Table of Contents | International Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Troy Civil Rights, Communications Law, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use | Coleman v. Bradshaw Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Mitchell v. Genovese Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Lipman v. Budish Civil Rights, Constitutional Law | Kirilenko-Ison v. Board of Education of Danville Independent Schools Civil Rights, Education Law, Labor & Employment Law | United States v. Duncan Burks Criminal Law | United States v. Lee Criminal Law |
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US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Opinions | International Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Troy | Dockets: 19-1151, 19-1399 Opinion Date: September 4, 2020 Judge: Danny Julian Boggs Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Communications Law, Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use | International, an outdoor advertising company, sought to erect digital billboards in two separate locations within the City of Troy. International's permit and variance applications were denied. International filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983), alleging that the ordinance granted unfettered discretion and contained unconstitutional content-based restrictions as it exempted from permit requirements certain categories of signs, such as flags and “temporary signs.” During the litigation, Troy amended the Ordinance. The Sixth Circuit remanded. The original Ordinance imposed a prior restraint because the right to display a sign that did not come within an exception as a flag or as a “temporary sign” depended on obtaining either a permit or a variance. The standards for granting a variance contained multiple vague, undefined criteria, such as “public interest,” “general purpose and intent,” “adversely affect[ing],” and “hardship.” Even meeting these criteria did not guarantee a variance; the Board retained discretion to deny it. The amendment, however, rendered the action for declaratory and injunctive relief moot. The severability of the variance provisions rendered moot its claim for damages. The court reinstated a claim that the ordinance imposed content-based restrictions without a compelling government interest for reconsideration under the correct standard. A regulation of commercial speech that is not content-neutral is still subject to strict scrutiny. | | Coleman v. Bradshaw | Docket: 15-3442 Opinion Date: September 4, 2020 Judge: Batchelder Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | In January 1996, Coleman killed Stevens to keep her from testifying against him at his trial on charges of drug trafficking. A jury convicted him for aggravated murder (with a capital-specification for his killing a witness and a firearm-specification) and of unlawful possession of a firearm. The Ohio trial court sentenced him to death and four-and-a-half years in prison. Coleman unsuccessfully sought relief on direct appeal, then unsuccessfully pursued state post0conviction relief. While Coleman’s first petition for post-conviction relief was pending, he returned to the trial court in 2002, with a motion for relief from judgment, a motion for a new trial, and a successive petition for postconviction relief, all raising claims of actual innocence and that the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of “Brady.” The court dismissed the petition without a hearing, The Ohio appellate court affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal habeas petition. The decision of the Ohio court of appeals, that a purported confession by another inmate lacked credibility and was not “Brady” material, neither contravened nor unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The state court evaluated the totality of the mitigation evidence and reweighed it against the evidence in aggravation to reasonably conclude that Coleman experienced no prejudice from his counsel’s conduct in failing to raise certain mitigation arguments. | | Mitchell v. Genovese | Docket: 19-6070 Opinion Date: September 4, 2020 Judge: Jane Branstetter Stranch Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | In 1986, Mitchell, a black man, was convicted by an all-white jury of raping two white women in Tennessee. It is undisputed that the prosecution’s decision to strike a black prospective juror violated the Supreme Court’s 1986 holding, Batson v. Kentucky. The district court granted relief on Batson grounds in 1995, but the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Mitchell had to first establish “cause and prejudice” for failing to develop the claim before the state court. Multiple remands left Mitchell in a “procedural thicket.” In 2012, the Supreme Court decided "Martinez," holding that when a state limits the consideration of ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims to collateral review, a habeas petitioner may establish cause for procedural default if state post-conviction counsel was ineffective under Strickland and the underlying claim has “some merit.” The holding changed prior law--that post-conviction counsel’s “ignorance or inadvertence in a post-conviction proceeding,” including failure to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, does not qualify as cause to excuse procedural default. The Sixth Circuit then granted Mitchell a conditional writ of habeas corpus, concluding that “Martinez” enables Mitchell to show the necessary “cause,” and authorizes him to raise his underlying ineffective assistance of counsel claim and to seek redress through a Rule 60(b) motion. | | Lipman v. Budish | Docket: 19-3914 Opinion Date: September 4, 2020 Judge: Eric L. Clay Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law | Ta’Naejah, born in 2011, was in the custody of her mother, who severely abused her, including through repeated burnings and beatings. Ta’Naejah was hospitalized and interviewed by Cuyahoga County caseworkers, but ultimately was returned to Crump’s custody. Throughout the next year, the county received further reports of abuse and interviewed Ta’Naejah several more times, but never acted to remove her from the household. The abuse eventually resulted in Ta’Naejah’s death. Her estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting claims based on Ta’Naejah’s due process rights and state-law causes of action. The district court dismissed, holding that the Constitution does not create a right to state protection from private harm. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. While several of the federal claims are foreclosed by precedent, the plaintiffs also allege that the state affirmatively increased Ta’Naejah’s risk of harm by repeatedly interviewing her in the presence of her alleged abusers, in violation of state regulations. Those allegations plausibly allege a claim under the state-created danger doctrine. The court rejected the defendants’ motion to seal the plaintiffs’ brief, which allegedly contained confidential information obtained through discovery, which had been subject to a protective order. The defendants do not explain why the information in question should be kept from the public, other than because it is covered by the protective order. | | Kirilenko-Ison v. Board of Education of Danville Independent Schools | Docket: 19-5767 Opinion Date: September 4, 2020 Judge: Eric L. Clay Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Education Law, Labor & Employment Law | Two nurses, employed by the Board of Education, claim that the School Board retaliated against them for advocating for the rights of students who are disabled within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701; and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act; and that the Board violated the Kentucky Whistleblower Act by retaliating against them for reporting a parent’s suspected child neglect to a state agency. One plaintiff also claimed that the School Board failed to accommodate her disability and constructively discharged her, in violation of the ADA and the KCRA. The district court granted the Board summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to the retaliation claims under the ADA, Section 504, and the KCRA. A jury could “reasonably doubt” the Board’s explanation for its actions and find that it acted, at least in part, because of the protected advocacy. The court affirmed as to the whistleblower claims; the plaintiffs only allege that they reported a mother of possible neglect and do not allege that they reported any violation of law by their employer to a state agency. The court affirmed as to the individual claim for failure to accommodate disabilities. The nurse failed to provide any documentation about her disability diagnosis during the interactive process. | | United States v. Duncan Burks | Docket: 19-6010 Opinion Date: September 4, 2020 Judge: Jeffrey S. Sutton Areas of Law: Criminal Law | Burks was a Gangster Disciple member with leadership and enforcement responsibility. On November 3, 2012, another member, Hardison, went to a Clarksville, Tennessee club, where members of the rival “Bloods” attacked him. Hardison called Burks. The Disciples found Wright, a Blood who had helped attack Hardison, partying without his crew. During the ensuing fight, someone shot Wright in the leg. He staggered toward the door and collapsed. Someone fired another shot into Wright’s abdomen. Wright collapsed and died. The government claims Burks shot Wright. At trial, prosecutors presented three informants to tie Burks to the killing. A jury convicted Burks on all charges. The court granted him a new trial on four counts, deeming the verdict for those counts against the manifest weight of the evidence. The government appealed. Months later, the government realized it had not disclosed two investigation reports. Burks unsuccessfully moved for a new trial on two counts not subject to the new trial order, claiming a "Brady" violation. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial. It discounted one informant’s grand jury testimony without a valid reason and discredited the other informants’ trial testimony based on contested facts that are generally resolved by juries. The evidence did not weigh heavily against the verdict but set out a straightforward narrative that the jury could reasonably believe. | | United States v. Lee | Docket: 18-2391 Opinion Date: September 4, 2020 Judge: Eric L. Clay Areas of Law: Criminal Law | In 2003, Lee, age 21, was convicted of second-degree criminal sexual conduct after he pleaded guilty to engaging in sexual activity with a 14-year-old whom he met at a bar that required patrons to be at least 18 years old to enter. He completed his 12-month custodial sentence. From 2004-2018, Lee consistently violated the conditions of his parole, most often by failing to comply with sex offender registration laws and location monitoring. Lee was punished and incarcerated for each of those violations. In 2018, while on parole, Lee was a passenger in his girlfriend’s car. Law enforcement initiated a traffic stop and instructed Lee to exit the vehicle. Lee attempted to flee. Officers tackled him and discovered that he was in possession of an unregistered firearm. Lee pleaded guilty to possession of a stolen firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(j) and was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment, reflecting an upward variance of almost two years from the high end of Lee’s 30-37 months guidelines range, purportedly due to Lee’s criminal history. The Sixth Circuit vacated. A court may vary upward from a defendant’s advisory guidelines range based on criminal history and a specific need for deterrence, 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). But here, nothing uniquely problematic about the defendant’s criminal history demonstrates a specific need for deterrence beyond that already captured in the guidelines range. Lee’s criminal history has little bearing on the instant offense; it does not justify the two-year upward variance. | |
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