Latest 6 Cases: Oracle America, Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Enterprise Co. (Business Law), Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp. (Civil Procedure), ...

Democracy Is on the Ballot: One Party Defends It, The Other Would Let It Die

AUSTIN SARAT

Austin Sarat—Associate Provost, Associate Dean of the Faculty, and William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science at Amherst College—explains why the 2020 Democratic National Convention was unlike any other political gathering in American history for reasons beyond its virtual platform. Sarat argues that the future of American democracy lies in the balance, and when we vote in November, it will be up to us whether democracy lives or dies.

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Oracle America, Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Enterprise Co.

Docket: 19-15506

Opinion Date: August 20, 2020

Judge: Milan D. Smith

Areas of Law: Business Law, Copyright, Intellectual Property, Internet Law

Oracle, owner of the proprietary Solaris software operating system, filed suit alleging that HPE improperly accessed, downloaded, copied, and installed Solaris patches on servers not under an Oracle support contract. Oracle asserted direct copyright infringement claims for HPE's direct support customers, and indirect infringement claims for joint HPE-Terix customers. The district court granted summary judgment for HPE. The Ninth Circuit held that the copyright infringement claim is subject to the Copyright Act's three year statute of limitations, which runs separately for each violation. The panel explained that Oracle's constructive knowledge triggered the statute of limitations and Oracle failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into the suspected infringement. The panel also held that the intentional interference with prospective economic advantage claim is barred by California's two year statute of limitations. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's partial summary judgment for HPE on the infringement and intentional interference claims. The panel also affirmed in part summary judgment on the indirect infringement claims for patch installations by Terix; reversed summary judgment on all infringement claims for pre-installation conduct and on the direct infringement claims for unauthorized patch installations by HPE; and addressed all other issues in a concurrently filed memorandum opinion.

Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp.

Docket: 18-15890

Opinion Date: August 20, 2020

Judge: Bridget S. Bade

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Consumer Law

The Ninth Circuit issued (a) an order amending its opinion filed on June 17, 2020, denying the petition for rehearing, and denying on behalf of the court the petition for rehearing en banc; and (b) an amended opinion affirming on different grounds the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims for restitution. In this case, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her sole state law damages claim and chose to proceed with only state law equitable claims for restitution and injunctive relief. Plaintiff did so in an attempt to try the class action as a bench trial rather than to a jury. Pursuant to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), the panel held that federal courts must apply equitable principles derived from federal common law to claims for equitable restitution under California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA). The panel explained that state law cannot circumscribe a federal court's equitable powers even when state law affords the rule of decision. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend her complaint for a third time to reallege the CLRA damages claim. In this case, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she lacked an adequate legal remedy.

Monarch Content Management LLC v. Arizona Department of Gaming

Docket: 20-15047

Opinion Date: August 20, 2020

Judge: Andrew David Hurwitz

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Gaming Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction in an action challenging Arizona Revised Statute 5-112(U). Section 5-112(U) requires, among other things, that any simulcast of live horseracing into Arizona that originates outside the state "must be offered to each commercial live-racing permittee … and additional wagering facility" in the state. The panel held that the Interstate Horse Racing Act of 1978 (IHA) does not preempt section 5-112(U). The panel also held that Monarch, a simulcast purchaser and sales agent for racetracks, and Laurel Park, a Maryland racetrack whose races Monarch simulcasts, had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The panel explained that the IHA does not address how the states can regulate simulcasts, and the Arizona statute does not address Laurel Park's statutory right to consent before interstate wagering on its races can be conducted. Therefore, it is not facially impossible to comply with both laws. Furthermore, the Arizona statute does not frustrate the intent of the IHA. The panel rejected plaintiffs' contention that section 5-112(U) is an unconstitutional regulation on commercial speech and a forbidden content-based restriction; rejected plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment and Due Process challenges; held that the Arizona statute does not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause; and held that the statute did not give rise to a Contract Clause claim.

United States v. Berckmann

Docket: 18-10446

Opinion Date: August 20, 2020

Judge: John Byron Owens

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for assaulting his wife with a dangerous weapon and assault of a spouse by strangulation, both of which occurred on federal land. The panel held that the evidence from two other attacks on defendant's wife was proper non-propensity evidence admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a). The panel stated that other acts of domestic violence involving the same victim are textbook examples of evidence admissible under Rule 404(b). In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the non-propensity evidence to show that defendant was not joking around or simply trying to frighten his wife, but rather intended to assault and strangle her. The panel also held that there was no error in admitting the evidence under Rule 403 where the evidence of the prior attacks were probative of his intent in this case. Furthermore, the district court on three separate occasions instructed the jury that such acts could only be used for the limited purpose of deciding whether the defendant had the state of mind, knowledge, or intent to commit the crimes charged in the indictment.

United States v. Lague

Docket: 18-10500

Opinion Date: August 20, 2020

Judge: J. Clifford Wallace

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for 39 counts of distributing controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose to five of his former patients. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his role as a physician's assistant at a chronic pain-management medical practice. The panel held that uncharged prescriptions of controlled substances in enormous quantities, and in dangerous combinations, support a reasonable inference that the underlying prescriptions were issued outside the usual course of professional practice and without a legitimate medical purpose. In this case, defendant's practice-wide evidence was therefore probative of his unlawful intent, undermining his defense at trial that the charged prescriptions amounted to a "few bad judgments." The panel held that, because the prescription data made the intent element of the 21 U.S.C. 841 charges more probable, the district court properly admitted defendant's uncharged prescriptions under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Assuming without deciding that the district court abused its discretion under Rule 403 by failing to preview all of the underlying prescription data before admitting it into evidence, the panel held that the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

United States v. Rodriguez

Docket: 16-50213

Opinion Date: August 20, 2020

Judge: Jacqueline H. Nguyen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for conspiracy in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act and conspiracy in violation of the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity (VICAR) Act. Defendant's convictions stemmed from her role as "secretary" to a high-ranking member of the Mexican Mafia (La Eme). The panel held that the district court correctly gave a "substantial purpose" rather than "but-for cause" instruction for the VICAR purpose element, and the evidence was sufficient to satisfy VICAR's membership-purpose requirement. The panel also held that there was no basis for reversal on the claimed instructional error for the RICO count; the jury instructions regarding attempt and conspiracy as predicate acts did not broaden the basis for conviction beyond the scope of the RICO statute; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving its mid-trial instruction. The panel rejected defendant's challenges to the dual role opinion testimony offered by two law enforcement witnesses for the government. Finally, the panel held that the district court did not err in excluding testimony from a key defense witness. Accordingly, the panel found no cumulative error providing a basis for reversal of defendant's conviction.