When Is Optimism Actually Pessimism? When Trump Is President

NEIL H. BUCHANAN

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan continues his discussion considering the future of the rule of law in the United States. Buchanan argues that even assuming a “long arc of American political history,” knowing that eventually, another group of heroes might rise is comforting only in a vague sense.

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Georgia v. Gates

Dockets: S19A1130, S19X1131

Opinion Date: March 13, 2020

Judge: Bethel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Both the State of Georgia and Johnny Lee Gates appealed the grant of Gates’ extraordinary motion for new trial by the trial court. In Case No. S19A1130, the State argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that Gates should receive a new trial because of the discovery of new DNA evidence that was material and exculpatory. The State also argued that the trial court erred when it also appeared to grant Gates’ extraordinary motion on the basis of Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), due to destruction of evidence by the State. In Case No. S19X1131, Gates cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court should have also granted him a new trial on his claim that the process by which the jury at his 1977 trial was selected was marred by racial discrimination. Because the Georgia Supreme Court found no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in its grant of a new trial to Gates on the basis of the newly discovered DNA evidence, it affirmed that judgment in Case No. S19A1130. In light of that determination, the Court did not consider the State’s argument in Case No. S19A1130 relating to Gates’ Youngblood claim or the arguments raised by Gates in Case No. S19X1131.

Georgia v. Remy

Docket: S19A1410

Opinion Date: March 13, 2020

Judge: David E. Nahmias

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In March 2018, Paul Remy was tried for murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Jenario Stark. After the jury had deliberated for a full day without reaching a verdict, the trial court declared a mistrial. Four days later, Remy filed a motion for immunity from prosecution under OCGA 16-3-24.2, arguing that he shot Stark in defense of himself and others. Before the hearing on the immunity motion occurred, the State re-indicted Remy for the same incident, omitting a count of aggravated assault and adding a second charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. After the hearing, the trial court granted Remy immunity. The court then dismissed the new indictment on the ground that it was issued after a court-ordered deadline for the filing of new indictments. On appeal, the State raised three alleged errors: (1) Remy was not entitled to file a motion for immunity after a mistrial; (2) even if an immunity motion may be considered after the declaration of a mistrial, Remy was not entitled to immunity on the merits; and (3) the trial court erred when it dismissed the second indictment. Because the trial court failed to provide a legal basis for dismissing the charges in the second indictment, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed that ruling. Furthermore, the Court vacated the felon-in-possession charge for the trial court to conduct further analysis in light of Johnson v. Georgia, Case No. S19A1404, 2020 WL 966592 (Feb. 28, 2020). The Court affirmed as to all other issues.

Mattox v. Georgia

Docket: S20A0026

Opinion Date: March 13, 2020

Judge: Keith R. Blackwell

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Charles “Dre” Mattox was tried by jury and convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the fatal shootings of Dewayne Bacon and John Bacon. Mattox appealed, claiming: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel; and (3) his due process rights were violated by a lengthy delay in the disposition of his motion for new trial. Upon its review of the record and briefs, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed.

Stubbs v. Hall

Docket: S19A1253

Opinion Date: March 13, 2020

Judge: Warren

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In 2005, Henry Stubbs was convicted of armed robbery and hijacking a motor vehicle, among many other crimes, and was sentenced to life imprisonment plus 31 years. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions in 2008. In 2012, Stubbs filed a writ of habeas corpus through an attorney, which the habeas court dismissed as untimely. He then filed an application for a certificate of probable cause with the Georgia Supreme Court to appeal that dismissal. The issue the Supreme Court considered on certiorari review was whether the habeas court erred in dismissing Stubbs' petition as untimely when Stubbs presented evidence, via a verified habeas petition, that he had not been advised of the time limitations governing habeas corpus actions. Although the Supreme Court concluded that the habeas court’s ruling about the exact date that Stubbs’s convictions became final was erroneous, the Court nonetheless affirmed the habeas court’s dismissal of Stubbs’s petition because it was untimely under OCGA 9-14-42(c)(1) — a fact that neither party disputed. The Court also concluded that Stubbs’s untimely petition was not subject to statutory or equitable tolling. The Court therefore answered the question presented “no” and affirmed the habeas court’s dismissal of Stubbs’s petition.

Watkins v. Ballinger

Docket: S19A1506

Opinion Date: March 13, 2020

Judge: Boggs

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted Joseph Watkins’ application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal a superior court order dismissing Watkins’ second petition for writ of habeas corpus. The issue presented for the Georgia Supreme Court's review centered on whether the habeas court properly dismissed Watkins’ petition as both untimely and successive. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the habeas court erred in dismissing Watkins’ petition, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Williams v. DeKalb County

Docket: S19A1163

Opinion Date: March 13, 2020

Judge: Ellington

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Edward Williams appealed a superior court order dismissing his second amended complaint with prejudice. Acting pro se, Williams sued DeKalb County and members of its governing authority, the Chief Executive Officer and the DeKalb County Board of Commissioners, in their official and individual capacities (collectively, “Appellees”). Williams challenged the legality of a DeKalb County ordinance, which increased the salaries of the members of the county governing authority, setting forth claims for mandamus, declaratory and injunctive relief, criminal and civil penalties for violating the Open Meetings Act, and attorney fees and costs of litigation. On appeal, Williams argued the trial court erred in dismissing his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the members of the governing authority in their individual capacities for acting unlawfully in increasing their own pay. He argued the trial court erred in dismissing his claim that the County Home Rule Paragraph of the Georgia Constitution, precluded county governing authorities from having the power to increase their own pay. The Georgia Supreme Court did not reach the merits of these claims of error because Williams lacked standing to sue the members of the governing authority for declaratory relief, he lacked standing to sue the commissioners for injunctive relief, and whether he has standing to seek injunctive relief against Thurmond required proper analysis by the trial court on remand. Williams also contended the trial court erred in dismissing his claims against the commissioners for violating the Open Meetings Act before passing the salary ordinance, making them individually liable for civil penalties under the Act. To this contention, the Supreme Court agreed, reversing that portion of the court’s order dismissing Williams’ claim against the commissioners for civil penalties under the Open Meetings Act. The matter was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings.