| United States v. Aboshady |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 19-1232 Opinion Date: February 20, 2020 Judge: David J. Barron Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions for one count of conspiracy to make false statements and to conceal in connection with healthcare benefit programs and two counts of false statements in connection with healthcare benefit programs, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress or in instructing the jury. Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress data that the government had acquired pursuant to a warrant because even if the government's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment there was nothing in the record to show that any of the evidence introduce at trial should have been suppressed; and (2) the district court did not err in instructing the jury about the inferences that it could draw from the fact that a particular witness was not called to testify. |
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| United States v. Nikolla |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 17-2206 Opinion Date: February 19, 2020 Judge: Leval Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Nikolla and two codefendants were charged in connection with the extortion of restaurant proprietors and other businesses in and around Astoria, Queens in 2012-2013. A third superseding indictment specifically charged the defendants with threatening physical violence. Nikolla pleaded guilty to two counts of Hobbs Act extortion conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), one count of threatening physical violence in furtherance of an extortion plan, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and one count of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to, or in furtherance of, a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Nikolla was sentenced principally to 216 months; the “brandishing” count increased the mandatory penalty from five years to seven years of imprisonment. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting Nikolla’s challenge to his section 924(c) conviction. The predicate offense for that conviction — Hobbs Act threat of violence in furtherance of extortion under 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) — does qualify as a “crime of violence” under the Elements Clause of section 924(c). The court noted that Nikolla conceded in the district court that this offense constituted a “crime of violence” under section 924(c). |
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| United States v. Arbaugh |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4575 Opinion Date: February 20, 2020 Judge: G. Steven Agee Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant appealed his sentence for engaging in illicit sexual conduct with a minor in a foreign country. The court held that the district court did not err in applying a two-level enhancement under USSG 2G1.3(b)(2) based on undue influence resulting from the age disparity between defendant and his victim. The court also held that the district court adequately explained the basis for defendant's terms of imprisonment and supervised release, and that defendant's 276-month term of imprisonment was substantively reasonable. However, the court held that the district court procedurally erred by failing to explain the reasons for imposing four computer-related special conditions of release. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and sentence except for the challenged conditions, vacating and remanding for partial resentencing. |
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| Roy v. City of Monroe |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-31063 Opinion Date: February 14, 2020 Judge: E. Grady Jolly Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Clarence Roy, a Christian street preacher, was issued a summons outside a nightclub in Monroe, Louisiana, after a woman accused him of following her and making inflammatory remarks. The summons, which was issued by Sergeant James Booth of the Monroe Police Department, cleared the way for formal charges under the city of Monroe’s “disturbing the peace” ordinance. Roy was tried and ultimately acquitted by a municipal court judge. Shortly thereafter, he filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, in which he argued Booth and the city deprived him of numerous constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Two district court judges denied relief, first in part and then in whole, respectively. Finding no reversible error, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. |
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| Smith v. McConnell |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-30287 Opinion Date: February 18, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence for conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, plus two counts of unlawful use of communications facilities. The court held that the BOP did not abuse its discretion by refusing to construe defendant's request for custody credit as a request for nunc pro tunc designation. In any event, defendant failed to establish that the BOP has made a final decision on a nunc pro tunc request, and thus his claim has not been administratively exhausted; the BOP did not err by declining to award custody credit under Willis v. United States, 438 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1971); and neither 18 U.S.C. 3553(e) nor 3553(f) applied to defendant's situation and thus granting his request would place his sentence below the statutory minimum. |
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| United States v. James |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-31069 Opinion Date: February 18, 2020 Judge: Catharina Haynes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Louisiana offense of armed robbery qualifies as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Defendant was sentenced as an armed career criminal after pleading guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. In Louisiana, armed robbery is "the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon." The court stated that elements of simple robbery are the same, except that they lack the dangerous-weapon element. In United States v. Brown, 437 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2006), the court held that the Louisiana crime of simple robbery qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA. The court rejected defendant's contention, under the rule of orderliness, that the Brown panel must have relied on the residual clause when it concluded that the use of force needed for robbery was the same as the use of force contemplated in the ACCA. Furthermore, subsequent precedent has supported, rather than overruled, Brown. |
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| United States v. Mecham |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-40319 Opinion Date: February 14, 2020 Judge: Costa Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant-appellant Clifford Mecham took his computer to a technician for repairs. The technician discovered thousands of images showing nude bodies of adults with faces of children superimposed. The technician reported the pornography to the Corpus Christi Police Department. Unlike virtual pornography, this “morphed” child pornography used an image of a real child. Like virtual pornography, however, no child actually engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined the circuits disagreed about whether morphed child pornography was protected speech. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the majority view that morphed child pornography did not enjoy First Amendment protection, so it affirmed defendant's conviction for possessing child pornography. "But the fact that the pornography was created without involving a child in a sex act does mean that a sentencing enhancement for images that display sadistic or masochistic conduct does not apply," so defendant's case was remanded for resentencing. |
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| Bailey v. Wainwright |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-3581 Opinion Date: February 20, 2020 Judge: Jeffrey S. Sutton Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 1974, a clerk was killed at a store near Toledo. According to Bailey, he entered the store, robbed the cash register at gunpoint, then shot the clerk in the neck and head. The Ohio Parole Board described the crime differently: Bailey entered the store, robbed Cannon, forced him to the ground, “told him . . . exactly what he was planning on doing,” placed the gun to the back of his head and shot him “execution-style” because “he was in need of money and ... the only way he was going to be successful was to kill all witnesses.” In 2014, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that Ohio prisoners had a right to a factually accurate parole record. Bailey challenged the Board’s version of events. Bailey ordered a transcript to show that trial testimony contradicted the Board's description and moved to correct his parole record. The Board and state courts denied his request. Bailey sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, alleging due process violations by the Board’s refusal to investigate and correct inaccuracies in its description of his crime. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his petition. Bailey is in custody but does not purport to be in custody in violation of federal law. Bailey cannot argue that, but for the allegedly inaccurate description, the Board would grant him parole. |
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| United States v. Faber |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-1575 Opinion Date: February 19, 2020 Judge: Deborah L. Cook Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Faber pled guilty to receiving pornographic images of minors and was sentenced to prison. Faber transitioned to supervised release, with conditions barring him from possessing sexually explicit images and from possessing or using digital devices. Faber eventually moved into an apartment with Gieszer. Probation officers visited their apartment and discovered that Faber had electronic devices without permission, containing sexually explicit material. Gieszer denied that either he or Faber had any digital devices and tried to hide the devices. The district court sentenced Faber to another prison term followed by supervised release, with a condition that Faber not have contact with Gieszer. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Meanwhile, Faber filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against his probation officer, alleging violation of his religious freedom by separating him from Gieszer (Faber’s spouse in their Wicca religion). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Faber unsuccessfully filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 and a second section 1983 suit. The district court again revoked Faber’s supervised release because he communicated with Gieszer by email and sentenced him to imprisonment with supervised release, continuing the “no contact” condition. Faber did not appeal but later moved to eliminate the no-contact order under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(2), citing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The Sixth Circuit ordered the dismissal of the motion for lack of jurisdiction. Section 3583(e)(2) allows a court to modify or rescind a condition of supervised release only within 14 days. |
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| United States v. Hendricks |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-3232 Opinion Date: February 19, 2020 Judge: Gibbons Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Hendricks was convicted conspiracy to provide and attempt to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1), in the form of personnel and services to ISIS. At trial, four witnesses had testified that Hendricks approached them about forming a group for the purpose of waging jihad in the U.S. Hendricks shared that he had purchased land and weapons for his group, occasionally asking whether they owned guns or suggesting that they should be trained to fight or operate weapons. Hendricks also exhorted each to recruit other like-minded individuals. The witnesses perceived Hendricks to be “build[ing] . . . an extension of [ISIS] in America.” Hendricks had similar interactions with an undercover FBI agent. An expert on terrorism testified that Hendricks’s interactions were consistent with the ISIS strategy at the time. Hendricks did not present any witnesses or evidence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, rejecting arguments that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he attempted or conspired to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization and that the district court abused its discretion by partially closing the courtroom during testimony from an undercover FBI agent. |
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| Bridges v. Dart |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1791 Opinion Date: February 19, 2020 Judge: ROVNER Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Bridges, a Cook County Department of Corrections pretrial detainee, fell out of the upper bunk to which he had been assigned and injured himself. He sued, asserting that his injuries were caused by the defendants’ practice of ignoring medically necessary lower bunk prescriptions. Bridges cited five lawsuits filed by detainees who alleged that, between 2005 and 2012, they were injured when using upper bunks after their lower bunk prescriptions were ignored. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. A local government may not be sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents; it is when the execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the governmental entity is responsible under section 1983. The Department houses thousands of detainees, with hundreds entering and leaving on a daily basis; three or five incidents over a seven-year period is inadequate as a matter of law to demonstrate a widespread custom or practice. Nothing connected the incidents and they were not so common as to place the defendants on notice of a widespread practice. |
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| United States v. Ballard |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2103 Opinion Date: February 14, 2020 Judge: Daniel Anthony Manion Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| From 1985-2017, Ballard accrued over 30 convictions for crimes including attempted residential burglary, kidnapping, battery, aggravated assault (amended from rape), possession of a firearm as a felon, and multiple convictions for driving with a suspended or revoked driver’s license. Ballard also accrued many parole violations and committed infractions while in prison. Ballard pleaded guilty in 2018 to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court initially imposed an armed career criminal enhancement, resulting in a Guidelines range of 180-210 months. The court considered old offenses for which the Guidelines did not assess criminal history points. Citing the 18 U.S.C. 3553 factors, the court imposed a 232-month sentence. On remand, a revised presentence report calculated a Guidelines range of 33-41 months, with a statutory maximum of 120 months. The court again pointed to Ballard’s extensive criminal history and cited the section 3553 factors to impose a sentence of 108 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court committed procedural error by not providing an adequate explanation for the major upward departure. The court referred to the defendant's history and characteristics and the goals of promoting respect for the law, deterrence, and protecting the public. These were the same factors discussed at the original sentencing, resulting in a sentence only 22 months above the original Guidelines range. The court provided no explanation for why consideration of the same factors warranted a much greater departure on resentencing. |
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| United States v. Bridgewater |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2522 Opinion Date: February 19, 2020 Judge: Joel Martin Flaum Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Bridgewater pleaded guilty to soliciting an obscene visual depiction of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(3)(B)(i). The Guidelines called for a mandatory minimum sentence of 60 months in prison. The district court deviated from the Guidelines to 78 months to account for a charge of attempted enticement of a minor that the government dismissed in exchange for his guilty plea. That conduct, the court found, aggravated the nature and circumstances of the offense of conviction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the sentence was substantively unreasonable because basing it—even in part—on dismissed conduct creates systemwide disparity. The court addressed unwarranted sentencing disparities and the lack of evidence of his recidivism and gave ample weight to the Guidelines but ultimately concluded they failed to properly reflect the scope of Bridgewater’s conduct. The court’s 18-month (or 30%) deviation did not introduce unwarranted sentence disparities among similar defendants. |
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| United States v. Cates |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1042 Opinion Date: February 18, 2020 Judge: HAMILTON Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Cates was transporting drugs when he was pulled over for driving without rear license plate lights. The deputy saw a revolver on the passenger seat. Cates admitted that he did not have a license for the firearm. Retail quantities of cocaine and heroin were later found in his possession. Cates pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm; the government agreed not to bring additional charges. Cates waived his right to contest his conviction on any ground other than ineffective assistance of counsel. A district judge accepted the plea. Before sentencing, Cates’s attorney moved to withdraw. A new lawyer was appointed and moved to withdraw the guilty plea, claiming that Cates had entered the guilty plea under duress because he was threatened with new charges and was given only one hour to decide. Cates testified that before he received the letter accepting his plea, he had told his attorney that he “changed [his] mind” but that his lawyer told him that it was too late. The district court denied Cates’s motion, noting the five days between the submission of the plea and the Rule 11 hearing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court questioned the wisdom of deciding Cates’s ineffective‐assistance claim on this record rather than on collateral review and directed his appellate counsel to review the question with him. He insisted on proceeding. The court held that the record contains insufficient evidence to support Cates’s ineffective‐assistance claim, |
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| United States v. Lee |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1300 Opinion Date: February 18, 2020 Judge: Daniel Anthony Manion Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Law enforcement learned that Lee was distributing large quantities of ice methamphetamine and arranged a controlled buy. The source purchased over 83 grams of ice methamphetamine. Days later, officers conducted a planned traffic stop. Lee consented to a K-9 walkaround. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs. Troopers searched the car and found over seven pounds of ice methamphetamine and $19,170 in cash, including $900 of marked money used in the controlled buy. Lee stated that he had been dealing ice methamphetamine in the area for three years. In the seven months before his arrest, Lee distributed approximately 100 pounds. Agents executed a search warrant at Lee’s residence and discovered ice methamphetamine, 12 firearms in close proximity to the drugs, scales, drug paraphernalia, and ammunition. Lee pled guilty to possessing 50 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possessing firearms in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime and was sentenced to 210 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, rejecting Lee’s argument that he should not have received two extra criminal history points under U.S.S.G. 4A1.1(d) for dealing methamphetamine while on supervision for a drunk driving offense. The court vacated a term of supervised release that would have prohibited him from interacting with known felons unless he receives the probation officer’s permission; that term violates the rule against delegating Article III power. |
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| United States v. Picardi |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1043 Opinion Date: February 19, 2020 Judge: ROVNER Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Picardi, a former Customs and Border Protection Officer at the international terminal of Chicago’s O’Hare Airport, was convicted of embezzlement by an officer or employee of the United States, 18 U.S.C. 654 and was sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment and a fine of $100,000. He had stolen from a traveler who was referred for a secondary inspection. While out on bond, Picardi harassed his estranged wife using electronic and other means and engaged a private detective in his efforts, falsely telling the man that he was a customs officer conducting a legitimate investigation. After Picardi was convicted, he enlisted a friend to approach his victim’s adult daughter to persuade her to convince her mother to recant her testimony. Because Picardi waived any argument regarding the amount of the fine and the adequacy of the explanation of the fine, the Seventh Circuit dismissed his appeal. Picardi and his lawyer knew what was at stake: the maximum under the Guidelines was $40,000, and the probation department recommendation was $100,000. This was not simply an inadvertent failure to object to the imposition of an above-Guidelines fine; it was a calculated, strategic decision, based on a hope that it would work to the client’s benefit on the custody determination. |
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| Ali v. Roy |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1239 Opinion Date: February 19, 2020 Judge: Grasz Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| Ali shot and killed three people during an attempted robbery in Minneapolis. He was given three consecutive life sentences, each permitting his early release after 30 years so that Ali must remain in prison for at least 90 years. Relying on recent Supreme Court precedent, Ali argued that the Eighth Amendment forbids life-without-parole sentences for juvenile defendants unless they are irreparably corrupt and that a sentencing court must conduct a hearing to consider the juvenile defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor before imposing a life-without-parole sentence. Ali claimed his sentence was the “functional equivalent” of life-without-parole. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Ali’s argument. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of Ali’s petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Ali’s case is distinguishable from the Supreme Court cases; Ali received three life sentences for three separate murders, each permitting possible release. Ali does not face a life-without-parole sentence and the Supreme Court has not “clearly established” that its ruling apply to consecutive sentences functionally equivalent to life-without-parole. |
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| United States v. Hamilton |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-2436 Opinion Date: February 19, 2020 Judge: Bobby E. Shepherd Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Following a guilty plea to possession of heroin with intent to distribute, the court sentenced Hamilton to 81 months imprisonment. Hamilton’s PSR criminal history score, used to calculate his Guidelines range, included a previous Illinois felony conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. The Eighth Circuit vacated Hamilton’s sentence because part of the Illinois statute of conviction had been declared unconstitutional. At resentencing, the district court stated that the scope of resentencing was limited to Hamilton’s previous Illinois conviction and concluded that this conviction was properly part of Hamilton’s criminal history score because Hamilton was convicted under a statutory provision that remained in effect. The court reimposed the 81-month sentence. The Eighth Circuit vacated. The court rejected Hamilton’s argument that, in determining his criminal history score, the court relied on documents that did not satisfy precedent to determine that Hamilton had a valid conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. The court examined an Order Assessing Fines, Fees and Costs, and the official charging document, which conclusively demonstrated that Hamilton was not convicted under the invalidated subsection. The district court was not limited on remand to consideration of only the Illinois conviction. Failure to understand the scope of authority and discretion at sentencing is a significant procedural error. The district court was not prohibited from considering Hamilton’s attempt to challenge the PSR’s statement of relevant conduct and the government’s original request for an upward departure or variance. |
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| United States v. Jesse |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3673 Opinion Date: February 14, 2020 Judge: Melloy Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Jesse received a suspended sentence and probation for possession of methamphetamine, second offense. Due to several probation violations and arrests, she spent more than 332 days in custodial settings. She was arrested again in June 2003. A state court imposed a revocation sentence of an indeterminate term not to exceed two years’ incarceration. Jesse’s attorney had consulted with the Iowa Department of Corrections, which indicated that Jesse would fully serve her sentence in no more than 332 days; based on her time in custodial settings, she had already served more than that amount of time. The Department advised that Jesse should not be transported to the Classification Center and that counsel should apply for an order discharging Jesse’s sentence. The court granted that order. At sentencing following her guilty plea to federal methamphetamine charges, the issue was whether the state sentence was for more than one year and one month for purposes of calculating criminal-history points under U.S.S.G. 4A1.1(a); 4A1.2(e)(1). The court found that the state sentence was two years, which resulted in an advisory range of 188-235 months. Applying 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), the court noted Jesse’s personal history and imposed a 175-month sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Courts should rely on the judgment imposing sentence, rather than evidence of time actually served when calculating criminal history points. The state judge expressly vacated the order regarding Jesse’s transport to prison but did not vacate the sentence and did not believe himself to be amending, retracting, or replacing the sentence. |
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| United States v. Oliver |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 17-3627 Opinion Date: February 19, 2020 Judge: Raymond W. Gruender Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| A “confidential reliable informant” told police that Oliver and his co-conspirators would mail packages of cocaine to Minnesota from Maricopa, Arizona. The postal inspector found one package from Maricopa, Arizona and another with similar handwriting from Chandler, Arizona. With a search warrant, officers found cocaine inside each. The informant stated that Oliver would be transporting cocaine in a BMW that would arrive in Minneapolis on November 30, 2014. On that date, police stopped and impounded a BMW that belonged to Oliver. Days later, with a warrant, police searched the vehicle and discovered six kilograms of cocaine, and executed a warrant to search Oliver's hotel room, where they recovered cell phones but no drugs. Oliver’s co-conspirator (Williams) testified that he made multiple trips to Arizona at Oliver’s request to transport cash for buying drugs and that in November 2014, he and another co-conspirator each mailed cocaine from different towns in Arizona at Oliver’s direction. Convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, Oliver was sentenced to 204 months' imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the government’s key witness—Williams—lacked credibility and that the district court erred in denying Oliver's motions to dismiss the second indictment, to disclose the identity of the informant, and to suppress the searches of his BMW and hotel room. Williams also unsuccessfully argued that the court should have given the jury an accomplice instruction regarding Williams’s testimony and that he was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel. |
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| United States v. Thomas |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3393 Opinion Date: February 14, 2020 Judge: Grasz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Thomas was charged with a 10-year conspiracy involving kidnapping, forced labor, hate crimes, and racketeering-related violent crimes. The court rejected his guilty plea and ordered competency restoration under 18 U.S.C. 4241(b). Thomas was evaluated at a Medical Center for Federal Prisoners. Clinical Psychologist Chavez concluded Thomas was unlikely to become competent in the foreseeable future; 18 U.S.C. 4246(d) required commitment if, due to Thomas's mental deficiencies, his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury or serious property damage. A Risk Assessment Panel diagnosed Thomas with an unspecified neurocognitive disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, and adult antisocial behavior, finding that Thomas “show[ed] a pattern of violating the rights of others,” and had previously been convicted of sexual assault, and implied that his professional boxing career suggested violent tendencies. The Panel explained that Thomas was easily manipulated by his domestic partner (the conspiracy’s ringleader). Thomas’s denials of past violence indicated a lack of empathy. The court granted Thomas’s request for an independent examination. Clinical Psychologist DeMier largely agreed with the diagnosis but concluded that Thomas’s dangerousness primarily stemmed from his manipulability, not his mental defects and did not warrant commitment. The court noted Chavez and the Panel spent significantly more time evaluating Thomas and because DeMier’s opinion was inconsistent. Thomas was committed to the Attorney General’s custody. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. That DeMier’s “less-than-robust opinion” is contrary to the court’s conclusion does not warrant clear-error reversal. |
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| Collier v. Kelley |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 77 Opinion Date: February 20, 2020 Judge: Hudson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying and dismissing Appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant failed to state a basis for issuance of the writ. Appellant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and other crimes. In his habeas petition, Appellant argued that the judgments in three counties reflected the incorrect legal name, making the convictions facially invalid. The circuit court declined to issue the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's challenge to the misnomer on the judgment and commitment orders was a mere allegation of trial error and not the type of defect that implicates the facial validity of a trial court's judgment or jurisdiction. |
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| Hayes v. Kelley |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 79 Opinion Date: February 20, 2020 Judge: Wood Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order denying Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-101, holding that Appellant did not state a ground for the writ. Appellant pled guilty to four counts of first-degree sexual assault. At the time of the trial court proceedings, Appellant requested a mental evaluation. After the circuit court granted the request Appellant withdrew the request and pled guilty. Thereafter, the forensic evaluation was submitted to the court with a finding that Appellant was competent and fit to proceed. In his habeas corpus petition, Appellant argued that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea before the mental evaluation was filed. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's claim was one that fell within the scope of habeas, but Appellant's claim that the circuit court was divested of jurisdiction due to the lack of a forensic report at that time of the proceeding failed. |
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| Hundley v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 89 Opinion Date: February 20, 2020 Judge: Womack Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court rejecting Appellant's proffered jury instructions at his resentencing hearing, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion. At age seventeen, Appellant committed capital murder and rape. Appellant received a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole. After the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), Appellant's life sentence for capital murder was vacated. After a resentencing hearing a jury sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment. On appeal, Appellant argued that the circuit court erred in rejecting his proffered jury instructions on capital murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant's proffered instructions would ask the jury to make findings required only in death cases the circuit court properly refused to give those instructions. |
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| Johnson v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 86 Opinion Date: February 20, 2020 Judge: Womack Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied Appellant's petition for rehearing of the Court's decision affirming the circuit court's denial of Appellant's petition for postconviction DNA testing under Act 1780, holding that Appellant's petition for rehearing failed to comport with the requirements set forth in Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 2-3(g). On appeal from the denial of his postconviction motion, the Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion of the circuit court that the proposed scientific testing under Act 1780 could not raise a reasonable probability that Defendant did not commit the murder for which he was convicted and that the admissibility of proffered eyewitness identification testimony was procedurally barred from consideration. In his petition for rehearing, Appellant reiterated the same arguments that were considered and rejected on appeal and, for the first time, asserted a constitutional claim. The Supreme Court denied the petition for rehearing, holding that the entirety of the petition fell outside the scope of rehearing under Rule 2-3(g). |
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| Lovelace v. Kelley |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 91 Opinion Date: February 20, 2020 Judge: Womack Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying and dismissing Appellant's duplicate petitions for writ of habeas corpus, holding that the petitions failed to allege a basis for the writ. Approximately forty years ago, Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment. This appeal concerned the circuit court's denial and dismissal of his duplicate pro se petitions for writ of habeas corpus. In his petitions, Appellant asserted that his conviction was void because the criminal information was signed by the deputy prosecuting attorney instead of the elected prosecuting attorney. The circuit court denied and dismissed the petitions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err. |
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| Mabry v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 72 Opinion Date: February 20, 2020 Judge: Hudson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of six counts of rape, holding that no reversible error occurred in the proceedings below. Defendant was sentenced for life imprisonment for each count of rape, with the sentences to be served consecutively. Because Defendant received a sentence of life imprisonment, the Supreme Court reviewed the record for all errors prejudicial to Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not commit prejudicial error (1) in denying Defendant's motion for a directed verdict because substantial evidence supported the conviction; (2) in making three evidentiary rulings; and (3) in denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial. |
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| Marshall v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 66 Opinion Date: February 20, 2020 Judge: Kemp Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Appellant's pro se petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, holding that the trial court did not clearly err when it denied relief. Appellant was convicted of aggravated residential burglary and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. In his postconviction relief petition, Appellant alleged that counsel ineffectively requested trial continuances without legal bases or good cause, thus depriving him of his speedy trial rights. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even assuming that counsel's requests delayed Appellant's trial without a legal basis, Appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced as a result of those alleged errors. |
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| Mcarty v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 68 Opinion Date: February 20, 2020 Judge: Karen R. Baker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the circuit court denying Appellant's two pro se petitions challenging his 1993 conviction for first-degree murder and sentence of life imprisonment, holding that the circuit court properly denied relief. The first petition Appellant filed sought scientific testing for habeas relief under Act 1780 of 2001 Acts of Arkansas, codified at Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-201 to -208. The second petition sought relief from an illegal sentence. The circuit court denied both petitions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant was not entitled to relief under Act 1780; and (2) Appellant failed to allege facts that would support his claim of an illegal sentence. |
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| Young v. Kelley |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 84 Opinion Date: February 20, 2020 Judge: Wynne Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying and dismissing Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-101, holding that Appellant stated no ground in the petition on which the writ could issue under Arkansas law. Appellant pled nolo contendere to two counts of second-degree sexual assault. Appellant later filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging claims of actual innocence and insufficient evidence. The circuit court denied the dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant did not meet his burden of demonstrating that he was being illegally detained and entitled to issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to effect his release from custody; and (2) Appellant offered no well-founded argument for the Court to expand the writ. |
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| California v. Bermudez |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C079168A(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 18, 2020 Judge: Murray Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeal consolidated two appeals of two jury trials for defendant Adolfo Rodriguez Bermudez. The first trial involved the possession of a concealed dirk. The second involved an assault with a deadly weapon with a vehicle done to benefit a gang. Defendant was sentenced to a 21-year four-month aggregate term. On appeal, defendant contended: (1) the statute defining a dirk (Pen. Code sec. 16470) was unconstitutionally vague; (2) the trial court erred in allowing two officers to testify to the legal definition of a dirk; (3) a gang expert provided improper opinion testimony that defendant committed a crime to benefit a gang; and (4) insufficient evidence established the existence of a criminal street gang under Penal Code section 186.22 because testimony concerning the predicate felonies was admitted in violation of California v. Sanchez, 63 Cal.4th 665 (2016). In supplemental briefing, defendant contended: (5) remand was required so the trial court could consider exercising its discretion under Senate Bill No. 1393; and (6) the imposition of fines and fees violated his right to due process and freedom from excessive fines under California v. Duenas, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (2019). Finally, in a petition for rehearing, defendant contended: (7) his one-year prior prison term enhancement should have been struck in light of Senate Bill No. 136. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held that the dirk statute was not unconstitutionally vague. Second, the Court concluded the knowledge element rendered the statute definite enough to provide a standard for police enforcement and ascertainment of guilt. Furthermore, the Court held that a gang expert’s testimony about gang enhancement predicate offenses did not violate Sanchez so long as the predicate offenses did not involve defendant or individuals involved in the defendant’s case. "Such predicate offenses are chapters in a gang’s biography and constitute historical background information, not case-specific information." The Court struck the one-year prior prison term enhancement and remanded to allow the trial court to consider exercising its discretion under SB 1393. During that remand, as the State conceded, defendant could request a hearing on his ability to pay. In all other respects, the Court affirmed. |
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| California v. Johnson |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D075097(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 18, 2020 Judge: Joan Irion Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The State appealed a trial court's order: (1) granting Raheen Johnson's motion to dismiss the petition to revoke parole filed by the Division of Adult Parole Operations of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DAPO); and (2) transferring Johnson from parole supervision to postrelease community supervision (PRCS). The State, through the San Diego County District Attorney, contended, among other things, the trial court did not have the authority, in the context of a parole revocation proceeding, to transfer Johnson's supervision to PRCS. According to the State, a parolee could challenge his classification as an offender subject to parole supervision only by exhausting his administrative remedies with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and then, if necessary, filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State also contended that even if the trial court had authority to transfer Johnson to PRCS, the transfer was barred by Penal Code section 3000.08(l), which permitted a transfer to PRCS only if the parolee had not yet served 60 days on parole supervision. The Court of Appeal determined the trial court had the authority to transfer Johnson's supervision to PRCS, and concluded the trial court properly concluded that the transfer was not barred by the 60-day time limit in section 3000.08(l). |
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| California v. Turner |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D075788(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 19, 2020 Judge: Dato Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| James Turner pled guilty in 2007 to voluntary manslaughter, and admitted a gang allegation. While he was serving his 21- year prison term, the California Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 making certain changes to murder liability under felony-murder and natural-and-probable-consequences theories and provided a procedure for eligible defendants to petition for recall and resentencing. Turner filed a petition pursuant to newly enacted Penal Code section 1170.95(a), but the trial court summarily denied relief on the ground that he was ineligible as someone who "was not convicted of murder." On appeal, Turner argued section 1170.95 applied to defendants who were charged with murder under a felony-murder or natural-and-probable-consequences theory but pleaded guilty to manslaughter to avoid trial. The Court of Appeal found no ambiguity in the plain language of Senate Bill 1437 as to whether a defendant convicted of manslaughter was entitled to relief. Turner relied on language in section 1170.95 (a)(2) to suggest ambiguity existed. “But even if he were correct, the legislative history demonstrates that Turner is not entitled to relief.” Because the trial court did not err in summarily denying Turner's petition, the Court affirmed its order. |
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| People v. Abrahamian |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B289162(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 18, 2020 Judge: Kenneth R. Yegan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant appealed her conviction for knowingly procuring or offering a forged quitclaim deed for recordation in a public office and knowingly possessing a false completed notary public's acknowledgment (notary acknowledgment) with intent to defraud. The Court of Appeal held that the evidence was insufficient to prove that defendant possessed a completed notary acknowledgement and thus reversed her conviction for possession of a false completed notary acknowledgment with intent to defraud. The court also reversed the true finding on the aggravated white collar crime enhancement allegation. The court struck the $500,000 fine imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 186.11, subdivision (c), and remanded for resentencing. The court affirmed in all other respects. |
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| People v. Alexander |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B296184(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 18, 2020 Judge: Tangeman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Senate Bill 1393, which amended Penal Code sections 667 and 1385 to give trial courts discretion to strike prior serious felony enhancements, does not apply to final convictions. The Court of Appeal dismissed defendant's appeal from the trial court's postjudgment order denying his motion for resentencing pursuant to S.B. 1393. In this case, when the trial court sentenced defendant, Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a), required it to add four five-year enhancements to his sentence for his prior serious felony convictions. Under S.B. 1393, the trial court now has discretion to strike the enhancements. The parties agreed that S.B. 1393 applies retroactively on appeal from judgment, but defendant argued that his case should be remanded for resentencing under the new law. The court agreed with the Attorney General and held that remand was not required because defendant's conviction was final prior to the law's effective date. The court also rejected defendant's alternative equal protection claim. |
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| People v. Medellin |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: F076022(Fifth Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 20, 2020 Judge: Snauffer Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeal reversed defendant's convictions for assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury, and their accompanying enhancements for inflicting great bodily injury. The court held that, if the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense, defendant waived the error; sufficient evidence supported each verdict; but the prosecutor's closing argument, which relied on and quoted CALCRIM's great bodily injury definition, prejudicially misstated the law. |
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| Colorado v. Berry |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 14 Opinion Date: February 18, 2020 Judge: Hart Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2014, William Berry, who was at the time a deputy of the Lake County Sheriff’s Office, obtained several firearms from the office evidence locker, gave one away, attempted to sell another, and kept two for himself. For this, Berry was convicted of embezzlement of public property in violation of section 18-8-407, C.R.S. (2019), and first-degree official misconduct in violation of section 18-8-404, C.R.S. (2019). The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was one of first impression for each of these statutory provisions: (1) does “public property” include property that is in the government’s possession but not owned by the government?; and (2) what is an act “relating to [an official’s] office” for purposes of the crime of official misconduct? The Supreme Court held the statute prohibiting embezzlement of public property criminalized only the embezzlement of property that was owned by the government. Furthermore, the Court concluded the prohibition on official misconduct should be broadly construed to include circumstances, like those in this case, in which an official used the opportunities presented by his or her office to engage in improper conduct. |
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| State v. Edwards |
| Court: Connecticut Supreme Court Docket: SC19899 Opinion Date: February 25, 2020 Judge: Kahn Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and related crimes, holding that any violation of Defendant's right to confrontation was harmless and that the trial court's third-party culpability instruction was sufficient. Defendant's convictions arose from a shooting on a crowded street in which a fifteen-year-old boy died and two individuals were seriously injured. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) as to Defendant's argument that the trial court erred in admitting the out-of-court statements of two witnesses identifying Defendant as the shooter, Defendant failed to preserve his hearsay objection, and even if the admission of the out-of-court identifications violated Defendant's right to confrontation, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the trial court's third-party culpability instruction was sufficient despite the fact that the instruction omitted certain names. |
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| State v. Turner |
| Court: Connecticut Supreme Court Docket: SC20186 Opinion Date: February 18, 2020 Judge: D’Auria Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming Defendant's conviction of felony murder, robbery in the first degree, and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, holding that Defendant was not entitled to any review of his unpreserved claim that the trial court improperly failed to conduct a hearing before admitting certain evidence. Specifically, on appeal Defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing sua sponte to conduct a hearing pursuant to State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739 (Conn. 1997), before admitting expert testimony regarding cell phone data and corresponding cell tower coverage maps. The Appellate Court held that Defendant's claim was unpreserved and unreviewable under State v. Golding, 567 A.2d 823 (Conn. 1989), because it was evidentiary, not constitutional, in nature. The court further declined to review the claim under the plain error doctrine or under its supervisory authority over the administration of justice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant failed to establish that any evidentiary error occurred, Defendant was not entitled to review of his unpreserved claim. |
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| Ward v. Idaho |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Docket: 46265 Opinion Date: February 18, 2020 Judge: Roger S. Burdick Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics |
| Glen Ward appealed an order and final judgment of the district court granting the State’s motion for summary dismissal and dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. In 2014, Ward was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor under 16 years of age after he pleaded guilty to all elements of the crime except for the sexual intent element, to which he entered an Alford plea. He was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment with a 7-year fixed term. Ward asked for, and was granted, appointment of counsel to represent him in the post-conviction relief proceedings. After granting the motion, the district court appointed a conflict public defender to represent Ward in the action. Although he had secured new counsel, Ward subsequently filed numerous pro se documents. Ward argued the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to proceed pro se as moot. Ward also argued the district court erred in denying his motion to proceed pro se because a post-conviction petitioner has a right to proceed pro se. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed. The Court held that the district court should have refused to entertain Ward’s independent filings in the first place; to the extent that the district court entertained the filings made by Ward as opposed to by his attorney, it was error to do so. However, having come to the conclusion that the district court erred, not by ruling incorrectly on Ward’s purported motion, but by ruling on it at all, the Supreme Court did not need to reverse the district court’s separate order and final judgment granting summary dismissal. "Because we hold that there was no motion properly before the district court to be ruled upon in the first place, the district court’s denial of the purported motion has no impact on the propriety of its final decision and judgment dismissing Ward’s post-conviction petition on the merits." |
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| Marsalis v. Idaho |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 47438 Opinion Date: February 18, 2020 Judge: Moeller Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Jeffrey Marsalis appealed a district court’s decision summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2009 rape conviction. Marsalis alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) challenge the testimony of the State’s expert witness regarding his and the victim’s blood alcohol levels; (2) present favorable eyewitness testimony at trial; and (3) properly advise him of his speedy trial rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). After review, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed in part, and affirmed in part the district court's decision. The Court affirmed the district court’s summary dismissal of Marsalis’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an allegedly favorable eyewitness at trial. However, it reversed and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on Marsalis’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the underlying methodologies supporting the State’s expert witness’s testimony and for failing to present an expert witness to discuss the scientific basis behind Marsalis’s blackout defense. The Court also remanded the case back to the district court so it could provide Marsalis with twenty days’ notice to respond to the court’s grounds for dismissing Marsalis’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of his speedy trial rights under the IAD. |
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| Heuring v. State |
| Court: Supreme Court of Indiana Docket: 19S-CR-528 Opinion Date: February 20, 2020 Judge: Loretta H. Rush Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his home and his father's barn, holding that the search warrants obtained in this case were invalid because the accompanying affidavits did not provide a substantial basis to support the magistrate's probable cause finding. Law enforcement obtained a warrant to plant a GPS tracking device on Defendant's vehicle. When the device stopped providing location readings, the officers discovered that the tracker was no longer attached to Defendant's car. Thereafter, an officer obtained warrants to search Defendant's home and his father's barn for evidence of "theft" of the GPS device. A magistrate issued both search warrants. During the search, officers found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a handgun. Defendant moved to suppress the seized evidence, arguing that the initial search warrants were issued without probable cause that evidence of theft of the GPS device would be found in his home or his father's barn. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the search warrants were invalid because the affidavits did not establish probable cause that the GPS device was stolen and that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. |
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| In re 2018 Grand Jury of Dallas County v. Doe |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 18-1534 Opinion Date: February 14, 2020 Judge: Brent R. Appel Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In this appeal challenging several district court rulings in a grand jury proceeding the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court, holding that the State cannot subpoena a criminal defense expert but that the prosecution's contact with the expert does not merit recusal and that there was no basis to quash the grand jury proceeding. Before the grand jury proceedings, the prosecutor contacted an expert witness retained by John Doe, who faced possible criminal charges, and asked the expert her opinions about the matter. When the expert declined to substantively respond, the prosecutor served the expert with a subpoena to appear before the grand jury. Doe moved to quash the subpoena and to disqualify the prosecutor from the proceeding. Doe also sought to quash the grand jury proceedings. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in not quashing the grand jury subpoena of Defendant's retained expert; (2) the issuance of the subpoena did not amount to the kind of misconduct that requires the disqualification of the prosecutor; and (3) the district court did not err in declining to quash the grand jury. |
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| State v. Boeschling |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 116757 Opinion Date: February 14, 2020 Judge: Carol A. Beier Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of burglary, theft, and prohibited possession of firearms, holding that the district court judge's response to a jury's mid-deliberation question about jury nullification was not reversible error and that the jury instructions were not in error. During trial, the members of Defendant's jury asked if nullification can "be applied" to the firearm charges. On appeal, Defendant asserted that the district judge's answer affirmatively misinformed the jury and clearly implied that jury nullification did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district judge's response to the jury question was not error; (2) the burglary instruction given to the jury was erroneous but not reversible; and (3) the accomplice instruction was not error. |
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| State v. Fowler |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 116803 Opinion Date: February 14, 2020 Judge: Carol A. Beier Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court sentencing Defendant after he pled guilty to felony possession of methamphetamine, felony domestic battery, and violation of a protective order, holding that the district judge did not engage in prohibited double counting of two prior misdemeanor domestic battery convictions. Defendant's domestic battery conviction qualified as a felony rather than a misdemeanor because it was his third such conviction in five years. In calculating Defendant's criminal history score to determine the sentence for Defendant's conviction for methamphetamine possession, the judge included the same two misdemeanor domestic battery convictions that were used to elevate Defendant's domestic battery to a felony. On appeal, Defendant asserted that the district judge engaged in double counting of the two prior misdemeanor domestic battery convictions under Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6810(d)(9). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that including Defendant's prior domestic battery convictions in Defendant's criminal history calculation for his primary grid conviction did not violate the double-counting provision of section 21-6810(d)(9). |
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| State v. Newman |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 118608 Opinion Date: February 14, 2020 Judge: Eric S. Rosen Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denials of Defendant's motions to withdraw his pleas of guilty to first-degree felony murder and attempted second-degree intentional murder but vacated the imposition of lifetime supervision, holding that the district court had no authority to impose lifetime postrelease supervision. Before sentencing, Defendant moved to withdraw his pleas of guilty to first-degree felony murder and attempted second-degree intentional murder. The district court denied the motions. The court imposed a life sentence for the first-degree murder conviction and ordered lifetime postrelease supervision. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motions to withdraw his pleas; but (2) the district court erred when it sentenced Defendant to lifetime postrelease supervision on the first-degree murder conviction because Defendant was eligible for parole after serving twenty years of his off-grid indeterminate life sentence for that conviction. |
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| State v. Peterson |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 119314 Opinion Date: February 14, 2020 Judge: Carol A. Beier Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court judge granting in part and denying in part Defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence, holding that this Court cannot consider the merits of Defendant's constitutional arguments because a motion to correct an illegal sentence is an improper vehicle for them. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility for parole for twenty-five years, known as a hard twenty-five, upon his plea of no contest to first-degree murder. Defendant later filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his hard twenty-five was constitutionally disproportionate and that the district judge erred by imposing lifetime postrelease supervision. The district court agreed that Defendant should not be subject to lifetime postrelease supervision but rejected Defendant's constitutional challenge. Defendant appealed, arguing that his hard twenty-five was disproportionate under the state and federal constitutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a motion to correct an illegal sentence cannot raise claims that a sentence violates a constitutional provision. |
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| Helton v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2019-SC-000024-MR Opinion Date: February 20, 2020 Judge: Michelle M. Keller Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of five counts of possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor and five counts of distribution of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor and sentencing Defendant to twenty years' imprisonment, holding that the circuit court did not err. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's request for a stipulation regarding the existence of the child pornography and permitting the Commonwealth to admit portions of five videos containing child pornography; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing limited testimony about eighty-eight additional child pornography videos and a DVD containing child pornography; and (3) Defendant's due process rights were not violated during the penalty phase when the jury heard incorrect testimony regarding Defendant's parole eligibility because it was unlikely that Defendant's parole eligibility affected the jury's recommended sentence. |
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| Howard v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Dockets: 2018-SC-000468-MR, 2018-SC-000469-MR Opinion Date: February 20, 2020 Judge: Michelle M. Keller Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of first-degree sexual abuse, first-degree sodomy, and related crimes, and sentencing Defendant to seventy years in prison, holding that the trial court improperly admitted certain Ky. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence, but neither of those instances rose to the level of palpable error. Specifically, the Court held (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that Defendant failed to present sufficient evidence to merit an in camera review of the juvenile records of some of the alleged victims; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for an independent evaluation and to continue the trial; (3) the trial court did not err by allowing two of the juvenile victims to testify in chambers and outside of Defendant's presence; and (4) there were two instances of improperly admitted Rule 404(b) evidence, but Defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of the evidence. |
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| Commonwealth v. Upton |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-11459 Opinion Date: February 19, 2020 Judge: Lowy Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree, aggravated assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon and armed assault in a dwelling house, holding that there was no Brady violation and that the superior court judge did not err in denying Defendant's second motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing on the matter. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that newly discovered evidence of later contradictory testimony by the Commonwealth's key witness proved that the prosecution failed to disclose a plea agreement at the time of trial in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed and declined to exercise its authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E to reduce or set aside the verdict on the murder conviction, holding (1) the judge did not err in finding that Defendant's evidence of a Brady violation did not create a substantial issue warranting an evidentiary hearing; (2) the judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that there was no undisclosed plea deal that would require granting Defendant's second motion for a new trial; and (3) the verdict of murder in the first degree is consonant with justice. |
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| Mississippi Department of Public Safety v. Herrington |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2019-CA-00145-SCT Opinion Date: February 20, 2020 Judge: Leslie D. King Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law |
| Justin Herrington, a law-enforcement officer with the Columbia Police Department, was convicted of violating Mississippi Code Section 97-3-104, which prohibited sexual activity between a law-enforcement employee and an offender on correctional supervision. The trial court ordered Herrington to register as a sex offender under Mississippi Code Sections 45-33-21 through 45-33-51. The trial court then amended its order and removed Herrington’s registration requirement. The Mississippi Department of Public Safety (MDPS) appealed and argued that the trial court erred by removing Herrington’s requirement to register as a sex offender. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed and reversed the trial court’s order dispensing with Herrington’s registration requirement. |
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| Smith v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2017-CT-01725-SCT Opinion Date: February 20, 2020 Judge: Josiah D. Coleman Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Carlos Smith appealed the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In his petition for post-conviction relief, Smith sought permission to proceed with an out-of-time appeal. The circuit court denied his motion, finding that it had no jurisdiction to allow the out-of-time appeal due to the 180-day time limit imposed by Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(h). The filing was well past the 180-day deadline under the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure; however, the petition was still within the three year time limit imposed for filing a petition for post-conviction relief under Mississippi Code Section section 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2015). The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred by not considering Smith’s post-conviction motion for an out- of-time appeal under Section 99-39-5(2). Accordingly, it reversed and remanded. |
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| State v. Amaya |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 305 Neb. 36 Opinion Date: February 14, 2020 Judge: Stacy Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting the State's motion to dismiss Appellant's motion for DNA testing under the DNA Testing Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-4116 to 29-4125, holding that the district court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous, and the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the motion for DNA testing. Defendant entered no contest pleas to aiding and abetting second degree murder and aiding and abetting first degree sexual assault. Defendant later filed a motion seeking DNA testing of numerous items of evidence under the DNA Testing Act. The court authorized testing on four items of evidence. After receiving the DNA test results the State moved to dismiss the proceeding, alleging that the results neither exonerated nor exculpated Defendant. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly dismissed the proceeding. |
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| State v. Jedlicka |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 305 Neb. 52 Opinion Date: February 14, 2020 Judge: William B. Cassel Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in sustaining Defendant's motion to quash an information for revocation of probation, holding that a probation violation allegation asserting a law violation from a new charge of possession of methamphetamine is not a "substance abuse" violation having a prerequisite of ninety days of cumulative custodial sanctions. Defendant was convicted of possession of methaphetamine. The court imposed a sentence of specialized substance abuse supervision probation. One of the conditions of probation required Defendant to "not use or possess any controlled substance." Eight months later, the State filed an information for revocation of probation alleging that Defendant intentionally possessed methamphetamine. Defendant moved to quash the information for revocation of probation, claiming that, under Neb. Rev. Stat. 29-2267(3), revocation proceedings could not be instituted for a substance abuse violation because the State did not allege or show that she had served ninety days of cumulative custodial sanctions during the probation term. The Supreme Court sustained the State's exception and remanded the cause for further proceedings, holding that Defendant's alleged violation was not a substance abuse violation but a law violation, and therefore, the district court erred in quashing the information for revocation of probation. |
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| Republican Attorneys General Ass'n v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department |
| Court: Supreme Court of Nevada Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 3 Opinion Date: February 20, 2020 Judge: Stiglich Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed in part the district court's order denying a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking body cam footage and other related records regarding juveniles and then-State Senator Aaron Ford's interaction with the police due to the confidentiality of juvenile justice records, holding that the petition was correctly denied as to all portions of the bodycam footage but that the district court erred in granting the petition as to the other requested records. Officers with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) arrested numerous juvenile suspects after responding to an incident. Ford, a parent of one of the suspects, arrived at the scene. The Republican Attorneys General Association's (RAGA) requested records from LVMPD related to the incident in accordance with the Nevada Public Records Act. LVMPD refused the request, citing Nev. Rev. Stat. 62H.025 and 62H.030 to justify its assertion of confidentiality. RAGA petitioned for a writ of mandamus. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the district court (1) did not err in finding that all portions of requested bodycam footage contained confidential juvenile justice information; but (2) failed sufficiently to assess whether the other requested records contained any nonconfidential material. |
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| New Hampshire v. Eldridge |
| Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court Docket: 2018-0551 Opinion Date: February 19, 2020 Judge: Donovan Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Brian Eldridge appealed his convictions by jury on one count each of possession of a controlled drug, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He argued the trial court erred by: (1) concluding that the immunity afforded by RSA 318-B:28-b (2017) did not apply to the offense of possession with intent to sell a controlled drug; (2) requiring him to waive that statutory immunity before instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of possession; and (3) denying his motion to suppress evidence. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the immunity provided by RSA 318-B:28-b did not extend to the offense of possession with intent to sell. However, the Court vacated defendant’s conviction for possession because the Court held that, under the circumstances in this case, defendant was entitled to both an instruction on the offense of possession and the statutory immunity. Furthermore, the Court concluded the police officers’ initial warrantless entry into defendant’s apartment was justified by the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement. |
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| People v. Anonymous |
| Court: New York Court of Appeals Citation: 2020 NY Slip Op 01113 Opinion Date: February 18, 2020 Judge: Jenny Rivera Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In this criminal proceeding, the Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division correctly concluded that the sentencing court erred in unsealing the court record of the proceeding in which Defendant was acquitted but erred in concluding that Defendant was not entitled to a remedy for the trial court's violation of N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 160.50, holding that the sentence should be vacated. Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance. Before sentencing, Defendant was prosecuted for a crime he allegedly committed after entering his plea. The jury acquitted Defendant of the new charge, and the official record was sealed. In sentencing Defendant for his possession charge, the court unsealed the records in the prior criminal action. Based in part on Defendant's trial testimony in the sealed proceeding, the court deviated upward from the court's promised sentence. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court erred in unsealing the records of the proceeding terminated by acquittal and improperly considered Defendant's trial testimony in deciding not to adhere to the promised sentence; and (2) because the court's sentence was based on that testimony, the proper remedy was to remit for resentencing without reference to the contents of the sealed records. |
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| State v. Dibble |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-546 Opinion Date: February 20, 2020 Judge: DeWine Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that a court may consider evidence beyond the four corners of a search warrant affidavit in determining whether an officer reasonably and in good faith relied on that warrant. Defendant was indicted for sexual imposition and voyeurism. Defendant filed a motion to suppress seeking to invalidate a search warrant authorizing the search of his home on the basis that the warrant affidavit contained materially false statements. The trial court ultimately denied the motion to suppress. At issue on remand was whether a detective's testimony regarding his unrecorded conversation with the judge at the time of the approval of the warrant was admissible at the suppression hearing. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the testimony was inadmissible and that the good-faith exception did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in deciding whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to a search conducted under a search warrant, a court can consider sworn but unrecorded oral information that the police gave to the judge; and (2) because application of the exclusionary rule would not serve to deter any bad police conduct, suppression was unwarranted. |
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| State v. Faggs |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-523 Opinion Date: February 19, 2020 Judge: Fischer Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that reasonable parental discipline is not a component of the physical-harm element on Ohio's domestic violence and assault statues but, rather, is an affirmative defense to a charge under those statutes, holding that reasonable parental discipline is an affirmative defense. Defendant was charged with one third-degree felony count of domestic violence and one first-degree misdemeanor count of assault for allegedly beating the seven-year-old son of his live-in girlfriend for acting out at school. During trial, Defendant argued that his conduct was a reasonable exercise of parental discipline and corporal punishment. The trial court found Defendant guilty of the charges. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that treating reasonable parental discipline as an affirmative defense and placing the burden of proving that defense upon the accused does not violate due process. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) proof of unreasonable parental discipline is not a component of the physical harm element of the offenses; (2) reasonable parental disciplines an affirmative defense; and (3) treating reasonable parental discipline as an affirmative defense does not unconstitutionally place the burden of proof on the defendant. |
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| Pennsylvania v. Tighe |
| Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 57 MAP 2018 Opinion Date: February 19, 2020 Judge: Dougherty Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| On the night of May 29, 2012, appellant Patrick Tighe, then 58 years old, sexually assaulted a minor female victim, J.E., then 15 years old. In this discretionary appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court examined whether the trial court improperly limited appellant’s right to self-representation in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution when, during appellant’s jury trial, the court prohibited appellant, who was proceeding pro se, from personally conducting cross-examination of the victim-witness, and instead required stand-by counsel to cross-examine the witness using questions prepared by appellant. The Supreme Court concluded there was no constitutional violation and affirmed the order of the Superior Court. |
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| Young v. PA Board of Probation & Parole |
| Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 1 MAP 2019 Opinion Date: February 19, 2020 Judge: Donohue Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Thirty years ago, Appellee Otto Young was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison after he was convicted of aggravated assault, burglary, terroristic threats, and conspiracy. He was repeatedly released on parole and his parole was repeatedly revoked. On three occasions, the revocations were due to crimes that Young committed while at liberty on parole. This case presented a straightforward issue for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s review, namely whether the Board of Probation and Parole (the “Board”) had the statutory authority to rescind a previous grant of credit for time spent at liberty on parole. The Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth Court’s determination that the Board lacked any such statutory authority and thus affirmed its order. |
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| State v. Franco |
| Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court Docket: 19-15 Opinion Date: February 19, 2020 Judge: Gilbert V. Indeglia Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court convicting Defendant of three counts of first-degree child molestation sexual assault, holding that Defendant's argument alleging an instructional error was waived and that the trial justice did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial. On appeal, Defendant asserted that the trial justice erred in failing to grant a mistrial or to strike the complaining witness's testimony and exacerbated the error by instructing the jury to disregard a portion of the complaining witness's testimony and that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant waived his argument as to the denial of the motion for a mistrial and motion to strike and further waived his contention that the trial justice compounded the alleged error; and (2) the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence and was not otherwise clearly wrong when he denied Defendant's motion for a new trial. |
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| South Carolina v. Moore |
| Court: South Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 27948 Opinion Date: February 19, 2020 Judge: John W. Kittredge Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Petitioner Robert Moore was convicted by jury and sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment for the attempted murder of Travis Hall. Hall was shot in the head and left for dead in a vehicle in a Taco Bell parking lot following a drug deal gone wrong. In the immediate aftermath of the shooting, law enforcement officers found three cell phones, including one later identified as Petitioner's in the area of the driver's floorboard after emergency medical personnel removed Hall from the vehicle. Without obtaining a warrant, the officers removed the cell phones' subscriber identity module (SIM) cards to determine ownership. The officers then obtained a warrant to search the contents of Petitioner's phone. Petitioner's subsequent motion to suppress all evidence acquired from the phone was denied, as the trial court found Petitioner had abandoned his phone. A divided court of appeals' panel affirmed Petitioner's conviction on the basis of inevitable discovery. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| State v. Nekolite |
| Court: South Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 S.D. 8 Opinion Date: February 19, 2020 Judge: Salter Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of hit and run involving an injury, holding that the State was not required to prove that Defendant had knowledge of an accident-related injury. Defendant pled guilty to driving under the influence, second offense, and, after a bench trial, was convicted of felony hit and run. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred when it found that S.D. Codified Laws 32-34-5 does not require knowledge of the injury as an essential element. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, the circuit court did not err in determining that knowledge of the injury was not an essential element of a felony hit-and-run offense and denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. |
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| State v. Welch |
| Court: Tennessee Supreme Court Docket: E2018-00240-SC-R11-CD Opinion Date: February 19, 2020 Judge: Page Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of criminal appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for burglary, holding that application of the burglary statute under the circumstances of this case did not violate due process or prosecutorial discretion. Defendant's conviction arose from her involvement in a scheme to enter a Walmart retail store, steal merchandise, and have another individual return the merchandise for a gift card. Defendant had previously been banned from Walmart retail stores for prior acts of shoplifting, and the owners of these stores had issued documents to Defendant precluding Defendant from entering the stores. The State sought an indictment against Defendant for burglary rather than criminal trespass, reasoning that Defendant entered Walmart without the effective consent of the owner and committed a theft therein. Defendant appealed her burglary conviction, arguing that the burglary statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the extent that it implicates due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the language of the statute criminalizing burglary is clear and unambiguous on its face; (2) the statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied, and nothing in the statute precludes its application to the fact scenario in this case; and (3) the prosecutor did not exceed her discretion in interpreting and applying the statute. |
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| Hand v. State |
| Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2020 UT 8 Opinion Date: February 19, 2020 Judge: Thomas R. Lee Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's claim brought under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), holding that, contrary to the conclusions of the district court, Appellant's petition was not barred because his initial petition did not count as a "previous request for post-conviction relief" under Utah Code 78B-9-106(1)(d). In 2013, Appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor. In 2017, Appellant submitted a petition in the Second District Court of Utah seeking to challenge his conviction. Appellant subsequently withdrew his petition under Utah R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A). Later, Appellant filed a new petition in the Second District Court. The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that it was procedurally barred because it asserted claims that were, or could have been, raised or addressed in a previous request for post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there is no "previous request for post-conviction relief" where the action was initiated but voluntarily dismissed under Rule 41(a)(1)(A). |
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| Washington v. Grott |
| Court: Washington Supreme Court Docket: 97183-8 Opinion Date: February 20, 2020 Judge: Yu Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Respondent Robert Grott was put on trial for a shooting incident in which he claimed he acted in self-defense. He appealed to the Washington Supreme Court contending the trial court erred in instructing his jury that Grott could not claim self-defense if the jury found "beyond a reasonable doubt that [Grott] was the aggressor, and that defendant's acts and conduct provoked or commenced the fight." Grott maintained the instruction was improperly given because it was unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. Grott's brother and cousins were friends with Julian Thomas, and Thomas would sometimes spend the night at their house. In August 2015, one of Grott's handguns went missing. Grott and his brother came to believe that Thomas had stolen the gun, but they did not confront him about it. Thomas stopped coming by their house around that time. Then on Halloween night in 2015, Grott came home intoxicated. Thomas' younger sister was at the house with some friends. Grott began yelling at the sister, accusing Thomas of stealing the gun. A man standing at the end of the driveway shot through the house's front door, nearly missing Grott's head. After the Halloween incident, Grott became "paranoid" and bought another gun. Months later, Thomas was shot while sitting in a car parked in a convenience store parking lot. Forty-eight shell casings were retrieved from the scene. The medical examiner testified that based on Thomas' wounds, he must have been directly facing Grott rather than lying on the car floor. A loaded gun with the safety off was discovered beneath Thomas' body. The Court of Appeals concurred with Grott the first-aggressor instruction was not properly given, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. The Supreme Court determined the jury was properly instructed, and Grott's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object. The matter was remanded for the Court of Appeals to address other issues raised on appeal. |
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| State v. Neill |
| Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court Docket: 2018AP000075-CR Opinion Date: February 14, 2020 Judge: Ann Walsh Bradley Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming a $4,800 fine imposed by the circuit court upon sentencing Defendant for third-offense OWI, holding that the court of appeals erred in interpreting the penalty enhancers in Wisconsin's OWI statutes. Defendant faced two penalty enhancers. At issue was how the penalty enhancers' provisions requiring "doubling" and "quadrupling" of the fine for a third-offense OWI should be determined when multiple penalty enhancers apply. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in affirming the $4,800 fine imposed by the circuit court, holding that, under the correct interpretation of the statutes, Defendant's two fines totaled $3,600, not $4,800. |
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| Huckins v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 21 Opinion Date: February 19, 2020 Judge: Kautz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of felony possession of marijuana, holding that the State's trial evidence was sufficient to establish that Defendant possessed the marijuana. Defendant was convicted of violating Wyo. Stat. Ann. 35-7-1031(c)(iii), which makes it a felony for a person to knowingly or intentionally have in his possession more than three ounces of marijuana in plant form. On appeal, Defendant argued that the State did not prove he exercised dominion and control over the marijuana. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial evidence was clearly sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Defendant constructively possessed more than three ounces of marijuana. |
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