them. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings because the notice was issued prior to plaintiffs obtaining ownership of the property and because the notice failed to identify the party to whom defendant could return possession of the property. The court also denied plaintiffs leave to amend. Plaintiffs’ appeal raised two questions of first impression: (1) whether a property owner could file an unlawful detainer action based on a notice served by its predecessor in interest; and (2) did notice under section 1161 (3) have to identify a person to whom the tenant could turn over possession of the property if the tenant chose to quit? The Court of Appeal ruled: (1) nothing in the text of section 1161 prevented a successor owner from filing an unlawful detainer action, "nor does such a procedure undermine the purpose of the notice requirement in subdivision (3), which is primarily designed to give the tenant an opportunity to cure the breach and retain possession of the property;" and (2) identifying a specific person was not required by the statute: "Based on our reading of this subdivision, it appears the Legislature purposefully chose not to include such a requirement."

People v. Choi

Docket: B301093(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 7, 2021

Judge: Tricia A. Bigelow

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of three counts of stalking and two counts of criminal threats, and sentenced to seven years, which included two one-year prior prison enhancements under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). Defendant's conviction stemmed from his erratic and threatening behavior towards other students in his paralegal studies program. The Court of Appeal held that the evidence was sufficient to support the criminal threats counts; the trial court properly excluded one defense witness; and, despite the trial court's initial statement, the record reflects that it did exercise its discretion to deny defendant's request for advisory counsel based upon the characteristics of this defendant and this case. The court remanded for the trial court to strike the two one-year enhancements under Senate Bill No. 136 and to resentence defendant. The court also ordered a correction to the criminal conviction assessment in the abstract of judgment. The court affirmed in all other respects.

Phelan Piñon Hills Community Services District v. California Water Service Co.

Docket: F082094A(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 7, 2021

Judge: Rosendo Peña, Jr.

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Utilities Law

The Antelope Valley Groundwater Cases (AVGC) proceeding litigated whether the water supply from natural and imported sources, which replenishes an alluvial basin from which numerous parties pumped water, was inadequate to meet the competing annual demands of those water producers, thereby creating an "overdraft" condition. Phelan, which provides water to its customers who are located outside the Antelope Valley Adjudication Area (AVAA) boundaries, became subject to the AVGC litigation because a significant source of its water is pumping from a well (Well 14) located in the AVAA basin. The trial court's judgment and adopted Physical Solution concluded that, while Phelan held no water rights in the AVAA basin, Phelan could continue operating Well 14 to draw up to 1,200 afy to distribute to its customers outside the AVAA, on condition that Phelan's pumping causes no material harm to the AVAA basin and that Phelan pays a "Replacement Water Assessment" for any water it pumped for use outside the AVAA. The Court of Appeal concluded that substantial evidence supports the judgment as to Phelan; the trial court correctly rejected Phelan's claim that it had cognizable water rights as an appropriator for municipal purposes; Phelan was not deprived of its due process rights to present its claims; and the trial court did not err in rejecting Phelan's claim to return flows from native water it pumped from the AVAA basin. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment as to Phelan.

Nagel v. Westen

Docket: B300552(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 7, 2021

Judge: Steven Z. Perren

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

In the underlying action, plaintiffs filed suit against sellers after the house plaintiffs bought from sellers was uninhabitable based on extensive water intrusion. The arbitrator found that sellers had failed to disclose material facts regarding the water damage; found that the house was worthless and its only value was the land; and awarded plaintiffs over $4.5 million for the loss of the home, the futile efforts to repair it, plus attorney fees and costs. This appeal is from the subsequent lawsuit filed by plaintiffs to unwind sellers' transfers of their assets under the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA). The action was dismissed because plaintiffs could not identify a "third party transferee" who received sellers' assets. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order to the extent it dismissed plaintiffs' causes of action for statutory fraudulent transfer and the companion claims for conspiracy and aiding and abetting. The court concluded that plaintiff stated a cause of action for fraudulent transfer under the plain language of the UVTA, and that limiting the UVTA to third-party transfers would neither conform to legislative intent nor serve the public's interest. The court affirmed the order's dismissal of plaintiff's common law cause of action for fraudulent transfer.