Table of Contents | United States v. Rodriguez-Pacheco Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit | Quito v. Barr Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit | United States v. Tyson Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit | United States v. Lockhart Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | United States v. Ross Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | United States v. Stockman Criminal Law, White Collar Crime US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | Manners v. United States Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | United States v. Doggart Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | United States v. Hatcher Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Day v. Wooten Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | United States v. Dodds Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | United States v. Williams Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit | United States v. Bettis Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | United States v. Brown Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | United States v. Daigle Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | United States v. Hansen Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | United States v. Watters Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | Altayar v. Barr Criminal Law, Immigration Law US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | Bearchild v. Cobban Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | Jauregui-Cardenas v. Barr Criminal Law, Immigration Law US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | United States v. Gaspar-Miguel Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | Walker v. Corizon Health Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Medical Malpractice US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | Jordan v. Georgia Department of Corrections Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | United States v. Mancilla-Ibarra Criminal Law US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Hallman v. State Criminal Law Arkansas Supreme Court | Tolston v. State Criminal Law Arkansas Supreme Court | California v. Humphrey Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law California Courts of Appeal | California v. Morales Constitutional Law, Criminal Law California Courts of Appeal | People v. M.B. Criminal Law, Juvenile Law California Courts of Appeal | People v. Parker Criminal Law California Courts of Appeal | People v. Verdugo Criminal Law California Courts of Appeal | People v. Villatoro Criminal Law California Courts of Appeal | Graham v. Executive Director of Colorado Department of Corrections Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Colorado Supreme Court | In re Colorado v. Kilgore Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics Colorado Supreme Court | Martinez v. Colorado Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Colorado Supreme Court | Clark v. Delaware Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Delaware Supreme Court | Advisory Opinion to Governor re Implementation of Amendment 4, The Voting Restoration Amendment Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Florida Supreme Court | Martin v. State Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Florida Supreme Court | Richards v. State Criminal Law Florida Supreme Court | Bankston v. Georgia Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Georgia | Chavez v. Georgia Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Georgia | Davis v. Georgia Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Georgia | Doyle v. Georgia Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Georgia | Driver v. Georgia Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Georgia | Flowers v. Georgia Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Georgia | Floyd v. Georgia Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Georgia | Gaston v. Georgia Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Georgia | Georgia v. Stephens Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Georgia | Harris v. Georgia Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Georgia | Perdomo v. Georgia Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Georgia | Swims v. Georgia Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Georgia | White v. Georgia Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Georgia | State v. Bynum Criminal Law Iowa Supreme Court | State v. Jenkins Criminal Law Kansas Supreme Court | State v. Lyman Criminal Law Kansas Supreme Court | State v. Patterson Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Kansas Supreme Court | Tunnell v. State Criminal Law Maryland Court of Appeals | Collazo v. Commonwealth Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court | Howell v. Commonwealth Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court | State v. Thompson Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Minnesota Supreme Court | Dancy v. Mississippi Animal / Dog Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Mississippi | State ex rel. Kelly v. Inman Criminal Law, Health Law Supreme Court of Missouri | State v. Smith Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Supreme Court of Missouri | State v. Jones Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Montana Supreme Court | State v. Myers Criminal Law Nebraska Supreme Court | New Hampshire v. Folley Constitutional Law, Criminal Law New Hampshire Supreme Court | New Hampshire v. Jones Constitutional Law, Criminal Law New Hampshire Supreme Court | New Hampshire v. Salimullah Constitutional Law, Criminal Law New Hampshire Supreme Court | Smith v. May Criminal Law, Juvenile Law Supreme Court of Ohio | Oregon v. Andrews Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Oregon Supreme Court | State v. Bozzo Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Rhode Island Supreme Court | Dixon v. Texas Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Texas Court of Criminal Appeals | Simpson v. Texas Constitutional Law, Criminal Law Texas Court of Criminal Appeals | Flores-Gomez v. State Criminal Law Wyoming Supreme Court |
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Criminal Law Opinions | United States v. Rodriguez-Pacheco | Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-1391 Opinion Date: January 15, 2020 Judge: Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The First Circuit reversed Defendant's conviction, holding that the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress seized evidence because law enforcement officers' warrantless entry into the house where Defendant was living, on the grounds that exigent circumstances existed, was unconstitutional, and there was no evidence demonstrating a different exception to the warrant requirement applied. Defendant was convicted of sixteen counts of production of child pornography and one count of possession of child pornography involving prepubescent minors. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the warrantless entry into his mother's house, where he was living, was presumptively unreasonable and that no exception to the warrant requirement existed. The First Circuit agreed and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether consent to the entry was given, holding that entry into the home on the basis of exigency was unconstitutional and could not serve as justification for the search and seizure that followed. | | Quito v. Barr | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-996 Opinion Date: January 15, 2020 Judge: Joseph Frank Bianco Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Second Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's denial of petitioner's motion to terminate removal proceedings, his applications for a waiver of inadmissibility and readjustment of status, and ordering him removed. The court held that petitioner's conviction for attempted possession of a sexual performance by a child, in violation of New York Penal Law 263.16, is an aggravated felony, and his remaining arguments failed to raise a colorable constitutional claim or question of law. | | United States v. Tyson | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 18-3804 Opinion Date: January 14, 2020 Judge: Restrepo Areas of Law: Criminal Law | Tyson contacted a 17-year-old female on Facebook to engage her in prostitution. He traveled from Pennsylvania to New York City, picked up the victim and her friend, took them to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, then rented several rooms at a Motel 6. Phone records reveal that Harrisburg-area individuals contacted the victim to engage in commercial sexual activity. Law enforcement recovered the victim during a sting operation, interviewed her and reviewed her phone. They found a video of the victim performing oral sex on an adult male in a Motel 6 room. The man was identified as Tyson. Tyson was indicted for knowingly transporting a minor to engage in prostitution, 18 U.S.C. 2423(a) and producing child pornography, section 2251(a). Before trial, the court prohibited Tyson “from eliciting evidence to establish 'mistake of age’” and from asserting “mistake of age” as an affirmative defense. The court found that such evidence’s “probative value is substantially outweighed by a risk that the evidence will result in unfair prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury.” Tyson entered a plea agreement, with a recommendation that his sentences be served concurrently for a total of 180 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed. The statutes’ text, context, and history make it clear that knowledge of age is not an element and mistake of age is not a defense. | | United States v. Lockhart | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 16-4441 Opinion Date: January 10, 2020 Judge: Barbara Milano Keenan Areas of Law: Criminal Law | On rehearing en banc, the Fourth Circuit vacated defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and remanded the case for further proceedings. Defendant argued that if he had been properly informed of his sentencing exposure, there was a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty. Defendant also argued that his intervening decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), rendered his guilty plea involuntary, because he did not understand the essential elements of the offense to which he pleaded guilty. Considering the totality of the circumstances relevant to defendant's potential sentence, the court held that the required warning about defendant's Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) exposure would have had a significant effect on his assessment of his strategic position. Furthermore, the government conceded, and the court agreed, that the magistrate judge plainly erred in accepting defendant's guilty plea based on this pre-Rehaif understanding of the law. Therefore, given the procedural and factual circumstances of this case, the magistrate judge's failure to properly advise defendant of his ACCA exposure, together with the Rehaif error, in the aggregate were sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. | | United States v. Ross | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-20496 Opinion Date: January 10, 2020 Judge: Rhesa Hawkins Barksdale Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Fifth Circuit rejected defendant's contentions that 18 U.S.C. 2252A, receipt of child pornography, is unconstitutional because possession and receipt of child pornography are logically inseparable; both section 2252A's legislative history and Sentencing Commission materials recognize their inseparability; prosecutors may arbitrarily decide to charge defendants, for indistinguishable conduct, under the more-severely-punished receipt offense instead of the less severely-punished possession offense; and such prosecutorial control over the ultimate sentence violates the separation of powers. The court also rejected defendant's alternative argument that USSG 2G2.2 is unconstitutional because it violates the separation-of-powers doctrine and invites arbitrary enforcement and application. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss. | | United States v. Stockman | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-20780 Opinion Date: January 10, 2020 Judge: E. Grady Jolly Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime | The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions on twenty-three felony counts related to his role in schemes to defraud philanthropists, using their money to finance his personal life and political career. Defendant served two nonconsecutive terms in the United States House of Representatives. The court held that the district court's jury instructions were not erroneous; it was not plain error for the district court to define 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizations in the charge, and defendant was not entitled to an instruction on good faith; the district court did not err by denying defendant's motions for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29; the government provided ample evidence that defendant fraudulently devised, and implemented, a scheme to deprive two donors of their money and property, thus allowing the jury to rationally find him guilty of mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering; and the Federal Election Campaign Act's contribution limits apply to coordinated spending on political communications, irrespective of whether those communications contain magic words of express advocacy. | | Manners v. United States | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 17-1171 Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: Karen Nelson Moore Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | In 2011, Manners pleaded guilty to assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(3), and use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C 924(c). In 2016, Manners moved to vacate his 138-month sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 in light of the Supreme Court’s Johnson decision, arguing that his section 924(c) conviction could not be based on the statute’s residual clause because Johnson invalidated a similar residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act and his predicate offense did not have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, so this offense could not fall under section 924(c)(3)’s elements clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Manners’s motion. The Supreme Court remanded in light of its 2018 holding, Sessions v. Dimaya, that the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. 16 was unconstitutionally vague and subsequently expressly determined that 924(c)(3)’s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. On remand, the Sixth Circuit again affirmed. Manners’s predicate offense is a “crime of violence” under 924(c)(3)’s elements clause. The court employed a “categorical approach” and found 18 U.S.C. 1959(a) divisible, setting forth the separate offense of assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering. The dangerous weapon element of 1959(a)(3) elevates even a minimal type of assault into “violent force” sufficient to qualify as a “crime of violence.” | | United States v. Doggart | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 17-5813 Opinion Date: January 15, 2020 Judge: Jeffrey S. Sutton Areas of Law: Criminal Law | Doggart, a nuclear engineer and former congressional candidate, believed that an Islamic community, “Islamberg,” was plotting a terrorist attack against New York City and began posting on Facebook that Islamberg had to be “utterly destroyed.” The FBI used a confidential informant to engage with him. Doggart recruited the informant to help him, describing the weapons they would use. Doggart traveled to meet with those he had enlisted, including the informant. After his arrest, Doggart (age 65) agreed to plead guilty to transmitting a threat to kill or injure someone in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 875(c). The district court rejected the agreement for want of a factual basis. The government then charged Doggart with solicitation, 18 U.S.C. 373; solicitation to damage religious property, section 247; solicitation to commit federal arson, section 844(i); and making a threat in interstate commerce by telephone, 844(e). Convicted, Doggart was sentenced to 235 months. The Sixth Circuit remanded, finding that the court wrongly denied him the benefit of his plea bargain by applying the wrong legal test for true threats. On remand, the district court concluded that Doggart made a threat but refused to accept the plea bargain as not adequately reflecting the severity of his conduct. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part. The court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the Criminal Rule 11(c)(1)(A) plea deal. The court reversed the conviction for solicitation to commit federal arson; the target of the crime—a mosque—is not “used in” interstate commerce or in any activity affecting interstate commerce. The court agreed that “intentionally defac[ing], damag[ing], or destroy[ing]” religious “real property” using “a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire,” necessarily involve the use of “physical force,” a “crime of violence” under the solicitation statute. | | United States v. Hatcher | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-4092 Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: Karen Nelson Moore Areas of Law: Criminal Law | Hatcher escaped from confinement under a 46-month sentence for felon in possession of a firearm. Weeks later, police found Hatcher lying on the ground with a gunshot wound. While performing first aid, an officer observed a firearm tucked in Hatcher’s waistband. Hatcher left the hospital and was apprehended months later after being shot again. Hatcher pleaded guilty to felon in possession of a firearm and escape. The court gave notice of a possible upward variance, citing 18 U.S.C. 3553(a); the guidelines range was 41-51 months. Hatcher’s counsel described multiple stabbings and gunshot wounds, a physically abusive father, bipolar disorder and depression, attempted suicide, and extensive substance abuse. The prosecutor responded to Hatcher’s assertion that he carried the firearm for protection by stating that shell casings discovered from a shooting three days before Hatcher was shot matched the firearm that he possessed, which “suggest[s] ... retaliation.” The court noted Hatcher's many convictions, rejected Hatcher’s argument that he escaped out of fear, and imposed a 72-month sentence, stating that Hatcher’s prior, 46-month sentence was insufficient to deter him. The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court relied on Hatcher’s alleged involvement in the uncharged shooting in fashioning his sentence, which constituted procedural error as a prejudicial surprise. The court relied on information that the government had not explicitly advanced as a basis for sentencing enhancement, without an opportunity for Hatcher to subject this information to critical examination. | | Day v. Wooten | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1930 Opinion Date: January 10, 2020 Judge: Daniel Anthony Manion Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Day, age 18, weighed 312 pounds and had an underlying heart condition. Day was confronted outside a store after apparently shoplifting a watch. Day refused to return to the store. A mall security officer noticed Day had a gun. A chase ensued; Day eventually collapsed. Police arrived. Day’s gun was out of his reach. Officers handcuffed Day behind his back. Day stated he was having trouble breathing; officers instructed him to take deep breaths. Day would not maintain a seated position. Officers positioned Day to lie on his side to prevent Day from asphyxiating by rolling onto his stomach. An ambulance arrived to evaluate Day five minutes later. Day appeared to breathe normally, stated he had no preexisting medical conditions and was able to speak clearly. After multiple tests, paramedics concluded Day did not need to go to a hospital. When the jail wagon arrived, Day was unresponsive, lying on his back with his hands still cuffed. A second ambulance arrived 43 minutes after the first. Day was pronounced dead. There were no visible signs of trauma. The autopsy report listed his cause of death as “Sudden Cardiac Death due to Acute Ischemic Change” with contributory causes: “Sustained respiratory compromise due to hands cuffed behind the back, obesity, underlying cardiomyopathy.” Day had never complained about the handcuffs. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the court concluded the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed. There is no precedent clearly establishing that the officers violated any right of an out-of-breath arrestee to not have his hands cuffed behind his back after he complains of difficulty breathing. There was no evidence that the handcuffs were the cause of Day’s breathing difficulty before the autopsy report. | | United States v. Dodds | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1135 Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law | Dodds applied for a passport using his brother’s personal information, rather than his own because he was restricted by a condition of probation. He pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. 1542. He did not object to any of the proposed supervised-release conditions, which concerned: refraining from excessive alcohol use; remaining within the jurisdiction unless granted permission to leave; permitting a probation officer to visit places including work; submitting to searches of person, property, residence, vehicle, papers, electronic communications, or office upon reasonable suspicion; community service until gainfully employed; not maintaining employment that includes access to personal information; and, as directed by a probation officer, third-party notifications. The court asked, “can [I] impose these conditions without reading them verbatim?”, counsel responded, “yes,” then asked: “Are there any objections ... to any of the proposed conditions of supervised release?”, counsel stated, “No.” Dodds later objected to the search condition. The court rejected his argument, explaining, “the needs for reasonableness and to take into account Mr. Dodds’s privacy while balanced against the need to make sure that Mr. Dodds is not misusing identities or identity documents or engaged in financial wrongdoing, which his history suggests he poses some risk of doing.” Dodds was sentenced to six months in prison and three years’ supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the challenged conditions were unconstitutionally vague or lacked adequate justification. Dodds waived any objection other than to the search condition. | | United States v. Williams | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1358 Opinion Date: January 10, 2020 Judge: St. Eve Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | In 1998, an Illinois state court convicted Williams, a teenager, of first‐degree murder. Williams was paroled in 2008 but had his parole revoked after pleading guilty to domestic battery. In 2017, he traded cocaine to his employer for a firearm. His employer cooperated with the government. Williams pled guilty to possession of a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The court confirmed Williams’s admission that he possessed a firearm; that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce; and that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. The court sentenced him to 96 months’ imprisonment, below the Guidelines range. Four months later, the Supreme Court held that an element of a conviction under section 922(g), 924(a)(2), is the defendant’s knowledge of his status as a felon or alien illegally in the U.S. The government would have needed to prove—or Williams to admit—that he knew he had “been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” Williams sought to vacate his conviction and withdraw his guilty plea. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction. Williams failed to carry the burden of showing that his erroneous understanding of section 922(g) affected his decision to plead guilty. Williams cannot plausibly argue that he did not know his conviction had a maximum punishment exceeding a year. Williams would have to convince a jury that he either had no knowledge of where he spent 12 years or that he believed Illinois had imprisoned him 11 years beyond the maximum punishment for first‐degree murder. Most defendants would want to avoid informing the jury of a murder conviction. | | United States v. Bettis | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-2407 Opinion Date: January 10, 2020 Judge: Kobes Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress nearly 2000 grams of heroin found in a rental car defendant was driving. The court held that, even if a strawman eliminated Fourth Amendment standing, the evidence here does not establish a strawman situation and the court's precedent holds that an unauthorized and unlicensed driver may challenge a search of a rental car operated with the renter’s permission. Therefore, defendant had standing to challenge the search of the vehicle. The court also held that, as the encounter with defendant unfolded, officers developed additional evidence indicating deception and criminal conduct. Therefore, the officers had probable cause to seize the vehicle and continue the search. | | United States v. Brown | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1021 Opinion Date: January 16, 2020 Judge: Erickson Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's revocation of defendant's supervised release and sentence of 36 months in prison for assault of a law enforcement officer. The court held that there was a sufficient basis for finding a grade A violation of assault on a law enforcement officer, because the deputy was indisputably performing his official duties at the time of the assault. In this case, when defendant placed his hand on the deputy's service weapon with intent to remove it, defendant took a substantial step toward committing the offense of assault with at least a threat of violence. Therefore, the district court did not err by finding that defendant violated his conditions of supervised release by assaulting the deputy. | | United States v. Daigle | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-2603 Opinion Date: January 14, 2020 Judge: Bobby E. Shepherd Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and his request for a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of sexual exploitation of minors and one count of possession of materials involving sexual exploitation of minors. The court held that the issuing judge had a substantial basis for finding probable cause to search a cell phone for evidence of sexual abuse. In this case, the sheriff's written affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause and any alleged inefficiencies were either non-existent or harmless because the issuing judge nonetheless had a substantial basis for finding probable cause. The court held that the victim was reliable; the fact that the affidavit does not set forth the sheriff's training and qualifications does not detract from a finding of probable cause; the forensic interviewer's identity and qualifications were irrelevant to the probable cause determination; the issuing judge was permitted to rely on the information contained in certain paragraphs of the affidavit when assessing probable cause; and the facts were sufficient to establish the basis for the victim's knowledge that there was a video of her on defendant's phone at the time of his arrest. The court also held that defendant failed to make the requisite substantial preliminary showing to merit a Franks hearing; the failure to discover evidence on the devices seized from the family residence pursuant to the first search warrant did not make it any less probable that such evidence would be found on the cell phone in defendant's possession; the circumstances and motives surrounding the report to the sheriff had no bearing on the probable cause analysis; and defendant's claim that the sheriff omitted certain information about the witness was rejected. | | United States v. Hansen | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3122 Opinion Date: January 14, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Eighth Circuit previously affirmed defendant's 600 month sentence after a jury convicted him of sexual exploitation of a minor, exploiting a minor while being required to register as a sex offender, two counts of distributing and receiving child pornography, and five counts of possessing child pornography. In this case, the court denied the petition for panel rehearing, holding that the crux of its harmless error analysis was not that the highest statutory maximum was 40 years if the maximum on Count One was reduced from 50 to 30 years. Therefore, the district court properly determined that the advisory range under USSG 5G1.2(d) greatly exceeded the 600 month sentence it imposed. The court held that any error was harmless because that remained true even if the statutory maximum for Count One was reduced by eliminating the section 2251(e) enhancement. | | United States v. Watters | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-2237 Opinion Date: January 10, 2020 Judge: Melloy Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography. The district court imposed a sentence at the bottom of the advisory guidelines range, 262 months, but ordered the sentence to run consecutive to the remaining portion of an earlier-imposed, 60-month, revocation-of-supervised-release sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3583(k). After the Supreme Court held that section 3583(k) was unconstitutional in United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019), the court ordered supplemental briefing. The court held that even if Haymond abrogated the court's double jeopardy precedent, any error in this case was not plain. The court also held that defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and sufficiently explained its reasons for imposing a within-guidelines sentence. | | Altayar v. Barr | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 17-73308 Opinion Date: January 14, 2020 Judge: Bress Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law | The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's determination that petitioner committed a crime involving moral turpitude. The panel held that an aggravated assault conviction under Arizona Revised Statutes 13-1203(A)(2) and 13-1204(A)(2) qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude that made petitioner removable. In this case, the parties have treated both the basic and aggravated assault provisions as divisible, and the panel agreed that such an approach comported with circuit and state precedent. In consideration of the charging document, plea agreement, and plea colloquy together, the panel held that it was clear petitioner was convicted under sections 13-1203(A)(2) and 13-1204(A)(2). The panel was satisfied that under its cases, an aggravated assault conviction under sections 13-1203(A)(2) and 13-1204(A)(2) involving the use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude. | | Bearchild v. Cobban | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 17-35616 Opinion Date: January 16, 2020 Judge: Morgan Christen Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Plaintiff, an inmate at the Montana State Prison (MPS), filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against prison staff members, alleging that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was sexually assaulted during the course of a pat-down search. The district court dismissed all defendants except Sergeant Larry Pasha, the prison guard who conducted the pat down, and a jury subsequently returned a verdict in Pasha's favor. Plaintiff appealed. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to continue plaintiff's trial sua sponte. The panel recognized that there was no model jury instruction for Eighth Amendment sexual assault, and took this opportunity to address this circuit's law governing this type of claim. The panel held that a prisoner presents a viable Eighth Amendment claim where he or she proves that a prison staff member, acting under color of law and without legitimate penological justification, touched the prisoner in a sexual manner or otherwise engaged in sexual conduct for the staff member’s own sexual gratification, or for the purpose of humiliating, degrading, or demeaning the prisoner. In this case the model instructions plainly misstated the law applicable to plaintiff's cause. The panel reversed and remanded for a new trial because it was impossible to determine whether the jury would have reached the same result had it been properly instructed. | | Jauregui-Cardenas v. Barr | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 16-71309 Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: Whaley Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law | A conviction under California Penal Code 114 is not an aggravated felony or a crime involving moral turpitude under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision concluding that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal due to her conviction under section 114. The panel used the categorical approach to determine whether the California statute categorically quaifies as an aggravated felony. The necessary elements for conviction under section 114 are: (1) the use; (2) of a false document; (3) to conceal citizenship or alien status; (4) with specific intent. The panel compared these elements with the federal definition of an aggravated felony and held that the California statute cannot be a match to the federal offense because it includes documents, such as fake drivers' licenses, that are not enumerated in the description of the federal crime. Furthermore, the state statute was not divisible. The panel also held that section 114 did not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude because, under the categorical approach, section 114 does not require fraudulent intent. Therefore, the panel held that the BIA erred in holding that petitioner's state conviction precluded her from consideration of cancellation of removal. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. | | United States v. Gaspar-Miguel | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-2020 Opinion Date: January 16, 2020 Judge: Mary Beck Briscoe Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Immigration Law | Defendant-Appellant Petrona Gaspar-Miguel appealed a district court’s affirmance of her conviction for entering the United States. On appeal, she contended the district court’s conclusion that she “entered” the United States even though she was under the constant surveillance of a border patrol agent was contrary to established law defining “entry.” The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the district court. | | Walker v. Corizon Health | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-3070 Opinion Date: January 14, 2020 Judge: Michael R. Murphy Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Health Law, Medical Malpractice | Marques Davis was an inmate at the Hutchinson Correctional Facility (“HCF”) from June 2016 until his death in April 2017. During the course of his confinement, Davis suffered from constant neurological symptoms, the cause of which went untreated by HCF medical personnel. When he eventually died from Granulomatous Meningoencephalitis, Davis’s estate (“the Estate”) brought federal and state law claims against Corizon Health, Inc. and numerous health care professionals who interacted with Davis during his incarceration. One such medical professional, Dr. Sohaib Mohiuddin, filed a qualified-immunity-based motion to dismiss the Estate’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim. The district court denied the motion, concluding the complaint set out a clearly established violation of Davis’s right to be free from deliberate indifference to the need for serious medical care. Mohiuddin appealed, arguing the district court erred in determining the complaint’s conclusory and collective allegations stated a valid Eighth Amendment claim as to him. Upon de novo review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the complaint did not state a valid deliberate indifference claim as to Mohiuddin. Thus, it reversed the denial of Mohiuddin’s motion to dismiss and remanded the matter to the district court for further proceedings. | | Jordan v. Georgia Department of Corrections | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-12948 Opinion Date: January 10, 2020 Judge: Julie Carnes Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | On petition for rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit vacated and reconsidered its original opinion, substituting the following opinion. The court affirmed the district court's grant of GDC's motion to quash plaintiffs' subpoena directing GDC to testify at a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition and to produce documents concerning Georgia's lethal injection protocol. Plaintiffs argued that the information was necessary to support their 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims pending in the Southern District of Mississippi challenging the legality of Mississippi's lethal injection protocol. The court held that the district court applied the correct standard of review, the clearly erroneous or contrary-to-law standard, to the magistrate judge's ruling on the motion to quash. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by affirming the magistrate judge's ruling to grant GDC's motion to quash where the relevance of the information sought in the GDC subpoena to the pending section 1983 litigation was highly questionable; the subpoena subjected GDC to an undue burden which mandated the quashing of the subpoena under Rule 45(d)(3)(A)(iv); and compliance with plaintiffs' subpoena would impose an undue burden on the State of Georgia. | | United States v. Mancilla-Ibarra | Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-13663 Opinion Date: January 15, 2020 Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiring to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. The court held that probable cause supported defendant's arrest because the informant's information was veritable, reliable, and corroborated. The court also held that the district court did not err by refusing to apply a two-level sentence reduction for truthful disclosure under USSG 2D1.1(b)(17), because defendant failed to satisfy his burden of proving his truthful disclosure. | | Hallman v. State | Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 16 Opinion Date: January 16, 2020 Judge: Hudson Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition seeking to proceed in the trial court with a petition under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, in which he would challenge a judgment reflecting his sentence of life imprisonment without parole for capital murder, holding that Petitioner failed to set out a meritorious basis for relief under Rule 37.1. The judgment challenged by Petitioner was entered in 1978. In his petition, Petitioner alleged seven bases for grounds for Rule 37 relief, all framed as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Petitioner failed to set forth meritorious grounds for postconviction relief under the Rule that may be included in the proposed petition. Therefore, the Court held, there was no need to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court. | | Tolston v. State | Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 14 Opinion Date: January 16, 2020 Judge: Karen R. Baker Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to file a petition for writ of error coram nobis and audita querela in his criminal case, holding that Petitioner's claims did not establish a ground for the writ. In his petition, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in failing to apply the criminal code section that was in effect at the time was committed and that the prosecutor committed a Brady violation by withholding a medical report pertaining to an examination of the victim. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that the existence of medical records that described the absence of corroborating physical evidence was known to defense counsel and that, even if the prosecutor had withheld this medical report, the outcome of the trial would not have changed as a result. | | California v. Humphrey | Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D074473(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 16, 2020 Judge: Richard D. Huffman Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law | In 2011, Dominick Humphrey pled guilty to four counts of robbery (counts 2, 3, 4 and 24). For three of these counts (counts 2, 3, and 4), Humphrey admitted that he used a deadly weapon (a knife) during the commission of the offenses, and used a firearm during the commission of one of the counts (count 24). Humphrey also admitted that he was 16 years old when he committed the crimes within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707. The trial court sentenced Humphrey to prison for 19 years. Five years into Humphrey's sentence, an employee of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) wrote a letter to the superior court, stating that the abstract of judgment "may be in error, or incomplete[.]" In 2018, the trial court clarified that Humphrey was sentenced to 15 years for count 24 and the associated firearm enhancement and consecutive 16-month terms for counts 2, 3, and 4 (including their deadly weapon enhancements). An amended abstract of judgment was issued showing a sentence of 19 years in state prison. Thereafter, Humphrey moved to strike the firearm enhancement under Senate Bill No. 620. The trial court denied the motion because Humphrey's conviction became final before the enactment of Senate Bill No. 620. Appellate counsel filed a "Wende" brief, indicating that he had not been able to identify any arguable issue for reversal on appeal, but asked the Court of Appeal to review the record for error as Wende mandated. In reviewing the record, the Court discovered an issue to be briefed, and the parties were requested to brief whether the trial court erred in finding Humphrey ineligible for relief under Senate Bill 620 after the trial court acted to correct the abstract of judgment. Find that the trial court only made plain how the original sentence should have appeared on the amended abstract of judgment, the Court of Appeal determined Humphrey did not file a notice of appeal following the original 2011 sentence. His case became final in 2011. Senate Bill 620 took effect January 1, 2018, and Humphrey's was not entitled to retroactive application of the law to his sentence. Therefore the trial court did not err in denying his motion for resentencing. | | California v. Morales | Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E070658(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 15, 2020 Judge: Raphael Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Defendant-appellant Hipolito Morales was charged with two counts of oral copulation or sexual penetration of a child under 10, and seven counts of committing a lewd or lascivious act on a child under 14. During his trial, the trial court admitted into evidence, after jury deliberations began and without any limiting instructions, a video and transcript of Morales’s police interrogation. In a pre-Miranda portion of that interrogation, an officer made statements to the effect that children had informed law enforcement that Morales had molested them; the officer knew Morales was lying; the officer could tell Morales was lying from his experience as an investigator; and Morales committed the crimes. Although the officer testified at trial, the parties had agreed to limit questioning to the post-Miranda portion of the interrogation only. The jury found Morales guilty, and he was sentenced to 175 years to life. Morales appealed, contending that because the full interrogation was admitted only after the officer was excused and the jury began its deliberations, he was deprived of the right to confront the officer about the pre-Miranda statements described above, none of which were repeated after Morales was read his Miranda rights. The Court of Appeal found no confrontation clause violation. "In order to implicate the confrontation clause, a statement must be testimonial, meaning that it must be made with sufficient formality and with the primary purpose of creating a substitute for trial testimony. Accusatory statements made by law enforcement in an interrogation will, absent unusual circumstances, satisfy neither of these requirements." The Court addressed Morales’s other contentions in the unpublished portion of its opinion, found them without merit and therefore affirmed conviction and sentencing. | | People v. M.B. | Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B295284(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: Kenneth R. Yegan Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law | People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, does not apply to a mandatory minimum juvenile restitution fine. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court's order requiring M.B. to pay a $100 restitution fine does not violate his due process rights. To the extent that Dueñas purports to state a rule of California criminal procedure, the court questioned whether the Court of Appeal, as opposed to the Supreme Court, has the authority to do so. The court explained that it was not bound by a sister appellate court opinion and it was obligated to follow the California Constitution, Article 6, 13. Therefore, the court concluded that a $100 mandatory juvenile restitution fine did not result in a miscarriage of justice. | | People v. Parker | Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B294553(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: Tangeman Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The treatment during an extension of a prisoner's custodial time to complete a psychiatrist's evaluation may be included in the required 90 days of treatment under the Mentally Disordered Offender Act (MDO Act). In this case, the Attorney General appealed from the trial court's order finding that defendant did not meet the criteria to be treated as an MDO because he did not receive 90 days of treatment before his scheduled parole date. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Attorney General's contention that treatment during the additional 45-day custody period authorized by the Board of Parole Hearings under Penal Code 2963 should have counted toward the 90 days of treatment required by section 2962, subdivisions (c) and (d)(1). Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's order vacating the Board's MDO determination. | | People v. Verdugo | Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B296630(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 15, 2020 Judge: Dennis M. Perluss Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Court of Appeal rejected defendant's argument that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to deny his Penal Code section 1170.95 petition on the merits without first appointing counsel and allowing the prosecutor and appointed counsel to brief the issue of his entitlement to relief and affirmed the trial court's summary denial of defendant's petition, which was properly based on its ruling that defendant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law. The court held that the relevant statutory language, viewed in context, makes plain the Legislature's intent to permit the sentencing court, before counsel must be appointed, to examine readily available portions of the record of conviction to determine whether a prima facie showing has been made that the petitioner falls within the provisions of section 1170.95. The court explained that petitioner must make a prima facie showing that petitioner may be eligible for relief because he or she could not be convicted of first or second degree murder following the changes made by SB 1437 to the definition of murder in sections 188 and 189. | | People v. Villatoro | Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B296613(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 16, 2020 Judge: Laurence D. Rubin Areas of Law: Criminal Law | Defendant appealed from the trial court's order imposing a $100 fine under Penal Code section 29810 for failure to complete a firearms disclosure form. The Court of Appeal reversed the order, holding that the statutory procedures for prosecuting an infraction were not followed. In this case, the trial court essentially charged defendant with an infraction, conducted a trial, found him guilty, and imposed the $100 fine on him for violating section 29810—all in the presence of the district attorney. However, the district attorney did not charge or approve the charging of an infraction. Therefore, the trial court had no authority to impose punishment for committing an infraction in these circumstances. | | Graham v. Executive Director of Colorado Department of Corrections | Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 1 Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | In February 2018, plaintiff-appellant Jimmie Graham’s parole officer filed a complaint alleging that Graham had violated three conditions of his parole: changing his residence without permission; failing to report to the parole office as directed; and committing a new felony - escape. The allegation related to the commission of a new felony was dismissed after the escape case was dismissed. Graham then pled not guilty to the two remaining allegations. The issue his petition for habeas corpus presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review the parole board’s order confining Graham for more than ninety days as a result of his parole violations. The Supreme Court concluded the parole board exceeded its statutory authority, and that the district court subsequently erred in denying Graham’s habeas petition. Thus, the district court’s order was reversed. Because Graham has been confined well beyond the ninety days authorized by the version of the parole revocation statute in effect at the time of Graham’s parole revocation, the Supreme Court remanded to the district court with directions to grant the writ of habeas corpus, make the writ permanent, and order the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections and the Warden of Sterling Correctional Facility (collectively, “DOC”) to immediately release Graham to parole. | | In re Colorado v. Kilgore | Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 6 Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: Samour Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics | The district court in this case sua sponte ordered the parties to exchange exhibits thirty days before trial. The State charged Joshua Kilgore with two counts of felony sexual assault. In the minute order it issued following the arraignment, the court indicated, among other things, that “exhibits [were] to be exchanged 30 days before trial” (“disclosure requirement” or “disclosure order”). The disclosure requirement was not prompted by a party’s request and appeared to have been part of the court’s standard case-management practice. A couple of months later, Kilgore filed an objection, arguing that the disclosure requirement violated his attorney’s confidentiality obligations, the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-product doctrine, and his due process rights (including his right to make the prosecution meet its burden of proof, his right to a fair trial, and his right to the effective assistance of counsel). Furthermore, Kilgore argued Rule 16 neither required him to disclose, nor entitled the prosecution to receive, his exhibits before trial. The court overruled Kilgore’s objection, reasoning that requiring Kilgore to disclose his exhibits prior to trial would “foster efficiency and allow for a fair trial” without running afoul of his rights. Any exhibits not disclosed before trial, warned the court, would “not be used at trial.” Kilgore sought reconsideration of this ruling, but the court declined to alter it. Thereafter, Kilgore submitted a sealed motion detailing the specific reasons he opposed disclosing a particular exhibit. Despite having this additional information, though, the court stood by its earlier ruling. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded a district court could not rely on its case-management discretion to order disclosures that exceed the discovery authorized by Rule 16 of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, nor could a court require disclosures that infringe on an accused’s constitutional rights. In this instance, the district court erred in ordering Kilgore to disclose his exhibits before trial. | | Martinez v. Colorado | Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 3 Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: William W. Hood, III Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | After pleading guilty to Driving While Ability Impaired, Quinten Martinez was sentenced to jail and probation under section 42-4-1307, C.R.S. (2019). The county court twice revoked his probation and resentenced him. Martinez has served 608 days in jail related to this offense, of which 458 stem from probation violations. Martinez appealed, asserting that the maximum jail sentence the court could impose was ten days. Martinez had moved for a stay of execution, which the trial court granted. By the time the stay entered, Martinez had already served 103 days of his 365-day sentence on the second revocation. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that when a defendant is sentenced to probation as part of his sentence for a second or subsequent DUI offense and then violates the terms of that probation, the sentencing court may impose all or part of the suspended 365-day jail sentence but can impose no more than 365 days cumulative jail time for all probation violations. | | Clark v. Delaware | Court: Delaware Supreme Court Docket: 114, 2019 Opinion Date: January 14, 2020 Judge: Traynor Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Jeffrey Clark and two associates, Rayshaun Johnson and Christopher Harris, were indicted for first degree murder , conspiracy in the first degree, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited, for their roles in the shooting death of Theodore “Teddy” Jackson. After Harris pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge and entered into a cooperation agreement with the State, the Superior Court granted Clark’s request that his case be tried separately from Johnson’s. Johnson’s case went to trial first, and a jury convicted him on all indicted charges. Then, after a nine-day trial in September 2017, a jury found Clark guilty of attempted assault in the second degree—purportedly a lesser-included offense of murder in the first degree, and conspiracy in the second degree, a lesser included offense of conspiracy in the first degree. Before he was sentenced, Clark moved the Superior Court for acquittal. When that was denied, Clark was sentenced to four years’ incarceration, followed by descending levels of supervision. On appeal, Clark argued that despite the inescapable fact that Teddy Jackson, the only victim identified in the indictment, was dead, the State failed to present sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury’s finding that Clark, at the time of the alleged crime, intended to cause “serious physical injury.” And because intent to cause “serious physical injury,” as opposed to mere “physical injury,” was an element of attempted assault in the second degree, according to Clark, the Superior Court erred when it denied his post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal. Finding no merit to Clark's claims, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence. | | Advisory Opinion to Governor re Implementation of Amendment 4, The Voting Restoration Amendment | Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC19-1341 Opinion Date: January 16, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | In this advisory opinion, the Supreme Court answered a question asked by Governor Ron DeSantis regarding the interpretation of a portion of the Florida Constitution affecting his executive powers and duties by stating that it is in the Court's opinion that the phrase "all terms of sentence," as used in article VI, section 4, has an ordinary meaning that the voters would have understood to refer not only to durational periods but also to all legal financial obligations (LFOs) imposed in conjunction with an adjudication of guilt. Specifically, the Governor requested advice regarding the meaning of language added to Fla. Const. art. VI, 4 by the approval of an initiative petition, commonly referred to as Amendment 4, that restored the voting rights of certain convicted felons "upon completion of all terms of sentence including parole or probation." The Supreme Court answered that the phrase "all terms of sentence" encompasses not just durational periods but also all LFOs - fines, restitution, costs, and fees - imposed in conjunction with an adjudication of guilt. | | Martin v. State | Court: Florida Supreme Court Dockets: SC18-214, SC18-1696 Opinion Date: January 16, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's third amended motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 and denied Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief. Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. This appeal concerned Appellant's second amended motion for postconviction relief. The postconviction court noted that Appellant was entitled to a new penalty phase pursuant to Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) but denied the guilt-phase claims. The majority of the claims presented in Appellant's appeal alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Supreme Court denied the claims and affirmed the order of the postconviction court. The Court also denied Appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant's claim that comments made by the prosecutor tapped into racial stereotypes was procedurally barred and that Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel also failed. | | Richards v. State | Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC19-24 Opinion Date: January 16, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversing the trial court's decision denying Defendant's motion to correct his sentence on the grounds that the trial court could not impose investigative costs because the State had not requested them, as required by Fla. Stat. 938.27(1), holding that the State's request for investigative costs must occur before the judgment is rendered. The Fifth District held that the trial court erred in imposing costs of investigation in the absence of a request from the State but concluded that the State, on remand, should be given the opportunity to request the imposition of investigative costs. The Supreme Court quashed the Fifth District's opinion, holding that because the State failed to request investigative costs before the trial court pronounced sentence and entered Defendant's judgment the State's opportunity to request investigative costs has passed. | | Bankston v. Georgia | Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1551 Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Appellant Clinton Bankston appealed a trial court’s denial in part and dismissal in part of his pro se motion seeking to vacate his convictions and to withdraw his guilty pleas stemming from the murders of five people. In September 1987, a grand jury indicted Bankston for the murders of five people and other crimes that he committed when he was 15 and 16 years old. In 1988, Bankston pled guilty but mentally ill to five counts of malice murder. Other charges were nolle prossed, and he was sentenced to five consecutive life sentences. The trial court denied Banskton’s pro se motion to the extent it sought to vacate Bankston’s convictions, rejecting on the merits Bankston’s claim that his convictions were void. The trial court dismissed the motion to the extent Bankston sought to withdraw his pleas, ruling that it did not have jurisdiction to consider the claim because it was untimely. To the extent that Bankston’s motion sought to vacate his convictions, the Georgia Supreme Court determined the trial court should have dismissed it rather than denied it on the merits, therefore it vacated that part of the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to dismiss that part of the motion. The trial court order was affirmed in all other respects. | | Chavez v. Georgia | Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1573 Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Juan Chavez appealed his convictions for malice murder, participation in criminal street gang activity, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a first-offender probationer all stemming from the 2015 shooting death of Ricardo Ovalle. Chavez challenged the sufficiency of the evidence as to his conviction for participation in criminal street gang activity and the felony murder count predicated on that felony. He also argued his lawyers at trial were ineffective in their handling of his prior first-offender disposition, and that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial based on the State’s failure to disclose a witness’s prior inconsistent statement. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the evidence was sufficient to sustain all but one of Chavez’s convictions; the evidence was insufficient to sustain Chavez’s conviction for possession of a firearm by a first-offender probationer, and it reversed that conviction. The Court determined Chavez did not show his trial counsel were ineffective or that the State’s failure to disclose the alleged witness statement violated his constitutional rights, so the Court affirmed Chavez’s other convictions. | | Davis v. Georgia | Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1187 Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Carlton Davis was convicted of felony murder in connection with the death of Lakeitha Sims. On appeal, Davis argued: (1) the trial court erred by admitting a statement he made to a detective that Davis contended he did not freely and voluntarily make; (2) the trial court erred by improperly admitting into evidence a letter that Davis contends violated his reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment; and (3) Davis’s due process rights were violated because of the 14-year delay between Davis’s jury verdict and the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Davis’s motion for new trial. | | Doyle v. Georgia | Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1005 Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Matthew Doyle was convicted by jury for the murder of Lyndon “Pookie” Tucker, and for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On appeal, he contended the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on the requirement for corroboration of accomplice testimony. Because the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the trial court plainly erred by failing to give the accomplice-corroboration charge, it reverse. The Court did not address Doyle’s remaining enumerations of error. | | Driver v. Georgia | Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1298 Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Frederick Driver was convicted of felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the 2017 shooting death of Randy Diamond. On appeal, Driver contended only that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence an admission he made to police while in custody. The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed with this contention and affirmed the conviction. | | Flowers v. Georgia | Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1151 Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Appellant Jasento Flowers was convicted by jury of the malice murder of his ex-wife, Bridgette Flowers, by shooting her with a handgun, and of the aggravated assaults of Tearro Moore, Ranoda Hammonds, Jamesia Williams, and Onterio Smith, by shooting at them with a handgun. He appealed, contending that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior altercation with Bridgette, and in admitting a photograph of her brain, taken during the autopsy. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. | | Floyd v. Georgia | Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Dockets: S19A1493, S19A1494 Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Louis Floyd, Jr. and Tara Lee Harrell were convicted by jury of murder and other offenses in connection with the death of William Jackson. Floyd argued on appeal that the trial court erred by not granting his motion to sever the trial and by failing to charge the jury on justification, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Harrell argued the evidence presented by the State against her was insufficient to support the verdicts, and that the trial court should have granted her motion for directed verdict. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. | | Gaston v. Georgia | Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1284 Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | In October 2016, a jury found Lerenzo Gaston guilty of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Terrance Walker. Gaston appealed, contending he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel: (1) did not request a jury charge on justification; (2) did not object to the State’s closing argument referencing evidence outside the record; (3) did not object to the admission of a prior consistent statement; and (4) did not introduce evidence that a witness initially denied seeing Gaston shoot Walker. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. | | Georgia v. Stephens | Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1079 Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | In a pending murder case involving multiple defendants, the State appealed an order denying its pretrial motion to admit a witness’s out-of-court statement by reason of necessity because the witness, Harry Dimeco, was dead. The trial court ruled that the statement was inadmissible under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), based on the court’s determinations that the witness’s statement was testimonial in nature and that the defendants were not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witness prior to his death. On appeal, the State conceded that the statement at issue was testimonial because, when given, the statement was going to be used for prosecution purposes. The State also conceded that the defendants had no meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The State argued, however, that notwithstanding Confrontation Clause concerns, the statement could be admitted for a non-hearsay purpose, specifically, explaining the witness’s conduct as depicted in a video recording that the State intended to offer. The Georgia Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s grant or denial of a motion in limine for abuse of discretion, and finding none, the Supreme Court affirmed. | | Harris v. Georgia | Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1572 Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Ricardo Harris was found guilty by jury of murder and concealing the death of another in connection with the death of Yvonne James. Harris contended on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting his pre-trial statements into evidence, and that trial counsel was ineffective for allowing him to give an incriminating custodial statement. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction. | | Perdomo v. Georgia | Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1641 Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: Robert Benham Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Appellant Hamlet Perdomo was convicted of the felony murder of Carl Bush, as well as fourteen other crimes committed against five additional victims during a 2010 crime spree. Appellant challenged the evidence presented against him at trial as insufficient to support his convictions. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. | | Swims v. Georgia | Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1427 Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Jesse Swims was convicted by jury of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the death of Deborah “Debbie” Leigh Clemenson. Swims appealed, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. | | White v. Georgia | Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19A1004 Opinion Date: January 13, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Dakota White appealed his convictions for malice murder and other crimes, stemming from the death of Samuel Poss. A juvenile at the time of his crimes, White alleged errors both in the admission of his confession and in the trial court’s decision to sentence him to life without parole. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded White did not show the trial court committed any reversible error under existing precedent with respect to either decision. Accordingly, the Court affirmed his convictions. | | State v. Bynum | Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 18-0294 Opinion Date: January 10, 2020 Judge: Christensen Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of making a false report alleging the occurrence of the criminal act of carrying weapons, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's request for an instruction on the exceptions to the underlying criminal act of carrying weapons. On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed only whether the definitional instructions to the criminal act of carrying weapons required inclusion of the statutory exceptions. Based on its review of the entire record, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's refusal to give Defendant's requested instruction was not erroneous because substantial evidence did not support Defendant's requested instruction on his hypothetical affirmative defense. | | State v. Jenkins | Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 118120 Opinion Date: January 10, 2020 Judge: Carol A. Beier Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of first-degree felony murder, two counts of aggravated battery, and related offenses, holding that the district court judge properly admitted as evidence recorded jail calls made using Defendant's assigned personal identification number and that a challenged provision in the Kansas felony fleeing and eluding statute is not unconstitutionally vague. On appeal, Defendant argued that he was entitled to a new trial because the district judge erred by admitting the jail phone calls into evidence and that Kan. Stat. Ann. 8-1568(b)(1)(E), the option within a means of the felony fleeing and eluding statute dependent on five or more moving violations, is unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting the recorded calls as evidence in Defendant's trial; and (2) the term "moving violations" used in section 8-1568(b)(1)(E) is not unconstitutionally vague. | | State v. Lyman | Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 114312 Opinion Date: January 10, 2020 Judge: Lawton R. Nuss Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for felony murder based on abuse of a child, abuse of a child by shaking, and aggravated battery, holding that the district court did not err or commit judicial misconduct during the proceedings below. Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court did not err by denying Defendant's motion for new trial; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Defendant's proposed expert witness for failure to satisfy the test under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); (3) the district court did not err by allowing the State to introduce evidence of Defendant's prior bad acts; (4) the district court judge did not commit judicial misconduct by sleeping during the trial; and (5) the district court did not err by prohibiting Defendant from introducing medical records that were subject to a written stipulation. | | State v. Patterson | Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 118180 Opinion Date: January 10, 2020 Judge: Dan Biles Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence arising from an armed robbery in which a victim was killed by an accomplice, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant's felony-murder conviction did not violate due process because the felony-murder statute does not remove from the jury's consideration an intent element required by criminal statute; (2) the district court did not commit clear error when it instructed the jury to apply the law if the State proved all elements of the charged offenses; (3) the prosecutor did not commit error during voir dire by saying that an empaneled jury could not "debate" the law; (4) Defendant's constitutional challenges to his hard twenty-five life sentence were unavailing; and (5) Defendant's Apprendi challenge to the use of criminal history scores was without merit. | | Tunnell v. State | Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 28/19 Opinion Date: January 16, 2020 Judge: Robert N. McDonald Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction for murder and firearms offenses, holding that the administrative judge did not abuse his discretion in finding good cause for the continuance of the trial date. Under the Hicks rule, a criminal trial in a circuit court must commence within 180 days of the first appearance of the defendant or defense counsel in the circuit court. This deadline is known as the Hicks date. A continuance of the trial beyond the Hicks date may be granted only for good cause. Here, the administrative judge found good cause to postpone Defendant's trial from the original trial date based on the State's need to provide additional discovery to the defense. Defendant's trial began approximately forty days after the Hicks date, but the court believed that the deadline under the Hicks rule was tolled for the period of time during which evidence was at a lab for DNA analysis. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the "Hicks rule" does not incorporate a mechanism for tolling or extending the Hicks date; but (2) the administrative judge properly found good cause for the continuance, and Defendant did not carry his burden of demonstrate that there was an inordinate delay in the new trial date. | | Collazo v. Commonwealth | Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12557 Opinion Date: January 9, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the county court denying Defendant's petition for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice neither erred nor abused his discretion in denying relief. Defendant was indicted on charges of murder in the first degree and other offenses. The trial judge declared a mistrial because the jury were unable to reach a verdict on the murder charge. Defendant moved to dismiss the murder indictment and for a required finding of not guilty, arguing that a retrial was barred by double jeopardy principles because there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conviction. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant then filed a Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition seeking relief from the denial of that motion. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that double jeopardy principles did not bar Defendant's retrial on the murder charge because the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction of murder in the first degree based on extreme atrocity or cruelty. | | Howell v. Commonwealth | Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12775 Opinion Date: January 10, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying relief. Petitioner was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon, and, at arraignment, a judge ordered that Petitioner be committed to the state hospital for a determination whether he was competent to stand trial. After he had been committed Petitioner filed this Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition alleging violations of his due process rights. The single justice denied the petition without holding a hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner did not demonstrate why he was entitled to review pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3. | | State v. Thompson | Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A18-0545 Opinion Date: January 15, 2020 Judge: Thissen Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for first-degree driving while impaired, holding that Officer Patrick Bendel of the Red Lake Police Department was acting within his proper authority when he detained Defendant and transported him to Beltrami County law enforcement. On appeal, Defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that all evidence obtained as a result of his arrest should be suppressed because Officer Bendel was not a "peace officer" as defined in Minn. Stat. 169A.03, subd. 18 and therefore could not legally arrest Defendant for driving while impaired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Officer Bendel detained and investigated Defendant and ejected him from the Red Lake Reservation pursuant to the tribal authority to detain and remove recognized by federal courts; and (2) therefore, Defendant's detention was lawful. | | Dancy v. Mississippi | Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2018-KM-01409-SCT Opinion Date: January 16, 2020 Judge: Chamberlin Areas of Law: Animal / Dog Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | In 2017, the Union County Sheriff’s Department seized six horses, four cats and three dogs belonging to Michael Dancy. The Justice Court of Union County found Dancy guilty of three counts of animal cruelty and ordered the permanent forfeiture of Dancy’s animals. Dancy appealed to the Circuit Court of Union County, where a bench trial was held de novo. The circuit court ordered that the animals be permanently forfeited and found Dancy guilty of three counts of animal cruelty. The circuit court further ordered Dancy to reimburse the temporary custodian of the horses $39,225 for care and boarding costs incurred during the pendency of the forfeiture and animal-cruelty proceedings. Aggrieved, Dancy appealed to the Mississippi SUpreme Court. Finding the forfeiture and reimbursement orders supported by substantial evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed. Furthermore, the Court found the circuit court did not abse its discretion in allowing a veterinarian testify for the State. The Supreme Court affirmed Dancy’s conviction under Section 97-41-7, and Section 97-41- 16(2)(a) that coincided with Union County Justice Court Arrest Warrant 7036216. However, the Court found Section 97-41-16(2)(a) made Dancy’s cruelty to his dogs and cats one offense. As a result, Dancy’s second conviction under Section 97-41-16(2)(a) that coincides with Union County Justice Court Arrest Warrant 7036219 was vacated. | | State ex rel. Kelly v. Inman | Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Docket: SC97744 Opinion Date: January 14, 2020 Judge: Mary R. Russell Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law | The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's guilty by mental disease or defect (NGRI) plea that the circuit court accepted after finding Defendant lacked competence to continue with the criminal proceedings, holding that the circuit court exceeded its authority under Mo. Rev. Stat. 552.020.8 and violated Defendant's due process rights. Defendant was charged with first-degree robbery and armed criminal action. After accepting Defendant's NGRI plea the circuit court found Defendant lacked competence to proceed and committed him to the department of mental health. The Defendant sought a writ of habeas corpus arguing that, pursuant to section 552.020.8, upon finding him incompetent, the circuit court was required to suspend the proceedings and commit him to the department of mental health. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that, by accepting Defendant's NGRI plea despite finding him incompetent to proceed, the circuit court exceeded its authority pursuant to section 552.020.8 and violated Defendant's due process rights. | | State v. Smith | Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Docket: SC97811 Opinion Date: January 14, 2020 Judge: Powell Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of felony possession of a controlled substance, holding that the circuit court did not err in admitting evidence obtained from Defendant's statements and a search of his vehicle after a traffic stop. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred in overruling his motion to suppress because the traffic stop was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) crossing the fog line and driving on the shoulder is a traffic violation and creates a lawful justification for a traffic stop; and (2) the stop in this case was justified after Defendant's vehicle crossed the fog line and drove on the shoulder and therefore did not constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. | | State v. Jones | Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 7 Opinion Date: January 14, 2020 Judge: Laurie McKinnon Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of assault with a weapon and aggravated assault, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion. Specifically, the Court held that the district court (1) did not violate Defendant's constitutional right to self-representation by refusing his request to represent himself at an omnibus hearing but otherwise allowing Defendant to represent himself for the duration of his case; and (2) correctly applied the law and did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant a new trial after the court considered the victim's post-trial recantations and the evidence of Defendant's guilt produced at trial. | | State v. Myers | Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 304 Neb. 789 Opinion Date: January 10, 2020 Judge: Funke Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion for testing under Nebraska's DNA Testing Act and his motion for the appointment of counsel, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for DNA testing. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and other crimes. Defendant later filed his motion for DNA testing pursuant to the DNA Testing Act, seeking to have certain items taken from the crime scene tested in order to exclude himself as a donor of any biological material. Defendant additionally claimed that the State withheld findings of biological evidence from him and asked that counsel be appointed. The district court denied relief, determining that the requested testing would not produce noncumulative exculpatory evidence. The court further determined that the State did not withhold evidence and denied Defendant's request for counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the DNA testing requested by Defendant would not result in noncumulative exculpatory evidence relevant to his wrongful conviction claim. | | New Hampshire v. Folley | Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court Dockets: 2018-0708, 2018-0710 Opinion Date: January 10, 2020 Judge: Donovan Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Defendants James Folley and his wife, Karen Folley, appealed their convictions after a joint jury trial on two counts of theft by unauthorized taking as a principal or accomplice, and as to James, an additional count of financial exploitation of an elderly adult. They also appealed the trial court’s restitution order requiring that they pay restitution to an assisted living facility where the victim resided at the time of the crimes. To the New Hampshire Supreme Court they argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions; and (2) the trial court erred by ordering them to pay restitution to the facility because it is not entitled to compensation under RSA 651:62 (2016). After review, the Supreme Court affirmed defendants’ convictions but reversed the restitution order because the economic loss claimed by the facility was not a direct result of the defendants’ criminal conduct. | | New Hampshire v. Jones | Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court Docket: 2019-0057 Opinion Date: January 10, 2020 Judge: Donovan Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Defendant Ernest Jones appealed a superior court order denying his motion to suppress evidence that led to his conviction on one count of possession of a controlled drug. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by: (1) concluding that he was not seized during his encounter with two Concord police officers; and (2) refusing to consider his race in its seizure analysis. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed and remanded because the State failed to meet its burden of showing that defendant was not seized. Furthermore, the Court concluded that race was one circumstance that courts may consider in conducting the totality of the circumstances seizure analysis. | | New Hampshire v. Salimullah | Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court Docket: 2018-0318 Opinion Date: January 10, 2020 Judge: Anna Barbara Hantz Marconi Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Defendant Mohammad Salimullah was convicted by jury on one count of attempted murder, two counts of first degree assault, one count of second degree assault, and one count of reckless conduct. He appealed: (1) a superior court order denying his motion to dismiss on the grounds that the State failed to comply with RSA 135:17-a (2015) (amended 2019) in bringing indictments against him in 2016; (2) another superior court order denying his motion for a competency determination prior to sentencing; and (3) a third superior court order imposing a no-contact condition on a stand-committed sentence. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the imposition of the no-contact condition, but otherwise affirmed. | | Smith v. May | Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-61 Opinion Date: January 14, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law | The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the court of appeals correctly denied relief. Appellant was sixteen years old when four delinquency complaints were filed in juvenile court. The cases were transferred to adult court where Appellant was convicted of five felony counts and sentenced to an aggregate prison term of sixteen years. Appellant later filed this habeas corpus petition alleging that the juvenile court did not fully comply with the procedures for transferring jurisdiction to the adult court because it did not timely notify his father of a hearing in one of the cases that led to the transfer of some of the charges. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the juvenile court's failure to provide timely notice was not a defect that deprived the adult court of subject matter jurisdiction. | | Oregon v. Andrews | Court: Oregon Supreme Court Docket: S066479 Opinion Date: January 16, 2020 Judge: Martha Lee Walters Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The state charged defendant Joshua Andrews with two crimes: one count of fourth- degree assault, and one count of harassment. At trial, the state presented evidence that defendant drove to the victim’s place of work, began yelling at him, spat on him, and punched him in the face, knocking out his tooth bridge. The jury acquitted defendant on the assault charge but convicted him of harassment. Post-trial, the state asked the court to impose restitution for the cost of replacing the victim’s tooth bridge. Defendant objected, arguing that the trial court did not have statutory authority to do so. Defendant unsuccessfully argued that restitution was permitted only when a trial court could conclude, from the defendant’s conviction, that the defendant engaged in the criminal act that formed the basis for the award of restitution, and that, in this case, the trial court could not reach that conclusion: the act that formed the basis for the victim’s damages was the punch, and the jury could have convicted defendant of harassment without finding that defendant had punched the victim. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Oregon Supreme Court allowed defendant’s petition for review, and, because it concluded the trial court could not award restitution under ORS 137.106, it reversed. | | State v. Bozzo | Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court Docket: 17-220 Opinion Date: January 15, 2020 Judge: Maureen McKenna Goldberg Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's judgment of conviction on one count of first-degree child molestation sexual assault and remanded the case to the superior court for a new trial, holding that the trial justice erred in denying Defendant's motion to pass the case after the prosecutor's statements during closing argument about Defendant's courtroom demeanor and behavior toward the complainant. Specifically, the Court held (1) the prosecutor's statements regarding Defendant's courtroom demeanor had the potential for unfair prejudice, and a curative instruction could not overcome the prejudice in this case; (2) the trial justice erred in admitting some, but not all, of the evidence pertaining to a police investigation into Defendant for possession of child pornography; and (3) Defendant's claim that the trial justice erred in failing to safeguard Defendant's right to a fair trial based on various claims related to the presence of members of a motorcycle group known as Bikers Against Child Abuse in the courtroom during trial was not properly before the court. | | Dixon v. Texas | Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Docket: PD-0048-19 Opinion Date: January 15, 2020 Judge: Sharon Keller Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | Appellant Thomas Dixon, was a plastic surgeon in Amarillo, Texas. Joseph Sonnier was a physician in Lubbock. David Shepherd was a friend of Dixon’s. In 2012, David Shepard killed Joseph Sonnier. The State’s theory was that Dixon hired Shepard to kill Sonnier. Although Dixon had originally told the police that he knew nothing about Sonnier, he admitted at trial that this was untrue. Dixon testified that he had hired Shepard to track and photograph Sonnier (hoping to obtain photos that would cause Dixon’s former girlfriend to break up with Sonnier) and that he understood that Shepard would be planting a camera at Sonnier’s house for this purpose. Also, Shepard’s phone records revealed that Dixon called Shepard within minutes after the police finished speaking to Dixon. Appellant was convicted under a murder-for-hire theory. The Court of Appeals reversed Appellant’s conviction for two reasons: (1) because cell phone location information was improperly admitted; and (2) because the trial court deprived him of a public trial. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined neither of these reasons "appears to stand up to close scrutiny." Appellant’s whereabouts on a date other than the date of the murder were not particularly important to the case, so any error in admitting the evidence was harmless. As for the public trial complaints, two were not preserved and the other had no merit. Consequently, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. | | Simpson v. Texas | Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Docket: PD-0578-18 Opinion Date: January 15, 2020 Judge: Michael E. Keasler Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law | While on probation for child endangerment charges, Robvia Simpson struck her roommate with an ashtray. She contended she did so in self-defense. But at the hearing to determine whether her probation would be revoked, Simpson did not claim self-defense. Instead, she simply pleaded “true” to the allegation that she assaulted her roommate. The question presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether Simpson’s plea of “true” precluded her from claiming self-defense in a subsequent criminal trial. The Court concluded that it did not, and affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment. | | Flores-Gomez v. State | Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 5 Opinion Date: January 10, 2020 Judge: Boomgaarden Areas of Law: Criminal Law | The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor, holding that Defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial under Wyo. R. Crim. P. 48. Defendant was charged with one count of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor. On April 9, 2018, the district court arraigned Defendant, starting the 180-day speedy trial clock. Defendant's trial, however, was not held within 180 days of his arraignment. Instead, Defendant's trial commenced on October 15, 2018, 190 days later. At issue was whether the district court properly continued the trial beyond the 180-day mandate of Rule 48(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly granted a continuance under Wyo. R. Crim. P. 48(b)(4)(A) even though Defendant did not agree to a continuance and the motion was not supported by a written affidavit; and (2) therefore, the ten-day continuance did not count toward the 180-day limit, and Defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial. | |
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