Latest 6 Cases This Week: United States v. Bellille (3d Cir.), Cartwright v. Silver Cross Hospital (7th Cir.), Timothy B. O'Brien LLC v. Knott ...

Hard Cases

JOSEPH MARGULIES

Cornell law professor Joseph Margulies uses the killing of Rayshard Brooks in Atlanta by police to explain some lessons for reform we might learn. Margulies calls upon us to use this case to reexamine the circumstances that should result in a custodial arrest and to shrink the function of police so as to use them only in the very few situations that truly require them.

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United States v. Bellille

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 19-3544

Opinion Date: June 16, 2020

Judge: Thomas L. Ambro

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics

Golubitsky, as a Virgin Islands Criminal Justice Act (CJA) panelist, was appointed counsel for Bellille, an indigent defendant in a multi-defendant RICO prosecution. Golubitsky unsuccessfully moved to withdraw, arguing that he was no longer a CJA panelist, having moved to an in-house counsel role, and was contractually barred from the representation. Weeks later, Golubitsky purportedly started an of-counsel relationship at the DiRuzzo law firm and filed an emergency motion to withdraw as Bellille’s counsel, arguing that DiRuzzo represented Ayala, who was likely to testify against Bellille, which created a conflict of interest. Golubitsky and DiRuzzo explained that Golubitsky was “on [the firm’s] system,” could bill using the firm’s software, and was added to DiRuzzo’s malpractice insurance. Golubitsky worked full-time as in-house counsel while working part-time for DiRuzzo’s Florida firm, litigating four matters together. They had no involvement in the other’s work related to Bellille’s case nor had they shared any information about the case. The court denied Golubitsky’s motion and ordered DiRuzzo and Golubitsky to wall off the latter’s representation of Bellille from DiRuzzo’s representation of Ayala. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, noting many “factual gaps,” surrounding the relationship between DiRuzzo and Golubitsky and why the relationship was established. The situation cannot be both ways. Either the of-counsel relationship was not genuine and there was no basis for imposing a screen or there was a true of-counsel relationship and a screen alone could not cure the conflict.

Cartwright v. Silver Cross Hospital

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-2595

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Diane S. Sykes

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law, Legal Ethics

In 2015, Cartwright sued his former employer, alleging discrimination based on his race and sex under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; discrimination based on race, 42 U.S.C. 1981; and age discrimination, 29 U.S.C. 623. The judge appointed counsel for the limited purpose of settlement negotiations. The parties did not reach an agreement. The attorney was relieved of the limited representation. Cartwright failed to respond to discovery requests and filed many motions. The judge recruited a lawyer to represent him pro bono but later permitted the attorney to withdraw. The judge recruited another pro bono lawyer. After 14 months and more than 530 hours of work, the third attorney moved to withdraw citing substantial, irreconcilable disagreements with Cartwright. The judge granted the defendants partial summary judgment. Cartwright responded with multiple motions, accusing the judge of bias. The defendants moved to dismiss the case with prejudice for failure to prosecute. The judge recruited another pro bono attorney, then denied the motion as moot. Counsel later was allowed to withdraw. After four years and repeated warnings, the judge dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reminding "judges that they need not and should not recruit volunteer lawyers for civil claimants who won’t cooperate ... Pro bono representation of indigent civil litigants is a venerable tradition ... courts must be careful stewards of this limited resource.”

Timothy B. O'Brien LLC v. Knott

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 19-2138

Opinion Date: June 17, 2020

Judge: Joel Martin Flaum

Areas of Law: Business Law, Copyright, Intellectual Property, Legal Ethics, Trademark

Apple owns Madison, Wisconsin vitamin stores. Knott, a former Apple employee, was fired in 2017. Knott founded his own vitamin shop, Embrace Wellness, in Middleton, Wisconsin. Embrace allegedly shared design features and a similar layout with Apple’s locations and carried comparable products. Apple sued, alleging infringement of its trademark, trade dress, and copyrights. The defendants filed counterclaims for tortious interference and retaliation. Apple sought a preliminary injunction on the trademark and trade dress claims, which the court denied, explaining that Apple had failed to show a likelihood of irreparable harm. Apple then moved to dismiss its own claims without prejudice. Because the defendants had already expended resources litigating an injunction, the court ordered Apple to withdraw its motion or accept dismissal with prejudice, expressing its opinion that no party’s claim was strong. Apple agreed to dismiss its claims with prejudice. The court subsequently denied defendants’ motion for fees; they appealed with respect to the copyright claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Apple’s copyright claims were frivolous—common-law copyright was abolished in 1976—but the totality of the circumstances did not warrant fees. There was no evidence that Apple had filed suit with an improper motive, and no need to deter future frivolous filings. The case was primarily about trademark and trade dress. no motions were filed related to copyright. Apple dismissed the copyright claims voluntarily before defendants had to argue against them.

Seed Company Limited v. Westerman, Hattori, Daniels & Adrian, LLP

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 19-7086

Opinion Date: June 12, 2020

Judge: Karen LeCraft Henderson

Areas of Law: Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Plaintiffs filed a legal malpractice case arising out of the failure of two sets of lawyers associated with two different law firms, Westerman, Hattori, Daniels & Adrian, LLP (Westerman) and Kratz, Quintos & Hanson, LLP (Kratz), to file necessary documents in plaintiffs' patent case, allegedly resulting in plaintiffs' loss of that case. The complaint alleged four counts against defendants: Count I against both defendants for the original malpractice, Count II alleging that Westerman negligently gave legal advice after the original decision in the patent case issued and Counts III and IV alleging that advice Kratz gave regarding the malpractice case against Westerman led to the loss of the Count I claim against both defendants through the operation of the statute of limitations. The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Count II of the Second Amended Complaint where the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that plaintiffs waived any claim for damages arising from the Count II allegations. The court also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Counts III and IV of the Second Amended complaint where plaintiffs failed to establish that Armstrong's advice was the proximate cause of its injuries.

Parsons v. Walters

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2018-CA-01272-SCT

Opinion Date: June 18, 2020

Judge: Chamberlin

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law, Legal Ethics, Personal Injury, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Vernon Walters was injured in a work-related incident in October 2006; the vehicle he was driving was struck by an oncoming train. After receiving workers’ compensation benefits, he and his wife, Donyell Walters, filed a third-party claim against the company operating the train involved in the collision, Kansas City Southern Railway Company (KCSR). The Walterses hired the Parsons Law Firm to represent them in their suit, and Tadd Parsons took the case. The Walterses’ lawsuit against KCSR was ultimately dismissed with prejudice in September 2010 for, among other reasons, failure to prosecute, failure to comply with discovery obligations and fraud upon the court. Tadd never told the Walterses that their case had been dismissed and led them to believe their case was ongoing. Three years after the case had been dismissed, Tadd admitted he fabricated a settlement offer from KCSR in the amount of $104,000 and advised the Walterses to accept the offer, which they did. When eight months passed after Tadd informed the Walterses about the fabricated settlement, the Walterses demanded to meet with Jack Parsons, the other general partner at the Parsons Law Firm. Jack offered the Walterses $50,000 to settle any claims they may have had against Tadd based on his conduct in representing them in the KCSR lawsuit. The Walterses refused Jack’s offer and then filed a claim against Tadd, Jack and the Parsons Law Firm, alleging claims of fraud, defamation, negligent representation, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for the Walterses on the matter of liability, finding that Tadd and the Parsons Law Firm were liable for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court then held a jury trial on damages. The jury verdict awarded the Walterses $2,850,002 in compensatory damages, which exceeded what the Walterses had demanded in compensatory damages in their complaint and in their motion to set damages. Finding the jury’s verdict shocked the conscience, the court remitted the damages to $1,034,666.67 in a second amended final judgment. Parsons appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court, and the Walterses cross-appealed. The Supreme Court determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding irrelevant evidence about the underlying KCSR lawsuit because the value of the lawsuit had no bearing on the damages the Walterses sustained due to Tadd Parsons’s and the Parsons Law Firm’s fraud and IIED. Further, the Court determined the remitted verdict’s award of damages was excessive and not supported by substantial evidence. The trial court was therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the matter remanded for a new trial on damages.

Miller v. Carroll

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Docket: 2017AP002132

Opinion Date: June 16, 2020

Judge: Dallet

Areas of Law: Family Law, Legal Ethics

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's denial of Father's motion for reconsideration of the circuit court's ruling in favor of Mother in a custody dispute, holding that the "extreme" facts of this case rebutted the presumption of judicial impartiality and established a due process violation. The circuit court judge accepted Mother's Facebook "friend request" after a contested hearing but before rendering a decision. During the twenty-five days between the judge's acceptance of Mother's friend request and his issuance of a written decision entirely in her favor, Mother engaged with and reacted to at least twenty of the judge's Facebook posts. Mother further "shared" and "liked" several third-party posts related to an issue that was contested at the hearing. After discovering the Facebook friendship and communications, which the judge never disclosed, Father moved the circuit court for reconsideration, requesting judicial disqualification and a new hearing. The judge denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case with directions that the court proceed before a different circuit court judge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circumstances and facts of this case rose to the level of a serious risk of actual bias, which rebutted the presumption of the judge's impartiality.