An Important Second Circuit Ruling on Sanctuary Jurisdictions May Have Reached the Right Result, but En Route it Misread the Momentous Sebelius Supreme Court Ruling on Conditional Federal Funding to States

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois Law dean and professor Vikram David Amar comments on a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit regarding so-called “sanctuary” jurisdictions. Amar argues that while the Second Circuit may have arrived at the correct conclusion of law, it also misunderstood the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB v. Sebelius, in which the Court struck down the “Medicare expansion” provision of the Affordable Care Act as unconstitutionally coercive. Amar points out that in Sebelius, the Court found the fact that the Medicare expansion provision of the ACA vitiated the terms of a preexisting deal was sufficient to hold that provision coercive.

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Wellfount, Corp. v. Hennis Care Centre of Bolivar, Inc.

Docket: 19-3777

Opinion Date: March 3, 2020

Judge: Gibbons

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

Wellfount, with its principal place of business in Indiana, contracted to provide services to Hennis nursing homes in Ohio. When the relationship soured, Wellfount sued Hennis in Indiana state court. Before Hennis filed a responsive pleading, Wellfount voluntarily dismissed its suit when Hennis questioned whether Indiana was a proper venue. The dismissal was without prejudice. Wellfount refiled in federal court. Hennis argued improper venue, based on a forum selection clause in the parties’ contract. Before Hennis filed a response, Wellfount moved for voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). Wellfount indicated that it planned to refile in Ohio state court. Hennis moved to convert Wellfount’s motion into a self-effectuating notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1). Hennis argued that no court order was necessary for Wellfount to dismiss its case because Hennis had yet to serve an answer or motion for summary judgment. Wellfount opposed Hennis’s motion; it sought a Rule 41(a)(2) court-ordered dismissal to avoid the claim-preclusive effect of Rule 41(a)(1)(B). The district court granted Wellfount’s motion, dismissing the case without prejudice. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; neither Rule 41(a)'s text nor the purpose of the Rule 41(a)(1)(B) two-dismissal clause indicate that a plaintiff is barred from seeking a court-ordered Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal if it is eligible to file a Rule 41(a)(1) notice of dismissal. The court rejected Hennis’s argument that allowing court-ordered dismissals at the earliest stages of a lawsuit will nullify the two-dismissal rule.

In re: Franklin

Docket: 19-6093

Opinion Date: March 3, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Franklin was convicted of arson (18 U.S.C. 844(i)), using a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c), possessing an unregistered firearm or destructive device; and possessing firearms while unlawfully using a controlled substance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In 2010, Franklin filed an unsuccessful 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. Franklin later sought authorization to file a second section 2255 motion, in which he would argue that his section 924(c) conviction should be vacated because his arson conviction no longer qualifies as a crime of violence under the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Davis” decision. The Sixth Circuit granted the petition. Davis established a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. Lower courts may determine the retroactivity of new rules when “[m]ultiple cases . . . necessarily dictate" retroactivity. The Supreme Court’s 2016 “Welch” decision explained that decisions announce a substantive rule and are retroactive when they “alter the range of conduct . . . that the law punishes.” In Davis, the Court narrowed section 924(c)(3), concluding that its second clause was unconstitutional. Arson under 18 U.S.C. 844(i) does not qualify as a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A) because it can be committed against a building, including one owned by the arsonist, Franklin’s section 924 conviction must have been based on section 924(c)(3)(B), which Davis invalidated.

Mays v. LaRose

Docket: 19-4112

Opinion Date: March 3, 2020

Judge: Nalbandian

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Election Law

Any Ohio registered voter may cast an absentee ballot, starting about a month before election day, but the state requires voters to request an absentee ballot by noon, three days before election day. The lone exception is for unexpectedly hospitalized electors, who may request an absentee ballot until 3 p.m. on election day. Police arrested the plaintiffs the weekend before election day 2018. Foreseeing their confinement through the upcoming election, they sued for access to absentee ballots on behalf of themselves and a class of similar individuals, with an Equal Protection claim, challenging the disparate treatment of hospital-confined and jail-confined electors, and a First Amendment claim. The trial court permitted the plaintiffs to vote in November 2018 but declined to extend that relief to the class. The district court then granted the plaintiffs summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The burden on the plaintiffs’ right to vote is intermediate, somewhere “between slight and severe.” They are not totally denied a chance to vote by Ohio’s absentee ballot deadlines, so the laws survive if the state’s justifications outweigh this moderate burden. The state identified several counties that do not have adequate resources to process late absentee ballot requests from unexpectedly jail-confined electors without foregoing other duties necessary to ensure the orderly administration of Ohio’s elections.

Siefert v. Hamilton County

Docket: 18-4179

Opinion Date: March 3, 2020

Judge: Siler

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Health Law

When the Sieferts’ child started experiencing suicidal thoughts, they took the teenager to Children’s Hospital near Cincinnati. After about a week, the Sieferts’ insurance company determined that Minor Siefert had no medical problems and denied further coverage. The Sieferts decided to bring their child home but the doctors and social workers resisted. For four weeks, the Sieferts wrangled with the hospital and county about getting their child back. Only after the Sieferts signed a voluntary safety plan did the child leave the facility. The Sieferts sued the county, its employees, the hospital, and its doctors, alleging substantive and procedural due process violations. The district court dismissed the hospital and county defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. The Sieferts adequately pled procedural due process violations “[e]ven a temporary deprivation of physical custody requires a hearing within a reasonable time.” The issue of their consent was not appropriate for summary judgment. The hospital may be considered a state actor in these circumstances. Children’s and Hamilton County worked together, collaborating and communicating about Minor Siefert’s situation. Rejecting substantive due process claims, the court stated that the defendants’ opting to err on the side of protecting the child at the expense of depriving the parents of their parental rights for a month is not conduct that shocks the conscience. The Sieferts’ claims against the county entities must fail under “Monell.”