Latest 5 Cases: Manson Construction Co. v. County of Contra Costa (Admiralty & Maritime Law), McCluskey v. Henry (Arbitration & Mediation), ...

The Coronavirus and the Election: Trump’s Fateful Decisions Are Shocking and Disqualifying

NEIL H. BUCHANAN

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan explains why President Trump’s inept handling of the COVID-19 pandemic should disqualify him from even running for reelection, let alone returning to office. Buchanan argues that it is shocking that we cannot predict the outcome of the 2020 election in light of Trump’s failure to address the biggest health crisis in a century and his consistent efforts to undermine the public response every step of the way.

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Election Day 2020: A Good Day to End the GOP’s War on Women

JOANNA L. GROSSMAN

SMU Dedman School of Law professor Joanna L. Grossman describes the myriad ways the Trump administration has harmed the interests of women and expresses hope that the outcome of the 2020 Presidential Election will mark the end of the GOP’s war on women. Grossman notes that if Biden and the Democrats win the White House and Congress, they will have not only the opportunity but the obligation to restore what the modern GOP has destroyed.

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States of Anxiety: Will Federalism Save Democracy in America?

DEAN FALVY

Dean Falvy, a lecturer at the University of Washington School of Law in Seattle, explains why federalism—the autonomy of the states in our country—has been a significant barrier to many of the authoritarian projects Trump has advanced or considered. Falvy argues that the same autonomy should prevent Trump from manipulating the election results decisively in his own favor.

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Manson Construction Co. v. County of Contra Costa

Docket: A159144(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 2, 2020

Judge: Petrou

Areas of Law: Admiralty & Maritime Law, Tax Law

Manson owns heavy marine construction and dredging equipment, including 60 specialized vessels and over 50 barges. After the Contra Costa County Assessor’s Office assessed property taxes on the value of Manson’s vessels for tax years 2013 and 2014, Manson filed administrative appeals, claiming some of its vessels were exempt from taxation under the Vessel Use Exemption, which provides that “[v]essels of more than 50 tons burden in this State and engaged in the transportation of freight or passengers” “are exempt from property taxation,” Cal. Const. art. XIII, section 3(l). The Board denied Manson’s appeals. The trial court and court of appeal affirmed. Manson did not establish that anyone owned or controlled the sludge it dredged, or that the dredged material could be considered goods, delivered from a consignor to a consignee. The dump scows and barges were moved from the harbor to disposal sites for the purpose of being emptied out so that they could return to the harbor and continue to perform the work for which they were hired; the carrying of the dredged material from the harbor to the disposal sites was merely a necessary byproduct of, and incidental to, that dredging work. Manson’s vessels were engaged in dredging, not in the transportation of goods for hire.

McCluskey v. Henry

Docket: A158851(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 2, 2020

Judge: Petrou

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Legal Ethics

McCluskey sought damages for the termination of her Airbnb account, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court granted a motion to stay the action and compel arbitration under the contract between McCluskey and Airbnb. McCluskey filed a claim for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association (AAA), which set deadlines for paying filing fees. McCluskey paid her fee; AAA acknowledged receipt. Airbnb sent the fee by wire transfer. AAA did not acknowledge receipt. In an April 9 email, AAA informed all counsel that it had closed the arbitration due to defendants’ failure to pay their filing fee. Defense counsel contacted AAA, and, on April 19, sent documentation of an April 5 wire transfer and an email explaining the payment had been sent together with another payment. On May 1, AAA emailed all parties that payment had been received and that AAA needed confirmation, by May 6, that they wanted the case reopened. Not having heard from McCluskey, on May 9 AAA sent “a final request for confirmation.” McCluskey again did not respond. On May 10, McCluskey sought to lift the stay, asserting that the defendants’ failure to pay their filing fee by April 5, constituted a default, waiver, or breach of the arbitration agreement. The court denied the motion. The defendants served a section 128.7 sanctions motion. The court of appeal affirmed an award of $22,159.50, as “reasonable” attorney fees for opposing the motion to lift the stay and declining to award fees incurred in bringing the sanctions motion.

California v. Stockman

Docket: E073190(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 2, 2020

Judge: Raphael

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The issue this appeal presented for the Court of Appeal's review related to the model jury instructions for driving under the influence (DUI) causing injury (Veh. Code, sec. 23153 (a)), and its lesser included offense of DUI (sec. 23152 (a)). Defendant-appellant Christopher Stockman contended the model instructions differed in a manner that affected his jury verdict. The instruction on the lesser offense of DUI, CALCRIM No. 2110, directed the jury that the “manner in which a person drives is not enough by itself to establish” that the person was “under the influence,” though it may be considered along with other factors. The instruction for DUI causing injury, CALCRIM No. 2100, contained no such direction. Stockman unsuccessfully sought a modified version of CALCRIM No. 2100 that would harmonize the two instructions. The Court of Appeal agreed with Stockman that there was no basis to provide differing instructions for determining whether a person was “under the influence” as to these two offenses. The Court published its opinion to encourage trial courts not to provide differing instructions for the two offenses, and it likewise encouraged the Judicial Council of California to consider reconciling the two instructions by amending either CALCRIM No. 2100 or CALCRIM No. 2110 to eliminate this disparity. To this case, however, the Court concluded that the “manner of driving” instruction implicated principles of law that had no bearing on this case. Thus, any error was harmless. Judgment was affirmed.

California v. Winkler

Docket: C077992(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 2, 2020

Judge: Murray

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Defendant Todd Winkler killed his third wife (the victim) by stabbing her in the neck, severing her jugular vein. She had been having an extramarital affair and was planning to divorce defendant. Defendant did not deny killing her, but claimed he did so in self-defense. A jury found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree and found true the enhancement allegation that defendant personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of the murder. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 26 years to life. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the 1999 death of defendant’s second wife under Evidence Code section 1101(b). The Georgia authorities where the incident took place determined the death was accidental. Before allowing the jury to hear this evidence, the trial court had a gatekeeping duty under Evidence Code section 403 (a) to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to establish a homicidal act by a preponderance of the evidence. In doing so, the trial court relied on evidence related to the charged offense as proof of the earlier homicidal act. Furthermore, the Court concluded that any probative value the uncharged act evidence had was substantially outweighed by the Evidence Code section 352 concerns of undue consumption of time and undue prejudice. However, given the strength of the admissible evidence, the Court of Appeal concluded the error was harmless. As to his asserted error regarding evidence related to the victim’s fear of him, the Court concluded defendant forfeited several of these contentions. And contrary to defendant’s assertion, he was not denied the constitutionally effective assistance of counsel for his attorney’s failure to object to the evidence. The Court also rejected defendant’s cumulative error argument. And there was substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support his conviction of murder in the first degree. The abstract of judgment had to be corrected to reflect that the indeterminate sentence imposed was 25 years to life, and delete reference to the term of life without the possibility of parole.

In re Christopher L.

Docket: B305225(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 2, 2020

Judge: Frances Rothschild

Areas of Law: Family Law

Father appealed the termination of his parental rights at a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 permanency planning hearing. Although the Court of Appeal was troubled by the errors father identifies in connection with the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the court concluded that they would not have affected the ultimate outcome of the dependency proceedings and affirmed the trial court's order regarding son. In this case, the errors identified were not prejudicial under the applicable harmless error analysis articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818. Nor are they prejudicial under the more stringent "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24. Under the harmless standard analysis, the record clearly establishes that, had father appeared and/or been represented by counsel at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, father would not have obtained a more favorable result. The court also denied father's motion to apply the doctrine of constructive filing to extend father's appeal regarding daughter. The court held that, given its conclusion that father's arguments regarding son do not warrant reversal, permitting father to pursue them with respect to daughter would serve no purpose.