Latest 5 Cases: Harris v. Wallace (Civil Rights), Garcia v. City of New Hope (Civil Rights), Little Rock Family Planning Services v. Rutledge ...

NYC’s Mandatory Collective Bargaining Agreements in Fast-Food Shops?

SAMUEL ESTREICHER, ZACHARY FASMAN

NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and adjunct professor Zachary Fasman comment on two bills passed by the New York City Council that would mandate detailed and extensive labor protections for fast-food workers in New York City. Professors Estreicher and Fasman praise the intent behind the laws but explain why the City Council is not the place where binding agreements governing private workplaces in the City should be enacted.

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Harris v. Wallace

Docket: 18-3717

Opinion Date: January 5, 2021

Judge: Jane Louise Kelly

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Harris pleaded guilty to first-degree assault. In 2012, the Circuit Court of Scott County, Missouri imposed a 15-year sentence, ordering that it run concurrently with Harris’s recently-imposed 25-year federal sentence, imposed after he pleaded guilty to interference with commerce by threat or violence, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and being a convicted felon in possession of ammunition. His federal sentence, which was silent on whether it was to be served consecutively or concurrently, was later reduced to 183 months, in light of the Supreme Court’s Johnson decision. Harris is in state custody, receiving credit only against his state sentence. He will begin serving his federal sentence after he completes his state sentence and is transferred to the Bureau of Prisons. Despite the state court’s order, Harris will serve consecutive, not concurrent, sentences. Harris sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Harris alleged sufficient facts to apprise the court and the state of a distinct basis for his claim—that Plea Counsel advised that his 25-year federal sentence would “swallow” up any state sentence he would receive for pleading guilty to assault. On remand, the district court must determine whether Harris procedurally defaulted that claim.

Garcia v. City of New Hope

Docket: 19-1836

Opinion Date: January 5, 2021

Judge: Lavenski R. Smith

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Officer Baker, on school patrol, motioned for Garcia to stop and shouted for him to slow down. Garcia responded that he was going the speed limit. Garcia drove away. Later, in the afternoon, Garcia again saw Baker at the school. He extended his hand and raised his middle finger. Baker followed Garcia, called for backup, and pulled Garcia over. Baker told Garcia that there were children present and that his actions constituted disorderly conduct. Baker repeatedly asked for Garcia’s license but he ignored her requests and demanded that she call her supervisor. Other officers arrived. Baker told Garcia to get out his “g*d d**n D.L.” Garcia yelled that he was “protected by the First Amendment!” Baker opened the door and grabbed Garcia as he stepped out of the vehicle, placed him against his vehicle, handcuffed him, stating that he was being detained for disorderly conduct. Baker held Garcia in the squad car for seven minutes and issued a citation. As Garcia left, he yelled, “f**k you.” Baker later stated that she had noted a license plate violation. Garcia later apologized in writing, took a driving course, and entered into an “Agreement to Suspend Prosecution.” Garcia's complaint with the New Hope Police Department was not sustained. In Garcia’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment, citing qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit reversed with respect to Garcia’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Baker. Genuine disputes of material fact exist; a reasonable jury could find that Baker lacked probable cause to pull Garcia over. The court affirmed in part. Given the totality of the circumstances, the officers’ use of force in handcuffing Garcia was objectively reasonable.

Little Rock Family Planning Services v. Rutledge

Docket: 19-2690

Opinion Date: January 5, 2021

Judge: James B. Loken

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

LRFP challenged the constitutionality (42 U.S.C. 1983) of three 2019 Arkansas statutes: Act 493 bans providers from performing an abortion when the “probable age” of the fetus is “determined to be greater than eighteen weeks’ gestation,” with exceptions for a medical emergency or a pregnancy that results from rape or incest; Act 619 prohibits a provider from intentionally performing an abortion with knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion “solely on the basis” of any reason to believe that the fetus has Down syndrome, with exceptions if the abortion is necessary to preserve the woman’s life or health and for rape or incest; and Act 700, providing that a person who performs an abortion must be a licensed physician “board-certified or board-eligible in obstetrics and gynecology” (OBGYN). A provider who violates these statutes commits a Class D felony and is subject to suspension or revocation of his medical license. The district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the Acts. The Eighth Circuit affirmed with respect to Act 493 and Act 619 and dismissed as moot the appeal concerning Act 700 because the plaintiffs were in compliance with the OBGYN requirement. Defendants presented no generally accepted medical evidence that the attainment of viability has shifted; Act 493 effectively prohibits a substantial universe of pre-viability abortions. Act 619 is a complete prohibition of abortions based on the pregnant woman’s reason for exercising the right to terminate her pregnancy before viability.

Robbins v. City of Des Moines

Docket: 19-2492

Opinion Date: January 5, 2021

Judge: Erickson

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City and three police officers, in their individual and official capacities, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff has not shown a deprivation of a clearly established right. In this case, officers observed plaintiff recording both vehicles near the police station and officers and civilian employees entering and leaving the police station; the officers possessed other significant information: they were aware of recent criminal activity involving cars parked in the area, and they were aware of a previous filming and stalking incident that escalated into the murder of two officers; and plaintiff was non-responsive, evasive, and confrontational. The court explained that, in light of the circumstances, the officers' conduct was not objectively unreasonable under clearly established law. Furthermore, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity for the Terry stop because they had at least arguable reasonable suspicion. Finally, there is no cognizable Monell claim. However, the court reversed in part, holding that the officers are not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity on plaintiff's claim of false arrest. The court explained that a reasonable officer would not have believed he had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for loitering because there is no evidence plaintiff was blocking the sidewalk or disrupting the activity of the police station. Furthermore, regardless of whether the Place exception applies to personal effects such as phones and cameras, the duration of the seizure here was unreasonable. Therefore, the officers violated plaintiff's clearly established right to be free of unreasonable seizures of his property and are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Wiseman v. Wachendorf

Docket: 19-2393

Opinion Date: January 5, 2021

Judge: Steven M. Colloton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Under a prisoner transfer arrangement, petitioner is serving a thirty-year sentence imposed in Arkansas state court in 1996. After petitioner was sentenced in Arkansas, the federal government prosecuted him for offenses committed before his incarceration, and a federal court in New Mexico sentenced him in September 1997 to a term of 595 months' imprisonment. The federal government briefly assigned petitioner to a federal prison, but then concluded that he should have been returned to Arkansas and transferred him back there in October 1997. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus based on petitioner's claim that time served since September 1997 on his Arkansas sentence should also be credited against his federal sentence. The court concluded that petitioner is not entitled to credit against his federal sentence where the district court did not clearly err in finding that Arkansas transferred custody to the United States pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum; the federal government's mistaken retention of custody does not constitute an assumption of primary jurisdiction where the State never intended to relinquish jurisdiction and the error was quickly rectified; and a detainer does not alter the custody status of a prisoner. Finally, the court held that the district court did not err in denying petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel.