| Hernandez-Gotay v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Dockets: 19-2236, 20-1084 Opinion Date: January 14, 2021 Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In these consolidated cases, the First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court rejecting Plaintiffs' suits seeking to enjoin the enforcement of Section 12616 of the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, which bans the sponsorship and exhibition of cockfighting matches in Puerto Rico, holding that Section 12616 is a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power and does not violate Plaintiffs' individual rights. On their complaints, Plaintiffs argued that Section 12616 violated their First Amendment and Due Process rights and that Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce and Territorial Clauses and further lodged both facial and as-applied pre-enforcement challenges to the statute. The district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs had standing to bring these lawsuits; (2) Section 12616 is a legitimate exercise of the Commerce Clause power; and (3) Section 12616 does not infringe on Plaintiffs' First Amendment freedoms of speech and association. |
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| United States v. Cruz-Ramos |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-1569 Opinion Date: January 27, 2021 Judge: Ojetta Rogeriee Thompson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of committing, or aiding and abetting others in committing, the crimes of RICO conspiracy, drug conspiracy, and other crimes, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error. After Defendant was originally convicted the First Circuit vacated the convictions, concluding that the police lacked probable cause to search Defendant's house, and therefore, the seized evidence should have been suppressed. On remand, a jury again convicted Defendant of the relevant charges. Defendant appealed, claiming trial error and sentencing issues. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's claims of trial error were without merit; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions; (3) the trial court did not err in instructing the jury; (4) there was no abuse of discretion in the denial of Defendant's motion for a new trial; and (5) Defendant's sentence was not procedurally unreasonable. |
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| United States v. Estes |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 19-2111 Opinion Date: January 14, 2021 Judge: Burroughs Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting the government's motion in limine to admit a recording of a 911 call placed by Defendant's girlfriend, holding that the Confrontation Clause was not implicated and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying a hearsay exception. Defendant was indicted for possessing a stolen firearm and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Prior to trial, the government filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce the 911 recording without calling Defendant's girlfriend as a witness. The district court granted the motion. Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the district court's order granting the motion. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the Confrontation Clause was not implicated by the non-testimonial statements and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 911 recording. |
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| United States v. Ouellette |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 19-2092 Opinion Date: January 14, 2021 Judge: Burroughs Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence imposed in connection with his plea of guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, holding that the sentence was reasonable. After Defendant pleaded guilty, the district court sentenced Defendant to seventy-two months of incarceration. On appeal, Defendant challenged his sentence, arguing that the district court miscalculated his base offense level under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) it was in the district court's discretion to impose a sentence outside of the Guidelines range, and any alleged error in calculating Defendant's base offense level was harmless; and (2) Defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable. |
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| United States v. Patrone |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 19-1486 Opinion Date: January 14, 2021 Judge: William Joseph Kayatta, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute drugs and one count of possessing a firearm as an alien unlawfully present in the United States, holding that Defendant failed to establish a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty had he been advised as required by Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019). Defendant pled guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement and was sentenced to 144 months' imprisonment on the drug count and 120 months' imprisonment on the firearm count, to be served concurrently. One month after Defendant's sentencing, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Rehaif. Before the First Circuit, Defendant asked that his conviction on the firearm count be vacated because he did not plead guilty to knowing the facts that made him a person prohibited from possessing a firearm, as Rehaif requires. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to establish that his substantial rights were affected by the district court's failure to anticipate Rehaif; and (2) the district court did not err in imposing a livelihood enhancement that Defendant received at sentencing. |
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| United States v. Quiles-Lopez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Dockets: 19-1379, 19-1380 Opinion Date: January 14, 2021 Judge: Boudin Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In this consolidated appeal brought by Appellant to contest the sentences he received in two separate cases, the First Circuit affirmed the sentences, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion. In the first case, Appellant pled guilty to attempted possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to 168 months' imprisonment. In this second case, Appellant was sentenced to eighteen months for violating supervised release terms that were imposed for an earlier conviction for conspiracy to attempt to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. The First Circuit affirmed both sentences, holding that the 168-month sentence was not unreasonably high and that the district court's sentencing rationale in the second case was not flawed. |
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| United States v. Santa-Soler |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Dockets: 19-1562, 19-1565 Opinion Date: January 14, 2021 Judge: Selya Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In these consolidated appeals the First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence imposed following his conviction on the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm and Defendant's sentence imposed following the revocation of a supervised release term imposed in connection with a prior, unrelated conviction, holding that Defendant's claims of error were unavailing. The district court imposed a sixty-six term of immurement for the felon-in-possession charge and a twenty-four-month sentence with respect to the supervised release violation. The First Circuit affirmed the sentences, holding (1) the sentence imposed on the felon-in-possession conviction survived Defendant's challenges; and (2) the district court acted within its discretion in imposing the sentence in connection with the revocation of Defendant's supervised release term. |
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| United States v. Croft |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-6627 Opinion Date: January 29, 2021 Judge: Quattlebaum Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, holding that a conviction under South Carolina's carjacking statute, S.C. Code 16-3-1075, which prohibits taking or attempting to take a motor vehicle "by force and violence or by intimidation while the person is operating the vehicle or while the person is in the vehicle," is a violent felony predicate under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). In this case, petitioner claims that "intimidation," as it is used in the carjacking statute, requires the threat of physical force against the person in the vehicle. However, the court explained that, although South Carolina courts have not explicitly interpreted the carjacking statute, the state has given every indication that it meant "intimidation" in its carjacking statute to require the use, attempted use or threat of physical force against the person in the vehicle. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that South Carolina carjacking is a violent felony under the ACCA. |
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| Rice v. Gonzalez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 20-20263 Opinion Date: February 2, 2021 Judge: Edith Hollan Jones Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Plaintiff, a detainee in the Harris County jail awaiting trial, filed what he described as a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking release from pretrial custody, contending that the conditions at the jail were insufficient to protect his constitutional rights in the midst of the COVID-19 crisis. The district court denied relief regardless of whether the petition was brought under federal habeas law, 28 U.S.C. 2241, or civil rights law, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Fifth Circuit construed plaintiff's petition as seeking habeas relief and affirmed the district court's denial of such relief. The court concluded that the Great Writ does not, in this circuit, afford release for prisoners held in state custody due to adverse conditions of confinement. Therefore, plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). |
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| Tampico v. Martinez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-20555 Opinion Date: February 3, 2021 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's claims because they are barred by the statute of limitations. In this case, plaintiff filed suit against defendant, in his individual capacity, alleging that plaintiff's property had been illegally seized after plaintiff's arrest. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to file his equitable claim within six years, making his current lawsuit untimely. Even if plaintiff's Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) motion was timely, the court explained that that has no bearing on the outcome of this case. Because the court held that plaintiff's equitable claim is time-barred, the court need not address plaintiff's suspicions about whether the government still possesses his property or whether defendant's sworn affidavit is admissible evidence to prove that plaintiff's property had been destroyed. Because Bivens actions are limited by a two-year statute of limitations, plaintiff's Bivens action is also time-barred. Finally, the court concluded that exceptional circumstances do not exist in this case to warrant the appointment of counsel. |
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| United States v. Cline |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-51178 Opinion Date: January 29, 2021 Judge: Edith Hollan Jones Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for violating the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). Defendant's arguments center on challenges to his conviction for violating two separate protection orders by transporting his girlfriend across state lines in violation of both. The court held that the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment where the definition of protection order in VAWA encompasses the two orders at issue. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion for acquittal as a matter of law where a rational jury could have found the elements of each offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, the court held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to elect a single count of conviction. In regard to defendant's sentence, the court held that the district court did not err by applying a two-level, vulnerable victim sentencing enhancement under USSG 3A.1.1. In this case, defendant knew that the victim was pregnant with his child and knew or should have known that she was susceptible to his efforts to contact her. |
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| United States v. Winters |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 20-30138 Opinion Date: February 3, 2021 Judge: Leslie Southwick Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to reduce defendant's sentence under the First Step Act. The court held that defendant's dual-object conspiracy offense under 21 U.S.C. 846, which was committed before August 3, 2010, is a covered offense under Section 404(a) of the First Step Act. The court also held that the district court had statutory authority under Section 404 to reduce defendant's sentence from 233 months to 180 months. Finally, the court held that neither of Section 404(c)'s limitations apply. Therefore, defendant is eligible for relief under the First Step Act. |
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| Jordan v. Howard |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 20-3274 Opinion Date: February 3, 2021 Judge: Richard Allen Griffin Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| During the early morning hours of October 20, 2017, McShann was asleep in the driver’s seat of a locked, running car with his right hand resting on a pistol in his lap and music blaring from the car stereo. Officers, responding to a complaint, determined that the car was registered to a woman whom they were unable to contact. Seconds after officers roused him from sleep, McShann stopped complying with their orders that he keep his hands up and away from the gun. He grabbed the gun and swung it toward the driver-side door, where two officers were positioned. Fearing for their safety and that of their fellow officers, the officers opened fire, killing McShann. After the shooting, the officers immediately called for medical assistance and attempted first aid. The district court concluded the use of deadly force was reasonable and granted the officers summary judgment on excessive force claims, 42 U.S.C. 1983, by McShann’s estate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The plaintiff’s expert’s testimony that “[t]he lack of damage to the gun provides clear evidence that Mr. McShann was not holding the gun when he was shot in the hand” did not create a genuine issue of material fact. Such speculation is not enough to controvert consistent officer testimony. |
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| United States v. Sherwood |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 20-4085 Opinion Date: February 2, 2021 Judge: Readler Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2015, Sherwood pleaded guilty to transporting visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct and possessing child pornography and received a below-Guidelines sentence of 108 months’ imprisonment. In 2020, Sherwood moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), asserting that the COVID-19 pandemic coupled with his age and medical conditions together constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons and that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors weighed in favor of release. The district court denied Sherwood’s motion, stating: “[Sherwood] has failed to demonstrate that he is not a danger to the community. Not only was he convicted of possession of child pornography, but he was convicted of transportation as well.” The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. Following enactment of the First Step Act, the policy statement in U.S.S.G. 1B1.13 is no longer an independent basis upon which a court may deny a defendant-filed motion for release. Because Sherwood was denied relief exclusively due to his failure to satisfy section 1B1.13(2)’s requirement that a defendant not be a danger to the community, the district court must apply the remaining section 3582(c)(1)(A) factors. On remand, the court may consider Sherwood’s history and characteristics, including his propensity to be a danger to the community, and the nature and circumstances of his offense. |
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| United States v. Collins |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 20-1198 Opinion Date: February 3, 2021 Judge: HAMILTON Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Collins pleaded guilty to participating in a heroin distribution ring and was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment, the statutory mandatory minimum. Collins sought to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that, at sentencing, the government breached the plea agreement by failing to move for a downward departure from the statutory minimum. The government explained that Collins had refused its requests to provide “complete and truthful testimony.” Collins disputed that assertion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence. Collins did not raise this argument in the district court, so the demanding “plain error” standard applies. Even if there might have been a breach of the plea agreement, it was not plain. Even if there had been a plain error, Collins did not suffer any prejudice from it. His sentence was the lowest the law would permit, and the plain-error review does not entitle Collins himself to choose to withdraw his guilty pleas. |
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| United States v. Hamzeh |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-3072 Opinion Date: February 3, 2021 Judge: Daniel Anthony Manion Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Hamzeh’s friend contacted the FBI, concerned that Hamzeh planned to commit a mass killing. The FBI involved another informant, who began working with the two at a restaurant. Both recorded their conversations with Hamzeh, who spoke about committing acts of terrorism to be martyred as part of his Islamic faith, carrying out a Middle East shooting, committing a domestic shooting at a Masonic lodge, and acquiring weapons for these crimes. The FBI instructed the informants to offer to arrange a purchase if Hamzeh wanted a weapon so authorities could set up a sting operation. Hamzeh and the informants negotiated with undercover FBI Agents posing as arms dealers for the purchase of two machine guns and a silencer. Hamzeh carried the unregistered weapons to his vehicle and was arrested. The government moved to admit excerpts of the informants’ recorded conversations with Hamzeh to show lack of entrapment. The court expressed concern with a jury convicting Hamzeh of possession based on his plans and “disturbing talk” rather than the elements of the offense and stated that motive was irrelevant under 26 U.S.C. 5861(d). The court excluded much of the government’s evidence. In an interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, noting repeated errors in excluding evidence as “not probative” or irrelevant, which affected the court’s further findings under Rule 403. It also erred in excluding the machinegun-availability evidence as irrelevant; the evidence is conditionally admissible, subject to Hamzeh’s introduction of evidence he did not have the ability to commit the crime. |
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| United States v. Morgan |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-2737 Opinion Date: February 3, 2021 Judge: Diane Pamela Wood Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Morgan transferred funds to an acquaintance in New Mexico, who used those funds to buy seven guns and mail them to Morgan’s Chicago residence. Morgan admits that the firearms were sent to his home and that "friends and family" had access to the residence, but could not recall in whose hands the guns came to rest. Officers recovered six of the guns. Several were linked to gang-related homicides, including one of a child. Morgan was charged under 18 U.S.C. 371 (conspiracy) and 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(3) (unlicensed receipt of a firearm). He pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge. The PSR calculated a sentencing guidelines range between 24-30 months’ incarceration, considering Morgan’s acceptance of responsibility. The court acknowledged his acceptance of responsibility but stated that Morgan distributed the guns knowing that they would be used by gang members, not just friends and family. Morgan agreed. The court sentenced Morgan to 48 months’ incarceration and imposed discretionary conditions of release, including condition 16, which authorized the probation office to visit Morgan at home, work, school, or other locations and confiscate any contraband in plain view, and condition 23, which authorized the probation office to search Morgan’s “person, property, house, residence, vehicle, papers, [computers], or office,” if the search was supported by reasonable suspicion. The Seventh Circuit rejected most of Morgan’s challenges but remanded. The district court failed to justify supervised-release condition 23 with reference to the sentencing criteria, 18 U.S.C. 3553. |
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| United States v. Stephens |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 20-1463 Opinion Date: February 2, 2021 Judge: HAMILTON Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Agents seized electronic devices with 184,000 pornographic images and videos of children from Stephens’s home. Before charges were filed, officers discovered that Stephens in the meantime had downloaded 10,000 more child pornography images and videos and had shared some files. Stephens pleaded guilty to transporting child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1). A probation officer calculated his guideline range as 151-188 months' imprisonment and recommended a 108-month sentence, reasoning that the computer enhancement is outdated, but suggested that an upward variance could be appropriate because Stephens possessed a large quantity of child pornography and because the first search had no deterrent effect. Stephens asked for the five-year mandatory minimum sentence, arguing that adopting 15 offense levels’ of enhancements would result in an artificially high sentence; citing his psychosexual evaluation, which concluded that, as a “no-contact” offender, Stephens was unlikely to sexually offend in the future; and noting his autism spectrum disorder, avoidant personality disorder, and depression diagnoses. He believed: “I did nothing wrong.” His attorney explained that Stephens had taken a cognitive skills class, behavioral treatment, and engaged ub reflection. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 151-month sentence, finding that the district court adequately considered the arguments in mitigation, the probation officer’s recommendation, and the sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The court had noted images that depicted violent, traumatic, and sadistic abuse, “[t]he number of children seriously and irreversibly traumatized,” and doubts that Stephens could “realize the pure evil of these images.” |
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| United States v. Blanks |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2042 Opinion Date: February 1, 2021 Judge: Roger Leland Wollman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for three counts related to the receipt and possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2), (a)(5)(B), (b)(1), and (b)(2). The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for leave to file post-deadline pretrial motions in light of his knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to do so. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a limited number of child pornography images from the more than one thousand images seized from defendant's devices. The court noted that, although it might well have been a better practice to examine the images in question, the district court did not abuse its discretion by making its Federal Rule of Evidence 403 decision without having done so. In this case, the images were neither unfairly prejudicial nor needlessly cumulative. |
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| United States v. Bastide-Hernandez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 19-30006 Opinion Date: February 2, 2021 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an indictment charging defendant with illegal reentry after removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. In this case, the district court held that a defective notice to appear (NTA) lacking time and date information did not provide the immigration court with jurisdiction to enter an order of removal. The panel explained that Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2019), and Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2020), created some confusion as to when jurisdiction actually vests. To clarify, the panel held that 8 C.F.R. 1003.14(a) means what it says and controls: the jurisdiction of the immigration court vests upon the filing of an NTA, even one that does not at that time inform the alien of the time, date, and location of the hearing. The panel further explained that while a defective NTA does not affect jurisdiction, it can create due-process violations. In defendant's brief, he chose not to address the requirements under section 1326(d) for a collateral attack on the validity of the underlying removal, and thus he failed to satisfy the section 1326(d) requirements based on the NTA's lack of date and time information. On remand, defendant may be able to collaterally attack the underlying removal order, if he can meet the requirements of section 1326(d). |
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| United States v. Hudson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 19-10227 Opinion Date: January 29, 2021 Judge: Michael Daly Hawkins Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence for possession of child pornography where the district court applied a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. 2252(b)(2). Section 2252(b)(2) applies if a defendant has a prior conviction "under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward." The district court applied section 2252(b)(2) based on defendant's prior conviction under California Penal Code 288(a), which criminalizes lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under the age of fourteen. The panel held that the statutory provision "relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward" is not unconstitutionally vague, because the language neither fails to give ordinary people notice of its scope nor poses a risk of arbitrary enforcement. |
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| United States v. Cannon |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 16-16194 Opinion Date: February 3, 2021 Judge: Hull Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Defendant Cannon and Holton's convictions for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence and a drug trafficking crime, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their participation in a plan to rob a stash house containing 18 kilograms of cocaine. However, one participant was an undercover detective and the stash house was fake. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants' motion for discovery on the claim of selective prosecution; Holton failed to show that the indictment was multiplicitious where the two conspiracy offenses have separate elements; and taken in its entirety, the government's conduct was not outrageous and did not violate due process. The court rejected defendants' challenges to the district court's refusal to give an entrapment defense. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a juror; Cannon's right to have all proceedings in open court transcribed was not violated; and defendants' challenge to their 18 U.S.C. 924(c) convictions on Count 3 fail. |
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| Benson v. Payne |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2021 Ark. 18 Opinion Date: February 4, 2021 Judge: Womack Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-101, holding that Appellant's claim was not cognizable in habeas proceedings. In three separate cases, Appellant was convicted of three counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of a terroristic act, rape and aggravated robbery. Appellant's current habeas petition challenged all three convictions based on defective informations. The circuit court denied habeas relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err when it rejected Appellant's claim for habeas relief as not cognizable. |
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| Brown v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2021 Ark. 16 Opinion Date: February 4, 2021 Judge: Rhonda K. Wood Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for first-degree murder, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below. The victim in this case died two hours after Defendant threw a cup of gasoline on him, lit a cigarette lighter, and ignited the victim's upper torso, arms, and face. On appeal, Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the first-degree murder conviction because he did not "cause" the victim's death. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Defendant caused the victim's death. |
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| Green v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2021 Ark. 19 Opinion Date: February 4, 2021 Judge: Webb Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Petitioner's petition to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-111, holding that Petitioner did not allege or demonstrate in this appeal that the imposed sentences were facially illegal. Petitioner challenged the amended sentence imposed for theft of property, asserting that the property stolen did not exceed $1,000, and therefore, his sentence was excessive. The circuit court summarily denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner's petition to correct the sentences imposed in the amended sentencing order was untimely and did not include a valid claim for relief under section 16-90-111. |
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| Starling v. Kelley |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2021 Ark. 15 Opinion Date: February 4, 2021 Judge: Karen R. Baker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order denying Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant stated no ground in the petition on which the writ could issue. Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and committing a terroristic act. The Supreme Court affirmed. In his habeas petition, Appellant argued that the first-degree murder conviction and the conviction for a terroristic act constituted multiple punishments for a single action, in violation of double jeopardy protections. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant did not meet his burden of establishing that his double jeopardy claim was cognizable in a proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus. |
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| Washington v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2021 Ark. 13 Opinion Date: February 4, 2021 Judge: Kemp Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's pro se third petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis, holding that Petitioner's claim has been raised in previous petitions and rejected by this Court. Petitioner was convicted of residential burglary, first-degree battery, and aggravated robbery and sentenced to an aggregate term of 480 months' imprisonment. In his third coram nobis petition, Petitioner reasserted his claim that he was deprived of counsel during his criminal trial because his trial counsel's license was suspended at the time of trial. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the petition was an abuse of the writ. |
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| In re Palmer |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S256149 Opinion Date: January 28, 2021 Judge: Cuellar Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal concluding that William Palmer was entitled to release from all forms of custody, including parole supervision, holding that to the extent Palmer's continued incarceration at some point became constitutionally excessive, that alone did not justify ending his parole under the current statutory scheme. Palmer first sought release on parole in 1995. The Board of Parole Hearings denied parole. Palmer continued to seek release. After the Board's tenth denial, Palmer filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the thirty years he had served on a life sentence for an aggravated kidnapping committed when he was a juvenile was constitutionally excessive. The Board subsequently ordered Palmer released on parole. Ruling on Palmer's writ, the court of appeals concluded that Palmer's now-completed term of imprisonment had become unconstitutional and ended his parole. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in the absence of any persuasive argument from Palmer that his parole term had become constitutionally excessive, his parole remained valid. |
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| People v. Baker |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S170280 Opinion Date: February 1, 2021 Judge: Tani Cantil-Sakauye Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death, holding that any errors, found or assumed, were not prejudicial. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) at the guilt phase, assuming that the trial court erred in admitting certain DNA evidence, the error was not prejudicial; (2) at the penalty phase, assuming the trial court erred in admitting evidence of potential animal abuse, the error was not prejudicial; (3) any error in imposing a parole revocation fine was harmless; (4) even when viewed in combination, the guilt phase and penalty phase errors were not prejudicial; and (5) the abstract of judgment reflected a clerical error, which will be corrected. |
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| People v. Johnsen |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S040704 Opinion Date: February 1, 2021 Judge: Goodwin Liu Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of first degree murder, attempted murder, and other offenses, and sentencing Defendant to death, holding that any errors that occurred during the trial proceedings were not prejudicial. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) during the guilt phase, there was error with respect to the prosecutor's misstatement of the reasonable doubt standard and with respect to defense counsel's agreement with the prosecutor on a certain point of law, but there was no reasonable probability that the prosecutor's or defense counsel's misstatements were prejudicial; (2) at the penalty phase, the prosecutor's comment about Defendant during penalty phase arguments bordered on "inflammatory" rhetoric, but any error was not prejudicial; and (3) the cumulative effect of these errors did not rise to the level of prejudice necessary to reverse Defendant's conviction or sentence. |
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| People v. Ramirez |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S155160 Opinion Date: January 28, 2021 Judge: Tani Cantil-Sakauye Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the trial proceedings. Defendant was convicted of the first degree murder of San Leandro Police Officer Nels Niemi. The jury returned a verdict of death, and the trial court sentenced Defendant accordingly. The court also ordered Defendant to pay a restitution fine of $10,000. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no error in the guilt phase of the proceedings; (2) there was no cumulative effect of any purported errors occurring at the penalty phase; and (3) the trial court did not violate any statutory or constitutional law by imposing restitution. |
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| California v. Clements |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E073965(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 4, 2021 Judge: Slough Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 1989, after appellant Jody Ann Clements solicited her ex-husband and her boyfriend to assault her 16-year-old brother, the two killed the brother by stabbing him and bludgeoning him with a rock and then buried his body in the desert. A jury convicted Clements of second degree murder in 1990 after the trial judge instructed them on both natural and probable consequences and implied malice theories of murder. In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) which, among other things, amended the definition of murder to eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The Legislature also added a new provision to the Penal Code, which established a procedure for vacating murder convictions predating the amendment if they could not be sustained under the amended definition of murder. Clements petitioned for relief under SB 1437, arguing she could not be convicted under the current law. After a hearing, at which the parties agreed to limit the evidence to the record of conviction, the trial judge looked to the Court of Appeal's decision in Clements’ original appeal and made two alternative determinations: (1) substantial evidence supported the determination that Clements could have been convicted of second degree murder under an implied malice theory; and (2) Clements in fact committed implied malice second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge therefore denied her petition on each of these independent, adequate grounds. Clements argued the trial court erred (1) by considering the Court of Appeal's opinion in her original appeal; (2) by misconstruing the nature of the eligibility determination it was required to make under the new statute; and (3) by denying her petition in the absence of substantial evidence supporting a finding of implied malice. The Court held an appellate opinion was part of the record of conviction and could be relied on in deciding a Penal Code section 1170.95 petition on the merits, so the trial judge did not err in doing so in this case. Furthermore, the Court held the trial judge sat as a fact finder at a hearing under section 1170.95 (d), and that substantial evidence supported the trial judge’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Clements committed implied malice second degree murder. The trial judge correctly denied Clements’ petition for resentencing for that reason. |
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| California v. Harris |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E074136(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 3, 2021 Judge: Menetrez Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2010, Terrence Harris was charged along with three other individuals with one count of premeditated first degree murder in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery, and two counts of robbery. Harris pled guilty to the two counts of robbery and one count each of attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter in exchange for dismissal of the murder count. The parties agreed to a stipulated prison term of 16 years four months, which the trial court imposed at sentencing. In 2019, following the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), Harris petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that section 1170.95 provided relief for murder convictions only. He appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. |
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| People v. Collins |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: F076883(Fifth Appellate District) Opinion Date: February 2, 2021 Judge: Snauffer Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant was convicted of many crimes, including two counts of murder, after he drove his car at nearly 100 miles per hour and collided into a vehicle carrying three young women, two of whom died. A test of defendant's blood revealed the presence of alcohol and phencyclidine (PCP). The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to challenge the prosecutor's excusal of a black prospective juror during jury selection. The court explained that its independent review of the record supports a reasonable inference that the prosecutor's excusal was improperly motivated. The panel also concluded that defendant's remaining issues lack merit where the evidence proved implied malice murder; defense counsel was not ineffective; and the trial court properly denied the motion to continue sentencing. Finally, the court concluded that the prior prison term enhancements no longer apply. The court conditionally reversed to resume and conclude the hearing on the motion. |
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| People v. Hwang |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B301972(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: January 29, 2021 Judge: Kim Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's request to have his case transferred to juvenile court pursuant to the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (Proposition 57) and Senate Bill No. 1391. Proposition 57 eliminated the ability of prosecutors to file charges against juveniles directly in a court of criminal jurisdiction. The court explained that SB 1391 effectively broadens the ameliorative benefit of Proposition 57 to 14 and 15 year olds by prohibiting prosecuting attorneys from moving to transfer individuals who commit certain offenses when they were 14 or 15 years old to adult court, unless they were "not apprehended prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction." Therefore, SB 1391 applies retroactively to defendants whose judgments are not yet final. The court explained that the fact that defendant is now over 25 years old does not change the court's conclusion that he is entitled to the retroactive benefit of Welfare and Institutions section 707, subdivision (a)(2), if his conviction was not final when SB 1391 was enacted. In this case, defendant was apprehended when he was still 15 years old and therefore section 707, subdivision (a)(2)'s exclusion, by its plain terms, does not apply to him. Furthermore, because a resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) replaces the original sentence, the original sentence is no longer operative, and the finality of the original sentence is no longer material. The court remanded to the trial court with directions for the matter to be transferred to the juvenile court for a juvenile adjudication. |
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| Colorado v. Garcia |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2021 CO 7 Opinion Date: February 1, 2021 Judge: William W. Hood, III Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Michael Garcia was convicted of violating a protection order. On appeal, the district court concluded the county court violated Garcia’s confrontation right by admitting a notarized return of service into evidence at trial without the process server testifying. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded the return of service wasn’t testimonial hearsay, and therefore its admission didn’t violate Garcia’s constitutional right to confrontation. The district court’s judgment was reversed. |
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| Colorado v. Ross |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2021 CO 9 Opinion Date: February 1, 2021 Judge: Samour Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2015, Phillip Ross visited a website showing advertisements posted by individuals willing to perform sexual acts in exchange for money. Two girls under the age of eighteen, C.W. and M.O., listed varying ages in their advertisements, but consistently indicated that they were at least nineteen years old, and that any activities would be between two adults. Ross sent the girls sexually explicit text messages and negotiated the price he would pay in exchange for sexual acts. During his communications with M.O., Ross specifically inquired about her age, and she replied that she was twenty years old. Though Ross did not ask C.W. her age, her photograph appeared in the advertisements. When he was subsequently arrested, Ross admitted to texting the girls and agreeing to pay for sexual acts but maintained that he had not intended to solicit them for the purpose of child prostitution. In this appeal, the State asked the Colorado Supreme Court to determine whether the phrase “for the purpose of” in two statutory provisions defining the crime of soliciting for child prostitution, sections 18-7-402(1)(a), (b), C.R.S. (2020), described a culpable mental state. A division of the court of appeals said it does and then equated the phrase with the culpable mental state of intentionally or with intent. The State contended the phrase “for the purpose of” in subsections (a) and (b) did not describe a culpable mental state or mens rea, but instead qualified the prohibited conduct or the actus reus - soliciting another or arranging (or offering to arrange) a meeting - by specifying the reason for which such conduct must have been undertaken: for the purpose of prostitution of a child or by a child. Contrary to the State's assertion, the Supreme Court determined the lower court correctly determined that neither the victim’s age nor the defendant’s knowledge of, or belief concerning, the victim’s age was an element of soliciting for child prostitution. The Supreme Court concluded that while section 18-7-407, C.R.S. (2020), precluded a defendant from raising a defense based on either his lack of knowledge of the child’s age or his reasonable belief that the child was an adult, it did not relieve the State of its burden of proof under subsections (a) and (b). "Thus, section 18-7-407 does not give the People a pass on their obligation to prove that, in soliciting another or arranging (or offering to arrange) a meeting, the defendant’s purpose was child prostitution." |
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| Casiano v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC19-1622 Opinion Date: January 28, 2021 Judge: Lawson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court held that a defendant's potential designation as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR) under Fla. Stat. 775.082(9)(a)1. is not a sufficient collateral legal consequence to preclude dismissal of an appeal challenging a state prison sentence erroneously imposed pursuant to a trial court's dangerousness finding under section 775.082(1). The decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in this case expressly and directly conflicted with that of the First District Court of Appeal in Johnson v. State, 260 So. 3d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). The district courts reached separate conclusions as to whether a defendant's potential designation as a prison releasee reoffender is a sufficient collateral legal consequence precluding dismissal of such an appeal. The Supreme Court approved the Fourth District's decision and disapproved the First District's decision, holding that a defendant's potential PRR designation under section 775.082(9)(a)1. is not a sufficient collateral legal consequence flowing from a state prison sentence erroneously imposed pursuant to a trial court's dangerousness finding to preclude dismissal of an appeal as moot where the defendant has served the incarcerate portion of the sentence. |
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| Harvey v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC19-1275 Opinion Date: February 4, 2021 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's second successive postconviction motion filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that Appellant did not demonstrate that he was entitled to relief. In 1986, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and sentenced. The Supreme Court affirmed. In his second successive postconviction motion, Appellant claimed that he was entitled to a new trial because counsel conceded Appellant's guilt to first-degree murder without giving Appellant notice and an opportunity to object. Appellant based his claim on the Supreme Court's decision in McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018). The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that McCoy did not entitle Appellant to relief. |
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| Randolph v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC20-287 Opinion Date: February 4, 2021 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's second successive postconviction motion filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that the trial court properly denied postconviction relief. Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. In his second successive postconviction motion, Appellant raised four claims based on the retroactivity of Hurst v. State, 202 So, 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016), and chapter 2017-1, Laws of Florida and asserted that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's arguments on appeal were unavailing. |
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| Allen v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S21A0256 Opinion Date: February 1, 2021 Judge: Carla Wong McMillian Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Alfredo Allen was convicted of malice murder and other related crimes in connection with the 2015 stabbing death of Erin McKinney and the aggravated battery of Candice McKinney. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence relating to both murder charges. Finding the evidence sufficient and no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Hall v. Jackson |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Dockets: S20A1574, S20X1575 Opinion Date: February 1, 2021 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2007, Matthew Jackson was convicted of 28 counts of armed robbery and other crimes. During his trial, motion for new trial proceeding, and direct appeal, in which the Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions, Jackson was represented by lawyers from the Paulding County Public Defender’s Office. In 2016, represented by a lawyer in private practice, Jackson filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in three ways, and that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance because that lawyer had a conflict of interest that prevented him from raising ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in Jackson’s amended motion for new trial. The habeas court denied relief as to Jackson’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, but granted relief and set aside Jackson’s convictions on the ground that his appellate counsel had an actual conflict of interest. Warden Phillip Hall appealed that portion of the habeas court’s judgment granting relief on the conflict of interest claim. In a cross-appeal, Jackson contended the habeas court erred by denying relief as to his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. The Georgia Supreme Court found Jackson's appellate counsel had an actual conflict of interest that significantly and adversely affected his performance, so the Court affirmed the grant of habeas relief. However, the Court vacated the part of the habeas court’s judgment setting aside Jackson’s convictions, because the proper remedy under these circumstances was to grant Jackson a new opportunity to pursue a motion for new trial and direct appeal with conflict-free counsel, not a new trial. In Jackson’s cross-appeal, the Court vacated the portion of the habeas court’s judgment denying relief as to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, because such claims should have been evaluated and raised in a new motion for new trial by conflict-free counsel and decided in the first instance by the trial court. |
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| Henderson v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1571 Opinion Date: February 1, 2021 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Aquillous Rayon Henderson tried by jury and convicted of malice murder and other offenses in connection with the 2016 shooting death of Timothy Hill. His amended motion for new trial was denied, and he appealed, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion to suppress his custodial statement; and (2) excluding of Henderson’s testimony that Hill said he had been in prison. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Jefferson v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20G0528 Opinion Date: February 1, 2021 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Ted Jefferson was convicted by jury of kidnapping, two counts of armed robbery, and other offenses, for which the trial court sentenced him to life plus five consecutive years in prison. Jefferson moved for a new trial, and the trial court granted the motion in part, finding that the evidence was insufficient to support Jefferson’s convictions for armed robbery. The trial court denied the motion as to the remaining convictions. Jefferson then timely filed a direct appeal, which the Court of Appeals dismissed. In dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the order partially granting Jefferson’s motion for a new trial left the case pending in the trial court and that it was, therefore, a non-final order that could be appealed only through the interlocutory appeal process. The Georgia Supreme Court found the trial court's order was directly appealable. The appellate court's judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. |
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| Jordan v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1477 Opinion Date: February 1, 2021 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| After Travis Jordan brought an abrupt end to his murder trial by pleading guilty to felony murder, he moved to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing. The trial court denied Jordan’s motion, concluding that Jordan did not have a right to withdraw his guilty plea because he was charged with a capital crime and that, even if he had such a right, he had waived it. Jordan appealed, arguing among other things, that he had an absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea and that he did not knowingly waive his right. To this, the Georgia Supreme Court found Jordan was correct, and so it reversed and remanded for further proceedings. |
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| Kirkland v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S21A0113 Opinion Date: February 1, 2021 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Johnathon Kirkland appealed his convictions for malice murder and related offenses, contending the trial court erred by failing to suppress an identification of him made by means of a photo lineup. Specifically, Kirkland contended the photo-lineup procedure was unduly suggestive. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Kirkland's convictions. |
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| Kitchens v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1230 Opinion Date: February 1, 2021 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Willie Kitchens was convicted by jury of two counts of malice murder, arson, attempted rape and other crimes in connection with the 2011 stabbing deaths of Corey Kemp and Melanie Troupe. In his sole claim of error, Appellant contended the trial court court erred in allowing a witness to offer hearsay testimony that Appellant was responsible for the crimes. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Middlebrooks v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S21A0381 Opinion Date: February 1, 2021 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Deshaun Middlebrooks appealed his convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2017 shooting death of Quintavious Barber and the aggravated assault of Keundre Chappell. On appeal, Middlebrooks contended the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude evidence of gang activity, and that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Because Middlebrooks’ conviction for the aggravated assault of Barber should have merged into the malice murder conviction, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the conviction and sentence for that count. Otherwise, the convictions were affirmed. |
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| Chernobieff v. Idaho |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Docket: 47337 Opinion Date: February 1, 2021 Judge: Roger S. Burdick Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Daniel Chernobieff appealed a district court’s decision on intermediate appeal to uphold a magistrate court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Chernobieff was convicted of a misdemeanor for driving under the influence with an excessive blood alcohol content in June 2014. After the Idaho Supreme Court upheld his conviction on direct appeal, Chernobieff filed a petition for post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. He alleged that his defense counsel’s decision to object to testimony at a suppression hearing suggesting that the on-call magistrate could not be reached to obtain a warrant because his cell phone ringer was off was unreasonable and prejudicial. He argued that the objection to the ringer testimony prevented him from arguing at trial that the State did not have good cause for the on-call magistrate's unavailability. The magistrate court granted the State's motion for summary dismissal, reasoning the objection was an unreviewable strategic decision and would not have changed the outcome of the case. The district court, sitting in an appellate capacity, affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court also affirmed. |
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| Pizzuto v. Idaho |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Civil Docket: 47709 Opinion Date: February 3, 2021 Judge: Brody Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 1985, Gerald Pizzuto Jr. murdered Berta and Delbert Herndon. Pizzuto was convicted of two counts of murder in the first degree, two counts of felony murder, one count of robbery, and one count of grand theft. He was sentenced to death for the murders. Between 1986 and 2003, Pizzuto filed five petitions for post-conviction relief. His fifth petition for post-conviction relief was predicated on the holding in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the execution of an intellectually disabled person constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In his fifth petition, Pizzuto asserted that his death sentence should be “reversed and vacated” because he was intellectually disabled. The district court summarily dismissed Pizzuto’s petition. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court did not err when it dismissed Pizzuto’s fifth petition for post-conviction relief on the basis that Pizzuto had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact supporting his claim that he was intellectually disabled at the time of the murders and prior to his eighteenth birthday. Pizzuto pursued this same claim in a federal habeas corpus action. In 2016, the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho denied Pizzuto’s successive petition for writ of habeas corpus after holding a four-day evidentiary hearing in 2010. Although it affirmed the federal district court’s decision denying Pizzuto’s successive petition for writ of habeas corpus, the Ninth Circuit stated in dicta that its decision does not preclude Idaho courts from reconsidering whether Pizzuto was intellectually disabled at the time of the murders. Based on this dicta, Pizzuto filed a motion with the district court to alter or amend the judgment dismissing his fifth petition for post-conviction relief in accordance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). The district court denied Pizzuto’s Motion in early 2020. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pizzuto’s Motion, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. |
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| Tate v. State |
| Court: Supreme Court of Indiana Docket: 19S-LW-00444 Opinion Date: January 28, 2021 Judge: Slaughter Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of molesting and murdering an eighteen-month-old boy, holding that the trial court did not commit fundamental error by admitting improper character evidence and medical-personnel testimony and that Defendant was not entitled to relief based on his challenged aggravators. During sentencing, the jury found three statutory aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt and recommended life imprisonment without parole. The trial court adopted the recommendation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to show that the trial court committed fundamental error by admitting certain testimony; and (2) the State introduced sufficient evidence during sentencing to support the torture and child-molest aggravators. |
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| State v. Boldon |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 19-1159 Opinion Date: January 29, 2021 Judge: McDonald Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence imposed following his pleas of guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, interference with official acts while armed with a firearm, and carrying weapons, holding that there was no error. On appeal, Defendant argued that the prosecutor breached the parties' plea agreement by failing to recommend the bargained-for sentence and that the district court improperly considered his juvenile offense history as an aggravating factor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to establish a breach of the plea agreement; and (2) the district court did not consider an improper sentencing factor in considering Defendant's juvenile adjudications and dispositions. |
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| State v. Ernst |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 18-1623 Opinion Date: January 29, 2021 Judge: Oxley Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for attempted burglary with intent to commit theft, holding that the State's evidence, and all reasonable inferences from that evidence, was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's attempted burglary conviction, concluding that the circumstantial evidence was too speculative to support his conviction because it required a stacking of inferences. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision after noting that this Court does not categorically prohibit stacking of inferences, holding that Defendant's conviction was supported by substantial evidence. |
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| State v. Griffin |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 120747 Opinion Date: January 29, 2021 Judge: Dan Biles Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for methamphetamine possession after he pled no contest to that offense, holding that the district court properly denied Defendant's motion to dismiss for violation of the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-4301 et seq. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court lost jurisdiction under the UMDDA because he was not timely brought to trial. The court of appeals rejected Defendant's claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's argument that an inmate's substantial compliance always starts the UMDDA's 180-day time limit despite the plain statutory language was unavailing. |
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| State v. Morley |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 120017 Opinion Date: January 29, 2021 Judge: Dan Biles Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals vacating Defendant's sentence, holding that a reasonable person would not find Defendant's acceptance of responsibility to be a compelling reason to override the statutory presumptive sentence of imprisonment. Defendant pled no contest to securities fraud and acting as an unregistered issuer agent. The district court granted a dispositional departure to probation from a presumptive sentence of imprisonment. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for resentencing, concluding that there was not a substantial and compelling reason to support departure. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no reasonable person would find that the limited responsibility Defendant took rendered Defendant's case a compelling deviation from the norm the legislature has established. |
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| State v. Glenn |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2021 ME 7 Opinion Date: January 28, 2021 Judge: Connors Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of possession of sexually explicit material, holding that the superior court did not err by denying Defendant's motion to suppress on the grounds that Defendant, despite his diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), was capable of voluntary consent. Defendant sought to suppress his statements to police regarding sexually explicit material depicting minors found on his electronic tablet and any evidence of sexually explicit materials depicting minors discovered as a result. The superior court denied Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant had the capacity to and did voluntarily speak to the police and consent to the search of his tablet. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's ASD did not render his statements or the search of his tablet involuntary. |
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| Canales-Yanez v. State |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 11/20 Opinion Date: January 29, 2021 Judge: Barbera Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the denial of Defendant's motion for new trial on the grounds that certain newly discovered evidence was immaterial, holding that there was no Brady violation in this case. Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. Following the trial but prior to sentencing, the State informed Defendant's counsel of an interview that took place between two detectives and the family members of one of the State's witnesses. Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the nondisclosure of the interview violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the evidence of the interview was not material. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the nondisclosure of the interview did not constitute a Brady violation. |
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| State v. Carter |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 74/19 Opinion Date: January 29, 2021 Judge: Biran Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing Defendant's convictions on the grounds that the circuit court should have granted Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the State failed to meet its burden of establishing the constitutionality of Defendant's seizure at the suppression hearing. When Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) police officers conducted a fare sweep aboard a Light Rail train Defendant confessed that he did not have a ticket. An officer obtained identifying information from Defendant and ran a warrant check on him revealing the existence of a warrant for Defendant's arrest. In attempting to arrest Defendant, officers saw that Defendant had a gun. Defendant moved to suppress the gun, arguing that the fare sweep constituted a warrantless seizure not based on reasonable suspicion. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress. The court of special appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendant's suppression motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) police officers effected a seizure of Defendant without reasonable suspicion by announcing the fare sweep, and Defendant did not impliedly consent to the seizure by riding the train; and (2) the record was insufficiently developed to conclude whether Light Rail sweeps are constitutional under the special needs doctrine. |
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| State v. Elzey |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 3/20 Opinion Date: January 29, 2021 Judge: Biran Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing Defendant's conviction of voluntary manslaughter and ordering a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in its formulation of the jury instruction on Battered Spouse Syndrome, and this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant killed her boyfriend but claimed that she did so in self-defense. To support her theory of self-defense, Defendant introduced expert testimony concerning Battered Spouse Syndrome (the Syndrome). The jury acquitted Defendant of murder but convicted her of voluntary manslaughter. The court of special appeals ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial judge's instruction to the jury concerning the Syndrome was erroneous and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the Syndrome and that the error was not harmless. |
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| State v. McGagh |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 12/20 Opinion Date: January 29, 2021 Judge: Hotten Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing Defendant's conviction of perjury and making a false statement to a police officer, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove the elements of perjury and false statement beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held (1) the court of special appeals erred when it applied a non-deferential, de novo standard of review to the legal sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the court of special appeals erred in finding that the evidence was insufficient to show willful and knowing falsity and in finding that one witness's testimony corroborated by surveillance video was insufficient to satisfy the two-witness rule for perjury; and (3) the evidence was legally sufficient to support Defendant's convictions. |
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| State v. Sayles |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Dockets: 15/20, 16/20, 17/20 Opinion Date: January 29, 2021 Judge: Shirley M. Watts Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing the circuit court's judgment entering judgment on the jury's verdict finding Defendants guilty of home invasion and other crimes, holding that the court of special appeals erred in concluding that jury nullification is authorized in Maryland. Three defendants were charged with multiple offenses related to a home invasion, kidnapping, and armed robbery. During jury deliberations, the jury sent three notes to the court inquiring about jury nullification. The court of special appeals reversed the convictions, concluding that the power of jury nullification exists in Maryland and that the circuit court's instructions in response to two of the jury notes at issue were legally incorrect and prejudicial. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) jury nullification is not authorized in Maryland; and (2) the circuit court's instructions were neither legally incorrect nor prejudicial. |
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| Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12933 Opinion Date: February 2, 2021 Judge: Kafker Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the Sex Offender Registry Board ordering John Doe to register as a level three offender, holding that the Board's decision was not arbitrary or capricious and was supported by substantial evidence. On appeal, Doe argued that the Board should be required to prove new sex offenses by clear and convincing evidence and that the Board's decision was improper because it was not based on new information and the hearing was not held within a reasonable time. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding (1) subsidiary facts, including new sex offenses, need be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, and regardless, there was clear and convincing evidence supporting the level three upward reclassification; and (2) because the Board initiated the reclassification process shortly after receiving information of the new sex offense charges, and because the delays in reaching a final decision were not unreasonable, the Board's decision was proper. |
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| Clark v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2017-CT-00411-SCT Opinion Date: February 4, 2021 Judge: Chamberlin Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Following the death of his four-month-old daughter and his subsequent indictment for murder, Joshua Clark was convicted of depraved-heart murder. The prosecution relied heavily on the testimony of Dr. Karen Lakin, a pediatrician who opined that the daughter's death resulted from Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS) (now referred to as Abusive Head Trauma (AHT)). The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Clark’s conviction after finding that crucial parts of Dr. Lakin’s testimony were unreliable and therefore inadmissible. The Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Dr. Lakin’s opinion testimony was inadequately supported to meet the reliability prong of the Daubert standard and was thus improperly admitted. Instead, the Court found the circuit court did not err by admitting Dr. Lakin’s testimony. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the judgment of the trial court was reinstated and affirmed. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found Clark’s six additional assignments of error not previously addressed by the Court of Appeals were without merit. |
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| Thames v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2019-KA-00814-SCT Opinion Date: February 4, 2021 Judge: Beam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Darron Thames was indicted by grand jury for conspiracy to commit murder and accessory after the fact to murder. Thames was acquitted by a jury of the conspiracy charge, but he was found guilty of accessory after the fact to murder under Mississippi Code Section 97-1-5 (Rev. 2014). Thames appealed his conviction claiming he was unfairly prejudiced by the State’s use of impeachment evidence and transcript testimony of a prosecution witness who had previously testified at a guilty-plea proceeding and at another trial. Thames further claimed his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence, and that the jury’s guilty verdict was not supported by overwhelming weight of evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Thames’s conviction. |
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| State v. Krause |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2021 MT 24 Opinion Date: February 2, 2021 Judge: Laurie McKinnon Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), fourth or subsequent offense, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence and in denying Defendant's motion for mistrial. On appeal, Defendant argued that the State had failed to meet its burden of proving that he was on a "way of this state open to the public" because he was found by a police officer in a vehicle that was parked in a permitted parking spot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence for the jury to assess whether the parking space at issue was adapted and fitted for public travel and in common use by the public, and therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion for a mistrial based on allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. |
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| State v. Catlin |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 308 Neb. 294 Opinion Date: January 29, 2021 Judge: Freudenberg Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of driving under the influence, second offense, and speeding and operating a vehicle without a driver's license, holding that the Court could not consider Defendant's assignment of error that implicitly challenged the constitutionality of Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-2705. Section 25-2705 prohibits jury trials for criminal cases arising under city ordinances. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred when it failed to found that the county court had violated his right to a jury trial. The Noting that Defendant's appeal inextricably involved an implied challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Court could not reach the merits of Defendant's appeal because he failed to provide notice as required by Neb. Rev. Stat. 2-109(E). |
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| State v. Cummings |
| Court: South Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2021 S.D. 4 Opinion Date: January 27, 2021 Judge: Jensen Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Native American Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court granting Defendant's motion to suppress statements he made to a state officer on the grounds that the officer lacked authority to investigate crimes in Indian country, holding that the officer did not violate any jurisdictional principles by entering Indian country to investigate crimes that occurred outside Indian country. When Defendant spoke with agents from the South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation and the Bureau of Indian Affairs at his home located on Indian trust land concerning property crimes that had occurred outside Indian country he produced evidence implicating him a burglary in Bennett County. Defendant was charged in state court. The circuit court suppressed Defendant's statements, concluding that the agents did not have authority to investigate state criminal offenses in Indian country. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant failed to show that the agents lacked authority to investigate state offenses while in Indian country or that the agents' actions infringed upon tribal sovereignty; and (2) Defendant failed to show a Fourth Amendment violation. |
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| In re State of Texas ex rel. John H. Best |
| Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Dockets: WR-89,923-01, WR-89, 923-02 Opinion Date: February 3, 2021 Judge: Yeary Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Relator was John Best, the District Attorney for the 119th Judicial District, and this case involved five codefendants who were all indicted for offenses arising out of the same criminal episode, a shooting that occurred in July, 2017. Stephen Jennings, Kristen Jennings, and David Navarro were all indicted for capital murder and lesser offenses. Garry Jennings was indicted for murder and lesser offenses. And Angella Wray was indicted for aggravated kidnapping and engaging in organized criminal activity. The five cases were assigned to four district courts, with Stephen Jennings’ and Kristen Jennings’ cases assigned to Respondent’s court, the 340th Judicial District Court. The State did not waive the death penalty in the three capital murder cases. Pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 38.43, the State submitted biological evidence collected in these cases to the DPS Crime Lab for DNA testing. Stephen Jennings and Navarro moved in their respective courts to have the DNA testing halted, arguing that some of the biological samples may not have been sufficient for the State to conduct its DNA testing, and for the five defendants to be able to retest the evidence. Navarro requested that the four trial courts agree on a single DNA testing policy. Navarro’s judge, the Presiding Judge of the 51st Judicial District Court, signed an “Order to Halt DNA Testing until Further Order” that directed Relator to provide all five codefendants with notice related to the scientific testing of evidence collected in these cases. Respondent found that the State’s proposed DNA testing would not provide enough remaining DNA sample or extract for each of the five defendants to conduct their own confirmatory testing of the biological evidence. Respondent signed an order providing that “any DNA testing conducted on the biological evidence in these cases be recorded by both audio and video.” Relator filed a motion for reconsideration asking Respondent to withdraw his orders. When this motion was denied, Relator filed his petition for mandamus relief, arguing Respondent lacked judicial authority to enter his orders, which in Relator's view, contravened Article 38.43 and the Separation of Powers Doctrine. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded Respondent exceeded his discretionary authority in discovery matters by ordering the State to create evidence in the form of a digital audiovisual recording of DPS’s DNA testing in these cases. "As usual, a formal writ of mandamus and/or prohibition will not issue unless Respondent should fail to rescind its order and allow DPS to proceed with the DNA testing without memorialization beyond that contemplated by Article 38.43(k), i.e., its bench notes." |
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| Kamoe v. Honorable Stevan Ridge |
| Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2021 UT 5 Opinion Date: January 28, 2021 Judge: Himonas Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Alexie Kamoe's petition for extraordinary relief, holding that an appeal from a negotiated plea in justice court under Utah Code 78A-7-118(3) does not vacate that court's judgment. Kamoe was charged in justice court with three separate criminal counts. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Kamoe pled guilty to a single count of impaired driving. Kamoe appealed to district court but withdrew the appeal after the denial of her motion to suppress blood-test evidence. Kamoe then returned to justice court seeking to have her original conviction, sentence, and commitment reinstated. The prosecutor, who wanted Kamoe to face trial on the initial three counts, objected. The justice court denied Kamoe's request for reinstatement. Kamoe then filed a petition for extraordinary relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2). The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the justice court with instructions to reinstate Kamoe's original judgment, holding that a criminal defendant's appeal of a guilty plea made in justice court does not void that court's conviction, sentence and commitment. |
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| Vermont v. Lafaso |
| Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2021 VT 4 Opinion Date: January 29, 2021 Judge: Cohen Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Scott Lafaso was convicted by jury of burglary, unlawful restraint, stalking, interference with access to emergency services, and two counts of unlawful trespass. These charges stemmed from unsuccessful attempts to reconcile with a former girlfriend. When the girlfriend ended the relationship, defendant twice entered her home without permission, held her down, and grabbed her phone from her hand when she tried to call police. On appeal of his convictions, defendant argued he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial, and that the superior court erred in not excluding certain testimony from the jury’s consideration. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Vermont v. Spencer |
| Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2021 VT 5 Opinion Date: January 29, 2021 Judge: Cohen Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Chad Spencer was convicted by jury of resisting arrest. Three uniformed state troopers were dispatched to serve a relief-from-abuse order on defendant. When the troopers explained their purpose, defendant became angry and stormed off inside the house. As was their practice to read the order to the recipient and obtain the latter’s signature on a return of service, the troopers asked defendant whether they could enter the home. When defendant consented, the officers followed him inside. There, defendant became increasingly agitated, and started yelling and swearing at the officers. At one point, defendant moved quickly and aggressively toward one of the troopers. Thinking he was being attacked, the other officers interceded and tried to arrest defendant for assaulting an officer. Defendant did not comply with the officers’ verbal demands; he was handcuffed, and placed inside a police cruiser, continuing to pull away and kicking an officer in the chin on the way. On appeal, defendant argued the superior court erred when it instructed jurors that whether he was read his Miranda rights was irrelevant to their consideration of the charge. The Vermont Supreme Court clarified the relevance of Miranda warnings to the resisting-arrest offense, and held on evidentiary grounds, there was no error in this case. |
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| In re Pers. Restraint of Fowler |
| Court: Washington Supreme Court Docket: 97456-0 Opinion Date: February 4, 2021 Judge: Steven González Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Long before his judgment and sentence was final, Vincent Fowler hired and paid an attorney, John Crowley, to prepare and file his personal restraint petition (PRP). But after repeatedly and falsely assuring his client he was working on the PRP, Crowley stopped responding to calls. As the one-year time bar approached and it became apparent Crowley had abandoned him, Fowler hired a new attorney. Fowler learned Crowley had resigned his law license rather than face professional discipline for failing to diligently represent other clients, among other things. Before the time bar passed, Fowler’s present counsel filed a “placeholder” PRP explaining he needed additional time to get Fowler’s legal file and investigate grounds for relief. After the time bar had passed, counsel filed a “supplemental” PRP arguing Fowler’s trial attorney was ineffective. The Court of Appeals dismissed the PRP as untimely. The Washington Supreme Court determined equitable tolling was warranted in this case. "The misconduct of Fowler’s attorney was egregious and Fowler exercised diligence." The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for consideration on the merits. |
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| State v. Halverson |
| Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court Docket: 2018AP000858-CR Opinion Date: January 29, 2021 Judge: Hagedorn Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court remanded this case to the circuit court with directions to deny Defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that Defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), when he was interviewed by a police officer. Defendant was an inmate in jail when he returned a call from an officer regarding an incident at Defendant's prior correctional institution. During the call, during which no Miranda warnings were given, Defendant admitted to the officer that he took and destroyed an inmate's missing property. The circuit court granted Defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that it was bound to apply the per se rule set forth in State v. Armstrong, 588 N.W.2d 606 (Wis. 1999), that incarcerated individuals are in custody for Miranda purposes. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the per se rule adopted in Armstrong was effectively overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (2012). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the decision in Howes functionally overruled Armstrong's per se rule; and (2) Defendant's circumstances did not satisfy the standard requirements for custody under Miranda's framework. |
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| Coffey v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2021 WY 21 Opinion Date: February 2, 2021 Judge: Michael K. Davis Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's Wyo. R. Crim. P. 35(b) motion for a sentence reduction, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Defendant pled guilty to one count of second degree sexual abuse pursuant to a plea agreement. The district court sentenced Defendant to a prison term of twelve to fifteen years. Defendant later filed a motion for sentence reduction, citing the progress that he had made since his incarceration. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's sentence was within the sentencing range, and the district court did not abuse its discretion denying a reduction. |
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| Miller v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2021 WY 16 Opinion Date: January 28, 2021 Judge: Gray Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for three counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor, holding that the district court did not commit prejudicial error in admitting evidence of prior bad acts under Wyo. R. Evid. 404(b) and by refusing to conduct a pretrial taint hearing. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that had the trial court considered the factors set forth in Gleason v. State, 57 P.3d 332 (Wyo. 2002) before admitting the 404(b) evidence, the evidence would not have been admissible at trial. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the admission of the 404(b) evidence did not prejudice Defendant because, even without the evidence of Defendant's prior uncharged conduct, there was no reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different conclusion; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the victim was competent without further consideration of evidence of taint. |
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| Ramos v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2021 WY 22 Opinion Date: February 2, 2021 Judge: Kate M. Fox Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court revoking Defendant's probation, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Defendant willfully violated his probation when he missed a meeting with his probation agent and used methamphetamine. In 2018, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of possession of a controlled substance. In 2020, the State moved to revoke Defendant's probation, alleging that Defendant, among other things, willfully used methamphetamine. The district court found that Defendant willfully violated his probation and revoked Defendant's probation and imposed the underlying sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's finding that Defendant willfully used and admitted to using methamphetamine was not clearly erroneous. |
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| Sears v. Sears |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2021 WY 20 Opinion Date: February 2, 2021 Judge: Kautz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In this divorce action, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court establishing joint custody of the children and failing to require Father to pay Mother retroactive child support, temporary alimony, and attorney fees and costs, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the parties joint custody of the children; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to require Father to pay Mother retroactive child support; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to require Father to pay Mother temporary alimony and her attorney fees and costs for the district court divorce proceedings; and (4) Father was entitled to his attorney fees and costs under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 20-2-112. |
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