Table of Contents | United States v. Ackerly Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | United States v. Castillo Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | United States v. Chan Criminal Law, Securities Law, White Collar Crime US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | United States v. Portillo Criminal Law, Juvenile Law US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | United States v. Rasheed Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | Folajtar v. Attorney General of the United States Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Tax Law US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | Pollini v. Robey Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Thompson v. Skipper Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | United States v. Budzynski Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | United States v. Jones Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Anderson v. United States Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | Dunn v. Jess Civil Rights, Construction Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | Fields v. City of Chicago Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | United States v. Gunn Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | United States v. McDonaldes Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | United States v. Smith Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | United States v. Diaz Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | Rico v. Ducart Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | United States v. Bautista Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | United States v. Gutierrez Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | United States v. Ngumezi Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | United States v. Rusnak Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | United States v. Romero-Lopez Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | United States v. Silva Constitutional Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | Gonzalez v. United States Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | United States v. Delgado Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | United States v. Green Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | United States v. Shah Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | United States v. Trader Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Meadows v. Shaver et al. Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Alabama | Larson Jr. v. Alaska, Department of Corrections, Board of Parole Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Alaska Supreme Court | In Response To The COVID-19 Pandemic Criminal Law, Health Law Arkansas Supreme Court | People v. Flinner Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of California | People v. Schultz Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of California | In re Canady Civil Procedure, Criminal Law California Courts of Appeal | In re Edgerrin J. Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law California Courts of Appeal | In re Haynes Constitutional Law, Criminal Law California Courts of Appeal | People v. Daniel Criminal Law California Courts of Appeal | People v. Hall Constitutional Law, Criminal Law California Courts of Appeal | People v. Shelp Criminal Law California Courts of Appeal | People v. Williams Criminal Law California Courts of Appeal | Colorado v. Lee Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Colorado Supreme Court | Galvan v. Colorado Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Colorado Supreme Court | Juliano v. Delaware Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law Delaware Supreme Court | Waters v. Delaware Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Delaware Supreme Court | Colley v. State Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Florida Supreme Court | State v. Jackson Criminal Law Florida Supreme Court | State v. Okafor Criminal Law Florida Supreme Court | State v. Casper Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Iowa Supreme Court | State v. Roby Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Iowa Supreme Court | City of Kingman v. Ary Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Kansas Supreme Court | State v. Heim Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Kansas Supreme Court | Byrd v. State Criminal Law Maryland Court of Appeals | Wise v. State Criminal Law Maryland Court of Appeals | Commonwealth v. Gosselin Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court | Hicklin v. Schmitt Criminal Law Supreme Court of Missouri | Avery v. Commissioner, New Hampshire Department of Corrections Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law New Hampshire Supreme Court | People ex rel. Johnson v. Superintendent, Adirondack Correctional Facility Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law New York Court of Appeals | People ex rel. McCurdy v. Warden, Westchester County Correctional Facility Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law New York Court of Appeals | People ex rel. Negron v. Superintendent, Woodbourne Correctional Facility Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law New York Court of Appeals | People v. Lendof-Gonzalez Criminal Law New York Court of Appeals | State v. Long Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Ohio | State v. McReynolds Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law South Dakota Supreme Court | State v. Snodgrass Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law South Dakota Supreme Court | Foreman v. Texas Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Texas Court of Criminal Appeals | Mitchell v. State Criminal Law Wyoming Supreme Court |
Click here to remove Verdict from subsequent Justia newsletter(s). | New on Verdict Legal Analysis and Commentary | In (Trial) Courts (Especially) We Trust | VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, JASON MAZZONE | | Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone describe the increasing importance of courts and lawyers in safeguarding and reinforcing the role of factual truths in our democracy. Dean Amar and Professor Mazzone point out that lawyers and judges are steeped in factual investigation and factual determination, and they call upon legal educators (like themselves) to continue instilling in students the commitment to analytical reasoning based in factual evidence, and to absolutely reject the notion that factual truth is just in the mind of the beholder. | Read More | The Rhetoric About a “Decline” in Religious Liberty Is Good News for Americans | MARCI A. HAMILTON | | Marci A. Hamilton, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania and one of the country’s leading church-state scholars, explains why the rhetoric about a “decline” in religious liberty actually signals a decline in religious triumphalism, and is a good thing. Professor Hamilton describes how religious actors wield the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) not as a shield, but as a sword to destroy the lives of fellow Americans. | Read More |
|
Criminal Law Opinions | United States v. Ackerly | Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 19-1967 Opinion Date: November 24, 2020 Judge: Selya Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding that the government failed to show that the district court granted reversible error by granting the motion for a new trial upon finding when the court deemed to be a violation of the Confrontation Clause. Defendant was convicted of three counts charging her with wire fraud, honest services wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit both types of wire fraud. Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal or for a new trial. The district court granted the motion, concluding that the Confrontation Clause was violated in the proceedings below and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no plain error in the district court's choice of the applicable standard of harmlessness. | | United States v. Castillo | Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-1966 Opinion Date: November 25, 2020 Judge: Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the sentencing court sentencing Defendant to a 235-month term of imprisonment for one count of abusive sexual contact with a child under the age of twelve, holding that the sentencing judge erred in applying the cross-reference provision in U.S.S.G. 2A3.4(c)(1). Defendant was indicted on two counts for abusing his two granddaughters. Defendant guilty to one count of sexual contact with a child under the age of twelve and the government dismissed the other count of the indictment, the charge of aggravated sexual abuse of a child under twelve. In sentencing proceedings, the government invoked the cross-reference provision at issue, the application of which resulted in a guideline range fourteen to eighteen years greater than the ordinary range for that offense. The sentencing court applied the cross-reference provision in sentencing Defendant. The First Circuit vacated the sentence, holding (1) only one of Defendant's acts considered by the sentencing court was suitable for consideration in assessing the appropriate sentence to be imposed; and (2) therefore, the sentencing judge erred when he relied on both acts to justify the application of the cross-reference provision. | | United States v. Chan | Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Dockets: 18-2232, 19-1911, 18-2233, 19-1910 Opinion Date: November 20, 2020 Judge: Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Securities Law, White Collar Crime | The First Circuit affirmed Defendants' convictions for securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud, holding that Defendants' claims of trial and sentencing error were unavailing. Defendants were two biostaticians employed by two publicly traded biopharmaceutical companies. The jury found Defendants guilty of conspiracy of commit securities fraud and all counts of securities fraud with which they were charged. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in denying Defendants' motions for judgments of acquittal as to the conspiracy and securities fraud convictions; (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants' motion to compel production of a letter from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority; (3) imposed sentences that were without error; and (4) did not err in awarding restitution. | | United States v. Portillo | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 19-2158 Opinion Date: November 24, 2020 Judge: Jon O. Newman Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law | The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's 55-year sentence imposed for his conviction of participating in a pattern of racketeering activity evidenced by his role in the murder of four teenagers. Defendant was 15 years old at the time of the offense and a member of the MS-13 gang when he participated in the execution-style murders of four members of a rival gang. The court assumed, for purposes of this appeal, that the district court was required to consider the factors in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), in determining that a sentence of 55 years, not subject to parole, was warranted for a defendant fifteen years old at the time of the homicide crimes. Even with this assumption, the court concluded that the district court considered the Miller factors and reasonably concluded that a further departure was not warranted. Acknowledging the broad scope of a sentencing judge's discretion and taking into account the care taken by the sentencing judge in exercising that discretion, the court concluded that defendant's sentence is not unreasonable in any legally cognizable sense. Finally, the court noted that defendant's sentence illustrates the unfortunate consequences of eliminating parole. Nevertheless, it is a sentence that a conscientious district judge concluded was appropriate and, upon review, the court affirmed. The court considered defendant's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. | | United States v. Rasheed | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-3479 Opinion Date: November 25, 2020 Judge: Raymond Joseph Lohier, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for one count of escape. The court held that venue was proper in the Western District of New York where, on the undisputed facts of this case, the extended limits of defendant's confinement required him to report to the VOA RRC in Rochester, New York by a designated time and his failure to appear there as required constituted an escape from the custody of the Attorney General under 18 U.S.C. 751(a) and 4082. The court also held that the district court's statements regarding defendant being in custody did not violate his right to a fair and impartial trial in violation of due process, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a mistrial. Finally, the court held that defendant failed to show a reasonable probability that a lower criminal history category and advisory range would have affected the ultimate sentence imposed; defendant also failed to show plain error in the district court's calculation of his guidelines range; the court upheld special conditions of supervised release that relate to substance abuse and mental health programs, construing the conditions to provide that the requirement that defendant contribute to services rendered is contingent upon a finding that he is able to pay such a contribution; and the court declined to consider defendant's challenge to the standard risk-notification condition. | | Folajtar v. Attorney General of the United States | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 19-1687 Opinion Date: November 24, 2020 Judge: Thomas L. Ambro Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Tax Law | In 2011, Folajtar pled guilty to a federal felony: willfully making a materially false statement on her tax returns, which is punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to $100,000, 26 U.S.C. 7206(1). She was sentenced to three years’ probation, including three months of home confinement, a $10,000 fine, and a $100 assessment. She also paid the IRS over $250,000 in back taxes, penalties, and interest. Folajtar was then subject to 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which prohibits those convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from possessing firearms. Folajtar sued, asserting that applying section 922(g)(1) to her violated her Second Amendment right to possess firearms. The district court dismissed, finding that Folajtar did not state a plausible Second Amendment claim because she was convicted of a serious crime. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting the general rule that laws restricting firearm possession by convicted felons are valid. There is no reason to deviate from this long-standing prohibition in the context of tax fraud. | | Pollini v. Robey | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-5131 Opinion Date: November 25, 2020 Judge: Readler Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | While burglarizing a garage, Pollini was confronted by Zeigler and fled. Zeigler alerted Pruitt that a burglar was in the area. Pollini had left his tools in Zeigler’s garage. Plank drove him back to the garage. Pruitt approached their car with a flashlight. Pollini fired a gun into the dark, killing Pruitt. Plank’s attorney prepared a transcript of Plank’s statement to the police. The court admitted an audiotape of the statement but denied admission of the transcript. The jury, with access to only the audiotape, had difficulty understanding some of Plank’s statement and asked the judge for a transcript, Without communicating with the parties, the judge responded: “There’s none available.” This ex parte jury communication violated Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.74. The jury found Pollini guilty. During the sentencing phase, the jury responded in the affirmative to: Was Pollini in the process of committing burglary when he killed Pruitt? Pollini argued that there was insufficient evidence to justify his life sentence because he was not committing a burglary when he killed Pruitt. The Kentucky Supreme Court remanded for resentencing without the inclusion of the aggravating circumstance. Pollini did not raise Rule 9.74. On collateral review, Pollini asserted ineffective assistance of counsel, citing the Rule 9.74 violation. The Sixth Circuit remanded the denial of relief. While Pollini’s claim fails the prejudice prong of Strickland, he did not procedurally default the claim. By the time of his collateral attack, Rule 9.74 violations were reviewed under a fundamental fairness standard, more favorable to the Commonwealth. The Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision to apply that standard was not “contrary to clearly established Federal law.” The court’s Implicit finding that the jury had the correct tape and that the tape was working was not an unreasonable determination of the facts | | Thompson v. Skipper | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-1779 Opinion Date: November 25, 2020 Judge: Deborah L. Cook Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Thompson sold heroin to a confidential informant. After the second controlled buy, police obtained a warrant to search the apartment where the transactions occurred. On their way to execute the warrant, police encountered Thompson and a passenger driving away from the apartment, stopped the vehicle, and arrested Thompson. During their search of the vehicle, officers found multiple bags of heroin and cocaine. Officers later discovered a loaded handgun under the back seat’s folding mechanism. Thompson’s fingerprints were not found on the gun. A Michigan jury convicted him of three drug crimes and four gun crimes. The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that a rational jury could infer Thompson constructively possessed the gun. Citing the “well-known relationship between drug dealing and the use of firearms as protection,” the court found that the gun’s proximity to both Thompson and the drugs sufficed to create a jury question. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Thompson’s federal habeas petition, rejecting his insufficient-evidence claim and claims of ineffective assistance and the denial of an impartial jury. Thompson, as the SUV’s driver “is held to a higher level of accountability" for its contents. Considering Thompson’s proximity to the gun and the evidence of his drug dealing, the Michigan Court of Appeals provided more than enough support for a fair-minded jurist to conclude that a rational jury could convict him of constructively possessing the gun. | | United States v. Budzynski | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 20-1264 Opinion Date: November 25, 2020 Judge: John M. Rogers Areas of Law: Criminal Law | Budzynski pleaded guilty to five counts related to fraudulently obtaining Social Security benefits totaling $48,306 in overpayments. She was sentenced to two years of probation and ordered to pay restitution and a special assessment. Months later, the probation office discovered Budzynski withdrawing money at a casino. Budzynski acknowledged that she frequently visited casinos. The district court imposed new conditions prohibiting Budzynski from gambling and requiring her to submit to searches when there is a reasonable suspicion that she violated a condition of her probation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Discretionary conditions of probation must be “reasonably related to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2)” and “involve only such deprivations of liberty or property as are reasonably necessary for the purposes indicated in section 3553(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. 3563(b). The no-gambling condition is reasonably related to the “nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” The provisions were directed at securing Budzynski’s restitution payments and were not overly broad. Budzynski had yet to make a full payment toward restitution in the three months since her probation began. Preventing her from gambling obviously serves to preserve her ability to meet the restitution obligation resulting from her fraud. | | United States v. Jones | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 20-3701 Opinion Date: November 20, 2020 Judge: Karen Nelson Moore Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Criminal Law | In 2019, Jones pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine base and was sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment. Jones filed a pro se emergency motion, seeking compassionate release because of the pandemic. Jones may have respiratory issues, is over 40 years old, and is obese. One out of every four prisoners has tested positive for COVID-19 in the prison where Jones is incarcerated. District courts may reduce the sentences of incarcerated persons in “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Previously, only the Bureau of Prisons could file motions for compassionate release. The Bureau rarely did so. The 2018 First Step Act allows incarcerated persons to file their own motions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Jones’s motion. In making sentence-modification decisions under section 3582(c)(1)(A), district courts must find both that “extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant the reduction and that the "reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission” before considering relevant 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)sentencing factors. Sentencing Guideline 1B1.13, which has not been amended to reflect the First Step Act, is not an “applicable” policy statement in cases where prisoners file their own motions. District courts must supply specific factual reasons for their decisions. Here, the court found for the sake of argument that an extraordinary and compelling circumstance existed but that section 3553(a)'s factors counseled against granting release. | | Anderson v. United States | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1257 Opinion Date: November 23, 2020 Judge: Joel Martin Flaum Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Anderson participated in an Illinois conspiracy to distribute heroin that included a dealer, Mansini. In 2012, Reader, a 21-year-old addict, purchased and used heroin from another dealer. Later that day, Reader purchased an additional half-gram of heroin from Mansini, who had obtained it from Anderson. Reader used that heroin and was found dead that evening. According to the coroner’s report, the cause of death was “opiate intoxication.” The report did not attribute Reader’s death to one particular heroin dose or make findings on the incremental effects of other drugs. Anderson and others were charged with conspiracy to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 846. Three defendants, including Anderson, pleaded guilty. Anderson admitted to distributing the heroin that resulted in Reader’s death, which carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years imprisonment and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Anderson concurred with the plea agreement’s factual statements but told the court that he might have a factual defense to Reader’s death because Reader had bought heroin from other sources and used prescription drugs. The court sentenced him to 223 months’ imprisonment. Anderson's 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel did not adequately investigate the cause of Reader’s death and advise Anderson of the “but-for” causation standard articulated by the Supreme Court in 2014. Counsel responded that Anderson authorized her to proceed with plea negotiations without hiring a medical examiner and she was “not trained to interpret toxicology results” and “never discussed” the toxicology evidence with anyone who had relevant training. The Seventh Circuit vacated a denial of relief. Anderson was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. | | Dunn v. Jess | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 20-1168 Opinion Date: November 24, 2020 Judge: St. Eve Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Construction Law, Criminal Law | Dunn slapped Schuckman in a bar's parking lot, causing him to fall to the ground. Witnesses reported seeing Schuckman upright and apparently unharmed afterward. Hours later, Schuckman was found dead on the bar’s patio. Dunn and Crochet were charged with felony murder, battery, and theft from a corpse. Dunn’s counsel consulted with a forensic pathologist. After viewing the medical examiner’s report, the pathologist believed that Schuckman died immediately from his head injuries—suggesting that Dunn’s slap could not have caused his death. Before trial, defense counsel repeatedly, erroneously, stated that the medical examiner had concluded that Schuckman died immediately from a fatal blow and would testify to that at trial. The medical examiner’s report did not contain such conclusions and counsel never confirmed them. The prosecutor informed Dunn’s counsel that Crochet had retained experts, who were going to produce reports that bolstered Dunn’s no-causation defense. The prosecution considered the reports exculpatory. Dunn’s counsel did not ask for a continuance or attempt to view the reports. At trial, defense counsel did not call his forensic pathologist as a witness. The medical examiner testified that there was no reason to think that Schuckman would have died immediately from the fatal head injury, and it would have been possible for Schuckman to move after sustaining this injury. The Seventh Circuit upheld an order granting federal habeas relief. Dunn’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and offer evidence to support a no-causation defense and Dunn was prejudiced by that deficient performance. | | Fields v. City of Chicago | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Dockets: 17-3079, 17-3125, 18-1207 Opinion Date: November 20, 2020 Judge: ROVNER Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Fields filed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law against Chicago, Chicago police officers, and former Cook County prosecutors. Fields alleged that the defendants violated his constitutional rights and state law by fabricating evidence and withholding exculpatory evidence in a criminal investigation that resulted in Fields’s conviction for a 1984 murder. A retrial resulted in an acquittal, 12 years after the original trial. The individual who had implicated Fields in the crimes eventually confessed to committing the murder. Fields sought a certificate of innocence, which was denied. After a third trial, the jury found in favor of Fields against Detectives O’Callaghan and Murphy on one of his section 1983 claims, against Chicago on Fields’s Monell liability claim, and against O’Callaghan on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and found for the defendants on the remaining claims. The jury awarded Fields $22 million in compensatory damages and punitive damages of $30,000 against O’Callaghan and $10,000 against Murphy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting the detectives’ challenges to evidentiary rulings concerning wiretaps, character evidence, evidence of Fields’s 1972 murder conviction, and evidence concerning prison incidents. The evidence allowed a jury to conclude that the city had failed to take the necessary steps to address an unconstitutional practice of using street files and that there was a “systemic underproduction of exculpatory materials to prosecutors and defense counsel.” | | United States v. Gunn | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 20-1959 Opinion Date: November 20, 2020 Judge: Frank Hoover Easterbrook Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Criminal Law | Federal judges may release prisoners for compassionate reasons. Previously, that authority required a motion by the Bureau of Prisons. The 2018 First Step Act created a judicial power to grant compassionate release on a prisoner’s own request; the prisoner must first allow the Bureau to review the request and make a recommendation (or let 30 days pass in silence), 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Gunn’s sentence for drug and firearm offenses runs into 2024. She sought release under section 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that, because of her age (62) and medical condition, she faces extra risks should she contract COVID-19. The district court denied relief, citing the requirement ”that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." The Sentencing Commission, which lacks a quorum, has not updated its policy statements to implement the Act. The most recent Guidelines Manual refers to a “motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons" and covers only prisoners who suffer from certain medical problems. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The Manual lacks an applicable policy statement; any decision is “consistent with” a nonexistent policy. “Consistent with” differs from “authorized by.” While a judge acting on a prisoner’s motion may lack the Director's advice, contemplated by Manual, about whether an “extraordinary and compelling reason” exists, the First Step Act does not muzzle the Director. Until an amended statement is adopted, district judges must operate under the statutory criteria: ”extraordinary and compelling reasons.” | | United States v. McDonaldes | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-3222 Opinion Date: November 24, 2020 Judge: St. Eve Areas of Law: Criminal Law | McDonald pleaded guilty to transporting child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1). He admitted to using his computer to send two emails with video attachments containing pornography depicting children as young as five and portraying “sadistic and masochistic conduct” and admitted to using a filesharing website to download child pornography. His hard drive contained approximately 5,000 images and 890 videos of child pornography. His guidelines range was 151-188 months’ imprisonment. The PSR recommended a reduction of three levels for acceptance of responsibility, even though McDonald insisted that he received the emails unintentionally and “wasn’t sure” if the content was illegal. McDonald sought a statutory minimum sentence of five years, arguing “[a]ny lengthy sentence may be a death sentence” because of his age (62-63), his type I diabetes, and two blocked arteries near his heart. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a 156-month sentence as being “in most part and significant part” based on the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, including the guidelines range. The court acknowledged McDonald’s medical reports and considered his age and medical conditions and how McDonald had served his family and community by caring for his parents and by rescuing animals. The court concluded that aggravating factors countervailed because McDonald possessed and distributed large amounts of child pornography, there were “significant” reasons to believe that McDonald would re-offend, McDonald had photographed neighborhood children, and he had wavered in accepting responsibility. | | United States v. Smith | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-3696 Opinion Date: November 25, 2020 Judge: Diane S. Sykes Areas of Law: Criminal Law | Smith stole a truck in Iowa, drove it across the Mississippi River into Illinois, crashed into a median, then fled, leaving a stolen handgun inside. He has a felony record and pled guilty to federal charges of unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon and possession of stolen goods. The PSR recommended an enhanced offense level under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2) based on Smith’s 2009 Iowa conviction for delivery of cocaine and a 2008 Iowa conviction for aggravated assault. Smith conceded the “controlled substance offense” but objected to counting the aggravated-assault conviction as a “crime of violence.” The judge overruled the objection and imposed a sentence of 115 months, the top of the advisory range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A “crime of violence” is an offense that has “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a). Under the Iowa Code, “[a] person who commits an assault ... and uses or displays a dangerous weapon in connection with the assault” is guilty of the crime of aggravated assault. Some variants of the simple assault offense do not require the use or threat of physical force but the section is divisible. Smith was convicted under a subsection that requires a threat of physical force; the judge properly relied on Smith’s 2008 aggravated-assault conviction to elevate his base offense. | | United States v. Diaz | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1801 Opinion Date: November 23, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Eighth Circuit held that, under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, defendant forfeited his right to have his appeal heard because he escaped from prison. On the Government's request, the appeal will be dismissed thirty days from the date of the filing of this opinion unless defendant submits himself to the jurisdiction of the United States District Court or is found and taken into custody by either state or federal officers. | | Rico v. Ducart | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 19-15541 Opinion Date: November 20, 2020 Judge: Richard C. Tallman Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Pelican Bay State Prison officials in a civil rights action brought by plaintiff, an inmate at Pelican Bay, alleging claims over prison noise stemming from the orders of a federal district court adopting recommendations of its Special Master to implement round-the-clock welfare checks to prevent inmate suicides in California's prison system. The panel held that, on the specific facts presented here, no reasonable officer would have understood that these court-ordered actions were violating the constitutional rights of the inmates. The panel explained that, even if the Pelican Bay officials haphazardly implemented the Guard One system, no reasonable official in these circumstances would believe that creating additional noise while carrying out mandatory suicide checks for prisoner safety clearly violated plaintiff's constitutional rights. In this case, where defendants were following court-ordered procedures to enhance inmate safety that are inherently loud, all Pelican Bay officials are entitled to qualified immunity. | | United States v. Bautista | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 19-10448 Opinion Date: November 23, 2020 Judge: William A. Fletcher Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Ninth Circuit reversed defendant's sentence for possession of ammunition by a convicted felon. Defendant contends that the district court erred in applying a recidivist sentencing enhancement based on his prior state conviction for attempted transportation of marijuana under Arizona Revised Statutes 13-3405(A)(4). The panel held that the district court's application of the six-level recidivist enhancement was plain error. The Arizona statute under which defendant was convicted included hemp in its definition of marijuana. However, in 2018, before defendant's federal conviction, Congress amended the Controlled Substances Act to exclude hemp from its definition of a controlled substance. Therefore, in 2019, when defendant was sentenced, the Arizona statute under which he had been convicted was overbroad and that conviction no longer qualified as a "controlled substance offense" under the Guidelines. Furthermore, the error affected defendant's substantial rights and allowing the error to go uncorrected would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Accordingly, the panel remanded for resentencing. | | United States v. Gutierrez | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 19-30107 Opinion Date: November 23, 2020 Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Ninth Circuit certified to the Idaho Supreme Court the following question: Whether an Idaho state court order reducing the defendant's judgment of conviction for felony burglary to a judgment of conviction for misdemeanor petit theft under the authority of Idaho Code 19-2604(2) changes the operative conviction for the purposes of Idaho Code 18-310, which prohibits the restoration of firearm rights to those citizens convicted of specific felony offenses. See Idaho Code 18-310(2). | | United States v. Ngumezi | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 19-10243 Opinion Date: November 20, 2020 Judge: Eric D. Miller Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress a firearm found in a search of his car, vacated his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, and remanded for further proceedings. The panel held that police officers who have reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a traffic stop—but who lack probable cause or any other particularized justification, such as a reasonable belief that the driver poses a danger—may not open the door to a vehicle and lean inside. In this case, the officer conducted an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment when he opened the car door and leaned into it to ask defendant for his driver's license and vehicle registration. The panel concluded that nothing about this case calls for a remedy other than the typical remedy for Fourth Amendment violation, which is the exclusion of evidence discovered as a result of that violation from criminal proceedings against defendant. Therefore, the firearm must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. | | United States v. Rusnak | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 17-10137 Opinion Date: November 25, 2020 Judge: Ryan D. Nelson Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for accessing, possessing, and distributing child pornography. The panel held that defendant arguably waived his Franks claim and that any error was not plain. The panel rejected defendant's claim under Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973), where defendant, not the Government, benefited more from the district court's enforcement of the parties' agreement to disclose the identity of testifying witnesses. The panel rejected defendant's remaining evidentiary challenges and held that the district court did not err in denying his motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct. The panel also held that the district court did not err, let alone plainly err, in imposing a lifetime term of supervised release. As to the substance of the Special Conditions, the Government concedes that remand is required to conform the written judgment to the oral pronouncement of Special Conditions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. So conformed, the Government also concedes Special Conditions 5 and 8 must be vacated and remanded for the district court to reconsider. Finally, the district court's imposition of Special Condition 7, requiring defendant to submit to searches of his property and person by his probation officer, was not an abuse of discretion. The panel remanded for further proceedings. | | United States v. Romero-Lopez | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-1268 Opinion Date: November 25, 2020 Judge: Robert Edwin Bacharach Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law | Deivy Romero-Lopez was convicted of illegally reentering the United States after being removed. The crime of illegal reentry begins when a noncitizen returns after removal and continues until he or she is “found” in the United States. The issue this case presented was not that Romero-Lopez was found in the U.S. after removal, but when he was found. The timing matters for his sentence because the Sentencing Commission dramatically increased the guideline ranges for individuals convicted of illegal reentry. The "starting point" for a sentence was the applicable starting guideline range. To determine that range, the district court needed to decide which annual version of the guidelines to use because the Sentencing commission changed the applicable provision in November 2016; the guideline ranges for illegal reentry sharply increased in November 2016. The new version of the guidelines would have applied only if Romero-Lopez's offense ended on or after the date of the change. Focusing on this increase, the parties disagreed over whether Romero-Lopez had been “found” before the change went into effect. The district court concluded that he had been found after the change, triggering the increased guideline range. Finding no reversible error in that conclusion, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. | | United States v. Silva | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-1298 Opinion Date: November 24, 2020 Judge: Harris L. Hartz Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Defendant Donovan Silva contended the district court erred in arriving at his sentence for possessing a firearm as a previously convicted felon under the Sentencing Guidelines by concluding a prior assault conviction was a crime of violence. He argued the assault conviction was too old to have independently received criminal-history points under USSG sections 4A1.1 and 4A1.2 n.3(a). To this, the Tenth Circuit agreed: the Guidelines did not permit a section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) enhancement. The error met all four prongs of the plain-error analysis. Therefore, the Court reversed sentence and remanded for resentencing. | | Gonzalez v. United States | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-11182 Opinion Date: November 20, 2020 Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law | Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, seeking to vacate his alien-smuggling conviction on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when deciding to plead guilty. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the petition, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the petition as untimely. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. The court also held that the district court did not err in ruling that petitioner failed to provide sound reasons for his delay from the time he learned of possible deportation consequences to file his petition—for a total of 20 months—because his petition was not ripe until October 2016 when removal proceedings officially commenced against him. | | United States v. Delgado | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-11997 Opinion Date: November 23, 2020 Judge: R. Stan Baker Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for knowingly importing approximately 2.62 grams of U47700, a Schedule I controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 952, and possessing five firearm silencers, which had not been registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861(d). The court held that the warrant for the search of defendant's home was supported by probable cause; the good faith exception provides an additional and alternative basis for the court to affirm the district court's ruling on the motion to suppress; the Government presented sufficient evidence to permit the district court, in sentencing defendant, to consider as relevant conduct his importation of the first intercepted package where the Government demonstrated, by a preponderance of evidence, that defendant knew that the substance being shipped in the first package was not a legal substance; and the district court properly applied a sentencing enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon under USSG 2D1.1(b)(1). | | United States v. Green | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-10346 Opinion Date: November 25, 2020 Judge: Charles R. Wilson Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Eleventh Circuit vacated its August 11, 2020 opinion and substituted the following opinion. Defendants appealed their convictions, sentences, and various decisions made by the district court throughout the pre-trial and trial process. Defendants operated a drug-trafficking organization in Bradenton, Florida. Defendants were convicted of participating in a racketeering conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act and a drug trafficking conspiracy, as well as gun crimes and other crimes. The court held that RICO conspiracy does not qualify as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and thus vacated defendants' section 924(c) convictions and sentences, remanding for resentencing. The court also held that Defendant Corey's 120-year sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to clarify the applicable guideline range and relied on a clearly erroneous fact. Accordingly, the court vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court affirmed as to the remaining issues. | | United States v. Shah | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-12319 Opinion Date: November 24, 2020 Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions for receiving healthcare kickback payments. At the request of the government, the district court instructed the jury that defendant violated the statute prohibiting kickbacks if one reason he accepted the payment was because it was in return for writing prescriptions. Both parties subsequently agreed at oral argument that the jury instruction was erroneous and that the statute requires no proof of the defendant's motivation for accepting the illegal payment, so long as he accepts the kickback knowingly and willfully. However, the parties disagreed about whether the error was harmful. The court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the error caused defendant no harm because it required the government to prove even more than the statute required. Furthermore, the district court correctly instructed the jury about the burden the government bore in proving willfulness, and correctly instructed the jury that defendant committed no crime if he accepted the payments in good faith. The court saw no reason why adding an unnecessary "one purpose" instruction could have prejudiced defendant by detracting from the otherwise correct willfulness and good-faith instructions. | | United States v. Trader | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-15611 Opinion Date: November 25, 2020 Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for enticing a minor to engage in sexual activity, enticing a minor to produce a sexually explicit video, and possessing and distributing child pornography. The court held that the government did not need a warrant to obtain a criminal suspect's email address and internet protocol addresses from a third party's business records, because Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2217 & n.3 (2018), did not create a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail addresses or internet protocol addresses. The court also held that probable cause supported a warrant to search defendant's house where the warrant contained more than enough evidence to establish a fair probability that the house contained evidence that a crime had been committed. Finally, defendant's sentence of life imprisonment was reasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(C) factors and did not abuse its discretion by considering the advisory guidelines in determining defendant's sentence. | | Meadows v. Shaver et al. | Court: Supreme Court of Alabama Docket: 1180134 Opinion Date: November 20, 2020 Judge: Tom Parker Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Kary Meadows was confined in a work-release program for eight months after his sentence ended. In 2009, Meadows pleaded guilty to theft, receiving stolen property, and possession of a controlled substance. He was sentenced to five years; that sentence was split and he was ordered to serve one year in the Walker County Community Work Release Program (operated by WCCC, a private company), followed by four years of supervised probation. In 2012, his probation was revoked, and he was placed under house arrest. In early May 2013, he was removed from house arrest for marijuana violations and placed back in the work-release program, where he was confined at night but released to work during the day. On the day Meadows was supposed to be released from custody, he asked to be released, but Shaver refused. Every day for the next eight months, Meadows asked to be released, insisting that his time had been served and asking to be shown his time sheet. Shaver and his subordinates refused to release Meadows and refused to provide him any document showing when he was supposed to be released or to provide him his prisoner-identification number so he could find his release date for himself. Meadows asserts that Shaver threatened to have him charged with felony escape and placed in a maximum-security facility for 15 years if he ever failed to return to the facility after work, so Meadows continued to spend every night in custody for 8 months. Meadows eventually retained an attorney and filed suit against Shaver and WCCC, asserting claims of of negligence and wantonness, negligence per se, false imprisonment, and money had and received (based on the fees and rent Meadows had paid to WCCC during the eight months he was improperly in custody). Shaver moved to dismiss, Shaver contended that he was not responsible for calculating the end-of-sentence date, nor was he capable of doing so. WCCC likewise moved for a summary judgment, incorporating by reference Shaver's arguments. The trial court ultimately entered judgment in favor of Shaver and WCCC. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed dismissal: "This Court ordinarily cannot reverse a summary judgment on the basis of an argument that reasonably could have been, but was not, presented to the trial court before that court entered the summary judgment." Because Meadows' appellate arguments were not preserved for review, summary judgment was affirmed. | | Larson Jr. v. Alaska, Department of Corrections, Board of Parole | Court: Alaska Supreme Court Docket: S-17529 Opinion Date: November 20, 2020 Judge: Daniel E. Winfree Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Loren Larson, Jr. was convicted in 1998 of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of first-degree burglary, and he was sentenced to two consecutive 99-year terms for the murder counts and a 10-year concurrent term for the burglary count; the court of appeals affirmed Larson’s conviction in 2000. In 2003, the court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s subsequent dismissal of Larson’s post-conviction relief claim. Larson maintained his innocence and has unsuccessfully challenged the convictions in numerous other proceedings. Larson claimed he wanted to apply for clemency from the Alaska Governor on grounds he was innocent and wrongly convicted, But he did not want to execute two required information release forms that were part of the clemency application. Larson was advised by the Board of Parole that under the current administrative framework an incomplete application would be returned to him and not forwarded to the governor. Larson then sued the Board, arguing that its refusal to forward his application without the release forms violated his due process right to submit a clemency application. He further argued that enforcing the information release requirement would violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which in some contexts barred the government from conditioning a benefit on the waiver of a constitutional right. The superior court granted summary judgment to the Board, rejecting the applicant’s constitutional arguments. Because the Board did not violate the applicant’s constitutional rights, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of the lawsuit. | | In Response To The COVID-19 Pandemic | Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 384 Opinion Date: November 20, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law | Here, the Supreme Court announced new protocols to maintain the safety of jurors, litigants, attorneys, court personnel and the public in light of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The Court suspended until January 15, 2021 jury trials that have not begun. The Court, however, urged that judges continue to move cases forward, either through the use of technology by virtual or telephonic hearings or through in-person hearings that meet the Arkansas Department of Health's criteria for safe gatherings. The Court held that any delay for speedy-trial purposes due to precautions against the COVID-19 pandemic shall presumptively constitute good cause under Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3(h) and shall constitute an excluded period for speedy-trial purposes. | | People v. Flinner | Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S123813 Opinion Date: November 23, 2020 Judge: Kruger Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder and grand theft, mingling a harmful substance with food or drink, and solicitation to commit murder, and sentence of death, holding that any error was not prejudicial. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant's judicial bias claim failed; (2) the erroneous admission of certain statements and the possibly erroneous admission of a certain letter were cumulatively harmless; (3) there was sufficient evidence for the lying-in-wait special circumstance finding and the lying-in-wait first degree murder conviction; (4) any asserted juror misconduct did not, singly or in combination, substantially prejudice the trial's fairness; (5) the trial court did not err in finding that Defendant was competent to stand trial; and (6) Defendant's challenges to the constitutionality of California's Death Penalty Law were unavailing. | | People v. Schultz | Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S114671 Opinion Date: November 23, 2020 Judge: Tani Cantil-Sakauye Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of first degree murder and finding true the special circumstance allegations that the murder was committed while Defendant was engaged in the commission of rape and burglary and sentencing Defendant to death, holding that the errors committed during the trial proceedings were not prejudicial. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) assuming for the purposes of argument that a recording of the victim's last telephone call and testimony regarding DNA extraction should not have been admitted, any error was harmless; (2) assuming that portions of correspondence to Defendant were inadmissible hearsay, Defendant was not prejudiced by any error in the admission; (3) the prosecution committed misconduct by eliciting statements from a rebuttal witness during the penalty phase regarding the contents of one of those pieces of correspondence, but the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's related motion for a mistrial; and (4) the cumulative effect of those asserted errors was harmless. | | In re Canady | Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C089363(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 25, 2020 Judge: Elena J. Duarte Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Criminal Law | Macanthony Canady petitioned the superior court for a writ of habeas corpus seeking early parole consideration under Proposition 57. He asserted the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (Department) regulation purporting to implement Proposition 57 was inconsistent with the Proposition. Specifically, the Department’s regulation did not consider conduct credits inmates earned while incarcerated in the calculation of inmates’ nonviolent early parole eligible dates.The trial court agreed with Canady and invalidated the Department’s regulations as contradicting the stated purposes of the Proposition. The Attorney General appealed, contending the order had to be reversed because the Department’s regulation was: consistent with the plain language of the Proposition, authorized by the broad discretion granted to it by the Proposition, and consistent with the voters’ intent in passing the Proposition. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the trial court's order. | | In re Edgerrin J. | Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D076461(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 20, 2020 Judge: Dato Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law | After receiving a citizen’s tip that Black males in a Mercedes were “acting shady,” four San Diego Police Department (SDPD) officers drove to the scene in two marked vehicles, activating emergency lights in one. Parking behind the Mercedes, the officers positioned themselves beside each of its four doors and asked the three teenagers inside for their names and identification. A records check later indicated that the driver was on probation subject to a Fourth Amendment waiver. The officers searched the vehicle and recovered a loaded firearm and sneakers linking the minors to a recent robbery. The minors moved to suppress the evidence found in the car, claiming their initial detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Finding the encounter was consensual rather than a detention, the juvenile court denied the motions. Two of the minors pleaded guilty to a subset of the charges originally filed. In a consolidated appeal, two of the minors, Edgerrin J. and Jamar D. challenged the denial of their motions to suppress, arguing the juvenile court erred in finding the encounter consensual, and claimed the citizen’s tip did not establish reasonable suspicion to detain them. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed on both points. However, the Court found conflicting evidence as to whether officers knew other facts that might furnish reasonable suspicion for the stop, or justify the detention and search pursuant to Edgerrin’s active Fourth Amendment waiver. Because the rationale for its ruling made it unnecessary for the juvenile court to address these other issues, judgment was reversed and remanded for a new hearing to permit it to assess witness credibility and reach factual findings in the first instance. | | In re Haynes | Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: G057671(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 24, 2020 Judge: Aronson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | After being informed he was not eligible for early parole consideration, Luther Haynes filed a petition for habeas corpus, alleging he was unlawfully precluded from Proposition 57 parole consideration because of his status as a sex offender registrant. Haynes was required to register as a sex offender due to: (1) two prior felony convictions for sex offenses committed in the 1980’s; and (2) a felony conviction for annoying or molesting a child, for which he presently was serving an indeterminate third strike sentence. The trial court granted the habeas petition, and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) appealed. Whether the CDCR may exclude from Proposition 57 parole consideration otherwise eligible inmates, who have prior convictions requiring sex offender registration, was under review by the California Supreme Court. The Court of Appeal concluded that based on the language of article I, section 32 of the California Constitution, Proposition 57 parole consideration had to be based on Haynes' current offense, not past convictions. Haynes did not show the challenged regulations were unconstitutional as applied to an offender whose sole current offense was a Penal Code section 647.6 conviction. The Court declined to resolve the broader issue of whether the CDCR could categorically exclude from eligibility for early parole consideration of all inmates currently serving sentences of having prior convictions for any offense requiring sex offender registration "because there are unquestionably violent crimes which require sex offender registration." The Court reversed the trial court's order granting Haynes' habeas petition. | | People v. Daniel | Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A157422(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 20, 2020 Judge: Humes Areas of Law: Criminal Law | In 2015, a jury convicted Daniel of second-degree murder in the death of his girlfriend. He was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. In 2018, Senate Bill 1437 altered liability for murder under the theories of felony murder and natural and probable consequences and established a procedure, Penal Code section 1170.95, for eligible defendants to seek resentencing. Daniel filed a petition for relief, alleging that he was convicted of murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or the felony murder doctrine and could no longer be convicted of murder because of Senate Bill 1437’s changes to the law. The trial court summarily denied the petition, reasoning that the jury was not instructed on either theory of liability and the record showed Daniel was the actual killer. The court of appeal affirmed. Although the judge who ruled on the petition failed to appoint counsel and was not the sentencing judge, both violations of section 1170.95, the errors were harmless. A court’s failure to appoint counsel after a petitioner files a facially sufficient petition for relief is not prejudicial error when records in the court’s own file—here, the jury instructions— demonstrate that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. | | People v. Hall | Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A157868(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 24, 2020 Judge: Miller Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | When Hall was pulled over for a vehicle equipment violation in 2018, a police officer observed in the car “a clear plastic baggie” of what appeared to be marijuana. Based on this observation, two police officers searched Hall’s car and found a gun in a closed backpack, resulting in criminal charges against Hall for carrying a loaded firearm in a public place, carrying a concealed firearm in a vehicle, and having no license plate lamp. The trial court denied Hall’s motion to suppress the evidence found in the search. The court of appeal reversed that denial. Since the passage of Proposition 64 in 2016, it has been legal for persons 21 years of age and older to possess and transport small amounts (up to 28.5 grams) of marijuana, Health & Saf. Code 11362.1(a)(1). The lawful possession of marijuana in a vehicle does not provide probable cause to search the vehicle. Under Proposition 64, a driver is not permitted to “[p]ossess an open container or open package of cannabis or cannabis products” but there was no evidence in this case that the plastic baggie observed by the officers was an “open container.” | | People v. Shelp | Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B298753(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 20, 2020 Judge: Kenneth R. Yegan Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Court of Appeal held that custody credits do not accrue with each Post Release Community Supervision (PRCS) flash incarceration or jail sanction, thereby shortening the PRCS three-year supervision period. The court stated that the very thought of custody credits whittling down a PRCS supervision period is counter-intuitive and counterproductive. The court exercised its discretion to resolve the appeal, despite claims of mootness, rejecting defendant's claims that custody credits accrue with each PRCS flash incarceration and jail incarceration, and the custody credits automatically shorten the three-year PRCS supervision period. The court explained that PRCS was enacted to rehabilitate nonviolent felons at the local level, not to reward the felon with custody credits that can theoretically reduce the PRCS supervision period to zero. Furthermore, the word "supervision" in PCRS means just that. Because PRCS supervision is not a sentence, the supervision period is not shortened by custody credits. Finally, the court held that this appeal is consistent with People v. Espinoza (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 635. The court affirmed the order revoking PRCS and ordering 180 days county jail, and order denying motion to terminate PRCS supervision. | | People v. Williams | Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A157917(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 20, 2020 Judge: Petrou Areas of Law: Criminal Law | In 1969, then 20-year old Williams and two juveniles committed an attempted robbery of a milkman; the milkman was fatally shot. Williams was convicted of first-degree murder. The court noted that the overwhelming evidence that Williams was present and participated. After serving seven years, Williams was released on parole. In 1979, he committed another murder. Williams was convicted of second-degree murder. In 2019, Williams sought to vacate his 1969 conviction. He cited the sentencing transcript in which the court had stated the crime was “senseless and cruel" but "not deliberate and premeditated,” and the expression of “some doubt" that Williams "did the actual killing’” and a 2014 decision by former Governor Brown reversing a favorable parole recommendation, stating that “Williams’ crime partners shot and killed a milkman.” The court found Williams not eligible for resentencing because he could have been found guilty of first-degree murder under the newly-amended Penal Code 189 as a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life in the commission of felony murder. The court of appeal affirmed. The robbery was planned at Williams's home. Williams held the gun, which contained at least three bullets; the court could reasonably infer that Williams had a reasonable expectation that death could result. He had an opportunity to act as a restraining influence on the attempted robbery and the juveniles. After the shooting, the three fled without calling for assistance or attempting to render aid to the victim who did not die at the scene. | | Colorado v. Lee | Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 81 Opinion Date: November 23, 2020 Judge: Gabriel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether, under prevailing Colorado equal protection principles, a defendant may be charged with second degree assault based on conduct involving strangulation under both the deadly weapon subsection of the second degree assault statute, section 18-3-203(1)(b), C.R.S. (2020), and the strangulation subsection of that same statute, section 18-3-203(1)(i). The State initially charged Dearies Deshonne Austin Lee with, among other things, two counts of second degree assault-strangulation pursuant to subsection 18-3-203(1)(i), following an incident in which he was alleged to have twice strangled his former girlfriend. Eight months later, the State added two counts of second degree assault-bodily injury with a deadly weapon (namely, hands), pursuant to subsection 18-3-203(1)(b), based on the same conduct. On Lee’s motion, the trial court dismissed the two charges of second degree assault-bodily injury with a deadly weapon on equal protection grounds. The State appealed, and in a unanimous, published opinion, a division of the court of appeals affirmed dismissal. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed: a defendant may not be charged with second degree assault based on conduct involving strangulation under both the deadly weapon subsection of the second degree assault statute, section 18-3-203(1)(b), and the strangulation subsection of that statute, section 18-3-203(1)(i). Rather, the defendant must be charged under the strangulation subsection. | | Galvan v. Colorado | Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 82 Opinion Date: November 23, 2020 Judge: Samour Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The Colorado Supreme Court revisited a question left open in Castillo v. Colorado, 421 P.3d 1141 (2018): When a trial court instructs the jury on the affirmative defense of self-defense, what quantum of proof is required to instruct the jury about an exception to that defense? The State urged the Supreme Court to adopt “some evidence” as the controlling standard. Defendant Jose L. Galvan, Sr. sought a heightened standard—substantial and sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that there were facts establishing the exception beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that when a trial court instructs the jury on the affirmative defense of self-defense, it should instruct the jury on an exception to that defense if there is some evidence to support the exception. In determining whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the provocation exception here, a division of the court of appeals correctly found that there was some evidence to support the exception. "the trial court’s provocation instruction, in addition to prudently tracking the governing statute and the Colorado Model Criminal Jury Instructions, made clear to the jury that for Galvan to forfeit the affirmative defense of self-defense, he had to have provoked the same person as to whom he was asserting self-defense. | | Juliano v. Delaware | Court: Delaware Supreme Court Docket: 320, 2019 Opinion Date: November 12, 2020 Judge: Traynor Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law | In January 2019, 15-year old Heather Juliano was a passenger in a sport-utility vehicle driven by Shakyla Soto in the vicinity of the Capital Green development in Dover, Delaware. Corporal Robert Barrett of the Dover Police Department was patrolling the area, accompanied by Probation Officer Rick Porter, as part of the Department’s Safe Streets program. Corporal Barrett spotted Soto’s SUV exiting Capital Green and noticed that the occupant of the front passenger seat was not wearing a seat belt. Corporal Barrett decided to pull the vehicle over. Almost immediately after Barrett initiated contact with the driver, he heard Porter say “1015 which means take . . . everybody into custody.” Three other Dover Police Department officers arrived on the scene in very short order. All four occupants of the SUV were removed from the vehicle and handcuffed in response to Porter’s order. The SUV was then searched, but no contraband was found. One officer searched backseat passenger Keenan Teat and found a knotted bag containing crack cocaine in one of his pants pockets. Another officer searched passenger Zion Saunders and found both marijuana and heroin in his jacket pockets. But when Officer Johnson searched Juliano, he found no contraband, but $245.00 in cash. Juliano was later taken to the police station, and strip-searched. Officers found marijuana and a bag of cocaine in her pants. Juliano was charged with Tier 1 possession of narcotics plus an aggravating factor (aggravated possession of cocaine), drug dealing, and possession of marijuana. The Delaware Supreme Court determined there was nothing unreasonable in a motor vehicle stop based on an officer's reasonable suspicion the operator or occupant of the vehicle committed a violation of the law - here, traffic laws. "Equally so, we are not prepared to say that, once a vehicle is lawfully stopped, the police must ignore evidence of other criminal activity when that evidence itself is lawfully uncovered." Rejecting Juliano's appellate claims with regard to the initial traffic stop and the suppression od evidence, the Supreme Court felt compelled to address "certain conspicuous irregularities" in the trial court's order denying Juliano's motion to suppress: (1) the trial court did not articulate a basis for finding a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the extension of the traffic stop to investigate the vehicle's occupants; and (2) the court's order did not explain the basis upon which the custodial arrest and threatened strip search were justified. The matter was remanded to the trial court for more complete statements of the factual and legal bases with respect to Juliano's search and subsequent arrest. | | Waters v. Delaware | Court: Delaware Supreme Court Docket: 491, 2019 Opinion Date: November 23, 2020 Judge: Montgomery-Reeves Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Appellant Reginald Waters appealed his convictions for various offenses relating to the death of Clifton Thompson. According to Waters,the Superior Court erred in three ways: (1) in applying an incorrect legal standard when considering his motion for a new trial and improperly denied the motion; (2) in denying his motion to exclude certain prison phone calls that were obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; and (3) in denying a continuance of his trial to allow his counsel time to review certain evidence, which compromised his right to a fair trial. The Delaware Supreme Court found the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Waters’ motion for a new trial. Nor did the court err in allowing the prison phone calls to be used at trial. Lastly, the Supreme Court determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Waters’ continuance of trial. Therefore, judgment was affirmed. | | Colley v. State | Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC18-2014 Opinion Date: November 25, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's two first-degree murder convictions and two corresponding sentences of death, holding that Defendant's assignments of error were unavailing. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in instructing on and finding the CCP aggravator and the HAC aggravator; (2) the trial court did not err in instructing on and finding the HAC aggravator; (3) Florida’s death penalty statute is constitutional; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Defendant's two proposed impairment mitigators; (5) the trial court did not err in allowing victim impact evidence; (6) the prosecutor’s penalty phase closing argument did not violate Defendant's constitutional rights; and (7) competent, substantial evidence supported Defendant's first-degree murder convictions. | | State v. Jackson | Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC20-257 Opinion Date: November 25, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Supreme Court denied the State's petition seeking an extraordinary writ that would direct the circuit court to dismiss a resentencing proceeding and reinstate two previously vacated death sentences for the State or, alternatively, a writ of prohibition that would bar the circuit court from conducting the resentencing, holding that Defendant's vacated death sentences cannot be retroactively reinstated. In 2017, Defendant filed a successive postconviction motion seeking relief under Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). The postconviction court granted Defendant a new penalty phase, scheduled to begin in 2020, and the State did not appeal the order granting relief. Before trial, the State filed a motion requesting that the circuit court dismiss the resentencing proceeding and maintain Defendant's sentences of death, seeking to apply the holding in State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020), to Defendant's case. The circuit court denied the motion. Thereafter, the State filed its emergency all writs petition and petition for writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that a death sentence that was vacated by the postconviction court cannot be "reinstated" if the State never appealed the final order granting relief, the resentencing has not yet taken place, and the Supreme Court has since receded from the decisional law on which the sentence was vacated. | | State v. Okafor | Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC20-323 Opinion Date: November 25, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Supreme Court held that its 2017 judgment vacating on direct appeal Defendant's death sentence is final, that neither the Supreme Court nor the trial court can lawfully reinstate that sentence, and that, therefore, resentencing was required. In 2015, Defendant was sentenced to death for first-degree premeditated murder. In 2017, relying on the then-applicable rule of Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), the Supreme Court vacated Defendant's death sentence and remanded for a new penalty phase proceeding. In 2020, the Supreme Court decided State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020), in which the Court receded from Hurst. Because Defendant would have been constitutionality eligible for a death sentence under the rule of Poole the State asked the trial court to reinstate Defendant's death sentence. The trial court denied the State's motion. Thereafter, the State filed a petition arguing that reinstatement of Defendant's death sentence was required under Poole. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the Court cannot reconsider its judgment vacating Defendant's death sentence and that the trial court also lacked the authority to reconsider the Supreme Court's final judgment vacating Defendant's death sentence. | | State v. Casper | Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 19-0849 Opinion Date: November 20, 2020 Judge: Edward M. Mansfield Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence for operating while intoxicated first offense, holding that a peace officer does not violate a duty under Iowa Code 321J.11(2) by agreeing to a detainee's request for a retest on the machine that has already tested the detainee's blood alcohol level without also informing the detainee of the statutory right to an independent test at the detainee's expense. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) an officer must inform the detainee of the right to an independent test only in circumstances when the detainee has reasonably asked about that right or when a failure to disclose that right could be misleading; and (2) because neither of those circumstances were present in this case, the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress. | | State v. Roby | Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 19-0551 Opinion Date: November 20, 2020 Judge: Thomas D. Waterman Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences for eluding while speeding and several unrelated offenses, holding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge Defendant's eluding charge on double jeopardy grounds based on his guilty plea to speeding in the same incident. At age seventeen, Defendant pled guilty to a speeding citation without pleading guilty to the accompanying charge of eluding. When Defendant turned eighteen, the State charged him by trial information with eluding while speeding. Defendant pled guilty to the eluding charge. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) speeding is a lesser included offense that at trial would merge into a conviction for eluding while speeding, but under the circumstances of this case, Defendant cannot use double jeopardy principles as a sword to defeat his conviction for eluding; and (2) therefore, Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail. | | City of Kingman v. Ary | Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 114413 Opinion Date: November 20, 2020 Judge: Marla J. Luckert Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the court of appeals and the district court allowing consideration of Defendant's blood test results, which presumptively showed that Defendant was guilty of driving under the influence, holding that Defendant did not persuade the Court to abandon its recent decision in State v. Perkins, 449 P.3d 756 (Kan. 2019). On appeal, Defendant argued that his warrantless blood test obtained under the implied consent statute was unconstitutional based either on consent or as a search incident to arrest. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that the district court properly considered the results of Defendant's blood test under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant offered no persuasive reason for this Court to abandon Perkins; and (2) the court of appeals did not err in applying the good faith exception, and the district court did not err in holding that Defendant's blood test result was admissible. | | State v. Heim | Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 115980 Opinion Date: November 20, 2020 Judge: Marla J. Luckert Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the court of appeals and the district court allowing consideration of Defendant's blood test results obtained under the implied consent statute, holding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule allowed the district court to consider the results of Defendant's blood test. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the blood test results as unconstitutional. The district court denied the motion and found Defendant guilty of driving under the influence. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the good faith exception applied to the results of Defendant's blood test. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant offered no persuasive reason for this Court to abandon its decision in State v. Perkins, 449 P.3d 756 (Kan. 2019), in which the Court held that the good-faith exception applies to breath tests for blood alcohol content collected under the unconstitutional implied consent statute; and (2) the court of appeals did not err in applying the good faith exception, and the district court did not err in holding that Defendant's blood test result was admissible. | | Byrd v. State | Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 4/20 Opinion Date: November 20, 2020 Judge: Barbera Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals upholding the circuit court's denial of coram nobis relief, holding that the nondisclosure of evidence relating to the alleged misconduct of several of the officers that prompted the charges and pleas in this case was not sufficient to render Petitioner's pleas involuntary. Petitioner pled guilty to have committed, in two separate cases, the crime of possession of heroin with intent to distribute. Upon completion of his sentences and probation, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing that prior to the entry of his guilty pleas, the State failed to disclose to him evidence of misconduct on the part of some officers involved in the arrests that prompted the criminal charges and pleas. The circuit court denied the petition, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State was under no obligation to disclose the potential evidence of misconduct prior to trial and that the nondisclosure did not constitute a misrepresentation in violation of Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). | | Wise v. State | Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 73/19 Opinion Date: November 24, 2020 Judge: Hotten Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of assault in the first degree, use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, and wearing, carrying or transporting a handgun, holding that the Court of Special Appeals did not err. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that the Court of Special Appeals (1) correctly affirmed the admission of a statement by a witness with memory loss as a prior inconsistent statement given the witness's contradictory testimony at trial; and (2) did not err in expanding the circumstances rule which hearsay is admissible under Md. Rule 5-802.1(a) to include statements containing a "material" inconsistency with the witness's testimony. | | Commonwealth v. Gosselin | Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-11598 Opinion Date: November 19, 2020 Judge: Lowy Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree, holding that Defendant failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel was ineffective and that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial. In this appeal, which the Supreme Court consolidated with the denial of Defendant's motion for a new trial, Defendant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to suppress his optical records and his cell site location information. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's trial counsel provided effective assistance; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial; and (3) there was no reason to vacate Defendant's conviction or to order a new trial pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. | | Hicklin v. Schmitt | Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Docket: SC97692 Opinion Date: November 24, 2020 Judge: Laura Denvir Stith Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court against Jessica Hicklin in a declaratory judgment action against Eric Schmitt, Missouri's attorney general and other State parties, holding that Hicklin's claims were without merit. Hicklin asserted in her complaint that her 1997 life-without-parole sentence for first-degree murder was invalid following the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) challenges to the constitutional validity of Missouri statutes are properly brought in a declaratory judgment action; (2) Missouri's General Assembly can accept the Supreme Court's invitation to remedy Miller-affected sentences by supplying parole eligibility; and (3) the Parole Board's authority does not violate the separation of powers. | | Avery v. Commissioner, New Hampshire Department of Corrections | Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court Docket: 2019-0051 Opinion Date: November 20, 2020 Judge: Anna Barbara Hantz Marconi Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Plaintiff Clifford Avery appealed a superior court order that dismissed his complaint for breach of contract against the Commissioner of the New Hampshire Department of Corrections (DOC or department). Avery argue the trial court erred in concluding that his suit was barred by sovereign immunity and, alternatively, that he lacked standing. Avery was an inmate at the New Hampshire State Prison for Men (NHSP) who sued the DOC as part of a federal, class-action, 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit, and the federal district court found that conditions at the NHSP subjected inmates to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The lawsuit resulted in a consent decree requiring the DOC to provide certain services to inmates confined at the NHSP, regularly inspect prison conditions, and ensure that NHSP practices, including those related to food service, medical care, mental health care, sanitation, and maintenance, comported with specified standards. The consent decree was modified to resolve issues raised by Avery and the class of original plaintiffs in motions for contempt that alleged the DOC was violating the terms of the original decree. In his complaint here, Avery made numerous allegations that conditions at the NHSP violated the terms of the settlement agreement. After the case was submitted, the New Hampshire Supreme Court directed the parties to provide supplemental briefing on the issue of sovereign immunity and sought amicus briefing. The Supreme Court determined RSA 491:8 (as amended July 2020) waived the State's sovereign immunity for Avery's suit for breach of the settlement agreement. Furthermore, Avery had standing to pursue his action. The trial court therefore erred in dismissing Avery's complaint on these grounds; the matter was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. | | People ex rel. Johnson v. Superintendent, Adirondack Correctional Facility | Court: New York Court of Appeals Citation: 2020 NY Slip Op 06934 Opinion Date: November 23, 2020 Judge: Fahey Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law | The Court of Appeals held that, in these two criminal cases, there was no constitutional violation in the practice of temporarily confining level three sex offenders in correctional facilities, after the time they would otherwise be released to parole or postrelease supervision (PRS), while they remain on a waiting list for accommodation at a shelter compliant with N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14). New York statutes allow the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) to place a Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA)-restricted sex offender temporarily in a residential treatment facility (RTF) until SARA-compliant housing is identified. At issue was whether the Federal Constitution allows DOCCS to place a SARA-restricted sex offender in an RTF or other correctional facility while awaiting SARA-compliant housing. The Court of Appeals held that the practice is constitutional. | | People ex rel. McCurdy v. Warden, Westchester County Correctional Facility | Court: New York Court of Appeals Citation: 2020 NY Slip Op 06933 Opinion Date: November 23, 2020 Judge: Stein Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law | The Court of Appeals held that New York statutes allow the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) to place a Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA)-restricted sex offender temporarily in a residential treatment facility (RTF) until SARA-compliant housing is identified. Under N.Y. Penal Law 70.45(3), the board of parole may impose as a condition of postrelease supervision (PRS) that for a period not exceeding six months immediately following release from an underlying term of imprisonment the person be transferred to and participate in the programs of an residential treatment facility (RTF). N.Y. Correct. Law 73(10) authorizes the DOCCS to use any RTF as a residence for persons who are on community supervision, which includes those on PRS. The Court of Appeals held that Correction Law 73(10) authorizes DOCCS to provide temporary housing in an RTF to sex offenders subject to the mandatory condition set forth in the SARA, N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14), after the six-month period specified in Penal Law 70.45(3) has expired but before the offender on PRS has located compliant housing. | | People ex rel. Negron v. Superintendent, Woodbourne Correctional Facility | Court: New York Court of Appeals Citation: 2020 NY Slip Op 06935 Opinion Date: November 23, 2020 Judge: Garcia Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law | The Court of Appeals held that the condition restricting entry upon school grounds on certain offenders is mandatory only for parolees who have been designated a level three sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) and are serving a sentence for an offense enumerated in N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14). Although Petitioner's conviction did not qualify as an enumerated offense under the statute, the Board of Parole determined that, because of his level three sex offender designation, Petitioner was nevertheless subject to the mandatory condition restricting entry upon school grounds. The Appellate Division granted Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus to the extent of annulling that part of the Board's determination that found Petitioner subject to the mandatory school grounds restriction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding than an offender must be serving a sentence for an enumerated offense and be a level three sex offender in order for the mandatory condition to apply. | | People v. Lendof-Gonzalez | Court: New York Court of Appeals Citation: 2020 NY Slip Op 06940 Opinion Date: November 24, 2020 Judge: Feinman Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Appellate Court vacating Defendant's convictions of two counts of attempted murder in the first degree and two counts of attempted murder in the second degree, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions. At issue was whether the People proved that Defendant and his purported coconspirator took any actual step toward accomplishing Defendant's plan to kill his wife and mother-in-law beyond mere conversations and planning. The Appellate Division concluded that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that Defendant engaged in conduct that came "dangerously near commission of the completed crime." The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was insufficient evidence that the intended crimes were dangerously close to completion. | | State v. Long | Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-5363 Opinion Date: November 24, 2020 Judge: Maureen O'Connor Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding Defendant's convictions in a second appeal, holding that Defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated after his case was remanded to the trial court for retrial. The trial court convicted Defendant of two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the matter. On remand, Defendant pleaded no contest to the charges of having a weapon under disability and failing to comply with an order or signal of a police officer. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated during the trial court's remand proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated Defendant's convictions, holding that all four factors under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) weighed in Defendant's favor. | | State v. McReynolds | Court: South Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 S.D. 65 Opinion Date: November 24, 2020 Judge: Jensen Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of simple assault on a law enforcement officer, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of her assignments of error. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court did not err when it denied Defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal; (2) the circuit court did not err by instructing the jury on facts not entered into the record; and (3) the circuit court did not violate Defendant's constitutional right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment by admitting a certified conviction from Codington County in the habitual offender trial. | | State v. Snodgrass | Court: South Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 S.D. 66 Opinion Date: November 24, 2020 Judge: Jensen Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of eight counts of first-degree child rape and four counts of sexual contact with a child, holding that no prejudicial error occurred in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a bill of particulars and his motion to quash the indictment; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting internet searches and images on Defendant's cell phones and tablet; (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a witness's hearsay statements; (4) the circuit court did not err in failing to enter a judgment of acquittal on any of the charges; and (5) Defendant's sentences were not cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment. | | Foreman v. Texas | Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Dockets: PD-1091-18, PD-1090-18 Opinion Date: November 25, 2020 Judge: Michael E. Keasler Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Acting on evidence that two men had been tortured and robbed at a business in Houston, police obtained a warrant to search the business. The warrant authorized the police to seize any and all "ITEMS CONSTITUTING EVIDENCE CONSTITUTING AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND ROBBERY that may be found therein . . . including,” among other things, “audio/video surveillance video and/or video equipment.” Pursuant to this warrant, the police seized three computer hard drives from the business. Upon analysis, one hard drive — the only hard drive at issue in this appeal, was found to contain surveillance footage depicting much of the incident leading to charges against Foreman for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. At the hearing on Foreman's motion to suppress evidence found on the hard drive, Foreman argued the warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause that audio and video surveillance equipment would even be found at the business. The trial court denied Foreman's motion; he was ultimately convicted on both offenses and sentenced to fifty years' confinement. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined the magistrate who signed the search warrant was justified in issuing the warrant authorizing police to seize the equipment from the business, thus affirming denial of Foreman's motion to suppress. | | Mitchell v. State | Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 142 Opinion Date: November 23, 2020 Judge: Kate M. Fox Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that Defendant failed to prove that the district court abused its discretion in its evidentiary rulings and challenged jury instructions and failed to prove the evidence was insufficient to convict him. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the State to play a recorded phone call between Defendant and his co-defendant; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to give Defendant's proposed modification to the pattern jury instruction on possession; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's convictions. | |
|
About Justia Opinion Summaries | Justia Weekly Opinion Summaries is a free service, with 63 different newsletters, each covering a different practice area. | Justia also provides 68 daily jurisdictional newsletters, covering every federal appellate court and the highest courts of all US states. | All daily and weekly Justia newsletters are free. Subscribe or modify your newsletter subscription preferences at daily.justia.com. | You may freely redistribute this email in whole. | About Justia | Justia is an online platform that provides the community with open access to the law, legal information, and lawyers. |
|