| United States v. Delarosa Arias |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 19-1572 Opinion Date: November 9, 2020 Judge: Boudin Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, entered pursuant to a guilty plea, holding that the district court did not err in accepting Defendant's plea. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court failed to determine that there was a factual basis for his guilty plea, as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). The First Circuit disagreed, holding that Defendant's admission to participating in a conspiracy that involved at least one other person provided a reasoned basis to believe that he was guilty of conspiracy and that Defendant could not show that the district court's acceptance of his plea prejudiced him. |
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| United States v. Ramos |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 19-4373 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Richard J. Sullivan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's 24-month sentence following a violation of supervised release, holding that calculation of the term of imprisonment under USSG 7B1.1(a)(1)(B) includes state law enhancements that increase the maximum penalty for recidivists. Therefore, defendant's crime of second-degree manslaughter was "punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding twenty years" – a Grade A violation under section 7B1.1(a)(1)(B). The court also concluded that the district court did not err in calculating the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, and disagreed with defendant's assertions that the district court committed other procedural errors during the sentencing hearing. In this case, defendant's procedural challenges essentially reduce down to two main points: the district court based its sentencing decision on improper evidence and the district court primarily sentenced her based on the severity of her state offense and not her breach of trust. The court concluded that neither of these arguments has merit. |
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| United States v. Anderson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-10963 Opinion Date: November 9, 2020 Judge: Leslie Southwick Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions for multiple counts of health care fraud and multiple counts of aggravated identity theft based on their submission of fraudulent insurance claims. Defendant Terry Anderson owned an optical and hearing aid business which employed his son, Defendant Rocky Anderson. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the health care fraud charges where a reasonable jury could conclude that defendants made implicit fraudulent representations, that they had the intent to defraud, or that their alleged false representations were material. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to support the aggravated identity theft convictions because there was sufficient evidence to support the underlying felony of health care fraud and there is direct or circumstantial evidence linking both Andersons to the clients in counts 12 through 15. |
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| United States v. Beaudion |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-30635 Opinion Date: November 11, 2020 Judge: Andrew S. Oldham Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute methamphetamine. In this case, the parties agree that the Government conducted a search when it used the GPS coordinates from Verizon to locate defendant's girlfriend's phone. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the "place searched" is limited to location information about defendant's girlfriend and that defendant does not have a Fourth Amendment property or privacy interest in that information. Therefore, defendant did not have Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision in Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), does not change the result. Even if defendant had standing to challenge the GPS search, the court held that he has failed to show that the search was unreasonable where the warrant clearly complies with the plain text of the Stored Communications Act. Finally, the court held that defendant never challenged the constitutionality of the traffic stop in the district court and offered no argument that the court should overlook his forfeiture under plain error review. |
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| United States v. Cooper |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-50119 Opinion Date: November 9, 2020 Judge: Jennifer Walker Elrod Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, holding that there is a sufficient factual basis to support the conviction. In this case, the record contains defendant's own admission that he possessed the firearm and the record also contains circumstantial evidence supporting defendant's advance knowledge, such as the presence of the firearm in defendant's car and the proximity of the gun to paraphernalia of drug distribution. Nevertheless, because the district court erroneously indicated that defendant pleaded guilty to the second superseding indictment, when in fact he pleaded guilty to the superseding indictment, the court remanded for correction of the judgment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. |
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| United States v. Frierson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-31048 Opinion Date: November 11, 2020 Judge: Jennifer Walker Elrod Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's concurrent, within-Guidelines sentences of 120 months for being a felon in possession of a firearm and 151 months for possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance. The court held that the district court did not err by applying the career offender enhancement because Louisiana R.S. 40:967 is divisible and, under the modified categorical approach, sufficiently narrow to serve as a predicate for a career offender sentence enhancement under section 4B1.1(a). Therefore, defendant's previous conviction under Louisiana R.S. 40:967 was a valid predicate offense for the sentence enhancement in this case. |
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| United States v. King |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-51094 Opinion Date: November 9, 2020 Judge: Stephen Andrew Higginson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for production of child pornography. The court held that the magistrate judge did not commit plain error during the plea colloquy; there was sufficient factual basis to satisfy the jurisdiction hook of 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and thus support defendant's conviction; the district court did not plainly err by applying three sentencing enhancements under USSG 2G2.1(b)(2)(A) ("sexual contact"); 2G2.1(b)(3) ("distribution"); and 2G2.1(b)(6)(B) ("use of a computer"); and defendant's facial challenge to section 2251(a)'s constitutionality is foreclosed. |
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| United States v. Clancy |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-6367 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Jeffrey S. Sutton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Clancy and a partner went to rob a Memphis store. Clancy wore a white hoodie, red pants with white letters, red shoes, a black mask, black gloves, and had a gun. His partner wore a black hoodie, black pants, a black mask, and also carried a gun. Clancy aimed his weapon and said: “You know what time it is.” Within seconds, shots rang out. The manager and another employee grabbed their guns and returned fire. The robbers fled. One employee was shot in the knee. Within 15 minutes of the robbery, a car arrived at the hospital. Two men dressed in black summoned an emergency technician, who found Clancy laying across the backseat with a gunshot wound. The other men left. Clancy wore a light-colored jacket, red pants with a white lettering, red shoes, and a black glove. Officers, walking into the emergency department, found Clancy, and saw his clothing on the floor, visible from the hallway. Crime scene investigators arrived and found Clancy’s bloodied clothes in a plastic bag. Clancy was convicted of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951, and use of a firearm related to a crime of violence, section 924(c). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the denial of a motion to suppress the clothing evidence, citing the plain-view doctrine. The court also upheld an instruction that required the jury to find that Clancy, “while being aided and abetted by others unknown,” used a firearm. |
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| United States v. Grant |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-3824 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Readler Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Federal prisoner Grant was detained at the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center NEOCC while awaiting sentencing for armed robbery. NEOCC, a privately owned and operated prison, contracts with the U.S. Marshals Service to house federal detainees before trial and/or sentencing. Grant punched a prison guard and ultimately pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. 111, which criminalizes assaulting federal officers and those who assist them. Grant contends that section 111 does not apply because the assault victim was a private contractor, not a federal employee, and, at the time of the assault, the contractor was not assisting a federal employee. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction. Section 111 encompasses circumstances where a private employee performs the same federal duties a federal employee would otherwise fulfill. |
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| United States v. Hall |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-5329 Opinion Date: November 10, 2020 Judge: Nalbandian Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Hall was convicted of 11 counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344(1), and one count of identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). During her trial, Hall admitted that she signed her children’s, niece’s, and sister’s names and altered her sister’s paystubs to obtain student loan money. She maintained that she thought all her actions did not violate the law and that her family members orally gave her permission to apply for the loans. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. Even if the indictment was duplicitous because it included both sections 1344(1) and (2) in each count related to one loan, rather than separating out section 1344(1) as one count for a particular loan and section 1344(2) as another count for that same loan, the government elected to rely on section 1344(1), and the district court only instructed on the elements for section 1344(1). Challenged statements made by the prosecutor were not so flagrant to merit reversal; the defense did not object to the remarks and overwhelming proof of guilt existed. |
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| United States v. Hogenkamp |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 20-1376 Opinion Date: November 6, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Hogenkamp pleaded guilty to a federal crime and was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment plus 25 years’ supervised release. Fourteen months before the anticipated end of his custodial time (April 2021), he asked the district court to modify the terms of his supervised release. The judge denied his motion as premature, suggesting that Hogenkamp wait until after his release to seek a change in those terms. The Seventh Circuit remanded. A prisoner is entitled to know, before he leaves prison, what terms and conditions govern his supervised release. Those terms govern where a person may live, with whom he may associate, and what jobs he may hold from the day he walks out of prison. Federal judges may alter the terms and conditions of supervised release at any time, 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(2). A district judge has the discretion to determine the apt time for decision—provided that a motion made a reasonable time in advance of release is resolved before supervised release begins--and to decide whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary. Hogenkam’s date is approaching; further delay in making a decision is appropriate only if the court has reason to think that better information will be available in the next few months. |
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| United States v. Mzembe |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 20-1265 Opinion Date: November 9, 2020 Judge: HAMILTON Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Mzembe and two others kidnapped another man, shot him, beat him, and held him for ransom, then abandoned him in an alley. Separate federal juries found the three men guilty of multiple federal crimes. Mzembe was sentenced to 44 years' imprisonment. Intervening changes in law required the Seventh Circuit to vacate the convictions under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for discharging a firearm in a crime of violence. Between Mzembe’s federal sentencing hearings, Mzembe was convicted in Indiana state court for crimes committed before the kidnapping and was sentenced to 62 years, consecutive to the federal sentence. The state sentence became final. Mzembe's Guidelines range for the remaining federal crimes was life in prison; he was sentenced to 36 years, to run consecutively. The court addressed mitigation evidence and said that a below-guideline sentence would be appropriate but said: I don’t know if I have the authority to run the sentences concurrent … if I do ... I don’t think it would be an appropriate exercise of my authority” because the state judge decided that the reasonable punishment for the state crime included consecutive sentencing. The written opinion stated: It is one thing for a federal court to modify a federal sentence in light of changes in federal law, but it would be a different thing for a federal court to restructure the state sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the judge gave an inadequate explanation for his decision, erred in deferring to the state court’s intervening judgment to make the sentences consecutive, and imposed an unreasonably severe sentence. |
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| United States v. King |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-50122 Opinion Date: November 6, 2020 Judge: Edward R. Korman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| On remand from the Supreme Court for further consideration in light of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), the Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The panel applied United States v. Johnson, 2020 WL 6268027 (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2020), and rejected defendant's Rehaif argument. In this case, as in Johnson, plain-error review applies when the defendant fails to challenge the district court's omission of the knowledge-of-status element now required under Rehaif. Furthermore, defendant's uncontroverted presentence report shows that he pleaded guilty to two felonies and served sentences of greater than one year for each. Therefore, defendant cannot prevail on plain error review. |
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| United States v. Robertson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 19-30237 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Richard G. Stearns Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit considered whether vacating the indictment against a criminal defendant ab initio following his death during the pendency of a certiorari petition to the Supreme Court requires vacation of an order issued under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) to make payments to reimburse in part the costs of his defense. After determining that the district court had jurisdiction to determine whether its CJA reimbursement order was within the scope of the abatement doctrine, the panel affirmed the district court's order on remand to enforce continuing obligations under the CJA reimbursement order. The panel held that the CJA reimbursement order is a final order not dependent in any way on defendant's conviction and is beyond the application of the abatement ab initio rule. The panel rejected claims of waiver and availability of funds under the CJA. |
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| United States v. Henry |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-1125 Opinion Date: November 10, 2020 Judge: Timothy M. Tymkovich Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant-appellant Floyd Henry, Jr. was convicted in the District of Minnesota, and after serving a term of imprisonment, absconded from the conditions of his supervised release. Henry's case was transferred to Colorado, and after a hearing for violations of supervision, the Colorado district court revoked his supervised release, sentenced him to 24 months imprisonment and a 120-month term of supervised release, and reimposed the special conditions initially imposed by the Minnesota court. The Colorado court indicated it could not change the special conditions another judge had imposed. Henry appealed the reimposition of the special conditions, arguing the district court erred by not making individualized assessments for them. The Tenth Circuit determined Henry failed to show this potential error justified vacating these special conditions. Thus, judgment was affirmed. |
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| United States v. Sanchez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-6034 Opinion Date: November 10, 2020 Judge: Timothy M. Tymkovich Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| This case arose from an eighteen-month investigation into a conspiracy to distribute large volumes of methamphetamine in Oklahoma City. The investigation culminated in a 125-count indictment charging ten individuals, including defendant-appellant Jose Sanchez. A jury would convict him of ten offenses relating to a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. On appeal, Sanchez argued the Tenth Circuit should have reversed his conviction because of a fatal variance between the conspiracy charged and the evidence presented at trial. According to Sanchez, while he bought drugs from members of the conspiracy on occasion, the evidence did not show he participated in the overarching drug conspiracy. The Tenth Circuit concluded that even if Sanchez was correct that a variance occurred here, it was not fatal: the evidence did not impair the jury's ability to evaluate the narrower conspiracy to which Sanchez was a party. Further, the Court affirmed the district court's sentence because the alleged drug calculation error had no effect on the sentence imposed. |
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| Ex parte Natasha Cunningham. |
| Court: Supreme Court of Alabama Docket: 1190187 Opinion Date: November 6, 2020 Judge: Sellers Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Natasha Cunningham petitioned for, and was granted, certiorari review of the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment holding that the offense of possession of a controlled substance was a lesser-included offense of the offense of distribution of a controlled substance. Cunningham's motion for judgment of acquittal as to the distribution-of-a-controlled-substance charge was granted because the evidence did not support that charge. Over Cunningham's objection, the circuit court instructed the jury on possession of a controlled substance as a lesser-included offense of distribution of a controlled substance. The jury returned a verdict finding Cunningham guilty of possession of a controlled substance. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the circuit court properly instructed the jury on the offense of possession of a controlled substance as a lesser-included offense of distribution of a controlled substance. As part of its analysis, the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that there could be circumstances in which a controlled substance could be distributed without a defendant being in actual or constructive possession of the substance. The court then reasoned that, because there was evidence indicting that Cunningham actually possessed a controlled substance, the jury was free to consider possession as a lesser-included offense of the charged offense of distribution. In reversing the appellate court's judgment, the Alabama Supreme Court found the indictment charging Cunningham with distribution did not include the statutory element of possession, nor did it allege any facts essential to the offense of possession of a controlled substance. Thus, under the facts of this case, because the indictment enumerated only the statutory language for the offense of distribution of a controlled substance, Cunningham was not given sufficient notice that she would have to defend against the offense of possession of a controlled substance. "We look to the indictment and must strictly construe it. To do otherwise would treat the proceedings in this case as if the terms of the indictment were so flexible as to imply a factual allegation that Cunningham was in possession of a controlled substance. To reach such a determination would require us to disregard the law." |
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| Collins v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 371 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Womack Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that no prejudicial error occurred during the proceedings below. Defendant was convicted of capital murder and aggravated assault. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict and in admitting autopsy photographs after he offered to stipulate the cause of death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported Defendant's conviction; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the autopsy photographs to aid the jury in understanding the nature and degree of the injuries the victims sustained and corroborated witness testimony. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the circuit court with directions to correct two clerical errors found in the sentencing order. |
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| Flow v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 370 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Wynne Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's pro se petition for a writ of error coram nobis, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief. Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1977), to second-degree sexual assault. In his coram nobis petition, Defendant argued that his guilty plea was coerced. The trial court denied issuance of the writ. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that the trial court did not clearly err when it gave greater weight to the testimony of Defendant's counsel and did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's petition for coram nobis relief. |
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| California v. Grant |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D076576(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Judith L. Haller Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Kenneth Grant admittedly stole merchandise from a Wilsons Leather outlet store. Everything there was sold at a discount (as evidenced by a “comparable value” the store displays on tags attached to each product). At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence showing that the cumulative comparable values of the stolen merchandise exceeded the $950 felony theft threshold. However, the prosecution introduced: (1) no evidence establishing that the comparable values represented the merchandise’s actual fair market values; and (2) evidence of actual sales prices for only a few of the stolen products (totaling about $265). Presumably relying on the comparable values, the jury found the value of the stolen merchandise exceeded $950, and convicted Grant of grand theft and burglary. The trial court sentenced him to three years in local custody. On appeal, Grant contended his grand theft conviction must be reduced to petty theft, and his burglary conviction had be reversed, because: (1) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding the definition of fair market value; (2) the trial court failed to instruct the jury regarding the distinction between burglary and misdemeanor shoplifting; and (3) substantial evidence did not support the finding that the value of the stolen merchandise exceeded $950. Even if the jury had been properly instructed, the Court of Appeal concluded its finding regarding the fair market value of the stolen merchandise was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court reduced Grant’s grand theft conviction to petty theft, reversed his burglary conviction, and remanded for resentencing. |
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| Kevin P. v. Superior Court |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A159680(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 6, 2020 Judge: Humes Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| Kevin was charged in juvenile court with a murder he allegedly committed at age 17. A contested hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(a)(1) lasted several days. The juvenile court was presented with evidence demonstrating both the heinousness of the crime and that Kevin was raised by a loving family, had no prior criminal history, suffered little past trauma, and had no significant psychological or behavioral issues. Kevin’s juvenile hall behavior was exemplary. The juvenile court concluded that Kevin was unfit for the juvenile system and transferred him to criminal court, acknowledging “a certain tragedy” in its ruling. The court of appeal remanded for reconsideration. The court’s findings regarding section 707’s gravity and criminal-sophistication criteria are supported by substantial evidence but the court improperly evaluated section 707’s rehabilitation criterion, which it deemed its “most significant” consideration. A court cannot determine a juvenile’s rehabilitative needs based solely on the gravity of the offense, and the standard seven-year parole consideration period that applies to juveniles committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice for murder does not establish a presumptive rehabilitation period. |
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| People v. Falcon |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B296392(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 9, 2020 Judge: Stratton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of defendant's petition seeking resentencing under Senate Bill 1437 under the theory that he entered a plea of no contest to avoid a conviction of first or second degree murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. In this case, the trial court found the record of conviction showed that defendant entered a plea to second degree murder as an aider and abettor to the actual shooter. The court held that the trial court did not err in finding defendant had failed to make a prima facie showing that he fell within the provisions of Penal Code section 1170.95. Although the court agreed with defendant that the trial court erred in relying on the records of his co-defendant, the court found that the error was harmless given that the evidence in the preliminary hearing transcript was virtually identical to the evidence at trial. The court explained that a sentence modification is not a criminal trial, but rather an act of lenity, and section 1170.95 is an act of lenity. In this case, if the trial court acted erroneously in declining to appoint counsel, that error does not constitute a violation of defendant's constitutional rights. |
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| People v. Johnson |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Dockets: B299044(Second Appellate District) , B302697(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 9, 2020 Judge: Kenneth R. Yegan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeal consolidated these cases and affirmed the orders denying defendants' petitions to vacate their first degree murder convictions and obtain resentencing under Senate Bill No. 1437, which added Penal Code section 1170.95. The court held that defendants cannot seek relief under the felony-murder provision of section 1170.95, because they were convicted of provocative act murder, not felony murder. The court also held that defendants are not eligible for relief under the natural and probable consequences provision of section 1170.95; Defendant Baker-Riley was the direct perpetrator of the crimes committed during the home-invasion robbery and he was also a direct perpetrator of the acts that provoked another individual to fire his gun; and Defendant Johnson, although he was an aider and abettor, was not convicted of murder pursuant to the natural and probable consequences doctrine but, rather, was convicted under the theory that a principle in the commission of the target crime had committed a nontarget crime that was a natural and probable consequence of the target crime. Finally, the court rejected Johnson's legislative intent argument and equal protection argument. |
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| People v. O'Hearn |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A158676(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 9, 2020 Judge: Kline Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics |
| Police responding to a report of O’Hearn acting erratically had previously dealt with him. They suspected O’Hearn had “mental health issues” but, after he threatened to kill his neighbors, they arrested O’Hearn for making criminal threats and violating conditions of probation. O’Hearn had four prior felony convictions. During the ensuing months, O’Hearn was represented by three attorneys and pled guilty. Then-counsel Selby failed to sign O’Hearn's Cruz/Vargas Waiver. The PSR noted that O’Hearn had bi-polar disorder and was not taking his medication at the time of the offense. Another attorney filed a motion to vacate the plea, arguing that it was the consequence of ineffective assistance. Counsel “barely met" with O'Hearn, failed to attend the sentencing hearing, lost the case file, never explained potential defenses, did not inquire about O'Hearn's extensive mental health history, and did not advise him of the consequences or alternatives. O’Hearn’s 800-page medical record showed hospitalizations for mental health problems and a history of schizophrenia. Selby had been repeatedly found to have failed to provide competent legal services. The victims, one of whom had a criminal history, had interacted with O’Hearn for many years. Conviction of making criminal threats requires specific intent, which can be negated by a mental disorder. The court of appeal reversed the denial of O’Hearn’s motion to vacate his plea. Selby never asserted any strategic reason for failing to learn whether his client’s mental state provided the basis for a possible mental defense and the deficient representation was prejudicial. |
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| People v. Valencia Baltazar |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: F078219(Fifth Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Jennifer R.S. Detjen Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Senate Bill No. 620 gave trial courts previously unavailable discretion to strike or dismiss firearm enhancements otherwise required to be imposed by Penal Code sections 12022.5 and 12022.53. There is no dispute that these statutory amendments apply retroactively to cases in which the judgment was not yet final when Senate Bill No. 620 went into effect. The Court of Appeal dismissed defendant's appeal of the district court's denial of his application to strike the firearm enhancements found true by the jury and added to his sentence. The court explained that Senate Bill No. 620's amendment to section 12022.53, subdivision (h) applies to nonfinal judgments and, by its plain language, extends the bill's benefits to defendants who have exhausted their rights to appeal and for whom a judgment of conviction has been entered but who have obtained collateral relief by way of a state or federal habeas corpus proceeding. Because neither scenario includes defendant, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify his sentence. In this case, defendant's judgment became final in 2013, well before the effective date of Senate Bill No. 620. |
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| Colorado v. Williams |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 78 Opinion Date: November 9, 2020 Judge: Coats Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The State of Colorado petitioned for review of a court of appeals' judgment reversing Barnett Williams' conviction for distributing a schedule II controlled substance. At trial, the district court admitted evidence pursuant to CRE 404(b) of a prior incident in which Williams pled guilty to selling cocaine. The court of appeals found that the district court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence for the limited purposes of demonstrating “modus operandi and common plan, scheme, or design,” largely on the grounds that the evidence in question did not meet the strictures imposed by prior case law for admitting uncharged misconduct evidence pursuant to CRE 404(b) for these particular purposes, and because the error was not harmless. The Colorado Supreme Court determined that because the incremental probative value of the evidence relative to any material issue in the case was substantially outweighed by the danger that it would be unfairly prejudicial, the district court abused its discretion in admitting it. Although for different reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals was therefore affirmed. |
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| Linnebur v. Colorado |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 79 Opinion Date: November 9, 2020 Judge: Hart Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In March 2016, law enforcement contacted Charles Linnebur after receiving a call that he had crashed his vehicle into a fence and might have been driving under the influence of alcohol. Although he initially denied that he had been drinking, Linnebur eventually admitted that he had consumed whiskey that day. He was arrested, and a blood test revealed that his blood alcohol level was well above the legal limit. The State charged Linnebur with DUI and DUI per se, seeking felony convictions under sections 42-4-1301(1)(a) and (2)(a), which provided that DUI and DUI per se were felonies if they “occurred after three or more prior convictions” for, among other things, DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI. Prior to trial, Linnebur filed a motion in limine arguing that the fact of his prior convictions was a substantive element of felony DUI that had to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court denied the motion, concluding instead that Linnebur’s prior convictions were “merely sentence enhancers or aggravating factors” and could be proved to the court by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury found Linnebur guilty of the lesser included offense of DUI, DWAI, and DUI per se. The State submitted certified copies of Linnebur’s three prior impaired driving convictions and his state driving record. Rather than applying a preponderance of the evidence standard (as it had earlier indicated it would), the trial court instead concluded that these exhibits proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Linnebur had three prior convictions, and entered judgment for felony DWAI, merged the DUI per se conviction, and sentenced Linnebur to four years in community corrections. The Colorado Supreme Court held, contrary to the trial court, the statutory provisions that defined and provided penalties for felony DUI treated the fact of prior convictions as an element of the crime, which had be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, not as a sentence enhancer, which a judge could find by a preponderance of the evidence. Because the court of appeals erred in arriving at the opposite conclusion, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for sentencing on the misdemeanor DUI charges that were properly proved to the jury in this case. |
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| Lowery v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0597 Opinion Date: November 9, 2020 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Jim Lowery challenged his 2017 conviction for felony murder and other crimes in connection with the death of Montgomery County, Georgia Sheriff Ladson O’Connor, who was killed in a vehicular accident while pursuing Appellant. Appellant argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his felony murder conviction; (2) the trial court failed to apply the correct standard in denying his motion for new trial on the general grounds; (3) his pretrial statements to investigators were inadmissible because they were not knowingly and voluntarily made; and (4) the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Sheriff O’Connor’s character. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction. |
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| Idaho v. Kent |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 47163 Opinion Date: November 10, 2020 Judge: Stegner Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The State appealed the district court’s order granting James Kent’s motion to suppress statements he made during a non-custodial interrogation. During this interrogation, the officer began reading Kent his Miranda rights, at which point Kent interrupted the officer and told him he would not answer any questions. The officer continued to read Kent his rights and, after completing the warnings, asked Kent if he was willing to speak with him. Kent said that he would, and eventually made incriminating statements. The district court suppressed the statements. The district court found that Kent was not in custody at the time, but nevertheless held: “Where Miranda warnings are read to an individual unnecessarily and the defendant invokes the right to remain silent, an officer may not ignore that invocation.” The State argued the district court erred by extending Miranda’s application to a non-custodial interrogation. In response, Kent contended that because he had a constitutional right to remain silent regardless of whether he was afforded Miranda warnings and irrespective of whether he was in custody, the district court did not err in suppressing his statements as having been obtained in violation of his right to remain silent. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the Kent made his statements voluntarily, therefore, the district court erred in suppressing the statements. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. |
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| State v. Thompson |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 19-1433 Opinion Date: November 6, 2020 Judge: Thomas D. Waterman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court revoking Defendant's deferred judgment, holding that the district court failed to include sufficient factual findings to support revocation. Defendant pled guilty to child endangerment. The district court ordered the judgment deferred and Defendant to pay a civil penalty, court costs, and attorney fees. Thereafter, the State filed an application to revoke deferred judgment and pronounce sentence, alleging that Defendant had not paid the balance due. The court found that Defendant had violated the terms of her probation and revoked the deferred judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the holding in State v. Damme, 944 N.W. 2d 98 (Iowa 2020), that a defendant who is not challenging her guilty plea or conviction has good cause to appeal an alleged sentencing error when the sentence was neither mandatory nor agreed to in the plea bargain extends to appeals from orders revoking deferred judgments; and (2) the district court's factual findings were insufficient. The Court remanded the case to the district court for a new hearing on the State's application to revoke Defendant's deferred judgment. |
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| State v. Lutz |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 117496 Opinion Date: November 6, 2020 Judge: Ward Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized after a traffic stop and a warrantless probable cause search of the vehicle, holding that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. Defendant was the front seat passenger in a vehicle stopped by officers for a traffic violation. Officers began removing the vehicle's occupants to facilitate a drug dog sniff, called for because of the nature of the stop and the officers' previous knowledge of Defendant. Officers observed drug paraphernalia in Defendant's immediate vicinity and called off the dog sniff before it began. Thereafter, a warrantless probable cause search of the vehicle disclosed controlled substances. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the officers detained the vehicle's occupants longer than lawfully permitted to accommodate the drug dog sniff. The district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial competent evidence supported the district court's findings, and those findings supported the district court's legal conclusions. |
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| Downs v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2018-SC-0402-MR Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Vanmeter Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions for first-degree manslaughter, tampering with physical evidence, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and second-degree persistent felony offender, holding that Defendant was deprived of his right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings. On appeal, Defendant argued that he was denied the right to conflict-free counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings - during an in-chambers hearing the trial court conducted on the fitness and ability of Defendant's private attorney. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the court's decision not to inform Defendant of the Commonwealth's allegations against his private attorney and not offer him the opportunity to retain independent counsel to represent his interests was of constitutional magnitude. |
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| Ernest E. v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12790 Opinion Date: November 6, 2020 Judge: Cypher Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the juvenile court judge denying a juvenile's motion for relief from sex offender registration, holding that the record below was inadequate for the Court to decide the constitutional issue presented by the juvenile in this case. After the juvenile court judge denied the juvenile's motion to be relieved from his obligation to register as a sex offender the juvenile filed a petition seeking relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, arguing that requiring juveniles to register violates due process and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment based on advances in the understanding of the adolescent brain. The Supreme Judicial Court denied relief, holding (1) based on the record, the judge's determination that the juvenile should not be relieved of the obligation to register as a sex offender did not lie outside the bounds of reasonable alternatives; and (2) because of the absence of expert testimony and the failure to properly introduce the scientific studies cited in the judge's written findings, the Court did not have the necessary record to reach the constitutional issue. |
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| State v. Fillion |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 283 Opinion Date: November 10, 2020 Judge: Laurie McKinnon Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for felony theft, felony altering an identification number, and misdemeanor violation of license plate requirement, holding that the district court did not err. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss based on the state's alleged failure to preserve exculpatory evidence; (2) the district court did not err when it allowed an out-of-court statement offered for the limited purpose of explaining an officer's conduct; and (3) after correctly instructing the jury, the district court did not abuse its discretion in referring the jury to instructions already provided. |
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| State v. Thomas |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 281 Opinion Date: November 10, 2020 Judge: Laurie McKinnon Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for aggravated promotion of prostitution of B.M. and promoting prostitution of Z.T., holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in granting the State's motion in limine prohibiting Defendant from eliciting any testimony concerning B.M. and/or Z.T.'s prior sexual conduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded evidence related to Z.T.'s prior involvement with prostitution under Mont. R. Evid. 401, 402, and 404(b). |
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| State v. Senteney |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 307 Neb. 702 Opinion Date: November 6, 2020 Judge: Lindsey Miller-Lerman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences for two counts of third degree sexual assault of a child, one count of attempted incest, and one count of attempted first degree sexual assault, holding that the district court did not commit plain error when it allowed certain testimony and that Defendant's sentences were not an abuse of discretion. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) the district court committed plain error when it allowed an investigator to testify regarding indicators of deception exhibited by Defendant in an interview, and (2) the district court imposed excessive sentences. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the testimony regarding indicators of deception was not plain error; and (2) Defendant's sentences of imprisonment, rather than probation, were not an abuse of discretion. |
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| State v. Teppert |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 307 Neb. 695 Opinion Date: November 6, 2020 Judge: Papik Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), fourth offense, holding that the district court did not err by receiving evidence of a prior conviction offered by the State in support of sentence enhancement. Defendant pleaded guilty to DUI and driving under suspension. At a sentence enhancement proceeding, the State sought to introduce evidence of Defendant's three prior DUI convictions. Defendant objected to the admission of records of his 2010 DUI conviction, arguing that those records did not affirmatively show that he had counsel or had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to counsel before entering his guilty plea in that case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by receiving records of Defendant's 2010 DUI conviction and finding that his conviction in this case was his fourth offense. |
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| Centerville v. Knab |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-5219 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Judith L. French Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's judgment ordering Michael Knab to make restitution to the City of Centerville, holding that a municipality is not a victim and has no right to restitution under Ohio Const. Art I, 10a, a provision known as Marsy's law. Knab was found guilty of making a false report to law enforcement and improper use of the 9-1-1 emergency system. The trial court ordered Knab to pay restitution to Centerville for the costs it had incurred responding to Knab's 9-1-1 call. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions but vacated the restitution order, holding that Centerville was not a victim for purposes of restitution when it was carrying out its official duties. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a municipal corporation does not qualify as a victim under Marsy's Law and is not entitled to restitution under that provision. |
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| State ex rel. Bandy v. Gilson |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-5222 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that the court of appeals did not err. Appellant, an inmate, was serving a sentence of fifteen years to life for the murder of Ray Emerson. In 2012, Appellant received a copy of the coroner's complete report on the autopsy on the body of Ray. In 2014, Appellant requested photographs of Ray's injuries. The office of the medical examiner did not provide the photographs. In 2019, Appellant filed a petition requesting a writ of mandamus to compel the office to provide photographs of Ray's stab wounds, X-rays of the stab wounds, Ray's death certificate, and a signed autopsy report. The court of appeals granted the office's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals was correct to deny Appellant's request for a writ of mandamus. |
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| State v. Bowers |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-5167 Opinion Date: November 10, 2020 Judge: Maureen O'Connor Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison for rape based on the trial court's finding that Defendant had compelled the victim to submit by force, holding that the Sixth Amendment requires that such a finding be made by a jury. Defendant was convicted of rape of a child under the age of thirteen. At a second resentencing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years to life under Ohio Rev. Code 2971.03(B)(1)(c). The court of appeals reversed, holding that Defendant's sentence was not authorized because none of the prerequisites for such a sentence under Ohio Rev. Code 2971.03(B)(1)(c) was present and that permitting a trial court to make a finding of force for the purpose of imposing a sentence under the statute would violate the Sixth Amendment based on Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Alleyne requires that a finding that the victim was compelled to submit by force or that one of the other factors under subsection (B)(1)(c) is present be made by a jury. |
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| Kuykendall v. Texas |
| Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Docket: PD-0003-20 Opinion Date: November 11, 2020 Judge: Yeary Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Kyle Kuykendall was charged in a single indictment with two separate instances of third-degree felony failure-to-appear. He was convicted on both counts and sentenced to concurrent ten-year sentences. He appealed, arguing that punishing him for both offenses violated Double Jeopardy (applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). Appellant argued that because he had been required to appear on a single occasion to answer for both charges against him, he could have only committed one offense when he failed to appear. The Court of Appeals agreed with this argument, holding that because Appellant failed to appear only once, he could only be punished once under the Double Jeopardy Clause. It vacated his conviction on the second failure-to-appear count. The State Prosecuting Attorney petitioned for discretionary review to challenge the appellate court's judgment. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the Court of Appeals, finding that the failure to appear statute created as many actionable offenses as there were conditional releases according to the terms of which the actor failed to appear. In other words, the “allowable unit of prosecution” for the offense of failure to appear was the number of discrete conditional releases for which he was required to appear and did not: "it is not simply the number of times he failed to show up before some adjudicative body. In this case, when Appellant failed to appear at the combined setting, he committed two distinct offenses." The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment was not violated. |
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| State v. Wilson |
| Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 19-0142 Opinion Date: November 6, 2020 Judge: Margaret L. Workman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction on a felony charge of fleeing from a law enforcement officer in a vehicle while operating the vehicle in a manner showing a reckless indifference to the safety of others, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) there was no error in the trial court’s giving of an instruction that evidence of flight may be considered by the jury, along with other facts and circumstances, to show consciousness of guilt; and (2) the court’s failure to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense of fleeing in a vehicle but without reckless indifference was error, but the error was not reversible under the applicable standard of review. |
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