Latest 4 Cases: Lorenzen v. Taggart (Bankruptcy), DaVita Inc. v. Amy's Kitchen, Inc. (ERISA), DaVita, Inc. v. Virginia Mason Memorial Hospital ...

In (Trial) Courts (Especially) We Trust

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, JASON MAZZONE

Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone describe the increasing importance of courts and lawyers in safeguarding and reinforcing the role of factual truths in our democracy. Dean Amar and Professor Mazzone point out that lawyers and judges are steeped in factual investigation and factual determination, and they call upon legal educators (like themselves) to continue instilling in students the commitment to analytical reasoning based in factual evidence, and to absolutely reject the notion that factual truth is just in the mind of the beholder.

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The Rhetoric About a “Decline” in Religious Liberty Is Good News for Americans

MARCI A. HAMILTON

Marci A. Hamilton, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania and one of the country’s leading church-state scholars, explains why the rhetoric about a “decline” in religious liberty actually signals a decline in religious triumphalism, and is a good thing. Professor Hamilton describes how religious actors wield the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) not as a shield, but as a sword to destroy the lives of fellow Americans.

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Lorenzen v. Taggart

Dockets: 16-35402, 16-60032, 16-60033, 16-60039, 16-60040, 16-60042, 16-60043

Opinion Date: November 24, 2020

Judge: Carlos T. Bea

Areas of Law: Bankruptcy

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's decision reversing the bankruptcy court's finding of civil contempt and vacating its award of civil contempt sanctions against a debtor's former business partners for violation of the discharge injunction. The Supreme Court explained that an objective, rather than subjective, standard is more appropriate in determining whether the Creditors could be held in civil contempt for violating the bankruptcy discharge injunction. Furthermore, "a court may hold a creditor in civil contempt for violating a discharge order if there is no fair ground of doubt as to whether the order barred the creditor's conduct." Applying this standard, the panel held that the Creditors had an objectively reasonable basis to conclude that debtor might have "returned to the fray" in the Oregon state court to obtain some economic benefit from a higher evaluation of the sale of his ownership stake in SPBC and in the amount of interest that had accrued after the date payment was due for the forced sale.

DaVita Inc. v. Amy's Kitchen, Inc.

Docket: 19-15963

Opinion Date: November 24, 2020

Judge: Susan Graber

Areas of Law: ERISA, Health Law

DaVita filed suit alleging that the Amy's Kitchen Employee Benefit Health Plan's dialysis provisions violate the Medicare as Secondary Payer provisions (MSP) of the Social Security Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), and state law. The district court dismissed the federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Reviewing de novo, the Ninth Circuit affirmed and agreed with the district court's conclusion that the Plan does not violate the MSP because it reimburses at the same rate for all dialysis services, regardless of underlying diagnosis and regardless of Medicare eligibility. The panel also held that DaVita may not bring equitable claims on behalf of Patient 1 under ERISA, because the assignment form the patient signed did not encompass an assignment of equitable claims.

DaVita, Inc. v. Virginia Mason Memorial Hospital

Docket: 19-35692

Opinion Date: November 24, 2020

Judge: Susan Graber

Areas of Law: Health Law

DaVita filed suit under the private cause of action under the Medicare Secondary Payer provisions (MSP), alleging that defendants reduced the payment amount for Patient 1's dialysis because of Medicare eligibility as soon as Patient 1 became eligible for Medicare, without waiting the mandatory thirty months. But the reduced payment amount remained greater than the Medicare rate, so Medicare never made any secondary payments. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the MSP's private cause of action is available only when Medicare has made a payment. Reviewing de novo, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erroneously dismissed the complaint on that ground. The panel explained that the statutory text, congressional purpose, and regulatory clues make clear that Congress did not intend payment by Medicare to be a prerequisite to bringing a private cause of action under the MSP. The private cause of action encompasses situations in which a primary plan impermissibly takes Medicare eligibility into account too soon, even if Medicare has not made any payments. Accordingly, the panel vacated in large part and remanded for further proceedings. The panel affirmed the district court's dismissal with respect to the 10-month period after Patient 1 dropped coverage under Virginia Mason's Plan.

Vega-Anguiano v. Barr

Docket: 15-72999

Opinion Date: November 24, 2020

Judge: William A. Fletcher

Areas of Law: Immigration Law

The Ninth Circuit filed (1) an order stating that the opinion, concurrence, and dissent filed November 19, 2019 are amended by the opinion, concurrence, and dissent filed concurrently with the order, and denying on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended majority opinion, concurrence, and dissent. In the amended opinion, the panel granted the petition for review of an ICE order reinstating petitioner's prior order of removal and held that that: (1) 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(1) establishes a thirty-day deadline for seeking review of reinstatement orders; (2) because petitioner timely challenged his reinstatement order, the court had jurisdiction to consider a collateral attack on his underlying removal order contending that the execution of that order resulted in a gross miscarriage of justice; (3) petitioner established a gross miscarriage of justice because his removal order lacked a valid legal basis when it was executed; and (4) there is no diligence requirement that limits the time during which such a collateral attack may be made.