Click here to remove Verdict from subsequent Justia newsletter(s). | New on Verdict Legal Analysis and Commentary | Not Letting Felons Vote Damages Democracy for All Citizens | AUSTIN SARAT | | Austin Sarat—Associate Provost, Associate Dean of the Faculty, and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science at Amherst College—argues that disenfranchising felons, as most American states do in some way, does substantial harm to everyone in our democracy. Sarat praises a recent decision by a federal district court in Florida striking down a state law requiring people with serious criminal convictions to pay court fines and fees before they can register to vote, but he cautions that but much more needs to be done to ensure that those who commit serious crimes can exercise one of the essential rights of citizenship. | Read More |
|
California Courts of Appeal Opinions | Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto Group | Docket: A156411(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Peter J. Siggins Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation, Labor & Employment Law | Jarboe was hired by DKD of Davis, doing business as Hanlees Davis Toyota. Shortly after he began working, Jarboe was transferred to Leehan of Davis, doing business as Hanlees Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram Kia. Following his termination at Leehan, Jarboe brought a wage and hour action against the Hanlees Auto Group, its 12 affiliated dealerships, including DKD and Leehan, and three individuals. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on an employment agreement between Jarboe and DKD. The trial court granted the motion as to 11 of the 12 causes of action against DKD of Davis but denied the motion as to the other defendants and allowed Jarboe’s claim under the Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code 2698. to proceed in court against all defendants. The court refused to stay the causes of action allowed to proceed in litigation pending arbitration of Jarboe’s claims against DKD. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument by Hanlees, its affiliated dealerships, and the individual defendants that they were entitled to enforce the agreement to arbitrate between Jarboe and DKD as third party beneficiaries of Jarboe’s employment agreement or under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The trial court did not err in failing to stay the litigation under Labor Code section 1281. | | Rubinstein v. Fakheri | Docket: B291116(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Elwood G.H. Lui Areas of Law: Business Law, Contracts | Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging a common count claim for "money lent." The trial court found that plaintiff loaned defendant $874,708.44, which defendant never repaid. Defendant argued that the money came from entities controlled by plaintiff rather than from plaintiff himself. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment against defendant because defendant waived his defense of lack of capacity by failing to assert it at the earliest opportunity. The court also held that the trial court properly concluded that proof of an implied promise to repay was legally sufficient for plaintiff's common count claim. In this case, substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that defendant made such an implied promise. Finally, defendant's statute of frauds argument is meritless. | | McGee v. Torrance Unified School District | Docket: B298122(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Tricia A. Bigelow Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law | This appeal challenges the legality of lease-leaseback agreements used by school districts for construction and modernization projects. The trial court entered judgment dismissing plaintiff's remaining conflict of interest claims because the challenged projects had all been completed, which it held rendered the reverse validation action moot. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of dismissal, holding that allowing plaintiff's claims to proceed long after the projects have been finished would undermine the strong policy of promptly resolving the validity of public agency actions. In this case, the lease-leaseback agreements were subject to validation, and plaintiff's conflict of interest claims necessarily challenge the validity of the agreements, regardless of label or remedy. Because the projects were completed, plaintiff's claims are moot. | | People v. Best | Docket: A155459(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Tucher Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | A man parked his car in San Francisco's Sutter-Stockton Garage, leaving his dog in the car. When he returned, he saw his dog had been brutally killed. A security guard viewed video clips from the incident and recognized Best, who was charged with second-degree burglary of a vehicle; killing, maiming, or abusing an animal; and vandalism of the vehicle, plus four misdemeanors. The trial court declared a doubt about Best’s competency; Best apparently refused to face the judge in order to avoid having her image recorded. Experts evaluated Best; the court found Best mentally competent to stand trial. The matter was continued for a Faretta hearing. A different judge confirmed that Best had read and initialed each portion of an “Advisement and Waiver of Right to Counsel” and inquired into Best’s education and awareness of the charges. The court engaged in extensive questioning. Some of Best’s responses betrayed a lack of understanding of legal concepts and procedures. When the court asked Best about possible defenses, her discussion verged on incoherence. Best gave clear, accurate answers to simpler questions. The court denied her motion. Best was convicted. The court of appeal reversed; the trial court erred in denying Best the right to represent herself on the grounds she had not knowingly and voluntarily made that choice. The court rejected arguments that the Faretta motion was untimely and that Best was disruptive and disobedient and noted that the transcript does not show Best was advised of the maximum punishment she faced. | | California Gun Rights Foundation v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Count | Docket: B299798(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Lee Anne Edmon Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law | Section 6259 of the California Public Records Act governs venue, not jurisdiction, and thus it does not deprive a superior court of subject matter jurisdiction over a public records dispute even if the requested records are not situated in the county where the lawsuit is brought. In this case, although the records sought are not situated in Los Angeles County, the Court of Appeal held that the Los Angeles Superior Court nonetheless has jurisdiction over this action. The court also held that the venue provision of section 6259 does not override Code of Civil Procedure section 401, which provides that if an action may be brought against the state or its agencies in Sacramento, it also may be brought anywhere the Attorney General has an office. Therefore, because this action may be brought in Sacramento County, the court held that it may also be brought in Los Angeles, where the Attorney General has an office. Accordingly, the court directed the trial court to vacate its order transferring this matter to Sacramento County. | | Owens v. City of Oakland Housing, Residential Rent & Relocation Board | Docket: A157663(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Peter J. Siggins Areas of Law: Landlord - Tenant, Real Estate & Property Law | Owens owns and resides in a single-family Oakland house. He rented individual rooms to three unrelated tenants. Tenant Barghout filed a petition under Oakland’s Rent Adjustment Program alleging her housing became unsuitable due to disruptive construction work and hazardous conditions and that Owens failed to provide the required notice of the Rent Adjustment Program and retaliated by terminating her lease when she complained and sought a reduction in rent. Owens filed an unlawful detainer complaint, identifying Barghout as a month-to-month housemate with “sole use of one or more rooms and shared use of common areas.” A hearing officer rejected an argument that Barghout’s rental was not subject to the Ordinance because the rooms she rented were in a single-family home that was “alienable, separate from the title of any other dwelling unit,” exempt under the Costa-Hawkins Act from local rent control. The Rent Board, trial court, and court of appeal affirmed. The term “dwelling unit” has different meanings under building and planning codes and rent control ordinances. Under landlord-tenant law, “a dwelling or a unit” is not the entire property to which an owner holds title; it is any area understood to be committed to the habitation of a given tenant or tenants to the exclusion of others. The relevant dwelling unit is not Owens’s home but each of the rooms he rented to tenants. | |
|
About Justia Opinion Summaries | Justia Daily Opinion Summaries is a free service, with 68 different newsletters, covering every federal appellate court and the highest courts of all US states. | Justia also provides weekly practice area newsletters in 63 different practice areas. | All daily and weekly Justia newsletters are free. Subscribe or modify your newsletter subscription preferences at daily.justia.com. | You may freely redistribute this email in whole. | About Justia | Justia is an online platform that provides the community with open access to the law, legal information, and lawyers. |
|