Click here to remove Verdict from subsequent Justia newsletter(s). | New on Verdict Legal Analysis and Commentary | Not Letting Felons Vote Damages Democracy for All Citizens | AUSTIN SARAT | | Austin Sarat—Associate Provost, Associate Dean of the Faculty, and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science at Amherst College—argues that disenfranchising felons, as most American states do in some way, does substantial harm to everyone in our democracy. Sarat praises a recent decision by a federal district court in Florida striking down a state law requiring people with serious criminal convictions to pay court fines and fees before they can register to vote, but he cautions that but much more needs to be done to ensure that those who commit serious crimes can exercise one of the essential rights of citizenship. | Read More |
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US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Opinions | Norman v. Elkin | Docket: 19-2294 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Jordan Areas of Law: Business Law, Contracts | Founding USM to acquire FCC licenses, Elkin contributed $750,000 and Norman $250,000. Norman acquired the licenses; his day-to-day involvement ended. In 1998, the FCC announced another auction. USM won several licenses, which Elkin transferred to TEG, another company that he owned; purportedly USM did not have sufficient funds. Elkin did not respond to Norman's inquiries. Some FCC notices listed USM as the winning bidder; others referred to TEG as the licenses' owner. Before 2002, without notifying Norman, Elkin caused USM to enter into a Shareholder Loan Agreement (SLA) to treat any amount Elkin contributed above his capital requirement as a loan. Elkin lent USM more than $600,000. In 2000-2001, USM sold licenses. Norman received federal income tax forms that declared USM had realized a capital gain. In 2000-2002, USM paid Elkin $615,026 from the sales proceeds. Norman received nothing. In 2002. Elkin admitted that licenses had been sold and that he had taken a distribution. Norman's 2004 Delaware "books and records" action was resolved in his favor in 2005. Norman sued, raising various tort and contract claims After two trials and a remand, the district court concluded that the limitations period for each of Norman’s claims was tolled during the Delaware Action and that Norman’s claim based on 2002 distributions was timely. Oer Third Circuit mandate, the court ruled in Normans' favor with respect to the execution of the SLA. For Norman’s other claims, including those based on 2001 distributions, the court held that Norman had at least inquiry notice beyond the limitations period. Elkin then argued that Norman was not entitled to tolling relating to the Delaware Action because he brought that suit in bad faith. The district court refused to consider new evidence. The Third Circuit affirmed, except with respect to Norman’s claim based on 2001 events. | | Deon v. Barasch | Docket: 18-3325 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Richard Lowell Nygaard Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Election Law, Gaming Law | Section 1513 of the Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act prevents the plaintiffs from making political contributions because they hold interests in businesses that have gaming licenses. They sued, claiming First Amendment and Equal Protection violations. The district court concluded that Section 1513 furthers a substantially important state interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption but ruled that the restriction is unconstitutional because the Commonwealth did not draw it closely enough. The court permanently enjoined the enforcement of Section 1513. The Third Circuit affirmed. Limitations on campaign expenditures are subject to strict scrutiny. The government must prove that the regulations promote a “compelling interest” and are the “least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.” Even applying an intermediate threshold, examining whether the statute is “closely drawn,” the Commonwealth does not meet its burden. The overwhelming majority of states with commercial, non-tribal casino gambling like Pennsylvania do not have any political contribution restrictions that apply specifically to gaming industry-related parties. The Commonwealth’s implicit appeal to “common sense” as a surrogate for evidence in support of its far-reaching regulatory scheme is noteworthy in light of the approach taken by most other similarly situated states. | | Doe v. University of the Sciences | Docket: 19-2966 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Porter Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Education Law | Doe, a student at USciences, a private Philadelphia college, had completed nearly all the coursework required to earn a degree in biomedical science when two female students accused him of violating USciences’s Sexual Misconduct Policy. After investigating, USciences concluded that Doe violated the Policy and expelled him. Doe filed suit, alleging that USciences was improperly motivated by sex when it investigated and enforced the Policy against him. Doe also asserted that USciences breached its contract with him by failing to provide him the fairness promised to students under the Policy. The district court dismissed Doe’s complaint. The Third Circuit reversed. Doe’s complaint contains plausible allegations that USciences, in its implementation and enforcement of the Policy, succumbed to pressure from the U.S. Department of Education and has “instituted solutions to sexual violence against women that abrogate the civil rights of men and treat men differently than women.” Doe claimed the school investigated him but chose not to investigate three female students who allegedly violated the Policy with respect to alcohol consumption and sex. The court analyzed the Policy’s promise of “fairness,” an undefined term, by examining federal guarantees and state case law. | | United States v. Fruit | Dockets: 19-1326, 19-1038 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Hardiman Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Pennsylvania Trooper Ramirez stopped a car for speeding after running the license plate and learning the car was owned by Enterprise. It lacked typical rental stickers. Each vent had an air freshener clipped to it. The driver, Fruit, gave Ramirez his license and rental car agreement, identifying his passenger, Garner. The rental agreement listed Fruit as the authorized driver but limited to New York and appeared to have expired 20 days earlier. Ramirez questioned Garner; 12 minutes into the stop, Ramirez put their information into his computer and learned that neither man had outstanding warrants, although Fruit was on supervised release. Both had extensive criminal records, including drug and weapons crimes. Enterprise confirmed that Fruit had extended the rental beyond the listed expiration date. Ramirez resolved to ask permission to search the vehicle but waited for backup, which arrived 37 minutes into the stop. Fruit declined permission to search. Ramirez stated that he was calling for a K-9 and Fruit was not free to leave. "Zigi" arrived 56 minutes into the stop, alerted at the car, then entered the vehicle and alerted in the back seat and trunk. A search revealed 300 grams of cocaine and 261 grams of heroin. Both men were indicted for conspiracy to possess (and possession) with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine. The district court denied their motion to suppress, ruling that Ramirez had “an escalating degree of reasonable suspicion” that justified extending the stop. In a consolidated appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. Ramirez had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop based on information he obtained during the first few minutes of the traffic stop before he engaged in an unrelated investigation; no unlawful extension of the stop occurred. | | Eshleman v. Patrick Industries Inc | Docket: 19-1403 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Theodore Alexander McKee Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law | Eshleman started working as a Patrick truck driver in 2013. In 2015, Eshleman took medical leave to undergo surgery to remove a nodule from his lung. After two months of medical leave, Eshleman returned to work without restrictions. Six weeks later, Eshleman suffered a severe respiratory infection from January 27-31, 2016 (spanning a weekend). His supervisor approved two vacation days. With his physician’s approval, Eshleman returned to work in his full capacity on February 1. At the end of his second day back, Patrick fired him. The Superintendent cited “performance issues.” Eshleman reminded the Superintendent that his performance review from January 2016 had been excellent. Thereafter, the Superintendent claimed that Eshleman was fired because he had not called out sick during his leave for the respiratory infection. Later, Eshleman learned that the reason for termination had been changed again; Patrick was claiming he had been fired for “behavioral issues.” Eshleman sued, alleging that he was fired because he was regarded as disabled, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and that the shifting reasons for his termination were a pretext for illegal disability discrimination. The district court dismissed, holding that the ADA did not cover Eshleman’s “regarded as” claim because his impairment lasted less than six months and was “transitory and minor.” The Third Circuit reversed. The district court did not conduct an independent analysis into whether Eshleman’s impairment was minor, apart from whether it was transitory. | |
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