Table of Contents | | McGirt v. Oklahoma Criminal Law, Native American Law US Supreme Court | | Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law US Supreme Court | | Trump v. Vance Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law US Supreme Court | | United States v. Cadden Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | | United States v. Chin Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, White Collar Crime US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | | United States v. Valdez Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | | Davidson v. Desai Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | | Ottey v. Barr Criminal Law, Immigration Law US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | | United States v. Mingo Criminal Law, Military Law US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | | Gordon v. Barr Criminal Law, Immigration Law US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | | Hawes v. Stephens Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | | United States v. Stewart Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | | United States v. Wallace Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | | Koger v. Mohr Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | | United States v. McReynolds Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | | United States v. Pritchard Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | | C.Y. Wholesale, Inc. v. Holcomb Agriculture Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | | Douglas v. Reeves Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | | United States v. Malagon Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | | United States v. Payne Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | | United States v. Robinson Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | | Wilborn v. Jones Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | | Williams v. Jackson Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | | United States v. Colombe Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | | United States v. Dowty Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | | United States v. Fisher Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | | United States v. Harris Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | | United States v. Jackson-Bey Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | | United States v. Vera-Gutierrez Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | | United States v. Malik Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | | United States v. Many White Horses Criminal Law, Native American Law US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | | United States v. Vandergroen Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | | United States v. Voris Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | | Kapinski v. City of Albuquerque Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | | United States v. Cantu Constitutional Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | | In re: Michael Price Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | | United States v. Ross Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | | Pinson v. Department of Justice Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | | California v. Superior Court (Ferraro) Constitutional Law, Criminal Law California Courts of Appeal | | People v. Soto Criminal Law California Courts of Appeal | | Johnson v. Preleski Civil Procedure, Criminal Law Connecticut Supreme Court | | Merck v. State Criminal Law Florida Supreme Court | | IDJC v. Dudley Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law Idaho Supreme Court - Civil | | Hairston v. Idaho Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal | | Mullins v. State Criminal Law Supreme Court of Indiana | | Downs v. Commonwealth Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Kentucky Supreme Court | | Louisiana v. Harris Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Louisiana Supreme Court | | Louisiana v. Michael Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Louisiana Supreme Court | | Louisiana v. Ricard Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Louisiana Supreme Court | | Commonwealth v. Fernandes Criminal Law Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court | | Roberts v. State Criminal Law, Juvenile Law Minnesota Supreme Court | | State v. Gibson Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Minnesota Supreme Court | | State v. Huisman Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Minnesota Supreme Court | | State v. Funkhouser Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Montana Supreme Court | | Matthews v. State Civil Rights, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Nevada | | New Jersey v. Courtney Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of New Jersey | | New Jersey v. Jackson Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of New Jersey | | State v. Doyle Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Rhode Island Supreme Court | | State v. Jarman Criminal Law Tennessee Supreme Court | | State v. Argueta Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Utah Supreme Court | | State v. Grunwald Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Utah Supreme Court | | State v. Malo Criminal Law Utah Supreme Court | | State v. Brown Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Wisconsin Supreme Court | | State v. Dobbs Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Wisconsin Supreme Court |
| Click here to remove Verdict from subsequent Justia newsletter(s). | New on Verdict Legal Analysis and Commentary | | A Modest Proposal: A Heartbeat Bill for Those Who Don’t Wear Masks | | MARCI A. HAMILTON | | | | University of Pennsylvania professor Marci A. Hamilton draws upon a strategy used by anti-abortion advocates in suggesting a way to encourage (or coerce) more people into wearing masks to avoid the spread of COVID-19. Hamilton proposes requiring persons who opt not to wear a mask in public (1) to watch, on a large screen, an adult's beating heart for 30 seconds, and (2) to be read a statement about how their decision unreasonably endangers others. | | Read More |
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Criminal Law Opinions | | McGirt v. Oklahoma | | Court: US Supreme Court Docket: 18-9526 Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: Neil M. Gorsuch Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Native American Law | | The Major Crimes Act (MCA) provides that, within “the Indian country,” “[a]ny Indian who commits” certain enumerated offenses “shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of [those] offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,” 18 U.S.C. 1153(a). “Indian country” includes “all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government.” McGirt was convicted by an Oklahoma state court of sexual offenses. He unsuccessfully argued in state postconviction proceedings that the state lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him because he is an enrolled member of the Seminole Nation and his crimes took place on the Creek Reservation. The Supreme Court held that McGirt was entitled to a federal trial. For MCA purposes, land reserved for the Creek Nation since the 19th century remains “Indian country.” An 1856 Treaty promised that “no portion” of Creek lands “would ever be embraced or included within, or annexed to, any Territory or State,” 11 Stat. 700, and that the Creeks would have the “unrestricted right of self-government,” with “full jurisdiction” over enrolled Tribe members. Once a federal reservation is established, only Congress can diminish or disestablish it. Congress did not end the Creek Reservation during the “allotment era,” when Congress sought to pressure many tribes to abandon their communal lifestyles and parcel their lands into smaller lots owned by individual tribal members. Other limitations on the promised right to self-governance, including abolishing the Creeks’ tribal courts and requiring Presidential approval for certain tribal ordinances fell short of eliminating all tribal interest in the contested lands. Many of Oklahoma’s arguments rest “on state prosecutorial practices that defy the MCA, rather than on the law’s plain terms.” Acknowledging the potential consequences of its ruling, such as unsettling convictions and frustrating the state’s ability to prosecute future crimes, the Court stated that Oklahoma and its tribes have proven that they can work successfully together and Congress remains free to supplement its statutory directions about the lands. | | | | Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP | | Court: US Supreme Court Docket: 19-715 Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: John G. Roberts, Jr. Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law | | Committees of the U. S. House of Representatives issued subpoenas seeking information about the finances of President Trump, his children, and affiliated businesses. The subpoenas were issued to financial institutions and the President’s personal accounting firm. The President in his personal capacity, his children, and affiliated businesses argued that the subpoenas lacked a legitimate legislative purpose and violated the separation of powers. The President did not argue that any of the requested records were protected by executive privilege. The Supreme Court vacated decisions by the D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit and remanded. The courts below did not take adequate account of the significant separation of powers concerns implicated by congressional subpoenas for the President’s information. A congressional subpoena is valid only if it is “related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress” and serves a “valid legislative purpose.” Congress may not issue a subpoena for the purpose of “law enforcement,” because that power is assigned to the Executive and the Judiciary. While executive privilege protections should not be transplanted to cases involving nonprivileged, private information, a limitless subpoena power could transform the established practice of the political branches and allow Congress to aggrandize itself at the President’s expense. The subpoenas at issue represent not a run-of-the-mill legislative effort but rather a clash between rival branches of government over records of intense political interest. Separation of powers concerns are no less palpable because the subpoenas were issued to third parties. A balanced approach is necessary to address those concerns. Courts should carefully assess whether the asserted legislative purpose warrants the significant step of involving the President and his papers. Congress may not rely on the President’s information if other sources could reasonably provide Congress the information it needs in light of its particular legislative objective. Courts should insist on a subpoena no broader than reasonably necessary to support Congress’s legislative objective and should be attentive to the nature of the evidence that a subpoena advances a valid legislative purpose. Courts should assess the burdens imposed on the President and incentives to use subpoenas for institutional advantage. Other considerations may also be pertinent. | | | | Trump v. Vance | | Court: US Supreme Court Docket: 19-635 Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: John G. Roberts, Jr. Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law | | The New York County District Attorney’s Office served a subpoena duces tecum on the personal accounting firm of President Trump, seeking financial records relating to the President and his businesses. The President, acting in his personal capacity, sought to enjoin enforcement of the subpoena. The Second Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of injunctive relief. Article II and the Supremacy Clause do not categorically preclude or require a heightened standard for the issuance of a state criminal subpoena to a sitting President. The Court examined precedent concerning federal subpoenas, from Aaron Burr’s motion for a subpoena directed at President Jefferson, through Monroe, Clinton, and Nixon, and concluded that, with respect to the state subpoena, the President’s “generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.” The Court rejected an argument that a state grand jury subpoena for a sitting President’s personal records must meet a heightened standard of need because of the possibility of diversion, stigma, and harassment. The President conceded that the criminal investigations are permitted under Article II and the Supremacy Clause; the receipt of a subpoena does not categorically magnify the harm to the President’s reputation and grand jury secrecy rules aim to prevent the stigma the President anticipates. Although a President cannot be treated as an “ordinary individual” when executive communications are sought, with regard to private papers, a President stands in “nearly the same situation with any other individual.” Absent a need to protect the Executive, the public interest in fair and effective law enforcement cuts in favor of comprehensive access to evidence. A President may avail himself of the same protections available to every other citizen, including the right to challenge the subpoena on grounds permitted by state law, such as bad faith and undue burden or breadth. A President can raise subpoena-specific constitutional challenges in either a state or a federal forum and can challenge the subpoena as an attempt to influence the performance of his official duties, in violation of the Supremacy Clause. | | | | United States v. Cadden | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 17-1694 Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: David J. Barron Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions but vacated and remanded his prison sentence and forfeiture order, holding that the district court erred in calculating Defendant's recommended sentencing range and erred in determining the amount of the forfeiture. A jury found Defendant guilty of racketeering and racketeering conspiracy, mail fraud, and violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 331(a), 333(a). The district court sentenced Defendant to a prison term of 108 months - the high end of the range that it had calculated under the Guidelines. The court also imposed a forfeiture order on Defendant in the amount of $7,545,501. The First Circuit remanded the convictions but vacated the prison sentence and forfeiture order, holding (1) the district court's reasons for declining to apply two enhancements were legally erroneous; and (2) the district court erred in its forfeiture calculation. | | | | United States v. Chin | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-1263 Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: David J. Barron Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, White Collar Crime | | The First Circuit affirmed both of Defendant's federal racketeering-related convictions but vacated and remanded the prison sentence, forfeiture order, and restitution order, holding that the district court erred in several respects. Defendant was convicted of racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, federal mail fraud, and violating the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 331(a), 333(a). The district court sentenced Defendant to ninety-six months' imprisonment, issued a forfeiture order in the amount of $175,000, and ordered restitution. On appeal, Defendant challenged his convictions for racketeering and racketeering conspiracy and his sentence. The First Circuit remanded the case, holding (1) the convictions were supported by sufficient evidence; (2) the district court erred in its reasoning declining to apply certain enhancements; (3) neither of the two reasons the district court gave for limiting the forfeiture order was sustainable; and (4) the district court too narrowly construed who counts as a "victim" under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. | | | | United States v. Valdez | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 19-1129 Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | The First Circuit dismissed Defendant's appeal challenging his sentence imposed in connection with his plea of guilty to drug-related offenses, holding that there was no miscarriage of justice and that the appeal waiver Defendant signed controlled. Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to several crimes stemming from a drug conspiracy that distributed drugs in three states. The plea agreement contained an appeal waiver. Defendant nonetheless appealed, arguing that his appeal waiver must be set aside under the "miscarriage of justice" standard set forth in United States v. Morillo, 910 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2018). The First Circuit disagreed, holding that there was no miscarriage of justice and that the appeal waiver controlled. | | | | Davidson v. Desai | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 19-280 Opinion Date: July 7, 2020 Judge: Menashi Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | Plaintiff filed suit alleging claims of deliberate indifference by prison officials to his medical conditions while he was incarcerated in a New York state prison. At the time of trial, plaintiff was on parole and asked the district court to order the New York Board of Parole to allow him to attend his trial in Buffalo and for the district court to pay for his travel. The Second Circuit held that although a parolee has no constitutional right to attend his own civil trial, a district court does have the authority to compel a parolee's attendance by issuing a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241(c)(5). The court explained that plaintiff did not seek such a writ from the district court and the relief he did request differed significantly from that provided by the writ. Therefore, the court reviewed only for plain error and held that the district court did not plainly err in not issuing the writ. The court also held that, even if plaintiff's request were construed as a petition for the writ, the court would still affirm because plaintiff did not not demonstrate that issuing the writ would be "necessary" as required by section 2241(c)(5). Furthermore, even if the district court should have issued the writ, the court held that the failure to do so was harmless because plaintiff has not demonstrated that the outcome of the trial would have been different if he had been physically present. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. | | | | Ottey v. Barr | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-834 Opinion Date: July 7, 2020 Judge: Amalya Lyle Kearse Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law | | In petition No. 18-834, petitioner contends principally that the BIA erred (a) in rejecting his challenge to the IJ's ruling that he failed to carry his burden of showing his procedurally regular admission to the United States, (b) in rejecting his contention that he was denied due process by the IJ's evidentiary rulings minimizing or curtailing evidence to show his procedurally regular admission, and (c) in denying his motion to reopen the proceeding to present newly discovered evidence. In petition No. 19-737, petitioner contends that the BIA erred in rejecting his contention that intervening legal authority requires the conclusion that criminal possession of stolen property was not a crime involving moral turpitude at the time of his conviction. The Second Circuit denied so much of Petition No 18-834 as contends that petitioner was denied due process. The court dismissed the remainder of that petition for lack of jurisdiction. In regard to Petition No. 19-737, the court held that there was no error in the Board's determination that petitioner's conviction for criminal possession of stolen property was a crime involving moral turpitude. Furthermore, the Board did not err by rejecting petitioner's motion to reopen removal proceedings based on petitioner's claim of an intervening change in the law. Therefore, the court denied the petition in No. 19-737. | | | | United States v. Mingo | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-2225 Opinion Date: July 8, 2020 Judge: Robert David Sack Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Military Law | | The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for failure to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). Defendant was convicted of raping another member of his platoon in violation of Article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and, after he was discharged from military service, he was designated as a Level Two sex offender. The court held that 34 U.S.C. 20911(5)(A)(iv)'s delegation to the Secretary of Defense to designate which military offenses constitute "sex offenses" under the statute does not violate the non-delegation doctrine. The court also held that the Secretary of Defense did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act in designating military offenses as sex offenses under SORNA. | | | | Gordon v. Barr | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-1539 Opinion Date: July 8, 2020 Judge: Barbara Milano Keenan Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law | | The Fourth Circuit held that petitioner's prior misdemeanor conviction under Virginia Code 18.2-280(A), for willful discharge of "any firearm" in a public place without resulting bodily injury, qualifies as a federal "firearm offense" for purposes of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(C). The court held that the plain language of the Virginia statute, as supported by later acts of Virginia's legislature and by decisions of its appellate courts, prohibits conduct involving the use of a "any firearm," including antique firearms. Therefore, petitioner was not required to identify a prosecution under the Virginia statute involving an antique firearm to defend against removal. Accordingly, the conduct punishable under Virginia Code 18.2-280(A) is broader than the conduct encompassed by the federal definition of a "firearm offense." | | | | Hawes v. Stephens | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-40341 Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: James Earl Graves, Jr. Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | Plaintiff, currently incarcerated in Texas, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that various employees of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice violated federal law when they deducted a $100 medical co-payment from his inmate trust account. Plaintiff, who receives regular payments from the VA, claimed that this deduction violated 38 U.S.C. 5301(a) and 31 C.F.R. 212. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants in regard to plaintiff's claims arising from the TDCJ defendants' purported violations of section 5301(a). In this case, plaintiff's VA benefits were commingled with transfers from his Altra account and with sizeable deposits by a private individual. Therefore, it is impossible to know whether the medical co-payment was charged against funds that originated from the Department of the Treasury and plaintiff cannot state a claim under Section 5301(a), which protects only payments of federal benefits. The court also affirmed the trial court's assessment of filing fees, and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on the due process claims. | | | | United States v. Stewart | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-60624 Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: Stuart Kyle Duncan Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | In 2019, defendant moved for resentencing under section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA), which provided for retroactive application of sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FAIR), which in turn reduced the statutory penalties for crack cocaine offenses. Based on United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414, 415 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 285 (2019), the district court calculated defendant's post-FSA sentence using the Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of his original conviction. The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and held that the district court erred by constraining itself to the 2001 Sentencing Guidelines when calculating defendant's post-FSA sentencing range, thereby denying him the benefit of Amendment 750's change to the marijuana equivalency calculation for crack cocaine—a change compelled by FAIR. Because the only Guidelines change necessary for the relief defendant seeks is Amendment 750, which in relevant part was mandated by FAIR, the court need not and did not decide whether a district court faced with a resentencing motion invoking section 404(b) of the FSA must apply all retroactive amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines. Accordingly, the court remanded for reconsideration. | | | | United States v. Wallace | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 17-40007 Opinion Date: July 6, 2020 Judge: Jennifer Walker Elrod Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion for post-conviction relief. The court held that defendant's three prior Texas burglary convictions under Texas Penal Code 30.02 are generic and thus qualified defendant for an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Defendant's arguments to the contrary are foreclosed by United States v. Herrold (Herrold II), 941 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc). | | | | Koger v. Mohr | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-4020 Opinion Date: July 7, 2020 Judge: Helene N. White Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | Koger, an inmate of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC), is a practicing Rastafarian. Between 2006 and 2018, Koger made several religious-practice accommodation requests, including requests to grow his dreadlocks, keep a religious diet, observe fasts, and commune with other Rastafarians. Alleging that ODRC’s responses were inadequate, Koger brought these claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and 42 U.S.C. 1983 against several ODRC officials. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. Koger has not shown that the prison’s grooming policy, which provides for an individualized determination of whether an inmate’s hair is “searchable,” prevents him from growing his locks naturally and, therefore, cannot “demonstrate that [the] prison policy substantially burdens [his] religious practice.” It is not clear that ODRC denied Koger the ability to commune with fellow Rastafarians. The court reversed in part. The defendants did not present any government interest to justify the denial of Koger’s religious diet requests. Koger sufficiently alleged equal protection violations. | | | | United States v. McReynolds | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-1672 Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: Eric L. Clay Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | McReynolds and 17 codefendants were charged under federal drug laws. McReynolds was charged only under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. Only McReynolds went to trial. He admitted selling drugs but argued that he was not a member of the conspiracy. There was testimony that McReynolds was in contact with the conspiracy’s leader every few days to buy drugs. The conspiracy’s supplier and its leader mentioned each of the other codefendants in their plea agreements but did not mention McReynolds. None of the searches returned any evidence associated with McReynolds. A cooperating codefendant testified that McReynolds was a conspiracy member. Confidential informant A.A. testified to buying drugs from McReynolds. The jury returned a guilty verdict and found the amount of controlled substances attributable to McReynolds beyond a reasonable doubt to be “less than 100 grams” of heroin and “less than 500 grams” of cocaine. The PSR combined the amounts from the codefendants’ plea agreements with the sales to A.A. for the total quantity of over 750 grams of heroin, over 700 grams of cocaine, and over 250 grams of crack. After a firearm enhancement, McReynolds’ guidelines range was 151-181 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction but vacated the 151-month sentence. The indictment sufficiently alleged that McReynolds had “knowingly conspired and agreed” with the other coconspirators. A court cannot hold a defendant to the entire conspiracy-wide drug amounts without any particularized findings as to why it is doing so. | | | | United States v. Pritchard | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-6210 Opinion Date: July 7, 2020 Judge: Nalbandian Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | Firefighters, including Sparks, responded to a fire at the Pritchard residence. Sparks lost consciousness and died days later. Sparks suffered from coronary disease, hypertension, and diabetes and had not been taking his prescribed medications. Pritchard had arranged for his wife, children, and dog to be out of the house that morning. Pritchard indicated to several people that he was responsible for the fire and gave investigators a false alibi. In persuading his wife, Brandi, to cooperate with his plan to burn the house to collect insurance proceeds, Pritchard recounted previous fires that he started to collect insurance money. Pritchard used threats of violence to coerce Brandi not to confess. Pritchard and Brandi were charged with malicious destruction of property by fire, 18 U.S.C. 844(i), which permits punishment for arson causing death, and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. Brandi pleaded guilty. At Pritchard’s trial, a physician for the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health testified that firefighting “triggered” Sparks’s fatal heart attack; he could not conclude that Sparks would not have had a heart attack independent of the fire. Pritchard’s counsel unsuccessfully objected to evidence about Pritchard’s previous arsons, emergency protective orders obtained by Brandi, and cell phone information obtained without a warrant. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Pritchard's conviction and 360-month sentence. The jury had sufficient evidence that Sparks' death was “a direct or proximate result of [Pritchard’s] conduct." | | | | C.Y. Wholesale, Inc. v. Holcomb | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-3034 Opinion Date: July 8, 2020 Judge: Diane Pamela Wood Areas of Law: Agriculture Law, Criminal Law | | Indiana-based hemp sellers and wholesalers sought to enjoin the enforcement of Indiana’s “Act 516” criminal prohibition on the manufacture, delivery, or possession of smokable hemp, Ind. Code 35-48-3-10.1, arguing that Indiana’s law is preempted by the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018. The 2018 Act expanded the definition of industrial hemp to include all parts of the cannabis plant with a low THC concentration and all low-THC cannabis derivatives; excludes industrial hemp from the federal definition of marijuana, removing it from the DEA’s schedule of controlled substances; provides that the states retain the authority to regulate the production of hemp (7 U.S.C. 1639p); and forbids the states from prohibiting the transportation of hemp products through the state. The district court issued the requested injunction. Indiana then enacted Act 335, which clarifies that Indiana’s prohibition on the delivery and possession of smokable hemp does “not apply to the shipment of smokable hemp from a licensed producer in another state in continuous transit through Indiana to a licensed handler in any state.” The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding the injunction overly broad. The part of Act 516 prohibiting the manufacture of smokable hemp does not fall under the 2018 law’s express preemption clause; it is not clear that the express preemption clause, alone, precludes a state from prohibiting the possession and sale of industrial hemp within the state. | | | | Douglas v. Reeves | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-2588 Opinion Date: July 7, 2020 Judge: HAMILTON Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | A nurse accused Indiana prisoner Douglas of threatening her in the infirmary. Based on this accusation, Douglas was convicted of a disciplinary offense. Douglas appealed. The prison’s superintendent overturned the conviction about 18 days later for lack of evidence. In the meantime, Douglas was placed in “segregation” housing, lost his job as a “wheelchair pusher,” and stopped receiving wages. After his successful appeal, Douglas was returned to the normal cell block but not to his original cell. Douglas sought return to his old cell, reinstatement to his old job or a better one, and back pay. Douglas eventually received a new job and back pay but he lodged several more grievances. He filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) alleging violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. The district court screened the complaint, 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b), and allowed only the First Amendment claim against his casework manager, Reeves, to proceed. Douglas asserted that Reeves punished him for taking his appeal by refusing to restore his benefits. Later, the court granted summary judgment, rejecting that claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No reasonable jury could conclude that Reeves inflicted deprivations on Douglas likely to deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in First Amendment activity. | | | | United States v. Malagon | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-3200 Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: ROVNER Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | At Malagon’s trial for conspiracy with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), the government introduced cell phone records, audio and video recordings and their transcripts, and witness testimony, including from undercover officers, concerning two meetings involving an informant. The recordings captured conversations about quantity, price, and timing. At the end of the second meeting, surveillance officers moved toward the house’s garage. Hearing them, Malagon tried to hide the cocaine. Officers saw the kilograms against the garage wall and a blue cooler that Malagon had previously been observed carrying. They arrested Malagon, and on one of his cell phones that they seized, they found a photograph of the two kilograms of cocaine. Malagon was convicted. The court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment, the statutory minimum. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Malagon’s arguments that DEA agents were improperly allowed to present expert testimony as to drug trafficking practices and the use of drug code, and to present lay opinion testimony. Malagon failed to demonstrate an error that was not intentionally waived, which was plain and affected his substantial rights, and that the error affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. | | | | United States v. Payne | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2384 Opinion Date: July 8, 2020 Judge: Brennan Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | Running from police officers, Payne threw down a loaded pistol. Payne then attempted to provide a false identity and said he was not a felon. Payne had outstanding warrants for absconding from probation and three prior felony convictions. He had been convicted of child abuse and driving a stolen vehicle and, later, of felony failure to comply with a police officer and misdemeanor battery after holding hostage a domestic partner and her child. Payne pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), 924(a)(2). The court conducted a colloquy to determine whether Payne’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, and confirmed that he previously had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. Payne did not say he knew he was a convicted felon. After hearing about his low educational attainment and mental-health issues, the court sentenced Payne to 41 months’ imprisonment, despite a Guidelines range of 51-63 months. Days later, the Supreme Court, in Rehaif, held that to be convicted of such a status offense, a defendant must have known “he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Payne argued there was a reasonable probability he would not have pleaded guilty had he known about this element. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, finding it “highly implausible Payne was ignorant of his felon status.” | | | | United States v. Robinson | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2441 Opinion Date: July 7, 2020 Judge: ROVNER Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | Robinson pled guilty to a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine after he was caught in a controlled buy. Robinson claimed on appeal that although the government indicted him for participating in a conspiracy involving 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), he only pled guilty to a conspiracy involving a lesser or unspecified amount, section 841(b)(1)(B). The Seventh Circuit affirmed Robinson’s 200-month sentence, a downward departure from a guidelines range of 262-327 months. Robinson admitted to the facts implicating him in the greater crime (section 841(b)(1)(A)) in documents filed before the plea hearing, at the plea hearing itself, by admitting to the facts in the presentence investigation report, and at sentencing. He agreed that he had been advised that the minimum sentence provided by the statute was 10 years and the maximum was life and stated that he made no claim of innocence. In exchange for the plea, the government agreed not to seek an increased sentence based on his prior felony convictions. Before either party entered the courtroom, both sides had agreed that Robinson would plead guilty to section 841(b)(1)(A)—a conspiracy involving 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. | | | | Wilborn v. Jones | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-1507 Opinion Date: July 6, 2020 Judge: William Joseph Bauer Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | Wilborn was convicted of first-degree murder for the 2004 murder of a rival gang member in Chicago and was sentenced to 30 years, plus 25 years for personally discharging a firearm. After exhausting state remedies, he sought federal habeas relief. He claimed that trial counsel’s promises during opening arguments amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial counsel indicated multiple times that Wilborn’s co-defendant, Jenkins, would testify to shooting the victim. During the trial, however, Jenkins changed his proposed testimony and defense counsel determined Jenkins would no longer be credible. Wilborn agreed with this recommendation on the record. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition. Wilborn’s representation did not contain serious errors amounting to a deprivation of a fair trial; unforeseen situations may arise during trial. Counsel’s failure to present Jenkins to the jury or present testimonial evidence does not rise to the level of prejudice under Strickland. Promising the jury it will hear testimony that Wilborn did not participate in the crime does not necessarily create prejudice. | | | | Williams v. Jackson | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-2631 Opinion Date: July 6, 2020 Judge: Scudder Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | Williams was convicted in Illinois state court in two separate cases for raping two women and received sentences totaling 66 years’ imprisonment. Williams contends that his defense attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not only advising him to reject a 41-year plea offer but also failing to inform him of his maximum sentencing exposure if he proceeded to trial in both cases and lost. An Illinois court rejected these claims, concluding that Williams failed to provide any information pertinent to one of the two cases that gave rise to the 41-year plea offer. Without knowing anything about that case, the Illinois court reasoned, there was no way to assess defense counsel’s performance and no way to conclude that Williams received ineffective assistance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal habeas petition, finding the Illinois court’s conclusion reasonable. The Illinois Appellate Court sensibly concluded that it had too little information to judge the advice Williams received in connection with the 41-year plea offer. Without even a superficial familiarity with one of the cases, a court could not know with confidence that Williams would have accepted a combined 41- year plea. | | | | United States v. Colombe | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1040 Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: Jane Louise Kelly Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | The Eighth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for conspiracy to retaliate against a witness. The court held that a reasonable jury could believe that defendant and her co-defendants formed a conspiracy where a reasonable jury could understand a certain conversation between defendant and her sister as evidence of a knowing agreement between them to retaliate against the new interim executive director that replaced defendant at the not-for-profit for providing evidence to federal investigators. Furthermore, a reasonable jury could conclude that overt acts were taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. | | | | United States v. Dowty | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1007 Opinion Date: July 6, 2020 Judge: Jane Louise Kelly Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of second degree murder and discharging a firearm during a crime of violence. Defendant's charges arose from a shooting on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) motion for a new trial because the evidence did not weigh heavily enough against the verdict that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred; there was no reversible error in the district court permitting three of the witnesses to meet before trial; there was no plain error in the district court's instructions to the jury regarding witness credibility; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for the jury to view the area where the victim was shot. | | | | United States v. Fisher | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-3023 Opinion Date: July 8, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that the district court did not err by imposing sentencing enhancements for possessing three to seven firearms and possessing a firearm capable of accepting a high capacity magazine. In this case, the evidence was sufficient to show constructive or joint possession, if not actual possession of the firearms. The court also held that the district court did not err by imposing an enhancement for possession of the firearm in connection with another felony offense where the firearm facilitated or had the potential of facilitating drug possession. Finally, the court held that any error in imposing any of the enhancements was harmless because the district court expressly stated it would have adopted the sentence regardless of its rulings on the enhancements. | | | | United States v. Harris | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-2481 Opinion Date: July 7, 2020 Judge: Kobes Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possessing a firearm as a felon. The court held that defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires him to develop facts outside of the record before the court and so the court declined to review it; hearsay testimony about the ownership of the gun was properly admitted under the invited error doctrine; defendant has not shown that any Rehaif error affected his substantial rights; defendant's sentence was not procedurally unreasonable where the district court explained its decision to give defendant a sentence at the top of his guidelines range; and defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court did not abuse its discretion and considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. | | | | United States v. Jackson-Bey | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3545 Opinion Date: July 7, 2020 Judge: James B. Loken Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that defendant's contention that his three prior Minnesota robbery convictions did not qualify as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act is foreclosed by Eighth Circuit decisions issued while his appeal was pending. The court also held that defendant's challenge to his conviction, contending that his indictment violated his due process rights, falls within the scope of the appeal waiver in his knowing and voluntary plea agreement, and no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcing the waiver. | | | | United States v. Vera-Gutierrez | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1025 Opinion Date: July 7, 2020 Judge: William Duane Benton Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 or more grams of methamphetamine. The court rejected defendant's claim of evidentiary error in admitting Exhibit 113, a chart showing records of all contacts between phone numbers identified with defendant and others. The court held that, even if the exhibit was admitted without proper foundation, the error was harmless. Furthermore, like Exhibit 113, the contents of Exhibits 114 and 125 duplicate other evidence and testimony and any error in admitting them was harmless. The court also held that the district court did not err by applying a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice for threatening a witness; defendant's 300 month sentence was substantively reasonable; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in varying downward from the guidelines. | | | | United States v. Malik | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 19-10166 Opinion Date: July 6, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order suppressing 135 pounds of cocaine and 114 pounds of methamphetamine found during the course of a traffic stop. The panel held that the district court erred by failing to evaluate the totality of the circumstances known to the officer prior to his search. In this case, during the Terry frisk of defendants, one defendant made statements contradicting his earlier story about when he had smoked the marijuana cigarette. The panel concluded that the district court erred by not including these contradictory statements in its analysis, and that this error was part and parcel of its broader error of focusing on the officer's subjective motivations for performing the search. The panel stated that the officer stopped the tractor-trailer because he reasonably suspected that one of the defendants was speeding, and the officer had probable cause to search the cab and containers for evidence of violations of Nevada state law based on defendant's admission and shifting story. | | | | United States v. Many White Horses | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 19-30018 Opinion Date: July 6, 2020 Judge: M. Margaret McKeown Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Native American Law | | The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's imposition of a special condition of supervised release prohibiting defendant from residing in the town of Browning, Montana, which is the tribal headquarters of the Blackfeet Indian Nation, or visiting the town without prior approval of his probation officer. Defendant is an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Nation and the special condition was imposed after he violated the conditions of his probation through alcohol and drug-related infractions. The panel held that the residency restriction is a legitimate condition of supervised release, because the condition is not an illegal banishment or exclusion. In this case, the condition allows defendant to freely travel or reside in all but one quarter square mile of the 1.5 million acres of reservation land, restricting only his access to Browning itself. Furthermore, defendant is free to visit his family, to participate in tribal life, and to receive tribal services in Browning. The panel also held that the tribe's authority does not preclude the federal government from exercising its own authority over defendant and the government's exercise of authority over defendant does not infringe the inherent sovereignty of the Blackfeet Nation. Finally, the panel held that the residency restriction is substantively reasonable. | | | | United States v. Vandergroen | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 19-10075 Opinion Date: July 7, 2020 Judge: Rakoff Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during a search that followed a 911 call and the stop of defendant's car. Defendant was subsequently convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The panel held that the totality of the circumstances in this case demonstrates that the 911 call was sufficiently reliable to support reasonable suspicion. Furthermore, the 911 call gave the police reason to suspect defendant was carrying a concealed firearm, which is presumptively a crime in California. Therefore, the 911 call generated reasonable suspicion justifying the stop and the district court was correct to deny defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop. | | | | United States v. Voris | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-10410 Opinion Date: July 7, 2020 Judge: Bennett Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | Defendant was convicted by a jury of six counts of assault on a federal officer with a deadly or dangerous weapon, six counts of discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendant argued that the five assault counts based on four shots he fired toward the door of his motel room are multiplicitous in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Ninth Circuit held that defendant failed to show that the district court erred, let alone plainly erred, in entering judgment on the four assault convictions based on the four shots he fired toward the door. However, the panel reversed one assault conviction. Furthermore, because each assault conviction served as a predicate offense for each firearm conviction, the panel also reversed one firearm conviction. The panel rejected defendant's remaining arguments and remanded with instructions. | | | | Kapinski v. City of Albuquerque | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-2149 Opinion Date: July 6, 2020 Judge: Timothy M. Tymkovich Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | Anthony Kapinski shot and killed two men for which he was arrested and prosecuted for murder. But at trial, the jury found him not guilty on the basis of self-defense. Trial evidence included video surveillance footage of the incident. Kapinski brought civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Detective Terra Juarez and the City of Albuquerque, alleging constitutional violations stemming from Detective Juarez’s failure to mention the video surveillance footage in her warrant affidavit for Kapinski’s arrest. He argued that if the court issuing the arrest warrant had been made aware of the video footage, it would not have found probable cause supporting the warrant. Detective Juarez moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, and the district court granted her motion. The court held Kapinski failed to show a constitutional violation because the video footage would not have negated probable cause for his arrest, and, even if Detective Juarez’s omission ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment, she was nonetheless entitled to summary judgment because the law on this issue was not clearly established. To this, the Tenth Circuit agreed Kapinski failed to show a clearly established constitutional violation and therefore affirmed summary judgment. | | | | United States v. Cantu | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-6043 Opinion Date: July 6, 2020 Judge: Harris L. Hartz Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | Defendant Francisco Cantu, Jr. appeals the enhancement of his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Although he failed to preserve his challenge to the enhancement in district court, the enhancement was plainly contrary to the law of the Tenth Circuit. The ACCA enhancement rested in part on the characterization of Defendant’s two prior convictions for drug offenses under Okla. Stat. tit. 63, section 2–401(A)(1) as “serious drug offenses.” But the Court found there were "multiple means by which the Oklahoma statute can be violated, and some of those means do not satisfy the ACCA definition of serious drug offense." Under the categorical/modified-categorical approach established by the United States Supreme Court for determining whether a state conviction can qualify as an ACCA predicate conviction, the two state convictions therefore cannot be predicate convictions supporting an ACCA enhancement. The Tenth Circuit vacated Cantu's sentence and remanded for resentencing. | | | | In re: Michael Price | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 20-12133 Opinion Date: July 7, 2020 Judge: Edward Earl Carnes Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | The Eleventh Circuit denied petitioner's application to file a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3). The court held that petitioner failed to make, and cannot make, a prima facie showing that his Davis claim would succeed. In this case, the court must presume that when the jury found petitioner guilty of the 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) convictions, it followed the district court's instructions and predicated those findings on the two bank robbery charges and the jury necessarily found that petitioner committed the two robberies. Furthermore, bank robbery is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)'s elements clause. The court also held that petitioner's Rehaif claim failed to meet the statutory criteria for a second or successive application, because Rehaif did not announce a new rule of constitutional law and, even if it did, it has not been made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. | | | | United States v. Ross | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-11679 Opinion Date: July 7, 2020 Judge: Newsom Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | In United States v. Ross, No. 18-11679, 2020 WL 3445818 (11th Cir. June 24, 2020) (en banc), the full court unanimously overruled United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2015), and held that a suspect's alleged abandonment of his privacy or possessory interest in the object of a search or seizure implicates only the merits of his Fourth Amendment challenge—not his Article III standing—and, accordingly, that if the government fails to argue abandonment, it waives the issue. The Eleventh Circuit applied the en banc court's holding here and held that the government waived its abandonment argument by failing to raise it in the district court. Therefore, the court assumed for purposes of its decision that defendant has Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the entry and sweep, which resulted in the seizure of the gun. The court also held that defendant's challenge to the initial entry and sweep failed on the merits. In this case, the officers had reason to believe that defendant was in the motel room, and they had authority to execute their arrests warrants, to conduct a protective sweep, and to seize the gun found in plain view. Finally, the court held that defendant has no Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the ensuing search of the room, during which officers discovered the drug-related evidence. Accordingly, the court reaffirmed the balance of its earlier decision. | | | | Pinson v. Department of Justice | | Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Dockets: 18-5331, 18-5375 Opinion Date: July 7, 2020 Judge: David S. Tatel Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | In two related cases under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Plaintiffs Gorbey and Pinson, both incarcerated three-strikers, seek to bring their appeals in forma pauperis (IFP) on the ground that they face imminent danger. Pinson argued, in the alternative, that the three-strikes rule is unconstitutional. The DC Circuit rejected plaintiffs' requests and explained that, to proceed under the exception, three-strike prisoners must show an imminent danger at the time of their appeal and a nexus between that danger and their underlying claims. The court held that Gorbey has failed to demonstrate a nexus between the danger he faced and the claims he brought, and Pinson has failed to show that she faced imminent danger at the time she noticed her appeal. In regard to Pinson's alternative argument, the court held that even assuming that some prisoners can make out viable as-applied constitutional challenges to the three-strikes rule, she has failed to do so here. | | | | California v. Superior Court (Ferraro) | | Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C089541(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: July 7, 2020 Judge: Renner Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | In 1990, real parties in interest Donald R. Ferraro and Roger Hunter pled guilty to second degree murder based on the same incident. In 2019, they each filed a petition for resentencing under the then-newly enacted Penal Code section 1170.95. Section 1170.95 was enacted as part of Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), which took effect January 1, 2019. The legislation limited the circumstances under which a defendant could be found guilty of murder under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The legislation applied retroactively, allowing qualifying petitioners to have their murder convictions vacated and be resentenced. The District Attorney for Butte County filed motions to strike the petitions for resentencing, arguing in part that Senate Bill No. 1437 was an unconstitutional amendment of two prior initiative measures: Proposition 7 (as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978)) and Proposition 115 (as approved by voters, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990)). The respondent superior court denied the motions. The District Attorney filed separate writ petitions to the Court of Appeals to challenge the superior court’s rulings. The Court of Appeals concluded Senate Bill 1437 was not an invalid amendment of either Proposition 7 or 115 because the legislation did not add to or take away from any provision in either initiative. Therefore, the Court denied the District Attorney's petitions. | | | | People v. Soto | | Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: H047581(Sixth Appellate District) Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: Danner Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | Soto was convicted of second-degree murder in 1996. The court of appeal affirmed. He unsuccessfully moved to vacate his murder conviction and be resentenced under Penal Code section 1170.95, citing Senate Bill No. 1437, which made statutory changes effective January 1, 2019. Soto claimed that he was convicted as an aider and abettor of murder on a natural and probable consequences theory and could not be convicted of murder on that basis under current law. Soto’s appointed counsel filed a brief that raised no issues. Soto filed a supplemental brief on his own behalf. The court of appeal requested supplemental briefing on whether the trial court erred in not issuing an order to show cause where its order denying Soto’s petition relied on information drawn from the record of conviction and, if so, whether any error was harmless. The court subsequently affirmed the denial of Soto’s petition to vacate his murder conviction. The jury instructions given at his trial conclusively demonstrate as a matter of law that he was not convicted of murder under a natural and probable consequences theory or of felony murder. Soto was convicted as a direct aider and abettor to second-degree murder. | | | | Johnson v. Preleski | | Court: Connecticut Supreme Court Docket: SC20104 Opinion Date: July 14, 2020 Judge: Richard A. Robinson Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law | | The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's dismissal of Petitioner's petition for a new trial brought against Respondent, the state's attorney, as time barred, holding that the Appellate Court improperly disregarded the remedial purpose of Conn. Stat. Ann. 52-593a in concluding that the successful fax transmission of process to the state marshal is not personal delivery as contemplated by the savings statute. Petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to forty-five years imprisonment. Petitioner subsequently sought to file a petition for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. Respondent claimed that the petition as time barred because Petitioner did not serve process on him until one day after the expiration of the three-year limitation period. The trial court agreed, determining that there was no proof of timely delivery of process to the state marshal for purposes of section 52-593a because the state marshal did not endorse the date of delivery, and Petitioner failed to provide support for the proposition that a fax constituted personal delivery as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Petitioner satisfied the personal delivery requirement via successfully faxing process to the state marshal for service. | | | | Merck v. State | | Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC19-1864 Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court summarily dismissing as untimely Petitioner's successive motion for postconviction relief, holding that the record conclusively established that Petitioner was not entitled to relief. In 1993, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court twice affirmed and twice remanded for resentencing at a new penalty phase. At Petitioner's third penalty phase, he was sentenced to death, and the Supreme Court affirmed. At issue was Petitioner's third successive motion for postconviction relief under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, filed on May 10, 2019. The circuit court dismissed the petition as untimely under rule 3.851(d)(2)(B). The Supreme Court affirmed without addressing the ruling that Petitioner's motion was untimely, holding that the record conclusively refuted Petitioner's allegation that trial counsel conceded Petitioner's guilt at trial. | | | | IDJC v. Dudley | | Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Docket: 46627 Opinion Date: July 6, 2020 Judge: Bevan Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law | | In 2016, John Doe was cited for petit theft. Doe’s disposition hearing was held, and the magistrate court committed Doe to the custody of Idaho Department of Juvenile Corrections (“IDJC”). the magistrate court ordered Doe’s father, Dennis Dudley, to reimburse IDJC for expenses incurred in caring for and treating Doe pursuant to Idaho Code section 20-524(1). Doe and Dudley appealed the reimbursement order to the district court. The district court, acting in its intermediate appellate capacity, affirmed. Doe and Dudley timely appealed the district court’s decision. The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding the reimbursement order against Dudley was not a final appealable order. | | | | Hairston v. Idaho | | Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 46665 Opinion Date: July 6, 2020 Judge: Bevan Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law | | James Hairston was sentenced to death after a jury convicted him of two counts of first-degree murder in connection with the deaths of William and Dalma Fuhriman. Hairston was about nineteen and a half when he killed the Fuhrimans. In this, his fourth post-conviction petition, Hairston argued his sentence was unconstitutional because: (1) he was under the age of twenty-one at the time of the offense; and (2) the trial court failed to give adequate consideration to the mitigating factors that had to be considered with youthful defendants. The district court dismissed Hairston’s first claim after holding that he failed to show that evolving standards of decency prohibited imposing the death penalty for offenders between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. The court dismissed Hairston’s second claim after finding that there was no basis to extend the special sentencing considerations that have been specifically limited to juvenile defendants under eighteen to those under twenty-one. Finding no reversible error in those judgments, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. | | | | Mullins v. State | | Court: Supreme Court of Indiana Docket: 20S-CR-451 Opinion Date: July 6, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | The Supreme Court exercised its constitutional authority to revise Defendant's sentence, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when sentencing Defendant but that, in Defendant's circumstances, her sentence was inappropriate. Defendant pleaded guilty to several drug-related offenses. The Supreme Court sentenced Defendant to an aggregate sentence of twenty-four-and-one-half years. The Supreme Court exercised its authority under Ind. Const. art. VII, 4 to review and revise Defendant's sentence, holding that, due to Defendant's youth, her difficult childhood, and her non-violent criminal history, her aggregate sentence was inappropriate. The Court remanded the case to the trial court to issue a revised sentencing order reflecting an aggregate sentence of eighteen years. | | | | Downs v. Commonwealth | | Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2018-SC-000402-MR Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: Vanmeter Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for first-degree manslaughter, tampering with physical evidence, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and second-degree persistent felony offender and twenty-five-year sentence, holding that Defendant was deprived of his right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings. On appeal, Defendant asserted that he was denied the right to conflict-free counsel during an in-chambers hearing that the trial court conducted on the fitness and ability of Defendant's private attorney to try the case. Defendant argued that the in-chambers hearing on his attorney's fitness was a critical stage of the proceedings and that he was prejudiced by not having conflict-free counsel represent him. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the trial court's decision not to inform Defendant of the concerns raised about his counsel's fitness to try the case and not to offer Defendant the opportunity to retain independent counsel to represent his interests was an error of constitutional magnitude mandating reversal. | | | | Louisiana v. Harris | | Court: Louisiana Supreme Court Docket: 2018-KH-01012 Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: Boddie Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | Derrick Harris was serving a life sentence pursuant to Louisiana's Habitual Offender law. The issue presented for the Louisiana Supreme Court's review centered on whether Harris could claim ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing on post-conviction review. Given the fundamental right involved, after a review of the record, the Court held Harris' ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing claim was cognizable on collateral review. Thus, the Court granted the relator’s writ, in part, and remanded the matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to consider his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. | | | | Louisiana v. Michael | | Court: Louisiana Supreme Court Docket: 2019-KK-01273 Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | In June 2016, defendant Jason Michael drove his truck into a smaller vehicle on Louisiana Highway 44 in Ascension Parish and then fled the scene of the accident. He was found by police a few miles away. His vehicle was heavily damaged, and its debris was found at the scene of the crash. In addition to defendant, two other people were injured in the crash: Bree Lavigne and her minor son Lucas. The State charged defendant with two counts of first degree vehicular negligent injury, one count of hit-and-run driving, and one count of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Defendant moved to suppress the BAC results, alleging that the trooper misinformed him that under La. R.S. 32:666 he could not refuse the blood test because serious injury resulted from the crash and that defendant’s consent was therefore coerced. The district court denied the motion to suppress after a hearing. Defendant unsuccessfully sought supervisory review from the court of appeal. He appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, contending the BAD blood draw had to be suppressed because he consented only after being threatened with criminal consequences if he refused. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless BAC blood test. | | | | Louisiana v. Ricard | | Court: Louisiana Supreme Court Docket: 2019-KH-00073 Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | Defendant Robert Ricard, Jr. was indicted on two counts of the aggravated rape of his niece, K.M., then aged 12. Defendant regularly babysat K.M. and her siblings in exchange for lodging in the home of his sister’s family. At trial, defendant’s younger sister (who was not the mother of K.M.), age 25, testified that defendant had raped her several times when she was 10 years old but that she did not reveal the abuse to her older sister, K.M.’s mother, until she heard the allegations that defendant raped K.M. The jury acquitted defendant of one count of aggravated rape, and found him guilty of the lesser offense of molestation of a juvenile, in response to the second count of aggravated rape. The charged offenses carried a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility. The jury was instructed that 10 of 12 jurors must agree to reach a verdict. Upon the jury’s return to the courtroom, however, the judge misspoke and asked whether nine jurors concurred in the responsive verdict, but the jury was not polled. Despite being instructed that sentencing is not the function of the jury but rather is the duty and responsibility of the judge, the jury was also informed of the sentencing range for each lesser responsive crime. Unfortunately, the court misinformed the jury that the sentencing range for molestation of a juvenile is five to 20 years imprisonment, when in fact the correct sentence for that crime is much greater because of the victim's age. Defendant did not object to the jury instructions and did not bring the error to the district court’s attention until sentencing when the State objected to the leniency of the 20-year sentence that the court initially imposed. The State subsequently filed a habitual offender bill of information alleging that defendant was a third-felony habitual offender. After negotiations, however, defendant accepted the State’s offer to waive the mandatory minimum sentence of 66 years. The court of appeal affirmed the conviction, habitual offender adjudication, and sentence. Defendant’s timely application for post-conviction relief was denied by the district court. Finding no reversible error, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed denial of relief on collateral review. | | | | Commonwealth v. Fernandes | | Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-11732 Opinion Date: July 6, 2020 Judge: Kafker Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for murder in the first degree and assault and battery and several related orders denying postconviction relief, holding that each of Defendant's claims lacked merit. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress digital camera images; and (2) the Commonwealth violated its obligation under article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to apprise Defendant of his article 36 rights to representation of counsel of his choice and court-appointed conflict-free counsel, but the error was neither constitutional nor structural. | | | | Roberts v. State | | Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A19-0389 Opinion Date: July 8, 2020 Judge: G. Barry Anderson Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law | | The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the district court's denial of Defendant's petition for postconviction relief, holding that, under Minn. Stat. 260B.245, subd. 1(b), delinquency adjudications may be deemed "felony convictions" for the purpose of the statutory definition of a crime of violence. Defendant was charged with possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, which required proof that Defendant had been convicted of a crime of violence. Defendant pled guilty to the offense, admitting that he had been adjudicated delinquent for committing fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance. The district court accepted the plea and placed Defendant on probation. Defendant later filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting that his juvenile delinquency adjudication failed to satisfy the definition of a "crime of violence" because, under section 260B.245, a delinquency adjudication cannot be deemed a "conviction of crime." The district court denied postconviction relief. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the phrase "felony convictions," as used in the statutory definition of crime of violence, includes a juvenile delinquency adjudication for felony-level offenses listed in Minn. Stat. 624.712, subd. 5; and (2) Defendant provided an adequate factual basis for his guilty plea. | | | | State v. Gibson | | Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A19-0675 Opinion Date: July 8, 2020 Judge: G. Barry Anderson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle during a traffic stop, holding that a driver violates Minn. Stat. 169.30(b) by driving past the stop sign or stop line before coming to a complete stop. Defendant's vehicle was stopped after he failed to stop at a stop sign and stop line. The district court suppressed the evidence seized from Defendant's vehicle, concluding that the traffic stop was unlawful because Minn. Stat. 169.30(b) requires a driver "to stop at the intersection, not at the stop sign or stop line." The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 169.30(b) is violated when the driver a vehicle drives past the stop sign or stop line before coming to a complete stop; and (2) because Defendant failed to bring his vehicle to a complete stop before he drove his vehicle past the stop line and the stop sign, the traffic stop was lawful. | | | | State v. Huisman | | Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A18-1710 Opinion Date: June 10, 2020 Judge: David L. Lillehaug Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction on the ground that Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel because, by conceding in the written closing argument elements of the crimes charged, Defendant's attorney conceded guilt without Defendant's consent or acquiescence, holding that no new trial was required. In reversing the conviction, the court of appeals reasoned that defense counsel's concession of one or more elements of a crime is a concession of guilt and that an unconsented-to concession requires a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) defense counsel's concessions of fewer than all of the elements was not a concession of guilt, and therefore, no new trial was required; and (2) counsel's concessions did not amount to trial error under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). | | | | State v. Funkhouser | | Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 175 Opinion Date: July 7, 2020 Judge: Laurie McKinnon Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence discovered during a police officer's chemical "field test" on the contents of a syringe found in Defendant's jacket pocket, holding that a rudimentary chemical field test of a lawfully seized substance is not a constitutionally protected search requiring a warrant. Defendant was placed under arrest after driving with a suspended driver's license and without vehicle insurance. While searching Defendant incident to his arrest, the arresting officer located a used syringe in Defendant's front jacket pocket. When booking Defendant into jail, the officer conducted a field test on the contents of the syringe. The field test came back positive for methamphetamine. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the field test of the syringe's contents without a warrant constituted an unlawful search that violated his reasonable expectations of privacy. The district court denied the motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy violated by a test for the presence of methamphetamine in a syringe lawfully seized from his person, and therefore, Defendant could not assert the constitutional protections afforded to a search. | | | | Matthews v. State | | Court: Supreme Court of Nevada Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 38 Opinion Date: July 9, 2020 Judge: Silver Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law | | The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction, holding that, based on the record, it was more likely than not that the State used a peremptory challenge for impermissible reasons in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), necessitating a new trial. Defendant faced multiple charges related to a shooting. During jury selection, the State exercised one of its peremptory challenges to remove an African-American veniremember. Defendant made a Batson objection claiming that the peremptory challenge was based on the juror's race. The district court summarily overruled the objection without making any specific findings or explaining its reasoning. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction, holding (1) the record belied the State's nondemeanor explanations for using a peremptory challenge on the juror, indicating that the explanations were pretextual; and (2) because the district court did not fully engage in the inquiry and consideration required at step three in the Batson analysis, the court clearly erred in denying Defendant's Batson objection. | | | | New Jersey v. Courtney | | Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey Docket: a-17-19 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: Timpone Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | Defendant Rahsjahn Courtney agreed to a negotiated plea agreement with the State, in which he pled guilty to a first-degree possession of heroin and a distribution charge in exchange for a fourteen-year prison sentence with a sixty-three-month period of parole ineligibility. As a part of the plea agreement, the State agreed not to request a mandatory extended-term sentence for which defendant was eligible under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f). The State alerted the court and defendant that defendant qualified for a mandatory extended term, but it agreed to defense counsel’s offered sentence. Defendant entered a guilty plea under the terms of the negotiated plea agreement. The court imposed the agreed-upon sentence. Defense counsel and defendant both acknowledged their understanding of the terms of the guilty plea and raised no objections regarding defendant’s eligibility for an extended term; the plea form and supplemental plea form reflected that agreement. Defendant, defense counsel, and the prosecutor signed both forms. Despite acknowledging the plea agreement, defense counsel requested a reduced sentence. The sentencing judge denied the request. The Appellate Division affirmed, rejecting defendant’s argument that the sentencing court had discretion to lower his sentence because the State failed to file a formal application requesting the extended mandatory term. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, finding that N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 did not require a formal application when a prosecutor agrees not to request a mandatory extended-term sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) yet seeks the benefit of a Section 12 plea agreement. Given the importance of ensuring consistency and accuracy in sentencing, the Court provided guidance for future cases where the State agrees not to request an extended term but still seeks the benefit of a negotiated waiver of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987's mandatory sentencing requirements under Section 12. | | | | New Jersey v. Jackson | | Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey Docket: a-11-19 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: Timpone Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant facing the same charges as a cooperating witness should have been barred from exploring that adverse witness’s sentencing exposure. Tiffany Taylor, Javon Clarke, and defendant Michael A. Jackson were apprehended and charged with participating in a burglary. Clarke accepted a cooperating plea offer in which he agreed to provide testimony inculpating defendant and Taylor in exchange for a three-year sentence. The trial judge urged modification of the plea agreement, suggesting Clarke’s sentencing exposure be lowered to 180 days in county jail, and probation. The new deal was accepted; Clarke testified that defendant and Taylor participated in the burglary. In an effort to demonstrate Clarke’s bias in favor of the prosecution, counsel for Jackson sought to elicit during cross-examination the sentencing range of three to five years’ imprisonment that Clarke would have faced had he not accepted a plea offer in exchange for agreeing to testify against defendant. The trial court barred defense counsel’s line of questioning regarding Clarke’s maximum sentencing exposure, explaining that such information could improperly prejudice the jury if they heard Clarke’s maximum sentencing exposure on the same crimes as defendant. The trial court permitted defense counsel to elicit testimony regarding only the initial plea offer of three years’ imprisonment and the final plea agreement, in which Clarke accepted 180 days’ imprisonment in county jail, plus probation.Under the circumstances here, the Supreme Court found defendant was deprived of his right to confrontation and denied a fair trial. Judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed, and defendant's conviction was vacated. The matter was remanded for a new trial. | | | | State v. Doyle | | Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court Docket: 17-312 Opinion Date: July 8, 2020 Judge: Maureen McKenna Goldberg Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court convicting Defendant of eighteen counts of financial fraud crimes and sentencing him to a total of seven years to serve in prison, with the balance of the eighteen concurrent sentences suspended with probation, holding that the trial justice did not err or abuse her discretion. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in admitting evidence related to Defendant's character; (2) the trial justice did not err by permitted a Rhode Island State Police detective to provide expert opinion testimony as a lay witness; (3) the trial justice was not clearly wrong in allowing a waiver of the attorney-client privilege; (4) the trial justice did not err when she denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence he claimed was illegally obtained by state action; (5) the trial justice did not err by denying Defendant's motion for a new trial; and (6) Defendant waived his remaining allegations of error. | | | | State v. Jarman | | Court: Tennessee Supreme Court Docket: M2017-01313-SC-R11-CD Opinion Date: July 6, 2020 Judge: Bivins Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of criminal appeals reversing Defendant's conviction for voluntary manslaughter, holding that the trial court did not err in admitting acquitted-act evidence and that the portion of State v. Holman, 611 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. 1981), holding otherwise is overruled. Holman prohibits the use of acquitted-act evidence against a defendant at a subsequent trial under all circumstances. On appeal, the court of criminal appeals held that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting evidence of a prior criminal offense for which Defendant was acquitted because the evidence should have been excluded under Holman. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) evidence of a defendant's conduct for which he was acquitted in a previous trial may be introduced in a subsequent trial on a different charge only after the evidence has met the requirements of Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b); (2) Holman is no longer good law; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the acquitted-act evidence for the limited purpose of proving Defendant's intent to harm the victim. | | | | State v. Argueta | | Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2020 UT 41 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: Himonas Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for burglary and sexual abuse, holding that any error found or assumed in this case was not prejudicial. On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor's comments about he differences between his initial statement at the scene of the crime and his trial testimony violated his constitutional right to remain silent and that the trial court's admission of two prior acts - a peeping incident and a trespassing incident - was prejudicial error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) assuming that a constitutional violation occurred during the prosecutor's cross-examination about omissions in Defendant's statement at the scene, the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not prejudice Defendant; (2) any assumed error in the admission of the trespassing incident was harmless; and (3) Defendant failed to preserve his challenge to the admission of the peeping incident. | | | | State v. Grunwald | | Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2020 UT 40 Opinion Date: July 2, 2020 Judge: Matthew B. Durrant Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for being an accomplice to the crime of aggravated murder, holding that it was reasonably probable that the jury would not have convicted Defendant of aggravated murder absent jury instruction errors. After Defendant was convicted she appealed, arguing that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to three errors in the jury instruction regarding accomplice liability. The court of appeals concluded that there were three errors in the jury instruction and that the performance of Defendant's trial counsel was deficient because he did not object to the errors. However, the court of appeals determined that the errors were not prejudicial because there was not a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome absent the errors. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the jury instruction discussing the elements for accomplice liability on aggravated murder contained three errors; and (2) there was a reasonable probability that at least one juror would not have voted to convict Defendant in the absence of the errors. | | | | State v. Malo | | Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2020 UT 42 Opinion Date: July 6, 2020 Judge: Himonas Areas of Law: Criminal Law | | The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying Appellant's expungement petition, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition. Appellant was charged with one count of unlawful sexual conduct with a sixteen or seventeen year old. Before trial, because the complaining witness was unavailable for trial, the district court granted the State's motion to dismiss the case without prejudice. Seven months later, Appellant filed his expungement petition. The district court denied the petition on the basis that Appellant had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that his expungement was not be contrary to the public interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in the way it handled the matter or in its decision to deny Appellant's expungement petition. | | | | State v. Brown | | Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court Docket: 2017AP000774-CR Opinion Date: July 3, 2020 Judge: Ann Walsh Bradley Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for possession with intent to deliver cocaine, holding that the Wisconsin Constitution permits law enforcement to ask drivers stopped for a traffic violation to exit the vehicle, inquire about the presence of weapons, and request consent to search the driver. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found during the search of the vehicle, contending that it was fruit of an unlawful search because the arresting officer's actions unlawfully extended the stop, and he lacked reasonable suspicion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the officer did not impermissibly extend Defendant's traffic stop beyond constitutional boundaries because his actions were negligently burdensome directly related to officer safety and therefore part of the stop's mission. | | | | State v. Dobbs | | Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court Docket: 2018AP000319-CR Opinion Date: July 3, 2020 Judge: Dallet Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | | The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle, holding that the circuit court did not err in its evidentiary rulings. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court (1) improperly excluded the expert testimony of Dr. Lawrence White, and (2) erred in denying his motion to suppress statements that he made to law enforcement because he was not read the Miranda warnings or, in the alternative, because his statements were not voluntarily made. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly excluded Dr. White's exposition testimony on the grounds that it did not fit with the facts of Defendant's case; (2) Defendant was subject to custodial interrogation and was not read the Miranda warnings, but the admission of those statements was harmless error; and (3) all of Defendant's statements were voluntary. | | |
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