Transitional Justice and Inauguration Poems

LESLEY WEXLER

Illinois law professor Lesley M. Wexler describes how Amanda Gorman’s The Hill We Climb and Jericho Brown’s Inaugural,’ an Original Poem—as two inaugural poems—fit within the call of transitional justice. Professor Wexler explains how, read together, the two poems provide a roadmap of the transitional justice terrain the government may choose to tread.

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Hargroves v. Commonwealth

Dockets: 2019-SC-0181-MR, 2019-SC-0279-DG

Opinion Date: January 21, 2021

Judge: Nickell

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of murder, first-degree assault, and first-degree wanton endangerment of a child, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying requested instructions on extreme emotional disturbance and voluntary intoxication; (2) the prosecutor did not improperly reenact Defendant's theory of the shooting during the direct examination of the medical examiner; and (3) the trial court properly applied the law in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.

Blackaby v. Barnes

Docket: 2020-SC-0004-DGE

Opinion Date: January 21, 2021

Judge: Vanmeter

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's petition for grandparent visitation on grounds that Appellant lacked standing to seek formal visitation after the adoption of his grandchild had been finalized, holding that the stepparent exception set forth in Hicks v. Enlow, 764 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1989), should be applied to grandparents under the facts appearing in this matter. Appellant was the paternal grandfather of Child. Child's maternal grandmother petitioned the family court to adopt Child with the consent of Mother, who also consented to the termination of her parental rights. Before the adoption was finalized, Father passed away. Thereafter, the family court granted the adoption petition. Appellant subsequently petitioned the family court for grandparent visitation pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 405.021, the grandparent visitation statute. The family court dismissed the petition, finding that Appellant lacked standing to seek visitation under section 405.021 because his grandparent rights terminated upon finalization of the adoption. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 405.021 does not contemplate the situation at hand; and (2) the public policy considerations of the stepparent exception articulated in Hicks extend equally to an intra-family grandparent adoption, such as the one in this case.

Brooks v. Honorable Tara Hagerty

Docket: 2020-SC-0065-MR

Opinion Date: January 21, 2021

Judge: Michelle M. Keller

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Elderserve, Inc.'s petition for a writ of mandamus directing the family court to grant its motion to amend an annulment petition to include a petition for dissolution of the marriage of Charles Brooks and Taylor Toney, holding that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to amend. On Brooks' behalf, Elderserve sought to amend the annulment petition to include a petition for a dissolution of the marriage of Brooks and Toney. In denying the motion to amend, the family court cited the prohibition in Johnson v. Johnson, 170 S.W.2d 889 (Ky. 1943), against guardians initiating an action for divorce on behalf of their wards. Elderserve then sought the writ of mandamus at issue. The court of appeals denied the writ, also relying on the holding in Johnson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's denial of the motion to amend the annulment petition was not in error because Johnson was good precedent at the time the court entertained Elderserve's petition; (2) changes to the Kentucky guardianship statutes since Johnson's rendering no longer justify its complete prohibition of guardian-initiated divorces. The opinion then described legal steps a guardian must follow before it can petition for a divorce of its ward.

M.C. v. Commonwealth

Docket: 2020-SC-0191-DGE

Opinion Date: January 21, 2021

Judge: Lambert

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the family court's finding of neglect against M.C. regarding his three teenaged children and vacated the family court's orders, holding that the family court's finding that M.C. neglected his children was an abuse of discretion. The family court found that the three children in this case were neglected by M.C. under Ky. Rev. Stat. 600.020(1)(a)2, 3, 4, and 8. The court of appeals affirmed, holding, among other things, that there was sufficient evidence of risk of physical or emotional injury to support a finding of neglect in this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there was no evidence that M.C.'s children were at a risk of physical or emotional injury; (2) there was no evidence that M.C.'s substance use disorder rendered him incapable of caring for his children or meeting their needs; and (3) no reasonable argument could be made that M.C. neglected his children under either section 600.020(1)(a)4 or 8.

Ford Motor Co. v. Duckworth

Docket: 2019-SC-0357-WC

Opinion Date: January 21, 2021

Judge: Hughes

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision upholding an administrative law judge's (ALJ) award of benefits to Deborah Duckworth, holding that the ALJ had the authority to determine the manifestation date for cumulative trauma injury and properly applied controlling law to the facts of this case. On appeal, Ford Motor Company argued that the ALJ exceeded the scope of his authority in determining the manifestation dates of Duckworth's cumulative trauma injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the ALJ had the authority to determine the manifestation date of Duckworth's cumulative trauma injury; and (2) Ford Motor Company was not deprived of due process because it had adequate notice and opportunity to be heard on the statute of limitations issue.

Pleasant Unions, LLC v. Kentucky Tax Co., LLC

Docket: 2019-SC-0358-DG

Opinion Date: January 21, 2021

Judge: Hughes

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision affirming the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of Kentucky Tax Company, LLC on Kentucky Tax's suit to foreclose its lien on certain property and to collect amounts owed by Pleasant Unions, LLC, holding that Kentucky Tax did not comply with statutory notice requirements. Kentucky Tax acquired a certificate of delinquency for property owned by Pleasant Unions. Kentucky Tax then brought this action. Kentucky Tax filed a motion for summary judgment, attaching letters to show that it had satisfied the notice requirements of Ky. Rev. Stat. 134.490. In response, Pleasant Unions claimed that Kentucky Tax had not proven that two letters were actually mailed. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Kentucky Tax, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an affidavit from Kentucky Tax's attorney tendered in support of its summary judgment motion was not sufficient proof of mailing as required by the applicable statute; and (2) summary judgment was premature because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to Kentucky Tax's compliance with the notice requirements of section 134.490.

Simms v. Estate of Blake

Docket: 2018-SC-0478-DG

Opinion Date: January 21, 2021

Judge: Lambert

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's ruling that Ky. Rev. Stat. 391.033 and Ky. Rev. Stat. 411.137 (together, "Mandy Jo's Law") precluded Appellant from recovering his intestate share of the settlement proceeds connected with the wrongful death of his son, Brandon Blake, holding that the trial court did not err in finding that Appellant willfully abandoned Brandon. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court's failure to remove Appellees Melanie and Derek Blake as co-administrators of Brandon's estate was harmless error; (2) the trial court correctly employed the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof; (3) the trial court did not clearly err in finding that Appellant willfully abandoned Brandon under sections 391.033 and 411.137; and (4) equitable estoppel did not preclude Melanie from raising Mandy Jo's Law as a defense.