Can a Misdemeanor Count as an “Emergency” for Purposes of Skipping the Warrant?

SHERRY F. COLB

Cornell law professor Sherry F. Colb comments on a case currently before the U.S. Supreme Court that presents the question whether the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies when the suspect may have committed a misdemeanor, as opposed to a more serious crime. Colb argues that if the Court believes that a misdemeanor (or a particular misdemeanor) is not important enough to justify the invasion of a person’s home, then it ought perhaps to hold that the police officer in the present should not have entered the suspect’s home, period, with or without a warrant.

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Vincent v. Sonkey

Docket: B293251(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Arthur Gilbert

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Legal Ethics

When a plaintiff requests entry of judgment by default, a request for attorney fees must be made at the same time or the fees are forfeited. But attorney fees are not forfeited absent such request when defendant contests a default judgment. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion for attorney fees in her lawsuit against defendants. The court concluded, among other things, that plaintiff was not entitled to attorney fees incurred for the period before she obtained the default judgment against defendants because she did not include a request for fees at the time the default judgment was entered. However, the trial court erred by denying attorney fees for plaintiff's successful post-judgment efforts to respond to and defeat defendants' motions to vacate the default judgment. The court remanded for further proceedings.

Dziubla v. Piazza

Docket: D076183(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Dato

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Internet Law, Personal Injury

Plaintiffs-appellants Robert Dziubla and Linda Stanwood claimed defendant Ignatius Piazza II, owner of a Nevada firearms training facility, harassed and threatened them by publishing defamatory statements along with their personal identifying information, and sending associates to invade their home. Piazza retorted that plaintiffs conned him out of thousands of dollars and are now attempting to steal his property and "chill his constitutional rights." The trial court granted in part and denied in part Piazza’s special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. With one important clarification as to the scope of protected activity, the Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion. That clarification involved so-called “doxing” allegations in the complaint: plaintiffs’ claim that Piazza published private personal identifying information about them to thousands of gun enthusiasts as a thinly-veiled threat about what could happen if they continued to litigate the business dispute. Although it was included in an otherwise-protected litigation “alert” that discussed the pending lawsuit, the doxing information was entirely extraneous to the court proceedings that were the ostensible subject of the communication. The Court of Appeal thus rejected Piazza’s assertion that plaintiffs could not meet the “minimal merit” standard on the anti-SLAPP motion because the doxing allegations would necessarily be barred by the litigation privilege in Civil Code section 47(b). The order granting the special motion to strike was reversed in part as to two of plaintiffs’ cause of action ‒ the tenth, seeking an injunction, and the twelfth, alleging a civil rights violation ‒ but only as to the claims included in these causes of action that alleged injury from the publication of their personal information, i.e., the doxing allegations. In all other respects, the order was affirmed. The matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Shirvanyan v. Los Angeles Community College District

Docket: B296593(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Frances Rothschild

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Labor & Employment Law

The District appeals from a judgment following a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, a former employee of the District, on her Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) claims. Plaintiff's claims were based on the District's alleged failure to provide reasonable accommodations for and/or engage in an interactive process to identify reasonable accommodations for two injuries, each of which was sufficient to render plaintiff disabled for the purposes of FEHA. The Court of Appeal agreed with the District that a Government Code section 12940, subdivision (n) plaintiff must prove an available reasonable accommodation. The court also concluded that the evidence presented is sufficient to establish only that a reasonable accommodation of plaintiff's wrist injury, not her shoulder injury, was available. In this case, the jury did not indicate whether it relied on the District's response to one or both of these disabilities in reaching its verdict, and the record does not permit the court to make such a determination. Therefore, the court reversed with instructions that the trial court conduct a new trial on plaintiff's failure to accommodate and interactive process claims based solely on the District's handling of her wrist injury. The court also concluded that the Workers' Compensation Act does not bar such claims, because they seek recovery for a harm that is distinct from the harms for which the Workers' Compensation Act provides a remedy. To the extent plaintiff prevails on limited retrial, the trial court must reassess attorney fees.

Santa Clara Valley Water District v. San Francisco Bay Regional Water Quality Control Board

Docket: A157127(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Brown

Areas of Law: Environmental Law, Government & Administrative Law

Every 10-20 years, Berryessa Creek flooded nearby Milpitas and San Jose. The Army Corps of Engineers named the Santa Clara Valley Water District as a flood control project sponsor. The Corps was responsible for design and construction; the District was to acquire property rights and conduct operations. Regional Water Quality Control Board staff requested that the project include mitigation of wetlands impacts. The Corps refused some of the requested changes as exceeding the scope its authorization from Congress and the environmental review. The District issued a final EIR, finding that the project would have substantial impacts on some aspects of water resources, but that those impacts could be reduced to less-than-significant by mitigation measures. The Corps applied to the Board for a Clean Water Act section 401 certificate that the project complied with state law, 33 U.S.C. 1341. Because the Corps’ application did not contain wetlands mitigation, the Board deemed the application incomplete. There was pressure to protect a BART station under construction and to avoid losing federal funding. The Board agreed to issue a section 401 certification, indicating that it would subsequently issue waste discharge requirements (WDRs) under the Porter-Cologne Act to address issues that were not handled under the certification. The Board later issued a WDR order requiring additional mitigation, stating that it was rescinding and superseding the section 401 certification, and required enhancement of 15 acres of waters of the state. The Board was willing to allow another of the District’s planned projects to satisfy the requirement. The State Board denied the District’s petition for review. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of relief. The District has not shown that the allegedly invalid rescission and reissue of the section 401 certification would justify reversal; the Porter-Cologne Act provides independent authority for the WDR order.

Marriage of Nevai and Klemunes

Docket: C086584(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Krause

Areas of Law: Family Law

Martha Nevai (wife) contended the trial court erred in various orders of reimbursement to the community for spending related to wife’s separate property. She also argued the trial court erred in setting spousal support and in refusing to award her attorney fees. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed the trial court erred in fixing the permanent spousal support award and in reimbursing John Klemunes (husband) for mortgage interest and property taxes on wife’s vacation home. Further, the trial court also erred in ordering that each side pay their own attorney fees. The Court reversed the relevant portions of the judgment and remanded the matter for recalculation and further consideration. Judgment was affirmed in all other respects.

Marriage of Wozniak

Docket: D074813(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Cynthia Aaron

Areas of Law: Family Law

Anna Wozniak challenged the trial court’s characterization of a particular residence as the parties' community property. The property at issue was originally owned by Anna as her separate property, but that at some point prior to 2006, Anna transmuted this property into community property. In 2006, Grzegorz Wozniak prepared and executed an interspousal transfer deed, which, if effective, would have passed his community property interest in the residence to Anna. At trial, the parties disputed Anna’s response to Grzegorz’s attempted delivery of the interspousal transfer deed; Grzegorz testified that Anna rejected the deed, and Anna testified that she was surprised when Grzegorz presented the executed deed to her but that she ultimately took possession of it. Over the next six years, the deed was not recorded and both parties appeared to agree that it remained in the martial residence. In 2012, after an incident in which a protective order was granted in favor of Grzegorz and against Anna, Anna took possession of the deed and recorded it. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court stated in its findings that it found Grzegorz’s testimony about the deed to be credible and concluded that Anna had rejected the deed in 2006, and that as a result, no transmutation had been consummated between the parties at that time. The court further found that when Anna recorded the deed in 2012, Grzegorz no longer had the intent to transmute his community property interest to Anna. The trial court thus concluded that the property at issue was community property. On appeal, Anna contended the trial court erred in concluding that the residence was community property. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err in its analysis of the law regarding the transmutation of property between spouses, and that the court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence.

Legal Aid Society of San Mateo v. Dept. of Finance

Docket: C076428(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 29, 2020

Judge: Murray

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law

In 1990, as the result of a dispute involving concerns about affordable housing for clients of plaintiff Legal Aid Society of San Mateo County (LAS), plaintiff City of Redwood City (Redwood City), the former redevelopment agency (RDA) formed by Redwood City, and LAS entered into an agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, the former RDA agreed to deposit $11,917,200 in tax increment funds into the Low and Moderate Income Housing Fund (LMI Housing Fund) it maintained pursuant to the requirements of the Community Redevelopment Law (CRL) to be used as housing funds consistent with the CRL. In 2011, faced with a state fiscal emergency, the California Legislature enacted the Dissolution Law, dissolving RDAs, eliminating tax increment financing, and transferring property taxes, including unencumbered funds in Low and Moderate Income Housing Funds, back to local governments and schools. Following the enactment of the Dissolution Law, plaintiffs’ position was that the $10,272,916 then on deposit in the LMI Housing Fund specifically attributable to the 1990 agreement, constituted an encumbered housing asset and thus was not subject to remit to the county auditor-controller. However, defendant Department of Finance (DOF) concluded these funds were unencumbered and directed the funds be remitted. Plaintiffs each filed writ petitions and complaints against DOF asserting that the funds were encumbered assets under the 1990 agreement and various provisions of the Dissolution Law and the CRL. The trial court denied the petitions, concluding that the subject funds were unencumbered, were not enforceable obligations within the meaning of the Dissolution Law, and were available for distribution to the local taxing entities. Plaintiffs separately appealed and the Court of Appeal granted plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate the appeals. Together plaintiffs asserted: (1) the 1990 agreement constituted an enforceable obligation; and (2) the $10,272,916 on deposit pursuant to the agreement could not be transferred to the taxing entities because the funds “are legally restricted as to purpose” within the meaning of Health & Safety Code section 34179.5 (c)(5)(B) and “are legally or contractually dedicated or restricted for the funding of an enforceable obligation” within the meaning of section 34179.5 (c)(5)(D). After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiffs and reversed.