In Ruth We Trust: How the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act Can Promote Women’s Equal Citizenship and Justice Ginsburg’s Legacy

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN

In honor of the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman explains how the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) can promote women’s equal citizenship and protect Justice Ginsburg’s legacy of shaping gender equality. Grossman argues that the PWFA could help break down entrenched occupational segregation in the American economy, and, in so doing, honor Justice Ginsburg’s lifelong commitment to ensuring that women can be full members of society.

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A Half Century After Its Publication, What Can “The Greening of America” Tell Us About the United States Today?

RODGER CITRON

In recognition of the 50-year anniversary of the publication of Charles Reich’s “The Greening of America,” Touro law professor Rodger D. Citron explains what Reich actually said in “The Greening,” explains why it generated such a strong response, and reflects on what the piece has to say about the fractures of our current moment. Citron cautions that the promise of a new consciousness is as alluring—and may be as illusory—as it was when Reich wrote the article and book, 50 years ago.

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United States v. Benoit

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 19-1476

Opinion Date: September 17, 2020

Judge: Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of one count of transporting child pornography and one count of possessing child pornography, holding that Defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable and that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed two special conditions of supervised release. Defendant pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. After a hearing, the district court sentenced Defendant to 156 months in prison and imposed conditions of supervised release that included restrictions on Defendant's contact with children. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's 156-month sentence was not outside the universe of reasonable sentences; and (2) there was a sufficient relationship between Defendant's criminal conduct and the conditions limiting his contact with his son.

United States v. Valdez

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 18-2219

Opinion Date: September 21, 2020

Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions for his role as a leader and organizer of a major drug-trafficking organization, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's pro se motions to withdraw his guilty plea and to appoint new counsel. Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the government and, pursuant to that agreement, was sentenced to 240 months of imprisonment. Defendant later made a statement that the district court construed as making a motion to withdraw the guilty plea and a motion to appoint new counsel. After a hearing, the court denied both motions. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to appoint new counsel; and (2) did not err in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Rodriguez v. Barr

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 18-1070

Opinion Date: September 18, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitioned for review of the BIA's 2018 decision finding him removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having been convicted of an "aggravated felony" as defined by section 101(a)(43)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The BIA found that petitioner was convicted of "sexual abuse of a minor" based on his 2010 New York state conviction under New York Penal Law 130.65(3) for sexual abuse in the first degree. The Second Circuit rejected petitioner's contention that section 130.65(3) criminalizes more conduct than the federal definition of "sexual abuse of a minor" covers. The court held that, because a conviction under N.Y. Penal Law 130.65(3) requires both that the victim be under the age of eleven and that the perpetrator's contact with the victim be "for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire," the state statute reaches no farther than the crime of "sexual abuse of a minor" as set forth in section 101(a)(43)(A) and construed by the BIA in In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 996. Therefore, a conviction under the state statute is an aggravated felony under the INA.

Santana v. Barr

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 18-2755

Opinion Date: September 18, 2020

Judge: Raymond Joseph Lohier, Jr.

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal of petitioner to the Dominican Republic. The court held that a conviction under New York Penal Law 165.50 is categorically an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G). The court deferred to the BIA's reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous term "including" in "including receipt of stolen property" in section 1101(a)(43)(G). Under that interpretation, "'receipt of stolen property' is a distinct aggravated felony independent of theft and the property received need not have been stolen by means of 'theft' as generically defined." The court also determined that an intent to deprive is inherent in the requirement that an offender "knowingly" possesses stolen property. The court considered petitioner's remaining arguments and concluded that they are without merit.

United States v. Bolin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 19-2119

Opinion Date: September 24, 2020

Judge: Robert David Sack

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant appealed two special conditions of his supervised release stemming from his conviction for making a materially false, fictitious, and fraudulent statement and representation to FBI agents. The conditions prohibit him from: (a) engaging in conduct online that "promotes or endorses violence"; and (b) possessing or using a computer or other internet-capable device without participating in a monitoring program operated by the U.S. Probation Office. The court concluded that the challenged conditions satisfy the "reasonably related" requirements of USSG 5D1.3(b)(1) and accord with the court's caselaw interpreting that provision. However, the court concluded that because of the vagueness of the condition prohibiting him from engaging in violence-promoting speech online in its present form, it infringes upon his rights to free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part.

United States v. Bryant

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 18-3569

Opinion Date: September 24, 2020

Judge: Joseph F. Bianco

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiring to distribute cocaine base and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, but vacated two challenged conditions of supervised release and remanded in part. The court held that defendant's guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon remains valid, even in light of Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), because it is plain that defendant knew of his unlawful status when he possessed the firearm and there is no reasonable probability that he would have not pled guilty had he been properly informed that such knowledge was a requirement for conviction under 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The court also held that there was no error at sentencing in the district court's consideration of potential sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants, and defendant's 90-month sentence was not procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Finally, the court held that the two disputed conditions of supervised release imposed on defendant are not unconstitutionally vague, but the court remanded (1) the risk condition so that the district court can formally incorporate its oral amendment of that condition into the written judgment of conviction, and (2) the communication condition so that the district court may provide the necessary justification for restricting defendant's communications with his brother, or exempt such communications from that condition.

United States v. Kosinski

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Docket: 18-3065

Opinion Date: September 22, 2020

Judge: Korman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of two counts of insider trading in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b–5. The court held that defendant had a duty to refrain from trading on nonpublic inside information and that the evidence was sufficient to convict him. In this case, defendant served as a principal investigator for a clinical trial of a cardiac drug developed by Regado Biosciences, a publicly traded biopharmaceutical company, that was designed to prevent blood clotting. After defendant learned that patients suffered adverse effects during the trial, he traded on that nonpublic inside information to avoid a loss and earn a profit in the shares of the company. The court concluded that, taken together, the evidence of defendant's deceptive activity was sufficient for the jury to find that he was a sophisticated investor that knew his actions were unlawful under the charge given by the district court. Finally, there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's evidentiary rulings.

Tyson v. Superintendent Houtzdale SCI

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 19-1391

Opinion Date: September 23, 2020

Judge: Restrepo

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Tyson handed his gun to Powell and waited in the getaway car while Powell shot and killed two men in a stopped van. A Monroe County, Pennsylvania jury convicted Tyson of two counts of first-degree murder as an accomplice. In seeking post-conviction relief in state court, Tyson claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the court’s erroneous instruction, which he argued allowed the jury to find him guilty without finding he possessed the requisite intent to kill. In federal habeas proceedings, the district court held the state court reasonably applied federal law in finding his trial counsel was not ineffective and denied relief. The Third Circuit reversed, finding a strong likelihood the jury convicted Tyson as an accomplice to first-degree murder without finding he possessed the specific intent to kill. There was no language in the instruction that would lead the jury to connect the requisite intent to kill to the role of an accomplice. In light of the instruction’s “profound impropriety,” the court concluded that trial counsel acted unreasonably in failing to object. Counsel’s failure to object to the court’s instruction led to the likelihood that the jury interpreted the law in a way that lessened the Commonwealth’s burden of proof.

United States v. Soriano

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 19-50832

Opinion Date: September 18, 2020

Judge: Carl E. Stewart

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. The search of defendant's vehicle revealed a suitcase that contained nine bundles of cocaine. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle. In this case, the district court considered the six factor balancing test and the totality of the circumstances, including the lack of coercive police procedures, the extent of defendant's cooperation, and defendant's education and intelligence. The court stated that the district court's analysis of the consent factors was plausible in light of the record as a whole.

United States v. Vialva

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 20-70019

Opinion Date: September 21, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Vialva was convicted under federal law of capital murder and sentenced to death. Since his 2000 conviction, Vialva’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal; his 28 U.S.C. 2255 challenge was denied; and his effort to vacate the denial of his section 2255 motion under FRCP 60(b) failed. The Federal Bureau of Prisons scheduled Vialva’s execution for September 24, 2020, and informed Vialva on July 31, 2020. Vialva moved to enjoin his execution. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Vialva is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his primary argument on appeal, that Texas state law should have been followed with respect to the issuance of an execution warrant and the setting of execution dates. Vialva has not shown the remaining factors favor a stay of execution. Vialva has thoroughly litigated his conviction and sentence. He was given official notice well in advance of his execution date. Vialva is not challenging his death sentence, but only the pre-execution procedures for carrying it out. The public’s interest in timely enforcement of the death sentence outweighs Vialva’s request for more time.

Wardrip v. Lumpkin

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 18-70016

Opinion Date: September 21, 2020

Judge: Leslie H. Southwick

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Wardrip committed five murders in Texas in 1984-1986.. He surrendered to police and confessed to his last murder. Wardrip was released on parole in 1997. After DNA testing connected Wardrip to unsolved murders, he was arrested and confessed to four other murders. At trial, the state introduced Wardrip’s prison disciplinary record, with only two infractions during his 11 years in prison. Wardrip’s defense counsel called a parole officer and an employer to testify to Wardrip’s good behavior while on parole. Waldrip’s attorney, Curry, later explained that suggesting Wardrip had rehabilitated would have required putting Wardrip on the stand. Curry wanted jurors to focus on the fact that Wardrip was not a disciplinary problem and not a danger to anyone if imprisoned for life. The jury found that Wardrip would be a threat to society and that mitigating circumstances did not warrant life imprisonment. The court sentenced Wardrip to death. Texas courts denied habeas relief. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of federal habeas relief. It was not an “unreasonable determination of the facts” for the state court to find that Curry had conducted a reasonable investigation that made him aware of Wardrip’s good conduct while imprisoned and made a reasonable strategic decision regarding what evidence to present, satisfying Strickland’s standard for effective assistance of counsel. It was also reasonable for the court to conclude that whatever else Curry might have done, the failure to take those steps had not prejudiced Wardrip.

Griffith v. Franklin County

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Dockets: 19-5440, 19-5378, 19-5438, 19-5439

Opinion Date: September 21, 2020

Judge: John K. Bush

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Griffith was arrested after a failed robbery attempt and was held at Franklin County Regional Jail. Griffith suffered seizures six days into his detention. He was sent to a local hospital, where he suffered another seizure, and was then airlifted to the University of Kentucky Hospital. He recovered but continues to suffer headaches and other negative symptoms. Griffith sued county defendants and SHP, a private medical company that provides medical services at the jail, and SHP medical staff under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he received unconstitutionally inadequate medical care. Griffith argued that the defendants were deliberately indifferent because they failed to adequately monitor him for drug withdrawal, allowing his vomiting to progress to the point of dehydration, which led to his kidney failure, which caused his seizures. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that Griffith failed to establish that they acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There is no evidence that the nurse knew or should have known that Griffith’s vomiting evinced a substantial risk to his health or that he was experiencing severe withdrawal symptoms. Griffith made no effort to obtain further care other than two sick call slips he filled out in detox; there is no evidence that the nurse would have expected that he had not responded to the treatment provided. Even a failure to follow internal processes does not, alone, indicate deliberate indifference.

United States v. Baker

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 19-5636

Opinion Date: September 24, 2020

Judge: Murphy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Officer Render saw a new warrant to arrest Baker for receiving stolen property. A judge had issued this warrant on the ground that Baker had received a stolen Nextbook tablet. The subject who pawned the tablet revealed that the tablet was purchased in Madisonville from Baker. Render and Officer Knelson met at the listed address, which appeared to be a hybrid residence and pawnshop, with a sign flashing “open.” Through the windows, Render could see merchandise and a man. The door was locked. The man voluntarily let him in and acknowledged that he was Baker, In response to a request for identification, Baker walked through a door. According to Render, officers should maintain visual contact with arrestees to ensure they are not getting firearms, so he followed Baker. The door led to a kitchen and then another door led to another area, where Baker retrieved his wallet. Render noticed jars of marijuana and a rifle in plain view and asked Baker if he was a convicted felon. Baker confirmed he was. Render left to secure a search warrant. Knelson searched Baker incident to his arrest and found crack cocaine. With a search warrant, officers found more crack cocaine, marijuana, firearms, and methamphetamine. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Baker's motion to suppress the evidence. The officer acted reasonably in monitoring Baker’s movements. The affidavit supporting the warrant contained enough of a connection between Baker and a crime that the officers could reasonably rely on the judge’s probable-cause finding.

United States v. Cruz

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 19-4160

Opinion Date: September 24, 2020

Judge: Guy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Cruz pleaded guilty to transporting a minor with intent to engage in sexual activity; receiving child pornography; and transporting child pornography. Cruz, then 37, had maintained a two-year online relationship with the 12-year-old victim before he picked her up in California, traveled across the country, and had sex with her on multiple occasions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his sentence of 188 months' imprisonment. Imposing a two-level offense enhancement on Count 1 for “unduly influenc[ing] a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct,” USSG 2G1.3(b)(2)(B), was not an abuse of discretion. The presumption of undue influence is triggered if there is a difference of 10 years between the defendant and the victim. Here, there was a difference of 25 years. Even if that were not the case, any claimed error is harmless. The application of the enhancement did not alter Cruz’s Sentencing Guidelines range or resulting sentence because Cruz was sentenced to a term of imprisonment at the top of the Guidelines range established by Counts 2 and 3, which did not include the undue-influence enhancement.

United States v. Snoddy

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 19-6089

Opinion Date: September 24, 2020

Judge: Karen Nelson Moore

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Trooper Malone stopped Snoddy for speeding and learned that there were Georgia warrants out for Snoddy’s arrest, including for drug crimes. Malone and another officer arrested Snoddy on the warrants. Malone suspected that Snoddy might have drugs in the car. Immediately after making the arrest, the officers sought consent to search the car. Snoddy refused. Malone stated, “I’m gonna have to get the car towed ... and we have to do an inventory on the car.” Malone repeatedly asked Snoddy for consent, warning Snoddy that if he did not consent, the car would be inventoried. Roughly eight minutes after the arrest, Malone called the tow truck but continued to seek consent. About five minutes after calling the truck, Malone began conducting an inventory. Malone discovered and seized approximately one pound of methamphetamine, two handguns, and a set of scales. Snoddy unsuccessfully moved to suppress the drugs and guns. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Snoddy conceded that the traffic stop was lawful, that his arrest was valid, that it was within Malone’s discretion to impound the car, and that an inventory was required once Malone decided to tow the car. Snoddy did not challenge the scope of the search. The district court did not err in rejecting his argument that the decision to impound and inventory the car was a pretext for a warrantless investigative search.

Vialva v. Watson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 20-2710

Opinion Date: September 18, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Vialva was sentenced to death for murders he committed in 1999. Vialva argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer had a conflict of interest and conducted an inadequate investigation. Vialva maintained that the district judge suffered from alcoholism and should not have been allowed to preside at trial or sentencing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition, seeking a stay of his scheduled September 24 execution; 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) provides: “An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” The Fifth Circuit resolved Vialva’s contentions under section 2255 by denying his requests for certificates of appealability. The Supreme Court denied Vialva’s petitions for certiorari. He received effective merits decisions. A section 2241 proceeding is not an authorized way to contest the Fifth Circuit's procedures. Vialva does not rely on a new, retroactive legal rule; he does not point to facts that came to light after that decision. The Suspension Clause does not entitle anyone to successive collateral attacks.

Webster v. Watson

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-2683

Opinion Date: September 22, 2020

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1996, Webster was sentenced to death for the murder of a 16-year-old girl. Webster has repeatedly sought relief from that sentence on the ground he advanced at trial—that he is intellectually disabled. In 2009, his lawyers came upon records dating to 1994 from the Social Security Administration showing that three different doctors found him intellectually disabled. In 2015, the Seventh Circuit held that Webster was not barred by the limitations imposed on successive requests for post-conviction relief from seeking to show that he is ineligible for the death penalty based on newly discovered evidence. The court remanded for a determination of whether the Social Security records constituted newly discovered evidence that counsel did not uncover despite diligent efforts. The district court found that Webster’s defense counsel did not discover the Social Security records despite reasonable diligence at the time of trial, held a five-day hearing, and determined that Webster had carried his burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he is intellectually disabled. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision to vacate Webster’s death sentence. Documentary evidence established that defense counsel focused on the possible existence of Social Security records and repeatedly requested them. Having demonstrated substantial deficits in intellectual functioning and adaptive functioning and onset of the deficiencies before the age of 18, Webster has carried his burden of proving that he is intellectually disabled and constitutionally ineligible to remain under a death sentence.

United States v. Cain

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 19-3540

Opinion Date: September 24, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2006, Cain was convicted of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. Guideline changes reduced his sentence to 151 months. His five-year term of supervised release began in 2016. Within 14 months, he was revoked for testing positive for cocaine nine times over a six-month period. Cain pled guilty, in state court, to attempted possession of 19.7 grams of methamphetamine, indicating attempted sales because his addictions were to cocaine and alcohol, not meth. Cain admitted violating the terms of his supervised release. The district court sentenced him to 48 months' imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit upheld the sentence as substantively reasonable, rejecting Cain’s argument that the district court should have given more weight to the guidelines range of five-11 months and to his probation officer's recommendation of eight months plus 24 months of supervised release. The district judge, who had presided over his trial and prior revocation, used the court’s “wide latitude” to weigh the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and to assign some factors greater weight. The court did not indicate that Cain’s revocation sentence is a punishment for his new criminal conduct but emphasized that his multiple violations demonstrate that he cannot be adequately supervised outside prison, where he can receive drug or alcohol treatment. The court mentioned the new criminal conduct only to show that the “conduct requiring revocation is associated with a high risk of new felonious conduct.”

United States v. Roberts

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 19-3249

Opinion Date: September 22, 2020

Judge: James B. Loken

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Following a shooting, police went to Roberts’s apartment to execute a search warrant on the residence and a Durango vehicle. Officers found firearms. An officer stated Roberts was not under arrest. Roberts admitted he brought the guns into the residence from the Durango, where “Mike” had left them. The officers noted possible federal firearm charges because they knew Roberts was a felon. The officers did not arrest Roberts, but read his Miranda rights, despite Roberts saying “you don’t have to.” Officers asked if Roberts wanted to continue to talk. Roberts replied, “Not really,” but continued the interview. He admitted driving a man to the crime scene on the night of the shooting in the Durango. Roberts was arrested hours later. Roberts entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the affidavit supplied with the search warrant application gave the judge probable cause to believe that Roberts drove the vehicle associated with a shooting on the night of the shooting and that evidence of the crime would be found in the truck or his residence. Roberts’s incriminating statements before receiving Miranda warnings were admissible; he was not in custody and the statements were voluntary. Roberts's prior Illinois and Iowa convictions were controlled substance offenses for purposes of sentencing under Guidelines 4B1.1(a).

United States v. Ansberry

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Docket: 19-1048

Opinion Date: September 23, 2020

Judge: Carolyn Baldwin McHugh

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant David Ansberry attempted to detonate a bomb in front of the Nederland, Colorado police station. He pled guilty to use or attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction against a person or property in the United States. At sentencing, the parties disputed the application of three provisions contained in the United States Sentencing Guidelines: (1) whether Ansberry knowingly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person (which under section 2K1.4(a)(1) would create a base offense level of twenty-four); (2) whether the individual officers who came into contact with the bomb were victims (which under section 3A1.2(a) would increase Ansberry’s offense level by three); and (3) whether Ansberry’s offense involved a federal crime of terrorism because it was calculated to retaliate against government conduct (which under section 3A1.4 would increase his offense level by twelve and convert his criminal history category from I to VI). The district court sided with the government on all three provisions and sentenced Ansberry to 324 months in prison. Ansberry challenged application of each of the three guidelines provisions. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err in applying the section 2K1.4(a)(1) base offense level because the court found that Ansberry actually created a risk of death or serious bodily injury, and this finding was not clearly erroneous. But the Court agreed with Ansberry that the court erred in applying: the section 3A1.2(a) enhancement because the court impermissibly relied on relevant conduct rather than on the facts immediately related to his offense of conviction; and the section 3A1.4 terrorism enhancement, because the district court expressly refused to determine whether the conduct Ansberry retaliated against was objectively government conduct. Ansberry’s sentence was vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing.

Chinuhuk et al. v. Alaska

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-16993

Opinion Date: September 18, 2020

Judge: Craig F. Stowers

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Petitioners were sex offenders who received prison sentences with some time suspended and probation imposed pursuant to a statute that mandated suspended imprisonment and probation as part of their initial sentences. The statute provided that the probationary term could not be suspended or reduced. After being released from prison, repeatedly violating the conditions of probation, and having all of their formerly suspended time reinstated, petitioners moved for discharge from probation. Their motions were denied because the statute mandating probation required the petitioners to serve the entire probationary term, even if they no longer had suspended time remaining as an incentive to comply with probation. While their cases were pending before the court of appeals, the statute was repealed. The court of appeals held the statute’s repeal was not retroactive, and it affirmed the denial of their motions. The Alaska Supreme Court granted review of this matter, and concluded that based on the statute’s text and legislative history, courts had no discretion to reduce a sex offender’s probation below statutory minimums, therefore affirming the court of appeals' judgment.

California v. Oliver

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E070859(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 23, 2020

Judge: Art W. McKinster

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant James Oliver challenged his convictions for human trafficking Jane Doe (count 1) and D.A. (count 4), and his sentence. On appeal, he contended: (1) his conviction on count 4 for human trafficking an adult in violation of Penal Code section 236.1 (b) should have been reversed there was no substantial evidence D.A. did not consent; (2) his conviction on count 4 had to be reversed because the trial court erred by not instructing the jury sua sponte on the element that D.A. did not consent to her restraint or confinement; (3) his conviction on count 1 for human trafficking a minor in violation of section 236.1 (c) had to be reversed because the trial court erred by permitting the State to admit hearsay evidence of Jane Doe’s age at the time of the alleged offense; and (4) during sentencing, the trial court erred by not considering his present ability to pay various fines and fees, as mandated by California v. Duenas, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (2019), so those fines and fees should have been stricken and the matter remanded for a hearing on his ability to pay. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding the lack of the victim’s consent was not an element or an affirmative defense of the offense of human trafficking an adult in violation of section 236.1(b); the record contained substantial evidence from which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant trafficked D.A.; and defendant forfeited his claim of Duenas error with respect to the maximum restitution fine imposed at sentencing, and his claims of reversible error about other fines and fees lacked merit. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court accurately instructed the jury on human trafficking as alleged in count 4; defendant forfeited his claim of evidentiary error on count 1 by not timely and specifically interposing a hearsay objection below; and his trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to so object.

California v. Xiong

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C079709(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 22, 2020

Judge: Murray

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Yor Xiong shot the victim multiple times and then led police on a high-speed car chase on surface streets from south to north Stockton ending across the street from his house. A jury found defendant guilty of: first degree murder (count 1); possession of a firearm by a felon (count 2); and evading an officer with wanton disregard (felony evading) (count 3). The jury also found true an enhancement allegation in connection with count 1 that defendant personally discharged a firearm causing the victim’s death. The jury deadlocked on gang enhancement allegations on counts 1 and 2, and thereafter, the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to strike those allegations. Defendant was sentenced to 50 years to life plus two years eight months. Defendant raised a host of alleged errors at trial. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in precluding defendant’s testimony regarding his understanding about what happened to people who denied allegations made by police in the Thai refugee camps where he was born and stayed as a boy. "His cultural experience was relevant to his state of mind in interacting with the detectives who interrogated him and tended to prove why he would have given a false confession." However, given the other evidence defendant was allowed to introduce concerning his confession, the Court concluded defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to present a defense by the preclusion of this testimony. Furthermore, the Court determined the erroneous preclusion of this testimony was harmless. In addition, the Court concluded the trial court erred in instructing the jury: the trial court included a sentence from CALCRIM No. 358. Defendant did not want the instruction, even though evidence of oral unrecorded inculpatory statements was admitted. "The trial court had no sua sponte obligation to give the instruction. It is up to a defendant to request the instruction and a defendant is entitled to reject it. However, under the circumstances here, we conclude the error was harmless." In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court modified judgment by striking the two one-year prior prison term enhancements imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5(b). The matter was remanded for resentencing. As for defendant's other contentions raised on appeal, the Court concluded they were forfeited, meritless and/or nonprejudicial. Judgment was affirmed as modified.

In re King

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E074401(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 18, 2020

Judge: Menetrez

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2016, Proposition 57 amended the California Constitution to allow early parole consideration for persons “convicted of a nonviolent felony.” The regulations the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) adopted pursuant to Proposition's authority excluded from early parole consideration any person convicted of an offense requiring the person to register as a sex offender. Ural King was serving 25 years to life for 2000 conviction of possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine with the intent to distribute methamphetamine. The CDCR denied King early parole consideration under Proposition 57 on the ground that he was required to register as a sex offender because of prior offenses. King petitioned for habeas relief, claiming that the CDCR’s regulation improperly excluded from the benefits of Proposition 57 inmates like him who were serving sentences for nonviolent offenses but were required to register as sex offenders because of prior offenses. The Court of Appeal concluded the plain language of section Cal. Const., art. I, section 32(a)(1) required early parole consideration to be based solely on the present offense of conviction. The Court therefore concluded the CDCR regulation excluding from early parole consideration prisoners who were required to register as sex offenders because of prior convictions was invalid. Consequently, King’s petition for writ of habeas corpus was granted.

Koussaya v. City of Stockton

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C089159(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 21, 2020

Judge: Andrea Lynn Hoch

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Personal Injury

Stephanie Koussaya was taken hostage, along with two other women, by three armed bank robbers, Alex Martinez, Jaime Ramos, and Gilbert Renteria, Jr., used as a human shield in order to facilitate the robbers’ escape from the bank. The hostages were forced into a Ford Explorer belonging to one of the hostages, Kelly Huber. A high-speed chase with law enforcement followed. Huber was pushed out of the moving vehicle after Ramos shot her in the leg. For Koussaya and the other hostage, Misty Holt-Singh, the pursuit lasted for more than an hour, reaching speeds of over 100 miles per hour, and included exchanges of gunfire between Martinez, who was firing an AK-47 assault rifle out of the back of the Explorer, and two Stockton Police Department (SPD) officers. Koussaya ultimately decided her best chance at surviving the ordeal was to open one of the rear side doors and throw herself from the moving vehicle: she believed that if she did not jump from the vehicle she would be killed by the special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team when the chase inevitably came to an end. Minutes after Koussaya’s escape, the chase did come to an end, at which point police officers fired several hundred rounds into the Explorer, killing two of the robbers and the remaining hostage. Having sustained serious injuries during her escape from the Explorer, Koussaya sued the City of Stockton and its police department (collectively, the City), as well as two officers, asserting causes of action for assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and general negligence. The City and officer defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions and entered judgment in favor of defendants. Koussaya appealed. The Court of Appeal, after review, affirmed the trial court. Though the Court found the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on an evidentiary matter and also misapplied the Government Claims Act to improperly limit the scope of Koussaya’s claims, taking into account the improperly excluded evidence and properly viewing the factual basis of her claims against the officer defendants and the City, the Court determined each defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

People v. Martinez

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B303086M(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 23, 2020

Judge: Tangeman

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Court of Appeal modified the judgment by remanding the matter to the trial court with directions to strike the two one-year sentence enhancements imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), and to resentence defendant. At issue in this case is whether a defendant is entitled to seek the retroactive benefit of an ameliorative statute on appeal from an order revoking supervision. The court held that a split sentence consisting of a county jail term followed by a period of mandatory supervision does not automatically become a final judgment of conviction for purposes of Estrada retroactivity when the time to appeal from the imposition of that sentence expires. The court further held that defendant is entitled to seek relief under the new law where, as here the trial court subsequently revokes supervision and the Legislature enacts an ameliorative statute prior to or during the pendency of an appeal from the revocation order.

People v. Perez

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B301466(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 21, 2020

Judge: Feuer

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 1999 Perez pled no contest to second-degree murder (Penal Cod 18(a)) and admitted an allegation that he personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon, a hammer, to strike his wife. Perez’s attorney stipulated to a factual basis for the plea but did not refer to the preliminary hearing testimony. The court sentenced Perez to a life term with a 15-year minimum parole eligibility date, plus a consecutive one-year term. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of his Penal Code section 1170.951 petition for resentencing. To establish a prima facie case that he was entitled to section 1170.951 relief, Perez was required to allege that the information allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine; he pleaded guilty or no contest to first or second-degree murder in lieu of going to trial on the belief he could have been convicted of first or second-degree murder under one of those theories; and he could not now be convicted of first or second-degree murder because of changes to Penal Code sections 188 and 189. Perez was not entitled to relief because he was the actual killer. The court properly relied on the transcript of Perez’s preliminary hearing, at which two witnesses testified they saw Perez strike his wife with a hammer on her head.

People v. Redus

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A157368(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: September 22, 2020

Judge: Kline

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Redus was committed to the Department of State Hospitals in 1975, after being found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) of murder in the stabbing death of his common-law wife. In July 2017, the San Francisco County District Attorney filed a petition under Penal Code 1026.5 to extend Redus’s civil commitment for two years. In 2019, the court found that the petition had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and ordered Redus’s commitment extended until December 2019. On appeal, Redus argued that substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that his mental illness causes him serious difficulty controlling potentially dangerous behavior, and double jeopardy principles preclude retrial or further commitment extensions and that the commitment extension order must be reversed because the trial court failed to advise him of his right to a jury trial and to ensure that he knowingly, intelligently, and unconditionally waived that right. The court of appeal found the appeal moot. Redus’s most recent commitment extension has now expired. Redus’s substantial evidence claim is, however, an issue that is likely to recur, but evade review. The court stated that its analysis may be relevant as guidance in future proceedings related to Redus’s potential recommitment. The court concluded that the evidence did not provide the required link between Redus’s ongoing mental illness and his purported difficulty in controlling his potentially dangerous behavior.

Colorado v. Jackson

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 CO 75

Opinion Date: September 21, 2020

Judge: Samour

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Brandon Jackson was convicted, as a complicitor, of both first degree murder and attempted first degree murder after his codefendant aimed at, shot, and killed Y.M. under the mistaken belief that Y.M. was E.O. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal and state constitutions dictated that Jackson could not stand convicted of both first degree murder and attempted first degree murder because elements of attempted first degree murder were a subset of the elements of first degree murder, and this particular attempted first degree murder was not factually distinct from this particular first degree murder. Contrary to the State's assertion, the shooter did not attempt to kill E.O. when he aimed at and shot Y.M. Rather, in aiming at and shooting Y.M., the shooter intended and attempted to kill Y.M., the same person he actually killed. "That the shooter wanted to kill E.O. and mistakenly believed Y.M. was E.O. is of no moment." Therefore, Jackson’s convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder were based on the same criminal conduct and relate to the same victim (Y.M.). The Court held the trial court plainly erred in entering convictions and imposing sentences for both offenses at issue here. The matter was remanded to the trial court to vacate Jackson's conviction and sentence for attempted first degree murder.

People v. Deleon

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2020 IL 124744

Opinion Date: September 24, 2020

Judge: Rita B. Garman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Deleon was charged with four counts of criminal sexual assault. The conditions of Deleon’s bond release prohibited him from contacting the victim or visiting her home, school, or workplace. Under 725 ILCS 5/112A-11.5, the State’s Attorney sought a plenary civil no-contact order prohibiting Deleon from contacting the victim, harassing or stalking her, and entering her place of employment. The circuit court orally pronounced that section 112A-11.5 was unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied; an evidentiary hearing was never held nor evidence proffered as to its unconstitutionality as applied to Deleon. The court found that the statute allows the state to make a prima facie case for the issuance of a protective order by producing the indictment without requiring the alleged victim to testify and be subject to cross-examination; that the requirement that a defendant present evidence of a meritorious defense to rebut the prima facie evidence violated constitutional protections against self-incrimination; and that the statute improperly shifts the burden of persuasion to the defense. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. There is no basis for concluding that due process precludes the use of an indictment, alone, for restricting a defendant’s liberties before trial. The government has a substantial interest in protecting victims of sexual assault and related crimes from continued contact by the accused pending trial. The conditions of the no-contact order were relatively limited and largely identical to the restraints imposed as conditions of pretrial bond release. There is no legal compulsion for a defendant to rebut the prima facie evidence and no self-incrimination concerns.

People v. Gaines

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2020 IL 125165

Opinion Date: September 24, 2020

Judge: Rita B. Garman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

After a dispute at his parents’ house, Gaines was charged with criminal damage to property, criminal trespass to a residence, misdemeanor criminal damage to property, misdemeanor domestic battery, and misdemeanor aggravated assault. At a hearing, the judge initially accepted a negotiated plea to two counts, but subsequently rejected the plea and reinstated the charges. At trial, Gaines was convicted of felony criminal trespass to a residence and misdemeanor domestic battery. Gaines did not raise a double jeopardy argument in post-trial motions. The appellate court ordered his release. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the misdemeanor battery conviction. In the context of a guilty plea proceeding, jeopardy attaches when the court unconditionally accepts the guilty plea. A formal finding of guilt is not required, nor is imposition of a sentence. The court unconditionally accepted Gaines’s guilty plea; jeopardy attached. Jeopardy did not, however, terminate improperly, where the court sua sponte vacated the guilty plea. The court did not abuse its discretion because it had “good reason to doubt the truth of the plea.” Because jeopardy did not terminate improperly, (720 ILCS 5/3-4(a)), Gaines’s subsequent trial on the same offense did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Gaines cannot demonstrate prejudice, so his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.

People v. Hollahan

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2020 IL 125091

Opinion Date: September 24, 2020

Judge: Lloyd A. Karmeier

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Hollahan was charged with aggravated DUI. His initial jury trial ended in a mistrial when a video recording of the traffic stop was inadvertently played beyond the point of admissible evidence. During a second jury trial, a redacted video of the traffic stop was played for the jury. Following the presentation of evidence, closing arguments, and instruction as to the applicable law, the jury retired to deliberate. Shortly thereafter, the jury asked to watch the video again. The judge granted that request. The video was shown to the jury in the courtroom because the court did not have the “arrangement” necessary to allow the jury to view the video in the jury deliberation room. The court allowed Hollahan, the attorneys, and two alternate jurors to remain in the courtroom while the jury watched the video. Defense counsel did not object. Before the jury was returned to the courtroom, the court admonished that the jury would be watching the video and that “[n]o one will have any conversation.” The judge told the jurors, “we will not be talking to you other than to get the video, period.” After watching the video, the jury returned to the jury room and found Hollahan guilty. The Illinois Supreme Court found no reversible error. Deliberations were not taking place while the jurors were watching the video in the presence of non-jurors and there was no communication with non-jurors. Even if there were error, Hollahan has not shown that he was prejudiced by the procedure employed by the circuit court.

People v. Stoecker

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2020 IL 124807

Opinion Date: September 24, 2020

Judge: Mary Jane Theis

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 1998, a jury convicted Stoecker of first-degree murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault of a 15-year-old girl. His convictions and sentences were affirmed. Stoecker filed numerous unsuccessful petitions for collateral relief. In 2005 Stoecker filed a petition for relief from judgment, arguing that the procedures in imposing his life sentence for murder violated the Supreme Court’s 2000 “Apprendi” holding that, other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum sentence must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Appointed defense counsel acknowledged that the Illinois Supreme Court had held that Apprendi did not apply retroactively to cases whose direct appeals had been exhausted. The petition was dismissed. Although Stoecker filed subsequent petitions claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, he did not appeal the Apprendi ruling. Seven years later, Stoecker again sought relief from judgment, raising the Apprendi issue. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the petition as untimely. Four years later, Stoecker again sought relief from judgment, arguing that under recent Supreme Court decisions, Apprendi applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. The state moved to dismiss the petition. Four days later, the circuit court dismissed the petition. The state was present but made no argument. Appointed counsel was apparently not notified of the proceeding. The court ruled that the state was correct as a matter of law. Stoecker filed an unsuccessful pro se motion to reconsider. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Any violation of Stoecker’s due process rights was harmless because the deficiencies in the petition could not be cured. The petition was untimely, barred by res judicata, and meritless. Any deficient performance by appointed counsel did not warrant remand.

United States v. Glispie

Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Citation: 2020 IL 125483

Opinion Date: September 24, 2020

Judge: Mary Jane Theis

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Glispie has four Illinois convictions for residential burglary, having pled guilty to knowingly and without authority entering into other people’s dwelling places to commit thefts. He subsequently pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)), reserving the right to challenge his designation as an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Burglary is included in the definition of a violent felony. The Supreme Court has ruled that burglary “contains at least the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” The district court determined that Illinois’s residential burglary statute was no broader than generic burglary and that Glispie’s convictions qualified as violent felonies, increasing his sentencing range from a maximum of 10 years to a minimum of 15 years' imprisonment (and a maximum of life). The court imposed a 15-year sentence. The Seventh Circuit agreed with Glispie that, if the limited authority doctrine applied to the Illinois statute, his convictions would not constitute aggravating offenses. That doctrine provides that the “authority to enter a building for a specific lawful purpose is vitiated when the wrongdoer departs from that purpose and commits a felony or theft.” Answering a question certified by the Seventh Circuit, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the doctrine does apply. Over the course of multiple statutory amendments, the legislature was aware that the term “without authority” in both the burglary and home invasion statutes incorporates the limited authority doctrine.

Commonwealth v. Evelyn

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12808

Opinion Date: September 17, 2020

Judge: Gaziano

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a stop, holding that, going forward, the age of a juvenile suspect, if objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, will be part of the totality of the circumstances relevant to whether the juvenile as seized under article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Minutes after a shooting, two police officers encountered seventeen-year-old Defendant walking on the sidewalk. After attempting to speak with Defendant, one of the officers started to get out of the cruiser, after which Defendant ran. Defendant was charged with murder in the first degree. Defendant filed a motion to suppress. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity; (2) a child's age, when known to the officer or objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, is relevant to the question of seizure under article 14; and (3) there was insufficient evidence that the officers knew or should have known prior to his arrest, that Defendant was below the age of eighteen.

Commonwealth v. Long

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12868

Opinion Date: September 17, 2020

Judge: Gaziano

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Judicial Court established a revised test for a court to determine whether a defendant seeking to suppress evidence based on a claim that a traffic stop violated equal protection principles. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle he was driving, holding that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the motion to suppress because Defendant produced sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable inference that the stop was racially motivated. In so holding, the Court concluded (1) a defendant seeking to suppress evidence evidence based on a violation of his or her equal protection rights must establish a reasonable inference that the officer's decision to initiate the stop was motivated by race or another protected class; and (2) to raise this inference, the defendant must point out specific facts from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop.

Tinsley v. Town of Framingham

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-12826

Opinion Date: September 17, 2020

Judge: Lowy

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment on several claims against police officers personally, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether the police officers used excessive force against Appellant after he was removed from his vehicle. Plaintiff, a black man, was stopped by two police officers. The stop escalated into a physical altercation during which five police officers forcibly removed Plaintiff from the vehicle and wrestled him to the ground. Plaintiff was convicted of several offenses stemming from the incident. While the criminal case was pending, Plaintiff filed a civil action alleging that the officers committed several torts and violated his civil rights. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants on the civil action. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment in part, holding (1) Plaintiff's civil action may only proceed where it is based on facts beyond those that were necessary to sustain Plaintiff's prior criminal conviction and where Plaintiff demonstrates that his claims would not necessarily challenge the validity of his prior criminal conviction; and (2) this conclusion does not bar the claims that Plaintiff based on events that occurred after the police officers forcibly removed him from his vehicle.

Chavez-Nelson v. State

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Docket: A19-1229

Opinion Date: September 16, 2020

Judge: G. Barry Anderson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's petition for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing, holding that, even if the facts alleged in the petition were proven by a preponderance of the evidence, Defendant was conclusively entitled to no relief. Defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release. In his postconviction petition, Defendant alleged that both his trial counsel and his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance. The district court summarily denied Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance, concluding that Defendant failed to allege facts that, if proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence, would entitle him to postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was conclusively entitled to no relief, and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying Defendant's claims.

Batiste v. Mississippi

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2019-CA-00283-SCT

Opinion Date: September 24, 2020

Judge: Chamberlin

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Bobby Batiste was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Mississippi Supreme Court. The Court later granted him the right to file a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), finding he was entitled to a hearing regarding alleged communications between bailiffs and/or others and members of the jury. During the hearings, a motion was made requesting that the trial judge recuse. This motion was denied, and, ultimately, the PCR was denied. Batiste appealed both the denial of the request to recuse as well as the denial of the PCR on its merits. Because the Supreme Court found that evidentiary questions remained relating to the recusal issue, it did not address the merits of the PCR. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.

New Hampshire v. Fitzgerald

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-0280

Opinion Date: September 22, 2020

Judge: Gary E. Hicks

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Defendant Keith Fitzgerald appealed a superior court order denying his motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. In December 2015, defendant was indicted on five counts of theft by unauthorized taking. Defense counsel, whose assistance is alleged to have been ineffective, was retained by defendant in March 2016, after defendant’s prior counsel withdrew. Defense counsel, defendant, and the prosecutor engaged in several plea discussions leading up to trial. Plea negotiations ultimately failed and the case went to trial. The jury heard testimony from the defendant that his father authorized the transactions. On cross-examination however, the State elicited a number of admissions from defendant, which defense counsel did not anticipate, that severely damaged defendant’s credibility and undercut his defense. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all five counts of theft by unauthorized taking. Ultimately, the court sentenced defendant to a term of not less than nine and one-half years and not more than 25 years in the New Hampshire State Prison. After an evidentiary hearing on defendant's new trial motion, the court ruled that defendant failed to sustain his burden of showing that the outcome of his case would have been different but for his counsel’s performance. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by concluding that, even if defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance, defendant was not prejudiced by: (1) defense counsel’s failure to adequately advise defendant regarding the merits of the State’s plea offer; or (2) counsel’s failure either to object to the trial court’s jury instructions on a sentence enhancement provision on the basis that it had not been presented to the grand jury for indictment, or to move for dismissal of the indictment on that same basis. The New Hampshire Supreme Court determined defense counsel did not adequately advise defendant about a sentence enhancement and the merits of the State's plea offer relative to defendant's likelihood of success at trial, and but for counsel's deficient performance, there was a reasonable probability that defendant would have accepted the State's plea offer. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings.

New Hampshire v. Williams

Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Docket: 2019-0250

Opinion Date: September 18, 2020

Judge: Donovan

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Laura Williams appealed circuit court orders denying her petitions to annul records of conviction and arrest, as well as charges not resulting in conviction, because she had subsequent convictions. After review of the facts specific to defendant's request, the New Hampshire Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s denial of defendant’s petitions to annul: (1) two charges that did not result in conviction; and (2) convictions from October 2007 and November 2012 for simple assault. The matter was remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion to determine whether granting the petitions would assist in defendant’s rehabilitation and was consistent with the public welfare.

Dailey v. Wainwright

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-4519

Opinion Date: September 23, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's habeas corpus petition against the warden of the Marion Correctional Institution (MCI), holding that Appellant's petition was barred by res judicata. Appellant, an inmate at MCI, filed a successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his maximum aggregate sentence had expired. The court of appeals dismissed the action, holding that habeas corpus does not lie because Appellant's maximum aggregate sentence will not expire until June 2023 and that the petition was barred by res judicata as a successive habeas petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals properly granted summary judgment on res judicata grounds.

State ex rel. Herring v. Wainwright

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-4521

Opinion Date: September 23, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that his claim lacked merit, holding that Appellant was not entitled to immediate release. Appellant was convicted of felonious assault and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight to twenty-five years in prison. In his habeas corpus petition, Appellant alleged that he had served his prison sentences and was entitled to immediate release. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant will not complete his lawfully imposed prison sentences until December 31, 2022, he was not entitled to immediate release.

State v. Hartman

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-4440

Opinion Date: September 22, 2020

Judge: DeWine

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's convictions of two counts of rape, holding that the trial court erred by admitting "other acts" evidence that Defendant had sexually abused his stepdaughter when she was a child. Defendant was convicted of raping an adult female acquaintance. During trial, the trial court allowed the State to present evidence that Defendant had victimized his former stepdaughter as a child. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's convictions, concluding that the evidence of Defendant's abuse of his stepdaughter constituted improper other-acts evidence and was inadmissible under Evid.R. 404(B). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence of Defendant's other acts constituted improper propensity evidence, and the trial court erred in admitting it.

State v. Smith

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2020-Ohio-4441

Opinion Date: September 22, 2020

Judge: DeWine

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for sexually abusing his granddaughter, holding that acquitted-act evidence was admitted for a proper purpose under Evid.R. 404(B). During trial, the trial court allowed the State to introduce "other acts" evidence that Defendant had previously molested his daughter under similar circumstances. Defendant was put on trial for these allegations but was ultimately acquitted. On appeal, Defendant asked the trial court to categorically rule that admitting evidence related to crimes for which a defendant has been acquitted violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Ohio Constitution. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding (1) the Double Jeopardy Clause does not impose a per se bar to the use of other-acts evidence for which the defendant was previously acquitted; and (2) because Defendant placed his intent at issue, the trial court properly admitted evidence of the prior sexual-assault allegations.

Price v. Texas

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0722-19

Opinion Date: September 23, 2020

Judge: Yeary

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Police approached Appellant Braden Price at the San Antonio airport, detained him on suspicion of trafficking in drugs, and handcuffed him behind his back. They then transported both him and his rolling suitcases to a “secure office” inside the airport. After reading Appellant his rights, police searched the suitcases and discovered marijuana. Appellant argued on appeal that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress the marijuana because the officers’ search of the suitcases was impermissible under the Fourth Amendment. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the warrantless search was not justified as a search incident to arrest. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State's petition for discretionary review of its claim the appellate court erred when it concluded the search was not valid as a search incident to arrest, because categorically, luggage is never “property immediately associated with the arrestee.” The Court held that an arrestee was in actual possession of a receptacle at the time of, or reasonably contemporaneously to, his custodial arrest, and that receptacle must inevitably accompany him into custody, a warrantless search of that receptacle at or near the time of the arrest was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment as a search incident to the arrestee’s person. "Such a search requires no greater justification than the fact of the lawful arrest itself. Application of this principle does not turn on the specific nature or character of the receptacle, as the court of appeals believed, but merely on whether it was in the arrestee’s possession at the time of arrest, and whether it would inevitably accompany him into custody." Accordingly, judgment was reversed.

In re Pers. Restraint of Cranshaw

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Docket: 97778-0

Opinion Date: September 24, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A jury found Ira Cranshaw guilty of several crimes committed against two victims. The convictions included attempted first degree murder of B.B. (count I), three counts of first degree rape of B.B. (counts II, III, and IV), first degree kidnapping of B.B. (count V), harassment of B.B. (count VI), two counts of first degree rape of S.H. (counts VII and VIII), first degree kidnapping of S.H. (count IX), and harassment of S.H. (count X). On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed Cranshaw’s convictions as to B.B. and remanded for a new trial on all of the counts involving her (I through VI), but it affirmed his convictions on the counts involving S.H. (counts VII through X) and remanded for resentencing on only those counts. This matter involved the proper calculation of an offender score in an unusual circumstance, which the State conceded resulted in Cranshaw receiving a longer sentence than he would have received if he had been sentenced in the normal manner. In May 2019, Cranshaw filed a personal restraint petition, raising a double jeopardy claim and a claim regarding the calculation of his offender scores. The acting chief judge dismissed the petition, and Cranshaw filed a motion for discretionary review. Cranshaw then moved to amend his motion for discretionary review, which the Washington Supreme Court allowed. After the State answered the amended motion for discretionary review, the deputy commissioner issued a ruling rejecting the double jeopardy claim. The Supreme Court determined the double jeopardy claim lacked merit, but the Court concluded Cranshaw demonstrated his judgment and sentence was facially invalid based on the offender score calculation, and he was entitled to be resentenced.

Davis v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 WY 122

Opinion Date: September 18, 2020

Judge: Boomgaarden

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant, after a remand, to an aggregate sentence of twelve to fifty years for aggravated robbery, to be served consecutively to a previously imposed sentence for first-degree murder, holding that Defendant's aggregate sentence was constitutional. When Defendant was seventeen years old he and a friend robbed and murdered a hitchhiker. Defendant pled guilty to first degree murder, felony murder, and aggravated robbery. Defendant was convicted to life without parole, which the court later converted to life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years for murder plus twenty to fifty years for aggravated robbery. Defendant later filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his new aggregate sentence remained a de facto life sentence. The trial court denied the motion, but the Supreme Court remanded. On remand, the trial court resentenced Defendant to twelve to fifty years for aggravated robbery, to be served consecutively to the previously imposed sentence for murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Defendant for aggravated robbery.