Impeaching a Former President Is Plainly Constitutional

NEIL H. BUCHANAN

UF Levin College of Law professor and economist Neil H. Buchanan argues that the text of the Constitution makes clear that Congress has the power to impeach and convict Donald Trump, even though he is no longer President. Buchanan describes the unambiguous textual support for this conclusion, which Buchanan (and others) argue is also amply supported by the Constitution’s purpose, structure, and other interpretive approaches.

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In re Brianna S.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B301802(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 28, 2021

Judge: Brian M. Hoffstadt

Areas of Law: Family Law

After a juvenile court places a child who has been declared a dependent with a relative and declares the relative to be a "de facto parent," when the social services agency later seeks to remove the child from the relative, Welfare and Institutions Code section 387 governs. Section 387 authorizes a juvenile court to "chang[e] or modif[y] a previous [placement] order by removing a child from the physical custody of a parent, guardian, relative, or friend and directing” a different placement. Although the juvenile court followed the incorrect procedures in this case, the Court of Appeal affirmed the removal orders because the error was not prejudicial. The court explained that the juvenile court's error in evaluating the Department's request under section 385 rather than section 387 was not prejudicial for two reasons. First, the Department's initial decision to follow all of the section 387 procedures up until its last-minute change of mind means that grandmother was effectively accorded all of the process she was due under section 387. Second, the juvenile court's modification order is supported by substantial evidence.

Marriage of Carlisle

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C084891(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: January 28, 2021

Judge: Murray

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Family Law

In April 2015, during marriage dissolution proceedings, plaintiff filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against defendant, her then-husband. The trial court granted a two-year DVRO. Defendant appealed. While that appeal remained pending, a little more than a month before the original DVRO was set to expire, plaintiff filed a request to renew the DVRO. After a hearing, the trial court granted plaintiff’s request, renewing the DVRO for five years. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the issuance of the original DVRO. Defendant, an attorney appearing in propria persona, appealed the grant of the renewed DVRO, asserting that: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to renew the DVRO while the appeal from the granting of the original DVRO remained pending; (2) the trial court erred in rendering its decision without reading the pleadings; (3) the trial court erred in excluding the witnesses and exhibits he offered; (4) the trial court erred in rendering its decision without considering the case law in the pleadings; (5) the trial court did not afford him sufficient time to present his defense; and, (6) in effect, substantial evidence did not support renewal of the DVRO. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the renewed DVRO.

Fletcher v. Feutz

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Docket: 566, 2019

Opinion Date: January 22, 2021

Judge: Montgomery-Reeves

Areas of Law: Family Law

William Fletcher, Jr. challenged a Family Court denial of his petition to modify or terminate alimony payments to his ex-wife, Melissa Feutz. Fletcher argued the Family Court erred by ruling that: (1) Feutz was appropriately employed; (2) there was not a substantial change in circumstances that warranted the termination or modification of alimony; (3) Feutz was not cohabitating with her paramour; and (4) Feutz was entitled to the attorney’s fees awarded. After review, the Delaware Supreme Court held the Family Court did not err in finding that Feutz was properly employed and that she was not cohabitating with her paramour. The Court remanded the issue of whether there was a substantial change in circumstances. In addition, the Court found the Family Court erredin awarding Feutz attorney’s fees for the defense of Fletcher’s Motion to Modify or Terminate Alimony.

Blackaby v. Barnes

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2020-SC-0004-DGE

Opinion Date: January 21, 2021

Judge: Vanmeter

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's petition for grandparent visitation on grounds that Appellant lacked standing to seek formal visitation after the adoption of his grandchild had been finalized, holding that the stepparent exception set forth in Hicks v. Enlow, 764 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1989), should be applied to grandparents under the facts appearing in this matter. Appellant was the paternal grandfather of Child. Child's maternal grandmother petitioned the family court to adopt Child with the consent of Mother, who also consented to the termination of her parental rights. Before the adoption was finalized, Father passed away. Thereafter, the family court granted the adoption petition. Appellant subsequently petitioned the family court for grandparent visitation pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 405.021, the grandparent visitation statute. The family court dismissed the petition, finding that Appellant lacked standing to seek visitation under section 405.021 because his grandparent rights terminated upon finalization of the adoption. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 405.021 does not contemplate the situation at hand; and (2) the public policy considerations of the stepparent exception articulated in Hicks extend equally to an intra-family grandparent adoption, such as the one in this case.

Brooks v. Honorable Tara Hagerty

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2020-SC-0065-MR

Opinion Date: January 21, 2021

Judge: Michelle M. Keller

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Elderserve, Inc.'s petition for a writ of mandamus directing the family court to grant its motion to amend an annulment petition to include a petition for dissolution of the marriage of Charles Brooks and Taylor Toney, holding that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to amend. On Brooks' behalf, Elderserve sought to amend the annulment petition to include a petition for a dissolution of the marriage of Brooks and Toney. In denying the motion to amend, the family court cited the prohibition in Johnson v. Johnson, 170 S.W.2d 889 (Ky. 1943), against guardians initiating an action for divorce on behalf of their wards. Elderserve then sought the writ of mandamus at issue. The court of appeals denied the writ, also relying on the holding in Johnson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court's denial of the motion to amend the annulment petition was not in error because Johnson was good precedent at the time the court entertained Elderserve's petition; (2) changes to the Kentucky guardianship statutes since Johnson's rendering no longer justify its complete prohibition of guardian-initiated divorces. The opinion then described legal steps a guardian must follow before it can petition for a divorce of its ward.

M.C. v. Commonwealth

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Docket: 2020-SC-0191-DGE

Opinion Date: January 21, 2021

Judge: Lambert

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the family court's finding of neglect against M.C. regarding his three teenaged children and vacated the family court's orders, holding that the family court's finding that M.C. neglected his children was an abuse of discretion. The family court found that the three children in this case were neglected by M.C. under Ky. Rev. Stat. 600.020(1)(a)2, 3, 4, and 8. The court of appeals affirmed, holding, among other things, that there was sufficient evidence of risk of physical or emotional injury to support a finding of neglect in this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there was no evidence that M.C.'s children were at a risk of physical or emotional injury; (2) there was no evidence that M.C.'s substance use disorder rendered him incapable of caring for his children or meeting their needs; and (3) no reasonable argument could be made that M.C. neglected his children under either section 600.020(1)(a)4 or 8.

Guardianship by Joseph W.

Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court

Citation: 2021 ME 5

Opinion Date: January 26, 2021

Judge: Ellen A. Gorman

Areas of Law: Family Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order of the probate court ordering that a sixteen-year-old minor, who had been residing with his mother and his siblings in Mississippi for over a year, would start living with his grandparents in Maine one week after the order was issued, holding that the court did not have the authority to enter the order. The minor child's grandparents petitioned the probate court for full guardianship of the child. The grandparents also separately moved for appointment as guardians on an emergency basis. The court eventually issued a document entitled "Consent Order" providing that the petition for guardianship be continued. The mother filed an emergency motion to vacate the consent order and to dismiss the guardianship request, asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction over the case. The court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that the court did not have the authority to grant the requested relief and should have granted the mother's motion to dismiss.