The Selfie Coup: How to Tell If Your Government Is Plotting to Overthrow Itself

DEAN FALVY

Dean Falvy, a lecturer at the University of Washington School of Law in Seattle, describes how to tell whether a government is plotting to overthrow itself—a phenomenon he calles a “Selfie Coup.” Falvy explains the difference between a Selfie Coup and creeping authoritarianism by providing examples of both and argues that the more aware civil society is of the possibility of a Selfie Coup, the more likely it can prepare its defenses in time to prevent it.

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Diamond v. Texas

Docket: PD-1299-18

Opinion Date: June 10, 2020

Judge: Newell

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Andrea Gooden was a laboratory technician who properly analyzed Appellant Lesley Diamond's blood for alcohol content in this case. After Appellant’s trial, it was revealed that Gooden had - before trial - mistakenly certified a blood alcohol analysis report in an unrelated case where a police officer had mislabeled the submission form accompanying a blood sample. Due to her self-report of the erroneous certification to her supervisor, Gooden had been temporarily removed from casework at the time of Appellant’s trial so she could research and document this incident. The prosecutors in this case, unaware of the problem in the unrelated case, failed to disclose this information to Appellant prior to Gooden’s testimony in Appellant’s trial. The question before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether that evidence is material. The post-conviction habeas court concluded it was not and denied Article 11.072 relief. Based upon its review of the trial record, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed and reversed the court of appeals’ holding to the contrary, and upheld the habeas court’s ruling.

In re Hon. John Yeager, Relator

Docket: WR-89,018-02

Opinion Date: June 10, 2020

Judge: Keel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The real party in interest, Roman Bledsoe, entered a not guilty plea to a Class C misdemeanor traffic violation and requested a jury trial. Before the jury was sworn in, relator Judge John Yeager asked Bledsoe whether, in the event he was found guilty by the jury, he preferred for punishment to be assessed by the jury or by the judge. Bledsoe replied that he wanted punishment to be assessed by the judge. The State objected “to the bifurcation of the trial” and asked Judge Yeager to follow Stevenson v. Texas, Nos. C-1-CR-12-100083, C-1-CR-12-100084, C-1-CR-12-100085 (Travis County Court at Law No. 1, Tex. May 16, 2013). Judge Yeager overruled the State’s objection and said he would assess punishment if Bledsoe was found guilty by the jury. The State requested a stay and filed a writ of mandamus to prohibit Judge Yeager from assessing punishment. Respondent, Travis County Court at Law No. 2 Judge Eric Shepperd determined Bledsoe could not elect for the court for punishment in the event of a guilty verdict by a jury after pleading not guilty. Judge Shepperd issued a writ of mandamus against Judge Yeager. Judge Yeager was unsuccessful in his own application for mandamus relief from the court of appeals, thereafter petitioning the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Since it is unclear to the Court whether Article 37.07 required juries to assess punishment in Class C misdemeanor cases on pleas of not guilty, Judge Yeager did not have a ministerial duty to deny defendants the opportunity to elect the court for punishment in the event of a jury verdict of guilty following a plea of not guilty, and mandamus did not lie against him. "Thus, even if Judge Shepperd had mandamus jurisdiction over Judge Yeager and authority to order him and other municipal court judges to carry out a clear ministerial duty, there was no such duty in this case. Consequently, we conditionally grant mandamus relief."

Moreno v. Texas

Docket: PD-1044-19

Opinion Date: June 17, 2020

Judge: Sharon Keller

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant Ricky Moreno claimed the defense of duress in his prosecution for aggravated kidnapping. In connection with this defense, he sought to offer evidence that he suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The trial court excluded this evidence, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that evidence of PTSD was relevant to showing duress. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed, because the defense of duress applied only to the type of compulsion that a person of “reasonable firmness” could not resist and PTSD evidence would show merely that the defendant had a greater sensitivity to compulsion than a person of reasonable firmness. Consequently, the Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment.

Timmins v. Texas

Docket: PD-0867-18

Opinion Date: June 10, 2020

Judge: Michael E. Keasler

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Troy Timmins was on bond for two felony offenses. At a pretrial hearing at which Timmins was personally present, the trial judge revoked Timmins’s bond for testing positive for methamphetamine. Ordinarily, when a trial judge revokes a defendant’s bond in open court for violating a bond condition, the defendant is “immediately returned to custody.” But in this case, Timmins pleaded with the trial judge to let him escort his elderly mother home before taking him into custody. The judge graciously obliged. He revoked Timmins’s bond, but allowed Timmins to turn himself in at jail by three o’clock that afternoon. The judge warned Timmins that if he did not report to the Bandera County Jail as ordered, he would “pick up a new felony in each of these cases.” The warning did not work; Timmins never reported to jail. The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' consideration was whether, when a trial judge informs a defendant that his bond is revoked, but allows him to report to the county jail later that day, can the defendant really be said to have been “released from custody” in contemplation of the Texas bail-jumping statute? And if the defendant does not report to the jail as ordered, has he “fail[ed] to appear in accordance with the terms of his release”? The Court answered both questions “yes,” therefore affirming the court of appeals’ judgment that held accordingly.

Williams v. Texas

Docket: PD-0870-18

Opinion Date: June 24, 2020

Judge: Walker

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Appellant James Williams moved for a new trial, and filed his notice of appeal 71 days after sentence was imposed in open court, but 52 days after the trial court entered a nunc pro tunc order that Appellant later challenged on appeal. The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' review was whether, if a defendant timely files a motion for a new trial and, while the motion for new trial is pending, the trial court enters a nunc pro tunc order, must a defendant seeking to challenge the nunc pro tunc order file notice of appeal within 30 days after the nunc pro tunc order or 90 days after sentence was imposed or suspended in open court? Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.2(a), the Court found a defendant's notice of appeal must be filed: (1) within 30 days after the day sentence is imposed or suspended in open court, or after the day the trial court enters an appealable order; or (2) within 90 days after the day sentence is imposed or suspended in open court if the defendant timely files a motion for new trial. Because defendant timely filed a motion for new trial, his notice of appeal was timely, and thus the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.