About Those Protests

JOSEPH MARGULIES

Cornell law professor Joseph Margulies comments on the protests that have erupted over COVID-19 restrictions. Margulies argues that because the state cannot (or will not) live up to its end of the social contract by committing to sustain people’s livelihood for the duration of the restrictions, the protests are morally legitimate.

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Dickey v. Iowa Ethics & Campaign Disclosure Board

Docket: 19-0094

Opinion Date: May 1, 2020

Judge: Edward M. Mansfield

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Election Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court dismissing for lack of standing Attorney's petition for judicial review of the decision of the Iowa Ethics and Campaign Disclosure Board dismissing Attorney's complaint that the Governor had underreported the fair market value of a trip to Tennessee, holding that the district court properly concluded that Attorney lacked standing in this case. To comply with campaign disclosure requirements, the Governor's campaign committee reported the trip as a $2800 campaign contribution from an individual donor. Attorney complained to the Board that the Governor had underreported the fair market value of the trip, but the Board dismissed the complaint. Attorney petitioned for judicial review. The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that Attorney had not been injured by the Board's action, nor had he been deprived of any information. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Attorney was not an "aggrieved or adversely affected" party within the meaning of Iowa Code 17A.19; and (2) because Attorney did not allege he was lacking any relevant information but merely voiced a a disagreement over the reporting method used by the candidate committee, Attorney lacked standing.

State v. Gordon

Docket: 18-1099

Opinion Date: May 1, 2020

Judge: Brent R. Appel

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for assault on a peace officer with a dangerous weapon, a felony, and several misdemeanors, holding that Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. After Defendant pleaded guilty, he absconded. He was later returned to custody. On appeal, Defendant argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because the plea bargain contained an unlawful term. Specifically, Defendant argued that the plea bargain's provision that he would be released from jail for a forty-eight-hour furlough after pleading guilty was illegal and that his trial counsel committed ineffective assistance in obtaining the illegal benefit for him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where Defendant entered into the plea agreement with the illegally lenient sentence, he could not benefit from that sentence and then attack the plea bargain.

In re the Marriage of Mann

Docket: 18-1910

Opinion Date: May 1, 2020

Judge: Brent R. Appel

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court concluding that Husband, who had a recent income history less than that of Wife, was not entitled to alimony under the facts and circumstances developed at trial, holding that Husband was not entitled to alimony. In determining that the record did not support alimony for Husband, the district court held that traditional alimony would not be appropriate based upon the length of the marriage and the earning capacity of both parties. The district court further declared that there was no basis for reimbursement or rehabilitative alimony. The court of appeals awarded Husband three years of alimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on a totality of all the relevant factors, the district court properly declined to award Husband alimony in this case.

Gumm v. Easter Seal Society of Iowa, Inc.

Docket: 18-1051

Opinion Date: May 1, 2020

Judge: Edward M. Mansfield

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Claimant's petition for judicial review challenging the decision of the workers' compensation commissioner concluding that Claimant, who was receiving disability benefits for a traumatic injury, could not later recover disability benefits on a separate cumulative injury claim where the cumulative injury was based solely on aggravation of the earlier traumatic injury. Because the three-year statute of limitations for review-reopening had passed Claimant instead brought a separate cumulative injury claim. The commissioner declined to award benefits for the asserted cumulative injury. The district court upheld the commissioner's ruling. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that because Claimant was precluded by the statute of limitations from bringing an original proceeding or review-reopening she could recover by way of a cumulative-injury claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that sufficient record evidence sustained the commissioner's finding that Claimant's difficulties were merely the aggravation over time of her original injury and that Claimant did not suffer a distinct and discrete cumulative injury to support additional benefits.

Logan v. Bon Ton Stores, Inc.

Docket: 19-0608

Opinion Date: May 1, 2020

Judge: Edward M. Mansfield

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's petition for judicial review, holding that timely faxing a petition for judicial review to the opposing party's counsel, where the petition is actually received and no prejudice results, constitutes substantial compliance under Iowa Code 17A.19(2). Appellant filed four petitions with the Iowa Workers' Compensation Commission against Respondents, her employer and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, alleging that she received several workplace injuries. The commissioner largely denied the petitions. Appellant then filed a pro se petition with the district court seeking judicial review. The petition was electronically filed, and Appellant faxed copies the same day to Respondents and the workers' compensation commission. The district court granted Respondents' motion to dismiss, concluding that Appellant's sending of a fax of her petition was not substantial compliance with the requirements of section 17A.19(2). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant substantially complied with the service requirements in section 17A.19(2).