| Taylor v. Riojas |
| Court: US Supreme Court Docket: 19-1261 Opinion Date: November 2, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Taylor, a Texas inmate, alleges that in September 2013, correctional officers confined him in a cell covered, nearly floor to ceiling, in “ 'massive amounts’ of feces.” Taylor did not eat or drink for nearly four days. Officers then moved Taylor to another, frigidly cold cell, which was equipped with only a clogged floor drain to dispose of bodily wastes. Taylor held his bladder for over 24 hours, but eventually, involuntarily relieved himself, causing the drain to overflow and raw sewage to spill across the floor. The cell lacked a bunk and Taylor was confined without clothing; he was left to sleep naked in sewage. The Fifth Circuit held that such conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment but, concluding that “[t]he law wasn’t clearly established” that “prisoners couldn’t be housed in cells teeming with human waste” “for only six days,” the court held that the prison officials did not have “ 'fair warning’ that their specific acts were unconstitutional.” The Supreme Court vacated. The officers were not entitled to qualified immunity; no reasonable correctional officer could have concluded that, under these extreme circumstances, it was constitutionally permissible to house Taylor in such deplorably unsanitary conditions for an extended period of time. There was no evidence that the conditions of Taylor’s confinement were compelled by necessity or exigency nor that those conditions could not have been mitigated, either in degree or duration. While an officer-by-officer analysis will be necessary on remand, the record suggests that at least some officers involved in Taylor’s ordeal were deliberately indifferent to the conditions of his cells. |
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| United States v. Jurado-Nazario |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-1679 Opinion Date: October 30, 2020 Judge: Boudin Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence for two counts of production of child pornography and two counts of transportation of a minor with the intent to engage in criminal activity, holding that the sentence was substantively reasonable. Defendant pleaded guilty, and his plea agreement tentatively calculated a prison term of 210 to 262 months. The district court made its own calculations, resulting in a proposed sentence of between 324 and 405 months. The court then granted Defendant a downward variance and sentenced him to a prison term of 300 months. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion by impermissibly balancing the sentencing pros and cons. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion. |
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| United States v. Debarros Cabral |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 19-408 Opinion Date: November 2, 2020 Judge: Joseph F. Bianco Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for one count of bank fraud based on a conditional guilty plea. Defendant argued that the 11-year delay between his 2007 indictment and 2018 arrest violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The court applied the Barker factors and held that the district court did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. In this case, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the delay was attributable to defendant fleeing to Brazil in 2006 to avoid prosecution; the government exercised reasonable diligence in determining whether defendant returned to the United States despite its failure to detect his periodic travel into and out of the United States from 2012 until his arrest in 2018, and defendant has shown no prejudice from the delay. Furthermore, the district court properly balanced the Barker factors in concluding that the delay, though lengthy, did not violate the Sixth Amendment. |
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| United States v. Moseley |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-2003 Opinion Date: November 3, 2020 Judge: Susan Laura Carney Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for charges related to his operation of an illegal payday-loan scheme. The jury found that defendant violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), and federal wire fraud and identity theft statutes from 2004 through 2014. As to the RICO counts, the court rejected defendant's contention that the district court erred as a matter of law by instructing the jury that, as to his business's loans to New York borrowers, New York usury laws governed the transaction rather than the laws of the jurisdictions specified in the loan agreements, which set no interest rate caps. Rather, the court ruled that New York law applies and that the district court was correct when it so instructed the jury. As to the TILA conviction, the court rejected defendant's contention that his loan agreements disclosed the "total of payments" borrowers would make, as TILA requires, and that the evidence was insufficient to show that these disclosures were inaccurate. The court held that the evidence supported the jury's guilty verdict under TILA. The court rejected defendant's remaining contentions, finding them unpersuasive. |
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| United States v. Requena |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-1906 Opinion Date: November 4, 2020 Judge: Debra Ann Livingston Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed Defendants Requena and Raymond's conviction for one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute a controlled substance analogue. Defendants were convicted under the Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act, which provides that substances with chemical and pharmacological properties "substantially similar" to those of substances listed on schedule I or II are treated for the purposes of federal law as controlled substances. The court held that the Analogue Act's instruction to treat a substance with chemical and pharmacological properties “substantially similar” to those of a scheduled substance as a controlled substance in schedule I is not unconstitutionally vague on its face, certain Supreme Court decisions notwithstanding. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction; the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the government's expert to testify; the district court correctly instructed the jury that it need not unanimously agree on which of the six synthetic cannabinoids charged in the indictment meet the statutory definition of a controlled substance analogue; the district court made all of the factual findings necessary to calculate defendants' base offense level at sentencing; and, because defendants are entitled to no relief in connection with their drug conviction, their money laundering conviction likewise stands. |
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| United States v. Scott |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-2836 Opinion Date: November 5, 2020 Judge: Richard J. Sullivan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed Defendants Scott and Santiago's convictions for their role in the assault of an inmate at the Downstate Correctional Facility and its subsequent cover-up. Defendants were former correction officers with the New York State Department of Correction and Community Supervision. The court held that there is no set time for a conspiracy to form under 18 U.S.C. 241, for conspiracy to violate civil rights, so long as the surrounding facts and circumstances support the existence of an agreement. The court also held that a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1519 for falsifying records does not require knowledge of an impending federal investigation. Furthermore, the court found that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to this case. It is clear that the statute was not vague as applied to Scott's conduct, which involved the filing of a false injury report and the orchestration of false use-of-force reports and photographs designed to mislead prison administrators and others into believing that the inmate was the aggressor, as opposed to the victim of a brutal assault. |
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| United States v. Wasylyshyn |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-1344 Opinion Date: November 3, 2020 Judge: Susan Laura Carney Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for creating a "loud or unusual noise or a nuisance" in the courthouse, in violation of 41 C.F.R. 102-74.390(a) (the "Noise Regulation"). Defendant's conviction stemmed from her engagement in a loud argument with a court security officer in the lobby of the Binghamton courthouse. The court concluded that defendant forfeited her challenge to the conspicuous posting of the Noise Regulation by not raising the argument on appeal to the district court. The court also concluded that, under United States v. Weintraub, 273 F.3d 139, 147 (2d Cir. 2001), the Noise Regulation carries only a general intent requirement, and that the evidence supports that defendant acted with this mens rea. Finally, the court determined that the Noise Regulation is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant's conduct. |
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| Khan v. Attorney General United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 19-1427 Opinion Date: November 3, 2020 Judge: Krause Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| Khan was admitted to the U.S. as a legal permanent resident in 2000. In 2006, he pleaded guilty to possession of less than one-half ounce of marijuana. He was not then subject to removal for “a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana,” 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). In 2010, Khan was convicted for two counts of larceny in the third degree under Connecticut law, which subjected him to removal as “convict[ions] of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct,” 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). Khan sought cancellation of removal, which required that he resided in the U.S. continuously for seven years after having been admitted, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(2). The “stop-time rule” stops the accrual of continuous residence when the noncitizen “has committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) . . . that renders the alien inadmissible.” Khan argued the rule did not apply because Connecticut later decriminalized the marijuana offense. His conviction had been vacated. The IJ disagreed, reasoning that the vacatur was due to a “post-conviction event,” rather than “on the basis of a procedural or substantive defect in the underlying proceeding.” The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. The stop-time rule still applies if, post-conviction, the offense has been decriminalized and the conviction vacated; Khan did not satisfy the continuous-residence requirement for eligibility for cancellation of removal. |
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| Atkins v. Hooper |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-30018 Opinion Date: November 3, 2020 Judge: Leslie Southwick Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit withdrew its previous opinion and affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner. Petitioner contends that the state court's decision denying his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause claim was contrary to and involved an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. The court held that Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985), and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968), do not even address the Confrontation Clause issue raised by petitioner's claims. To the extent the state district court was applying either opinion, the court concluded that it was an unreasonable application to hold they controlled as to these different facts. Rather, the court concluded that Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998), was closer factually and analytically to what occurred in this case. Nonetheless, the court concluded that any error was harmless because it did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. |
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| In Re: Orlando Hall |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-10345 Opinion Date: October 30, 2020 Judge: James C. Ho Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit denied movant's request for authorization to file a third habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to challenge his yet-unserved sixty-month sentence for carrying and using a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Movant and his coconspirators were convicted of kidnapping and repeatedly raping a 16 year old high school student, taking turns beating her with a shovel, covering her with gasoline, and burying her alive. The court rejected movant's claim under Davis v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), and held that, although Davis set aside section 924(c)(3)'s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague, it left intact the elements clause of section 924(c). Furthermore, defendant's conviction for kidnapping resulting in death satisfies the elements clause of section 924(c)(3). |
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| United States v. Cartagena-Lopez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 20-40122 Opinion Date: November 2, 2020 Judge: Don R. Willett Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit joined the Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits in adopting the fugitive tolling doctrine in the context of supervised release. The court held that 18 U.S.C. 3583(i) does not foreclose the fugitive tolling doctrine, and 18 U.S.C. 3624(e) does not preempt the fugitive tolling doctrine. As the four circuits to adopt it so far recognize, the court noted that by ensuring defendants participate in their supervision, the fugitive tolling doctrine protects the statutory scheme of post-confinement monitoring that Congress established in the Sentencing Reform Act. In this case, defendant argues that because his supervised release term ended in November 2018, the district court lacked jurisdiction over violations that occurred in October 2019. The court affirmed the district court's revocation of defendant's supervised release and held that defendant's status as a fugitive tolled his period of supervision. |
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| United States v. Kendrick |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-30375 Opinion Date: November 3, 2020 Judge: Carl E. Stewart Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit treated the petition for rehearing en banc as a petition for panel rehearing, denied the petition for panel rehearing, and denied the petition for rehearing en banc. The court withdrew its prior opinion and substituted the following opinion. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress where probable cause still exists even if the allegedly false statements are excised in the Title III wiretap affidavit; district court did not err in denying defendant's request for a Franks hearing; the evidence was sufficient to support his drug conspiracy conviction where a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant conspired with others to distribute crack cocaine; and the district court did not err by applying a firearm enhancement and an Armed Career Criminal Offender enhancement to defendant's sentence. The court dismissed the Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective counsel without prejudice because defendant did not preserve this challenge for direct appeal. |
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| United States v. Pike |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 20-10168 Opinion Date: November 2, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's 151 month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in denying defendant a mitigating-role reduction where the record demonstrates that defendant understood the scope and structure of the conspiracy, exercised decision-making authority, participated in the conspiracy and performed acts to further it, and financially benefitted from the conspiracy. Though the lack of evidence regarding the degree to which defendant participated in planning or organizing the conspiracy weighs in favor of mitigation, the court has found that when some factors support the reduction, but others do not, the district court does not clearly err in denying the reduction. The court also held that defendant did not request the district court to articulate a factual basis for denying the mitigation-role reduction and thus United States v. Melton, 930 F.2d 1096, 1099 (5th Cir. 1991), is inapplicable to his case. Therefore, defendant failed to show any error, much less plain error, and remand is unnecessary. |
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| United States v. Alebbini |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-3647 Opinion Date: November 5, 2020 Judge: John K. Bush Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| FBI agents arrested Alebbini, a Jordanian national who immigrated to the U.S. in 2009 and became a permanent resident in 2014, at the Cincinnati Airport, suspecting that he was attempting to travel to Turkey and then Syria to join ISIS, a designated foreign terrorist organization. Alebbini had previously shouted a threat while being escorted away from the Turkish Embassy and, during the ensuing investigation, told FBI agents that Facebook deactivated his account because he had posted pro-ISIS videos, that he agreed with ISIS’s overall goals but not necessarily with their means, that he attempted to join the U.S. Military to fight Syrian forces, and that he was not a terrorist, but that he “would be the perfect recruit for ISIS.” An informant had recorded conversations in which he expressed pro-ISIS views. His relatives believed he was planning to travel to join ISIS. Alebbini was convicted of attempting and conspiring to provide material support and resources to ISIS, 18 U.S.C. 2339B(a)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for both of his convictions. A rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted evidence contradicting Alebbini’s assertion that he had disavowed his plan. |
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| United States v. Ruffin |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-3599 Opinion Date: November 3, 2020 Judge: Bush Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| An informant told the DEA that Ruffin planned to drive to Columbus to purchase heroin from Mexican drug traffickers. She described the SUV, provided the license plate number, and stayed in contact throughout the trip. Agents watched Ruffin and the informant enter the house. Two Hispanic men entered the house briefly. The informant messaged the agents from inside the house that Ruffin had purchased a plastic bag of heroin, and, holding a plastic bag, had gone into the bathroom, where he stayed for about 20 minutes. Agents followed Ruffin until he committed a traffic infraction, then pulled him over. A drug dog alerted on the car. Searches of the car and Ruffin’s person yielded no evidence. The agents suspected that Ruffin had concealed the drugs inside his body. An Ohio magistrate issued a warrant for a body cavity search. Police took Ruffin to the hospital where a nurse conducted a finger-search of Ruffin’s rectum, with Ruffin shackled at the legs and one agent remaining in the room. The nurse’s notes say that she felt something in the anal cavity. The nurse then inserted an instrument to visually examine the inside of Ruffin’s rectum. The nurse’s notes indicate that she saw a foreign object. The physician ordered an X-ray, saw three objects, and ordered soap suds enemas until Ruffin released three bags of heroin and fentanyl. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Ruffin’s motion to suppress the drugs. The facts created a “fair probability” that Ruffin had concealed the drugs in his body, so the magistrate did not “arbitrarily exercise” his discretion in finding probable cause. Although the search could have been handled better, the presence of a warrant, the absence of any safety risk, and the police’s need for evidence make this search reasonable. |
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| United States v. Crutchfield |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-3767 Opinion Date: November 2, 2020 Judge: Melloy Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress where police entry into the residence in response to the call for medical aid for a shooting victim was not constitutionally objectionable. In this case, given the fact of a shooting and the other information known to officers at the time, exigent circumstances made it permissible to look into other rooms to ensure the absence of a shooter or additional victims. Furthermore, the officers almost immediately saw ammunition and suspected narcotics in plain view; officers were permitted to secure the exterior of the residence for the same reasons; and, to the extent defendant takes issue with the officers looking on the adjacent property, any objects found there were abandoned. The court concluded that defendant's arguments do not merit relief where the officers were not "lingering" or "frolicking" in a manner inconsistent with a security sweep. Moreover, no information gleaned through lingering in the home, or re-entering after the ambulance departed, aided in securing the search warrant. Finally, the court held that the district court did not clearly err by finding that defendant possessed the firearms in connection with another felony under USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(b). |
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| United States v. Doran |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-3222 Opinion Date: November 2, 2020 Judge: Melloy Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that the district court did not err by applying an enhanced offense level pursuant to USSG 2K2.1(a)(2) based on prior state convictions for a crime of violence and a controlled substance offense. In this case, defendant's prior conviction for threatening to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person, in violation of California Penal Code 422(a), qualified as a crime of violence because the statute's elements necessarily include a threatened use of physical force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person. The court rejected defendant's contention that his prior California conviction for possession of marijuana for sale does not qualify as a controlled substance offense due to California's reclassification of his conviction. The court has repeatedly rejected similar arguments to the federal effects of state classification. |
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| United States v. Slater |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2800 Opinion Date: November 5, 2020 Judge: Raymond W. Gruender Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence of a firearm. The court held that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion that defendant and his companion were the assailants described in a 911 call so as to have justification to stop them in the first place. In this case, defendant and his companion were two men, they matched the generic description of the assailants, they were in close temporal and geographical proximity to the crime, their clothing partly matched the assailants' clothing, and they were walking away from the crime scene. Having concluded that reasonable suspicion existed to justify the stop, the court had no trouble concluding further that reasonable suspicion existed to justify the frisk. |
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| United States v. Stevenson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-3224 Opinion Date: November 4, 2020 Judge: James B. Loken Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for five controlled substance offenses. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for conspiring to distribute crack and heroin and distribution of heroin; defendant's Batson challenge failed because the government offered race-neutral reasons for its peremptory strike and the district court did not clearly err in finding that defendant failed to establish that the government's combination of reasons was pretextual; and there was no error in answering the jury's question for clarification of the term "on or about" and there was no abuse of the district court's substantial discretion in formulating jury instructions. |
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| Medina-Rodriguez v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 19-72681 Opinion Date: October 30, 2020 Judge: Milan Dale Smith, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's determination that petitioner was removable for having committed an aggravated felony by violating California Health & Safety Code 11359. The panel held that petitioner's violation of section 11359 constitutes an aggravated felony for purposes of the INA, as decided by Roman-Suaste v. Holder, 766 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2014). The panel joined the Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits in deciding that, when conducting a categorical analysis for removability based upon a state criminal conviction, it is proper to compare drug schedules at the time of the petitioner's underlying criminal offense, not at the time of the petitioner's removal. Because the California and federal definitions of marijuana were identical at the time of petitioner's guilty plea, the panel concluded that his conviction was a categorical match with the generic federal offense. Therefore, petitioner is removable. The panel also affirmed the BIA's decision to deny petitioner's claim for deferral of removal under the CAT. |
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| United States v. Bacon |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-50120 Opinion Date: November 5, 2020 Judge: Sidney Runyan Thomas Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit voted to rehear this case en banc to consider what the proper remedy is on appeal when it concludes that a district court has erred under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), by admitting or excluding expert testimony on one ground, but when it cannot tell from the record whether the admission or exclusion was nevertheless correct on other grounds. Recognizing that there are different circumstances involved in every case, the en banc court concluded that a bright-line rule requiring a specific remedy is inappropriate. Instead, each panel should fashion a remedy "as may be just under the circumstances." 28 U.S.C. 2106. The en banc court explained that the remedy may include remanding for a new trial or remanding for the district court to first determine admissibility, then requiring a new trial only if that admissibility determination differs from that in the first trial. In this case, the en banc court remanded to the three-judgment panel so that the panel may, in its discretion, determine the appropriate remedy. |
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| United States v. Dutch |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-2196 Opinion Date: November 5, 2020 Judge: Timothy M. Tymkovich Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Marc Dutch pleaded guilty in 2016 to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. In its presentence report, probation recommended that Dutch could be subject to a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA). At the sentencing hearing, the district court concluded the ACCA should not govern Dutch’s sentencing because the government had not met its burden of proving Dutch’s predicate crimes occurred on separate occasions. The federal government appealed the sentencing decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and, in an unpublished opinion, a panel concluded the ACCA applied because the government had proved by a preponderance of evidence that Dutch’s prior crimes “occurred on different dates and at different locations.” Prior to remand, Dutch pursued en banc review, raising much the same arguments, and then petitioned for relief before the United States Supreme Court. Both requests were denied. At resentencing, despite this history, the district court at defendant’s urging revisited the ACCA determination and concluded, once again, that it did not apply. The district court concluded the charging document and plea agreement the government offered to show Dutch committed his crimes on different occasions were inadequate to determine whether Dutch had actually committed the crimes on different occasions or simply committed one act of aiding and abetting. The court sentenced Dutch to a 60-month term of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. This appeal addressed the federal government’s challenge to the district court’s resentencing. The government insisted the district court violated the Tenth Circuit's directions for resentencing on remand by deciding, once again, that the ACCA did not apply to Dutch despite the Court's differing conclusion in "Dutch I." To this, the Tenth Circuit agreed: the district court disregarded the Tenth Circuit's clear mandate from Dutch I that the ACCA governed Dutch’s sentencing. The matter was reversed and remanded for resentencing. |
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| United States v. Lawless |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 20-1173 Opinion Date: November 2, 2020 Judge: Stephanie Kulp Seymour Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2011, defendant-appellant David Lawless detonated or attempted to detonate five homemade bombs in three separate public places. He subsequently pled guilty to one count of using a destructive device to commit a crime of violence and was sentenced to 20 years in prison pursuant to his plea agreement. In 2016, Lawless filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that in light of Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), arson no longer qualified as a section 924(c) crime of violence. The district court denied the motion on March 1, 2017, and he appealed. The Supreme Court invalidated section 924(c) for vagueness, and the Tenth Circuit held that arson was not a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A) in United States v. Salas, 889 F.3d 681 (10th Cir. 2018). The Tenth Circuit granted the parties’ joint motion to vacate Lawless’s 924(c) conviction, to direct entry of a judgment of conviction for arson under 18 U.S.C. 844(i), and to remand to the district court for resentencing. The district court held a hearing and sentenced Lawless to 144 months in prison on the one count of arson, varying upward from the advisory guideline sentence of 60 months. Lawless again appealed his sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable, but finding no abuse of discretion in the sentence, the Tenth Circuit affirmed it. |
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| Teasley v. Warden, Macon State Prison |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-12224 Opinion Date: November 3, 2020 Judge: Brasher Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief to petitioner. Petitioner argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a certain juror's presence on the trial jury. Because the Warden concedes that counsel performed deficiently, the only issue is prejudice. The court held that the state habeas court's ruling that petitioner did not prove that the juror was actually biased against him was not based on an unreasonable determination of fact under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). In this case, the court cannot say for certain what the juror meant when he raised his hand in response to a question during voir dire regarding a murder prosecution involving a shooting, and, for that reason, the court cannot say the state court's finding was unreasonable. The court also held that the state court did not unreasonably apply Strickland v. Washington when it held that petitioner failed to establish a reasonable probability that his appeal would have been decided differently had appellate counsel raised the presence of the juror. Finally, the court held that Georgia's juror non-impeachment statute is not an alternative basis for relief. |
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| State v. Poyson |
| Court: Arizona Supreme Court Docket: CR-98-0510-AP Opinion Date: November 2, 2020 Judge: Bolick Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentences of death, holding that the mitigation evidence was not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Defendant was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder. During sentencing, the trial court found three aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt and only one mitigating factor. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. On review, the Supreme Court found additional mitigating factors but nonetheless upheld Defendant's sentence. Defendant later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the federal district court denied. The Ninth Circuit reversed and granted relief, concluding that habeas relief was warranted because the Supreme Court erred in its independent review of the death sentences when considering Defendant's mitigation evidence. The Supreme Court granted the State's motion to conduct a new independent review and affirmed, holding that the mitigating evidence was not sufficient to warrant leniency in light of the three aggravators proven by the State. |
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| State v. Smith |
| Court: Arizona Supreme Court Docket: CR-18-0295-AP Opinion Date: November 4, 2020 Judge: Gould Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences for first-degree murder and child abuse, holding that no prejudicial error occurred during the trial proceedings. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress; (2) the trial court did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by admitting a pretrial identification of Defendant; (3) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's Batson challenges to the State's peremptory strikes of two jurors; (4) the trial court did not err by admitting a video demonstrating the location and movement of Defendant's and the victim's cellphones on the day of the murder; (5) the trial court did not err by restricting Defendant's cross-examination of the State's former case agent; (6) the trial court did not commit fundamental error by failing to reinstruct the jury at the close of the aggravation stage; (7) substantial evidence supported the jury's finding that Defendant killed the victim for pecuniary gain; (8) the jury was properly instructed; (9) the State did not engage in prosecutorial error; and (10) the jury did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to death. |
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| Jones v. Professional Background Screening Ass'n |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 362 Opinion Date: November 5, 2020 Judge: Hudson Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Labor & Employment Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Professional Background Screening Association, Inc. (PBSA) on PBSA's claim pursuant to the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and partial summary judgment to Jennifer Jones, the Clerk of the District Court of Benton County, Arkansas, Bentonville Division, holding that the circuit court did not err. PBSA, a nonprofit trade association, filed a complaint against Jones alleging that Jones erred in applying Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order Number 19 to PBSA members who request court records to perform background checks in a manner that violated their right to access court records and, instead, PBSA members' requests for court records are governed by the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor of PBSA on its FOIA claim and granted Jones's motion for summary judgment on PBSA's claims alleging that Order 19, as applied by Jones, violated PBSA members' right to access court records under the First Amendment and/or federal common law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err. |
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| California v. Kruse |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D077038(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: October 30, 2020 Judge: Patricia D. Benke Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A jury convicted Cody Kruse of: making a criminal threat (count 1); attempting to deter or prevent an executive officer from lawful performance of his duties by means of violence or threat of violence (count 2); and possession of a controlled substance (count 3). The trial court sentenced Kruse to three years and eight months in state prison. Kruse contended on appeal the trial court prejudicially erred by: (1) allowing the prosecutor to question him on cross-examination about being investigated for killing his former girlfriend’s baby; and (2) refusing to instruct the jury on Penal Code section 148(a)(1) (willfully resisting, delaying or obstructing a public officer) as a lesser included offense of Penal Code section 69 (attempting to deter an executive officer from performing any duty by means of threat or violence). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed Kruse's convictions and sentence. |
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| California v. Lamoureux |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D077361(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 5, 2020 Judge: Judith McConnell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Patty Ann Lamoureux was convicted by jury for felony murder. The trial court vacated the conviction and resentenced her under Penal Code section 1170.95, the resentencing provision of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.). Lamoureux was released from custody for time served and, although she had excess custody credits, the trial court exercised its discretion to place her on parole supervision for the statutory maximum of three years. On appeal, Lamoureux contended the trial court erred in declining to apply her excess custody credits to offset her three-year parole supervision period. Additionally, she claimed: the court failed to articulate a rational method of computation when it imposed a $560 restitution fine; erred by not applying her excess custody credits to offset her restitution fine; and miscalculated her presentence custody credits. With respect to the offset, the Court of Appeal determined the trial court did not err in declining to reduce Lamoureux's parole supervision period by her excess custody credits. As to Lamoureux's remaining arguments, the Court of Appeal concluded she forfeited the challenge to restitution by failing to object at trial court. The issue of her entitlement to additional presentence custody credits was moot, but those excess custody credits had to be applied to offset the restitution fine in its entirety. |
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| California v. Stockman |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E073190(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 2, 2020 Judge: Raphael Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The issue this appeal presented for the Court of Appeal's review related to the model jury instructions for driving under the influence (DUI) causing injury (Veh. Code, sec. 23153 (a)), and its lesser included offense of DUI (sec. 23152 (a)). Defendant-appellant Christopher Stockman contended the model instructions differed in a manner that affected his jury verdict. The instruction on the lesser offense of DUI, CALCRIM No. 2110, directed the jury that the “manner in which a person drives is not enough by itself to establish” that the person was “under the influence,” though it may be considered along with other factors. The instruction for DUI causing injury, CALCRIM No. 2100, contained no such direction. Stockman unsuccessfully sought a modified version of CALCRIM No. 2100 that would harmonize the two instructions. The Court of Appeal agreed with Stockman that there was no basis to provide differing instructions for determining whether a person was “under the influence” as to these two offenses. The Court published its opinion to encourage trial courts not to provide differing instructions for the two offenses, and it likewise encouraged the Judicial Council of California to consider reconciling the two instructions by amending either CALCRIM No. 2100 or CALCRIM No. 2110 to eliminate this disparity. To this case, however, the Court concluded that the “manner of driving” instruction implicated principles of law that had no bearing on this case. Thus, any error was harmless. Judgment was affirmed. |
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| California v. Winkler |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: C077992(Third Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 2, 2020 Judge: Murray Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Todd Winkler killed his third wife (the victim) by stabbing her in the neck, severing her jugular vein. She had been having an extramarital affair and was planning to divorce defendant. Defendant did not deny killing her, but claimed he did so in self-defense. A jury found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree and found true the enhancement allegation that defendant personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of the murder. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 26 years to life. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the 1999 death of defendant’s second wife under Evidence Code section 1101(b). The Georgia authorities where the incident took place determined the death was accidental. Before allowing the jury to hear this evidence, the trial court had a gatekeeping duty under Evidence Code section 403 (a) to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to establish a homicidal act by a preponderance of the evidence. In doing so, the trial court relied on evidence related to the charged offense as proof of the earlier homicidal act. Furthermore, the Court concluded that any probative value the uncharged act evidence had was substantially outweighed by the Evidence Code section 352 concerns of undue consumption of time and undue prejudice. However, given the strength of the admissible evidence, the Court of Appeal concluded the error was harmless. As to his asserted error regarding evidence related to the victim’s fear of him, the Court concluded defendant forfeited several of these contentions. And contrary to defendant’s assertion, he was not denied the constitutionally effective assistance of counsel for his attorney’s failure to object to the evidence. The Court also rejected defendant’s cumulative error argument. And there was substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support his conviction of murder in the first degree. The abstract of judgment had to be corrected to reflect that the indeterminate sentence imposed was 25 years to life, and delete reference to the term of life without the possibility of parole. |
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| People v. Armando Garcia |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B300163(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 4, 2020 Judge: Kenneth R. Yegan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In determining whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief under Penal Code section 1170.95, the courts should not ignore the evidence in the record of conviction that shows the petitioner is ineligible for relief. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of the petition to vacate appellant's second degree murder conviction under section 1170.95. The court held that the trial court properly considered the statement of facts in its 2001 opinion; the absence of a jury instruction on murder based on a theory of direct aiding and abetting does not mean that appellant could not presently be convicted of murder under this theory; and appellant failed to make a prima face showing that he could not be convicted of second degree murder. The court explained that where, as here, the record of conviction contains substantial evidence based on which a reasonable trier of fact could presently find petitioner guilty of murder despite the changes made by S.B. 1437, it would be a waste of judicial resources to require a full-blown evidentiary hearing at which the court may rely on the record of conviction. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing. |
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| People v. Braud |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A158186(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: October 30, 2020 Judge: Burns Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Braud was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm. Braud’s sentence was deemed served and he was immediately released on post-release supervision. His three-year period of supervision was originally scheduled to end in January 2019. Braud’s supervision required that he “not engage in conduct prohibited by law.” Braud’s supervision was revoked and reinstated three times for violations he admitted. As a result of the first two violations, the termination date of Braud’s supervision was ultimately extended to October 2020. In July 2019, the San Francisco Probation Department filed the third petition to revoke Braud’s supervision, alleging a new arrest. The trial court summarily revoked Braud’s supervision. At the formal revocation hearing, Braud admitted the violation but reserved his rights to challenge the new termination date of July 2021. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument the trial court lacked authority to extend the termination date beyond three years from his release date under section 3455(e), which imposes a three-year limit on supervision with exceptions. The court stated that it cannot presume that the trial court misunderstood or abused its discretion when it ordered the termination of Braud’s supervision extended for periods of time during which his supervision was revoked. |
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| People v. Lopez |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: H047254(Sixth Appellate District) Opinion Date: October 30, 2020 Judge: Elia Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2014, Lopez was convicted of second-degree murder under a natural and probable consequences theory, Later, Senate Bill 1437 amended the natural and probable consequences doctrine as related to murder and enacted Penal Code section 1170.951, which permits a person convicted of murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to petition to have his murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts if he “could not be convicted of first or second-degree murder” following the enactment of Senate Bill 1437. Lopez filed a section 1170.95 petition. The prosecutor conceded that Lopez had made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief but opposed his petition on the ground that he could be convicted of second-degree murder under a still-valid theory— implied malice. The prosecutor bore the burden “to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.” The court denied the petition, concluding that Lopez could still be convicted on an implied malice theory. The court of appeal affirmed. The trial court properly applied the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard and its ruling is supported by substantial evidence. Section 1170.95 does not implicate Lopez’s federal constitutional rights to have essential facts found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. |
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| People v. Nunez |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B299065(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: November 3, 2020 Judge: Elwood G.H. Lui Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeal affirmed the summary denial of a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. The panel held that, in order to make the initial prima facie showing under subdivision (c) of section 1170.95 that the petitioner falls within the provisions of the statute, the petition must include the factual basis for the legal conclusion that "[t]he petitioner could not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189." The court resolved the remaining issues in accordance with Division One decisions, holding that the superior court may summarily deny a section 1170.95 petition at the initial prima facie review on the ground that a defendant convicted of murder with a felony-murder special circumstance finding is not, as a matter of law, eligible for resentencing under section 1170.95. The court agreed with the holdings in the Division One decisions that a section 1170.95 petition is not a vehicle for challenging, under the state Supreme Court's decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, a murder conviction by attacking the jury's prior factual finding that the defendant was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. |
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| People v. Reyes |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A158095(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: October 30, 2020 Judge: Streeter Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics |
| Reyes, a deputy public defender who began practicing law less than three years ago, was charged with witness tampering under Penal Code section 136.1(b)(1), which proscribes an attempt to dissuade any victim of or witness to a crime from reporting “that victimization” to law enforcement, and under section 137(b), which proscribes the attempted inducement of any person “by the use of fraud” to “withhold” “true material information pertaining to a crime” from law enforcement. The superior court granted Reyes’s motion to set aside the information. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the section 136.1(b)(1) count. Neither the statutory text, the structure of the statute, nor the legislative history addresses whether, to constitute "dissuasion," the suppressed report of “victimization” must be of a past, completed crime or may be either a past crime or an ongoing course of criminal conduct expected to continue into the future; the court resolved the ambiguity in Reyes’s favor under the rule of lenity. The court reversed the dismissal of the 137(b) count. The statute has no language requiring, even arguably, that the withholding of testimony or information to which it is directed must involve a past crime. All it requires is that the attempt to induce the withholding must be made “by the use of fraud,” which was indisputably alleged. |
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| People v. Roldan |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B298570(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: October 30, 2020 Judge: Victoria Gerrard Chaney Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court's denial of defendant's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 and request for the appointment of counsel. Defendant was convicted of second degree murder under an implied malice theory for killing a person while driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). The court held that defendant was convicted under a theory of actual implied malice, not malice imputed under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and thus failed to meet the threshold requirement of showing he was convicted under a natural and probable consequences theory. Therefore, defendant failed to demonstrate eligibility under the statute. Furthermore, defendant's arguments contesting that failure have all been fairly presented by his appellate counsel, and an appellate record preserved. |
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| Sierra v. Delaware |
| Court: Delaware Supreme Court Docket: 21, 2020 Opinion Date: November 4, 2020 Judge: Vaughn Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Luis Sierra was convicted on two counts of Murder in the First Degree, three counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Robbery in the First Degree, and Conspiracy in the Second Degree. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. His motion for postconviction relief was denied by the Superior Court. On appeal, Sierra claimed the Superior Court erred in rejecting his contention that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because his counsel: (1) failed to call available fact and expert witnesses; (2) failed to object to prejudicial testimony offered by the State; and (3) failed to object to prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. He also claimed the Superior Court’s denial of his motion was inconsistent with Fowler v. Delaware, 194 A.3d 16 (Del. 2018). Finding no reversible error in the Superior Court's judgment, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Georgia v. Copeland et al. |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Dockets: S20A0820, S20A0821, S20A0822 Opinion Date: November 2, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Professional Malpractice & Ethics |
| Former sheriff's deputies Henry Lee Copeland, Rhett Scott, and Michael Howell were indicted by grand jury for the felony murder (and other offenses) of Eurie Lee Martin. Each defendant sought immunity from prosecution under OCGA 16-3-24.2, claiming that his actions resulting in Martin’s death were in defense of himself or others. Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order granting immunity to Deputies Copeland, Scott, and Howell, and the State appealed. The Georgia Supreme Court determined that, in granting immunity, the trial court made findings of material fact that were inconsistent with its legal conclusions regarding the deputies’ encounter with Martin, conflated principles regarding the reasonable use of force by law enforcement with self-defense and immunity, made unclear findings of material fact with respect to whether any or all of the deputies used force intended or likely to cause death, and did not address the facts pertinent to each of the three deputies individually. For these reasons, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s ruling and remanded the cases for further consideration. |
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| Williams v. Hollinshead |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Docket: 48053 Opinion Date: November 2, 2020 Judge: Brody Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Health Law |
| A group of prisoners (“Petitioners”) sought a writ of habeas corpus based on the conditions of their confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Petitioners were all incarcerated at the Elmore County Jail (“Jail”), contending the conditions of confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. More specifically, the Petitioners claimed they were in imminent danger because officials at the Jail did not implement any discernable mitigation measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Elmore County Sheriff Mike Hollinshead and Lieutenant Shauna Gavin (collectively “Officials”) denied this assertion, contending that Petitioners’ request for a writ of habeas corpus should have been denied because the Petitioners did not exhaust their administrative remedies. The Officials filed a motion for summary judgment with the district court, which was granted. The district court also awarded the Officials their attorney fees. Petitioners timely appealed the district court’s decisions to the Idaho Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the appeal on an expedited basis. After that review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment, but reversed the district court’s award of attorney fees. |
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| Idaho v. Doe |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 47158 Opinion Date: November 2, 2020 Judge: Brody Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| John Doe was a minor at the time the State alleged he committed two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct against a minor under the age of sixteen. Doe maintained his innocence, but argued that even if he did commit the acts alleged, the petition was time-barred under the four-year, catch-all limitation for civil actions found in Idaho Code section 5-224. The magistrate court (“juvenile court”) denied Doe's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely, and thereafter granted the State’s motion to waive Doe into adult proceedings. On intermediate appeal, the district court affirmed the decision of the juvenile court. The issue presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review was whether proceedings under the Juvenile Corrections Act ("JCA") were "civil actions" subject to a civil statute of limitations. The Court concluded they were not, and affirmed the juvenile court, finding at JCA petition was not subject to the limitation in Idaho Code 5-224. |
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| Commonwealth v. Crowe |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2019-SC-0231-DG Opinion Date: October 29, 2020 Judge: Michelle M. Keller Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the ruling of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to classify him as a domestic violence victim pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401(5), holding that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy Defendant's burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was a victim of domestic violence. Defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree for the death of his wife. Defendant moved the trial court to classify him as a domestic violence victim, which would reduce his parole eligibility from eighty-five percent of his sentence to twenty percent of his sentence. The trial court denied the motion, but the court of appeals reversed, concluding that Defendant successfully connected the physical and verbal domestic violence he experienced to the crime he committed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant proved that he was a victim of domestic violence in regard to the manslaughter of his wife. |
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| Commonwealth v. Mitchell |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2019-SC-0087-DG Opinion Date: October 29, 2020 Judge: Michelle M. Keller Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals reversing Defendant's conviction for being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun on the grounds that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the Commonwealth's reasonable suspicion argument was precluded. In his motion to suppress, Defendant argued that the traffic stop in the case was impermissibly prolonged beyond its original purpose and violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion without addressing whether the officers had independent reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) the officers deferred completion of the stop beyond its original purpose for a purpose totally unrelated to the original stop; and (2) the Commonwealth was precluded from arguing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity as a justification for the extension. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals (1) correctly held that Defendant's stop was impermissibly extended; but (2) erred in concluding that the Commonwealth's reasonable suspicion argument was precluded. The Court remanded the case to the trial court for additional factual findings and conclusions of law as to the officers' reasonable suspicion. |
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| Hodge v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2019-SC-0137-TG Opinion Date: October 29, 2020 Judge: Vanmeter Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court denying Defendant's motion for DNA testing with respect to hair found at the residence of the victims whom Defendant was convicted of murdering, burglarizing, and robbing, holding that the trial court did not err. Defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. This appeal concerned Defendant's motion seeking DNA testing of hair that was found in the victims' home. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed after noting that Defendant's DNA arguments have been raised and rejected by both the Supreme Court and the federal courts, holding that no reasonable probability existed that the DNA testing and analysis would produce exculpatory evidence. |
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| Lee v. Kentucky Department of Corrections |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2018-SC-0403-DG Opinion Date: October 29, 2020 Judge: Hughes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's denial of Appellant's petition to declare his violent offender classification unconstitutional, holding that a defendant convicted of robbery in the first degree qualifies as a violent offender pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. 439.3401(1) regardless of whether the victim suffered serious physical injury or death and regardless of whether the trial court's judgment addresses the victim's status. Appellant was convicted of twelve counts of first-degree robbery and was classified as a violent offender. The circuit court did not state in its judgment that any of Appellant's victims suffered serious physical injury or death. Appellant filed a petition seeking to declare her violent offender classification unconstitutional. The lower courts denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Benet v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 528 (Ky. 2008) correctly interprets the requirements of section 439.3401(1) for violent offender status; and (2) the portion of Pate v. Department of Corrections, 466 S.W.3d 480 (Ky. 2015), that is inconsistent with Benet is overruled. |
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| Ray v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2019-SC-0164-MR Opinion Date: October 29, 2020 Judge: Lambert Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sixty-five-year sentence for attempted murder, first-degree robbery, and other crimes, holding that the trial court did to err by denying two of Defendant's directed verdict motions and that there was no error in Defendant's sentencing phase. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied his directed verdict motions for first-degree robbery and first-degree wanton endangerment and that his sentencing phase was unfairly tainted by incorrect information regarding parole eligibility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court overrules precedent requiring defendants to comply with the "second rule" of preservation; (2) in order to preserve an alleged directed verdict issue for appeal, criminal defendants must move for a directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth's evidence and renew the directed verdict motion at the close of all evidence; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's motions for directed verdict; (4) even though testimony by the Commonwealth's sole witness in the sentencing phase regarding first-degree wanton endangerment was clearly false, the error was not palpable; and (5) the Commonwealth's misstatement of parole eligibility during its closing argument did not constitute manifest injustice resulting in palpable error. |
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| Rhoton v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Docket: 2019-SC-0298-DG Opinion Date: October 29, 2020 Judge: Michelle M. Keller Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's drug-related convictions, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress. After he was arrested and indicted, Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized during a traffic stop, arguing that the law enforcement officer impermissibly prolonged the stop to facilitate a dog sniff search. The trial court denied the request. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the actions taken to facilitate the arrest of Defendant's passenger did not impermissibly extend his traffic stop, and therefore, the trial court correctly denied Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the subsequent use of the narcotics dog. |
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| Taylor v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Kentucky Supreme Court Dockets: 2019-SC-0066-MR, 2019-SC-0138-TG Opinion Date: October 29, 2020 Judge: Vanmeter Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of wanton murder and four counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a directed verdict. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erroneously denied his motions for a directed verdict on the wanton murder and wanton endangerment charges because the evidence was insufficient to establish "aggravated wantonness" and to prove that his conduct caused the victim's death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commonwealth met its burden of persuasion, and therefore, the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the charges. |
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| Burr v. Department of Corrections |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 130 Opinion Date: November 5, 2020 Judge: Horton Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In this action brought by Plaintiff, an inmate, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portions of the superior court's judgment denying injunctive relief, restoring good-time credit for the period of Plaintiff's nondisciplinary segregation, and entering judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C.S. 1983 claim, holding that restoration of Plaintiff's "good time" was not an available remedy through judicial review of the Department's disciplinary action against Plaintiff and that the Maine Constitution's mandate regarding separation of powers does not preclude an award of injunctive relief on a section 1983 claim against the Department of Corrections. Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking judicial review of a disciplinary decision of the Department and injunction for violations of his civil rights. The superior court vacated the disciplinary decision but concluded that it was prohibited from entering injunctive relief on the section 1983 claim. The court then restored good-time credit for the period of nondisciplinary segregation as a remedy for Plaintiff's Rule 80C claim and entered judgment for Defendants on the section 1983 claim. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment in part and remanded for the court to determine whether injunctive relief should be awarded, enter judgment in Plaintiff's favor on his section 1983 claim and ordered the restoration of good-time credit for the period of Plaintiff's nondisciplinary segregation as a remedy for the constitutional violations alleged in his section 1983 claim. |
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| State v. Weyland |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 129 Opinion Date: November 3, 2020 Judge: Horton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder, entered by the trial court following Defendant's guilty plea, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea and did not abuse its discretion or misapply sentencing principles in sentencing Defendant. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) contrary to Defendant's asserting on appeal, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Defendant understood the nature of the offense charged and voluntarily entered the plea, and therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea; and (2) the trial court did not misapply sentencing principles in determining the basic period of incarceration. |
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| State v. Williams |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 128 Opinion Date: November 3, 2020 Judge: Humphrey Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of intentional or knowing murder of a deputy sheriff, holding that there was no error, clear or otherwise, in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the State to introduce in-court demonstrations of the possible circumstances of the shooting and in allowing the demonstration to be presented to the jury over Defendant's Rule 403 objection; (2) the trial court did not err in partially denying Defendant's motion to suppress statements he made to detectives after his arrest; and (3) there was no error in the court's sentencing proceedings, and the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence of life imprisonment. |
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| Commonwealth v. Wilkerson |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12124 Opinion Date: November 4, 2020 Judge: Gaziano Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate premeditation and an attempt to suborn perjury and declined to exercise its extraordinary authority under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33 E to order a new trial or to reduce the degree of guilt, holding that no prejudicial error occurred in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress cell site location data and admitting that data at trial; (3) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing into evidence out-of-court statements by Defendant's alleged coventurer and in excluding other evidence concerning that coventurer; (4) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by allowing the charges against Defendant to be joined for trial; (5) the trial judge did not commit prejudicial error by not giving "missing witness" and Bowden instructions; and (6) improprieties in the prosecutor's closing argument did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. In addition, the Supreme Judicial Court discerned no reason to order a new trial or to reduce the degree of guilt under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. |
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| Eason v. State |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A19-1664 Opinion Date: October 28, 2020 Judge: Chutich Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's request for counsel and his pro se petition for post conviction relief, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Appellant was found guilty of first-degree intentional felony murder. Appellant later filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief and requested appointment of counsel, alleging error in the jury instructions, abuse of prosecutorial discretion, and ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's postconviction claim that the judge who presided over his trial committed reversible error by not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree unintentional felony murder; (2) the district court did not err in rejecting Appellant's claim of abuse of prosecutorial discretion; and (3) Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed under the first Strickland prong. |
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| Scott v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2019-KA-00928-SCT Opinion Date: November 5, 2020 Judge: Ishee Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Using a cell-phone app that simulated a flashing police light, Louis Scott impersonated an undercover police officer and pulled over a young woman late at night. Scott approached the woman’s vehicle and threatened her with a knife through the car window, but the woman escaped by driving away suddenly. Based on this, Scott was convicted of attempted kidnapping. Evidence admitted at trial revealed Scott had kidnapped and raped another young woman later the same evening. On appeal, Scott contended the evidence of the second attack was substantially more prejudicial than probative under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined that argument was without merit: Scott’s kidnapping and rape of the second victim was highly probative of his intent with regard to the attempted kidnapping charge. Scott also contended for the first time on appeal, that his indictment was defective because it failed to specifically allege Scott failed in the kidnapping attempt. The Court held in the past that such allegation was not required. Therefore, the Court affirmed Scott’s conviction and sentence. |
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| State ex rel. Becker v. Honorable Gael D. Wood |
| Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Docket: SC98416 Opinion Date: November 3, 2020 Judge: Zel M. Fischer Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court made permanent its preliminary writ of prohibition prohibiting the circuit court from enforcing an order requiring Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney Matthew Becker and an associate prosecuting attorney, Matthew Houston, to appear and provide sworn testimony under oath at a pretrial motion hearing, holding that this case did not merit a presumption of vindictiveness. Defendant was indicted on two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of armed criminal action. After the State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty Defendant filed a motion to strike, alleging prosecutorial vindictiveness. The circuit court entered an order requiring Becker and Houston to appear and provide sworn testimony regarding Defendant's motion to strike. Becker filed a petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent the circuit court from ordering him and Houston to provide sworn testimony. The Supreme Court issued a preliminary writ of prohibition. The Court then made permanent its writ of prohibition, holding (1) Defendant failed to allege sufficient facts to support a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness; and (2) the circuit court's order would cause irreparable harm by requiring Becker and Houston to divulge privileged work product. |
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| State v. Fjelsted |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 278 Opinion Date: November 4, 2020 Judge: Laurie McKinnon Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court revoking Defendant's deferred sentence for criminal endangerment, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Defendant's deferred sentence after he failed to report to his probation officer for five months. Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal endangerment. The district court sentenced Defendant to five years' incarceration, with all time suspended, and imposed standard conditions of probation. The State later filed a petition to revoke Defendant's sentence, alleging that Defendant violated four conditions of his suspended sentence. The district court found that Defendant committed the violations alleged in the State's petition to revoke and imposed a five-year commitment with two years suspended. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Defendant's deferred sentence. |
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| State v. Howard |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 279 Opinion Date: November 4, 2020 Judge: James A. Rice Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the revocation of his suspended sentence by the district court, holding that the district court's sentence revocation was supported by sufficient evidence that Defendant had violated the conditions of supervision by engaging in a new criminal offense. Defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault and endangering the welfare of a child. After completing the unsuspended portion of his sentence Defendant was released to serve the suspended portion of his sentence. Later, the county attorney filed a petition for revocation of Defendant's suspended sentence, alleging that Defendant had violated a condition of probation. The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant had committed non-compliance violations of the probationary conditions of his sentence. The court then revoked Defendant's sentence and resentenced him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by determining that Defendant violated a sentencing condition by committing sexual abuse of children. |
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| State v. Andera |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 307 Neb. 686 Opinion Date: October 30, 2020 Judge: William B. Cassel Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's drug possession conviction, holding that the district court did not err in overruling Defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for not having license plates. During the traffic stop, the officer obtained the driver's consent to search the vehicle. The officers found methamphetamine in a purse located on the front passenger floorboard. The purse belonged to Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the search violated her Fourth Amendment protections against unlawful searches and seizures because she did not consent to the search of her purse. The district court overruled the motion. After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the search was constitutional because the officer reasonably believed that the driver could have owned the purse and the officer found the contraband in plain view upon opening the wallet that contained Defendant's identification. |
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| Moore v. State |
| Court: Supreme Court of Nevada Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 71 Opinion Date: October 29, 2020 Judge: Mark Gibbons Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of lewdness with a child under the age of sixteen, holding that a mistaken belief as to the victim's age is not a defense to the crime of lewdness with a child under the age of sixteen. Defendant was convicted of two counts of lewdness with a child under the age of sixteen. On appeal, Defendant argued that he had a reasonable, good-faith belief that the victim was eighteen years old and that the district court erred in preventing him from asserting a mistake-of-fact defense as to the victim's age. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in instructing the jury regarding this crime, holding that a mistaken belief as to a child's age is not a defense to the crime of lewdness with a child under the age of sixteen. |
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| State ex rel. Burfitt v. Sehlmeyer |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-5147 Opinion Date: November 5, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought by Relator, an inmate at the Toledo Correction Institution, ordering the production of shift rosters that show the duty assignments of correctional officers within the prison, holding that the shift rosters are security records exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act. Respondent, the public-records custodian at TCI, withheld the requested records from Relator on the basis that they were "security records" exempt from public-records disclosure under Ohio Rev. Code 149.433(A) and (B). Relator then filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering Respondent to produce the requested records. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the shift rosters are security records exempt from public records disclosure under section 149.433(A) and (B). |
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| State ex rel. Ware v. DeWine |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-5148 Opinion Date: November 5, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Communications Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's request for a writ of mandamus against Governor Mike DeWine, holding that Appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence a clear legal right to the requested relief and a clear legal duty on the part of the Governor to provide it. Appellant, an inmate, sent a public-records request to the Governor requesting certain documents. Appellant later filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the production of the documents. The court of appeals denied the writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where the evidence showed that the Govenor's office satisfied its duty to make the records available by sending them to the correctional institution at which Appellant was an inmate, Appellant was not entitled to his requested relief. |
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| Pennsylvania v. Jones Jr. |
| Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Docket: 24 WAP 2019 Opinion Date: October 30, 2020 Judge: Mundy Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Rod Jones, Jr. was charged with rape and various sexual offenses following allegations by his stepdaughter (“the victim”) of repeated sexual abuse over a period of several years. According to the victim, the first instance of abuse occurred when she was thirteen year sold. The victim did not tell anyone about these incidents for many years. because Appellant told her no one would believe her. The victim also feared what Appellant would say about her to her mother. When the victim was seventeen years old, she eventually told her mother about the abuse. Throughout the trial, defense counsel focused on discrepancies in the victim’s recounting of events in an attempt to undermine her credibility. At one point, the Commonwealth called as a witness Detective Scott Holzwarth, who interviewed the victim during the course of the investigation. The jury ultimately found Appellant guilty of rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a person under sixteen years of age, unlawful contact with a minor, aggravated indecent assault, sexual assault, statutory sexual assault, endangering the welfare of a child, corruption of minors, and indecent assault of a person under sixteen years of age. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of twenty-seven to sixty years’ imprisonment. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Appellant argued, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Detective Holzwarth to testify that child sexual assault victims were often unable to recall specific details and dates of sexual assaults. The Supreme Court found that expert testimony on the issue of a witness’s credibility was impermissible, as it encroached on the province of the jury to make such determinations. "While some testimony on this topic may be prohibited for impermissibly invading the jury's province of determining credibility, we disagree that all testimony will." The Court held that whether Detective Holzwarth's testimony complied with admissibility considerations was a question for the trial court upon remand. The superior court's judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. |
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| State v. Maxie |
| Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court Docket: 19-112 Opinion Date: November 2, 2020 Judge: Paul A. Suttell Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, holding that the motion for a new trial was untimely filed. Defendant was found guilty of sex trafficking of a minor and conspiring to do so and three counts of first-degree sexual assault. The Supreme Court vacated the convictions for sex trafficking of a minor and conspiring to do so and otherwise affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a second motion for a new trial, arguing that the vacatur of his convictions on counts four and six constituted newly available evidence, allowing him to file this motion. The trial justice denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the motion for a new trial was filed outside of the ten-day time limit set forth in Rule 33, which cannot be waived. |
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| State v. Ostby |
| Court: South Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 S.D. 61 Opinion Date: November 4, 2020 Judge: Jensen Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the orders of the circuit court sustaining Defendants' motions to suppress evidence seized by law enforcement, pursuant to a search warrant, at the apartment where Defendants resided, holding that probable cause existed for the issuance of the search warrant. Defendants - Carrie Lynn Ostby and Dana Olmsted - were indicted on drug-related charges. The circuit court granted Defendants' motions to suppress, determining that probable cause did not exist for the warrant to search Defendants' apartment and that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement was inapplicable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the affidavit in support of the search warrant established probable cause to search the apartment where Defendants resided; and (2) therefore, it was unnecessary to consider whether the good-faith exception applied to the exclusionary rule. |
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| State v. Clark |
| Court: Tennessee Supreme Court Docket: E2020-00416-SC-T10B-CO Opinion Date: October 30, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals reversing the trial judge's denial of Defendant's motion for recusal, holding that, for the reasons provided today in State v. Griffin, __ S.W.3d __ (Tenn. 2020), Defendant failed to establish that there was a reasonable basis to question the trial judge's impartiality. In this case, one of three decided today involving a trial judge who previously served as a deputy district attorney general in Knox County at the time the defendants in each case were indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury, Defendant moved for recusal, arguing that the trial judge previously had supervisory authority over his case as Deputy District Attorney General. The trial judge denied the motion for recusal, but the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as in Griffin, Defendant failed to establish that the trial judge's supervisory responsibilities in his role as Deputy District Attorney General were personal or substantial in that case. |
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| State v. Griffin |
| Court: Tennessee Supreme Court Docket: E2020-00327-SC-T10B-CO Opinion Date: October 30, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals reversing the trial judge's decision to deny Defendants' motion for recusal on the grounds that the trial judge had supervisory authority over their cases as Deputy District Attorney General, holding that the trial judge appropriately denied the motion to recuse in this case. The trial judge here served as a deputy district attorney general in Knox County at the time Defendants were indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury. The trial judge was subsequently appointed to serve as a trial judge in Knox County Criminal Court and assigned to Defendant's cases. Defendants moved for recusal. The trial judge denied the motions, but the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial judge did not err in denying the motion for recusal because a person of ordinary prudence in the judge's position, knowing all the facts known to the trial judge, would not find a reasonable basis for questioning the judge's impartiality. |
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| State v. Styles |
| Court: Tennessee Supreme Court Docket: E2020-00176-SC-T10B-CO Opinion Date: October 30, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals reversing the trial judge's denial of Defendant's motion for recusal, holding that, for the reasons provided today in State v. Griffin, __ S.W.3d __ (Tenn. 2020), Defendant failed to establish that there was a reasonable basis to question the trial judge's impartiality. In this case, one of three decided today involving a trial judge who previously served as a deputy district attorney general in Knox County at the time the defendants in each case were indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury, Defendant moved for recusal, arguing that the trial judge previously had supervisory authority over his case as Deputy District Attorney General. The trial judge denied the motion for recusal, but the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, as in Griffin, Defendant failed to establish that the trial judge's supervisory responsibilities in his role as Deputy District Attorney General were personal or substantial in that case. |
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| Gonzalez v. Texas |
| Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Docket: AP-77,066 Opinion Date: November 4, 2020 Judge: Keel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In October 2015, appellant Mark Gonzalez pled not guilty, but a jury convicted him of capital murder for the 2011 murder of a police officer, for which he was sentenced to death. Appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was automatic. Appellant raised twenty-eight points of error. The Court addressed point number four: the trial court's juror substitution procedure, which was an issue of first impression. The remaining points of error were addressed in the unpublished portion of the Court's opinion. Finding none of his points to have merit, the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and sentence of death. |
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| Lopez v. Texas |
| Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Docket: PD-0956-19 Opinion Date: November 4, 2020 Judge: Barbara Hervey Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Antonio Lopez confessed to killing his 11-month-old foster child. He was indicted on two counts for capital murder and murder. He filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his confession was inadmissible because it was involuntary under the Due Process Clause and Article 38.21 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. According to appellant, he confessed only after police told him that, if he did not, he and his wife might be arrested and that, if they were, Child Protective Services (CPS) might take away their other children. The trial court denied the motion and filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. A jury acquitted Lopez of capital murder, but convicted him of murder. The trial court sentenced him to 35 years’ confinement based on the agreement of the parties. On appeal, Lopez argued the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress, but the court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the appellate court that Lopez’s confession was voluntary, but not based on the probable-cause analysis used by the court of appeals. Rather, the Court reached that result by examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession: "The existence of probable cause is only a factor in the analysis." |
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| Pleasant Grove City v. Terry |
| Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2020 UT 69 Opinion Date: October 29, 2020 Judge: Himonas Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction on the offense of domestic violence in the presence of a child, holding that a jury could not both convict Defendant of the compound offense of domestic violence in the presence of a child and acquit him of the predicate offense of domestic violence assault. Pleasant Grove City charged Defendant with one count of domestic violence assault and one count of commission of domestic violence in the presence of a child. A jury convicted Defendant on the offense of commission of domestic violence in the presence of a child but acquitted him of the offense that predicated the conviction - domestic violence assault. The trial judge did not intervene in the verdict. The Supreme Court vacated the conviction, holding that the verdict in this case was legally impossible and that vacatur of the verdict was required. |
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| State v. Paul C. |
| Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 19-0776 Opinion Date: November 5, 2020 Judge: Hutchison Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioner's motion to dismiss an indictment that alleged eighteen felony sexual offenses against him involving two minors, holding that the three-term rule was not violated in this case. In his motion to dismiss, Petitioner claimed that because three regular terms of court passed without a trial he was entitled to be discharged from prosecution for the offenses charged in the indictment, pursuant to W. Va. Code 62-3-21. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) three unexcused terms of court did not pass without a trial; and (2) therefore, Petitioner's right to be tried without unreasonable delay, pursuant to section 62-3-21, was not violated. |
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