Why the Biden Administration Was Right Earlier This Week to Change Course in the Obamacare Challenge Pending Before the Court

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois Law Dean Vikram David Amar comments on an unusual move by the U.S. Solicitor General’s office, sending a letter to the U.S. Supreme Court amending the position of the federal government in a case currently pending before the Court challenging the Affordable Care Act. Dean Amar explains why the arrival of a new administration should generally not trigger such position reversals, but he argues that the unusual circumstances—specifically the “exceptional implausibility” of the government’s prior filings—may justify the government’s action in this instance.

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Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen GCA UP v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.

Docket: 20-2092

Opinion Date: February 12, 2021

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Labor & Employment Law, Transportation Law

In 2020 Union Pacific Railroad announced a change to its employee attendance policy. Several regional branches of the union opposed the change and sought an order under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151a (RLA), requiring Union Pacific to submit the change to collective bargaining. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; the claim belonged in arbitration before the National Railroad Adjustment Board. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and granted Union Pacific’s motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 for the frivolous appeal. For the second time in three years, the Brotherhood has pressed a position squarely foreclosed by settled law. The union’s challenge to the revised policy amounted to a “minor dispute” subject to mandatory arbitration under the RLA. Given the parties’ course of dealing over workplace attendance requirements, there was a clear pattern and practice of Union Pacific modifying its policies many times over many years without subjecting changes to collective bargaining, which provided the railroad with a nonfrivolous justification to unilaterally modify its attendance policy. That reality made this dispute a minor one subject to resolution through mandatory arbitration.

Hall v. Hanlon

Docket: 20-3245

Opinion Date: February 12, 2021

Judge: Diane Pamela Wood

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Hall filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition in the Southern District of Indiana while incarcerated at a facility operated by the federal Bureau of Prisons in that district. Hall was later transferred to a federal prison in the Middle District of Florida. The Indiana district court concluded that it had lost jurisdiction over the petition, and transferred Hall’s case to Florida. The Seventh Circuit granted Hall a writ of mandamus, directing the Indiana court to rescind the transfer and return the case to Indiana. When the government moves a habeas petitioner after she properly files a petition naming her immediate custodian, the district court retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent within its jurisdiction who has the legal authority to effectuate the prisoner’s release. Hall filed in the correct court and named his immediate custodian; there is a respondent within the jurisdiction of the original court that has the authority to comply with any order that may issue. The Bureau of Prisons has been and remains Hall’s ultimate custodian; the Bureau can take any necessary action. Mandamus is the proper vehicle for review of a transfer decision, including transfers of a habeas corpus proceeding. Hall did not need to show prejudice before pursuing his venue challenge.

United States v. Alvarado-Santiago

Dockets: 19-2937, 19-2526

Opinion Date: February 12, 2021

Judge: St. Eve

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Guzman-Cordoba and Alvarado-Santiago participated in an extensive drug trafficking organization operating from Indianapolis and Chicago. Guzman-Cordoba was a drug courier, drug seller, and stash house guard; Alvarado-Santiago laundered the drug proceeds by wiring large sums from the Indianapolis grocery store that he managed to California and Mexico. Nine defendants were indicted. Guzman-Cordoba presented a duress defense, arguing that she had been forced to join the organization through violence and threats of violence to herself and her family. Alvarado-Santiago argued that he did not know that the money he had sent to California and Mexico was drug money. A jury convicted Guzman-Cordoba of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute controlled substances and distribution of methamphetamine and convicted Alvarado-Santiago of conspiracy to launder money. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in limiting the evidence Guzman-Cordoba attempted to introduce regarding her duress defense, erred in instructing the jury on that defense, and erred in ordering her to forfeit $10,000 in cash that was found at a stash house. The court rejected Alvarado-Santiago’s argument that the district court erred in only admitting a portion of his post-arrest statement, in admitting a statement by Guzman-Cordoba without limiting the jury’s ability to consider that evidence against him, and in giving the jury an instruction on deliberate avoidance of knowledge, the “ostrich instruction.”

United States v. Strobel

Docket: 20-1092

Opinion Date: February 12, 2021

Judge: Kenneth Francis Ripple

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Ashland, Wisconsin police found Strobel passed out in his car beside of the road. A search of Strobel’s vehicle uncovered methamphetamine and resulted in state drug charges. Months later, Ashland police again found Strobel passed out in his car in a parking lot. A search of his car uncovered a firearm, marijuana, and paraphernalia. At the time, Strobel was out on bail. Strobel pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1),. At his sentencing hearing, he raised no objections to the conditions of supervised release proposed in the PSR and waived a full reading of those conditions. The court nevertheless discussed some aspects of the conditions, then imposed explicitly the term of supervised release but neglected to impose explicitly the conditions of supervised release. Later, the court issued its written judgment, which included all the conditions of supervised release recommended by the PSR. Strobel argued that the court’s failure to impose explicitly the conditions of supervised release during the sentencing hearing renders the written judgment inconsistent with the court’s oral pronouncement, requiring the vacation of his sentence and remand for a complete resentencing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his below-guidelines sentence of one year and one day, to run consecutively with Strobel’s state sentence, finding no impermissible inconsistency between the court’s oral pronouncement and its written judgment.

Hickey v. Protective Life Corp.

Docket: 20-1076

Opinion Date: February 12, 2021

Judge: Kenneth Francis Ripple

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law

Hickey filed suit under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, alleging that his former employer, Protective Life, had interfered with the exercise of his FMLA rights and had retaliated against him for exercising those rights. Hickey later abandoned his retaliation claim. The district court held that Hickey could not succeed on his interference claim because he was unable to prove that he had suffered any monetary damages as a result of the alleged interference or was otherwise entitled to equitable relief. The court refused to consider a supplemental declaration that, according to the court, contradicted Hickey’s deposition testimony. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly concluded that, without evidence that Hickey suffered harm for which the FMLA provides a remedy, Hickey does not have a cognizable action for FMLA interference, and did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider Hickey’s supplemental declaration as evidence of damages. When Hickey returned from his FMLA leave, he received the same salary and benefits as he had received before his leave. Under the arrangement given him upon his return, his compensation could have diminished after six months but his employment with Protective terminated approximately three weeks after his return for reasons unrelated to his FMLA leave.