Latest 7 Cases: Gracia v. SigmaTron International, Inc. (Civil Procedure), Cheli v. Taylorville Community School District (Civil Rights), United ...

Who May/Should Preside Over Former President Trump’s Second Impeachment Trial?

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, JASON MAZZONE

Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar and professor Jason Mazzone argue that the constitutional ambiguity over who may preside over former President Trump’s second impeachment trial supports the conclusion that the Senate should ask Chief Justice John Roberts to preside. Dean Amar and Professor Mazzone explain why other people—such as Senate President Pro Tempore, the Vice President, and any other senator—are not ideal options because of real or perceived conflicts.

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Gracia v. SigmaTron International, Inc.

Docket: 19-1526

Opinion Date: February 3, 2021

Judge: Scudder

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law

Gracia’s former employer, SigmaTron, fired her 13 years ago after she filed sexual harassment and hostile work environment claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Gracia prevailed in a 2014 trial on a Title VII retaliation claim. She found new work at a different company. In 2015, SigmaTron described Gracia’s lawsuit in public filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Gracia filed another Title VII retaliation claim, plus claims for retaliation under the Illinois Human Rights Act, defamation, and invasion of privacy. The district court dismissed Gracia’s defamation and false light invasion of privacy claims and later granted SigmaTron summary judgment on the Title VII and Illinois Human Rights Act claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Gracia failed to present specific facts to show any injury in fact and expressly acknowledged that SigmaTron’s disclosures did not affect her current employment, with which she is content. That admission left the district court without subject matter jurisdiction to consider the Title VII claim on the merits. As for Gracia’s state law claims, the district court was right to conclude that the allegations failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted.

Cheli v. Taylorville Community School District

Docket: 20-2033

Opinion Date: February 3, 2021

Judge: Joel Martin Flaum

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Education Law, Labor & Employment Law

On September 28, 2018, Cheli, a computer system administrative assistant for the District, since 2014, was taken into a meeting with about 25 minutes’ notice. The District’s superintendent and Director of Computer Services terminated Cheli because a female student had alleged that Cheli had sexually harassed her three weeks prior. Cheli denied the allegations. The Board retroactively memorialized Cheli’s termination on October 9, 2018. Cheli never received notice of the Board meeting and did not receive written notice of the charges or the evidence against him but received a notice of termination via certified mail stating that “[t]he basis or grounds for discharge include incompetence.” That notice informed Cheli that he could request the written report. The District did not provide the report upon Cheli’s request. A collective bargaining agreement governed Cheli’s employment and provides for discipline for reasonable cause. An employee is entitled to a conference, attended by a representative of his choice, and a written explanation for the discipline. The District’s Policy Manual, however, contains a provision titled “Employment At-Will.” Cheli sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging the defendants violated his procedural due process rights. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. The collective bargaining agreement established that Cheli could not be terminated except “for reasonable cause,” which created a protected property interest for which he was entitled to due process

United States v. Collins

Docket: 20-1198

Opinion Date: February 3, 2021

Judge: HAMILTON

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Collins pleaded guilty to participating in a heroin distribution ring and was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment, the statutory mandatory minimum. Collins sought to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that, at sentencing, the government breached the plea agreement by failing to move for a downward departure from the statutory minimum. The government explained that Collins had refused its requests to provide “complete and truthful testimony.” Collins disputed that assertion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence. Collins did not raise this argument in the district court, so the demanding “plain error” standard applies. Even if there might have been a breach of the plea agreement, it was not plain. Even if there had been a plain error, Collins did not suffer any prejudice from it. His sentence was the lowest the law would permit, and the plain-error review does not entitle Collins himself to choose to withdraw his guilty pleas.

United States v. Hamzeh

Docket: 19-3072

Opinion Date: February 3, 2021

Judge: Daniel Anthony Manion

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Hamzeh’s friend contacted the FBI, concerned that Hamzeh planned to commit a mass killing. The FBI involved another informant, who began working with the two at a restaurant. Both recorded their conversations with Hamzeh, who spoke about committing acts of terrorism to be martyred as part of his Islamic faith, carrying out a Middle East shooting, committing a domestic shooting at a Masonic lodge, and acquiring weapons for these crimes. The FBI instructed the informants to offer to arrange a purchase if Hamzeh wanted a weapon so authorities could set up a sting operation. Hamzeh and the informants negotiated with undercover FBI Agents posing as arms dealers for the purchase of two machine guns and a silencer. Hamzeh carried the unregistered weapons to his vehicle and was arrested. The government moved to admit excerpts of the informants’ recorded conversations with Hamzeh to show lack of entrapment. The court expressed concern with a jury convicting Hamzeh of possession based on his plans and “disturbing talk” rather than the elements of the offense and stated that motive was irrelevant under 26 U.S.C. 5861(d). The court excluded much of the government’s evidence. In an interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, noting repeated errors in excluding evidence as “not probative” or irrelevant, which affected the court’s further findings under Rule 403. It also erred in excluding the machinegun-availability evidence as irrelevant; the evidence is conditionally admissible, subject to Hamzeh’s introduction of evidence he did not have the ability to commit the crime.

United States v. Morgan

Docket: 19-2737

Opinion Date: February 3, 2021

Judge: Diane Pamela Wood

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Morgan transferred funds to an acquaintance in New Mexico, who used those funds to buy seven guns and mail them to Morgan’s Chicago residence. Morgan admits that the firearms were sent to his home and that "friends and family" had access to the residence, but could not recall in whose hands the guns came to rest. Officers recovered six of the guns. Several were linked to gang-related homicides, including one of a child. Morgan was charged under 18 U.S.C. 371 (conspiracy) and 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(3) (unlicensed receipt of a firearm). He pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge. The PSR calculated a sentencing guidelines range between 24-30 months’ incarceration, considering Morgan’s acceptance of responsibility. The court acknowledged his acceptance of responsibility but stated that Morgan distributed the guns knowing that they would be used by gang members, not just friends and family. Morgan agreed. The court sentenced Morgan to 48 months’ incarceration and imposed discretionary conditions of release, including condition 16, which authorized the probation office to visit Morgan at home, work, school, or other locations and confiscate any contraband in plain view, and condition 23, which authorized the probation office to search Morgan’s “person, property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, [computers], or office,” if the search was supported by reasonable suspicion. The Seventh Circuit rejected most of Morgan’s challenges but remanded. The district court failed to justify supervised-release condition 23 with reference to the sentencing criteria, 18 U.S.C. 3553.

Cutchin v. Robertson

Docket: 20-1437

Opinion Date: February 3, 2021

Judge: ROVNER

Areas of Law: Health Law, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Cutchin’s wife and daughter were killed in an automobile accident that occurred when another driver, Watson, age 72, struck their vehicle. Cutchin alleges that Watson’s driving ability was impaired by medications she had been prescribed, including an opioid. Cutchin filed a malpractice suit against Watson’s healthcare providers, charging them with negligence for an alleged failure to warn Watson that she should not be driving given the known motor and cognitive effects of those medications. After the providers and their malpractice insurer agreed to a settlement of $250,000, the maximum amount for which they can be held individually liable under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act (MMA), Cutchin sought further relief from the Patient’s Compensation Fund, which acts as an excess insurer. The Fund argued that the MMA does not apply to Cutchin’s claim and that he is barred from seeking excess damages from the Fund. The district court agreed. The Seventh Circuit certified to the Indiana Supreme Court the questions: Whether Ithe MMA prohibits the Fund from contesting the Act’s applicability to a claim after the claimant concludes a court‐approved settlement with a qualified healthcare provider, and whether the MMA applies to claims brought against individuals (survivors) who did not receive medical care from the provider, but who are injured as a result of the provider’s negligence in providing medical treatment to someone else.

White v. United Airlines, Inc.

Docket: 19-2546

Opinion Date: February 3, 2021

Judge: Diane Pamela Wood

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law, Military Law

White has been employed as a commercial airline pilot since 2005 and has also served in the U.S. Air Force since 2000, first on active duty and now on reserve duty. As a reservist, he is required to attend periodic military-training sessions. White has taken periods of short-term military leave, usually for a day or two at a time, during which he did not receive pay from United. Under United’s collective bargaining agreement, pilots receive pay when they take other short-term leaves of absence, such as jury duty or sick leave. United also maintains a profit-sharing plan for its pilots that is based on the wages they earn; pilots who take paid sick leave or paid leave for jury duty earn credit toward their profit-sharing plan, while pilots who take short-term military leave do not. White initiated a class action under the 1994 Uniformed Services Employee and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), which is intended to prevent civilian employers from discriminating against employees because of their military service, 38 U.S.C. 4301(a). The district court dismissed White’s complaint. The Seventh Circuit reversed. USERRA’s mandate that military leave be given the same “rights and benefits” as comparable, nonmilitary leave requires an employer to provide paid military leave to the same extent that it provides paid leave for other absences. Paid leave falls within the “rights and benefits” defined by the statute.