| United States v. Briggs |
| Court: US Supreme Court Docket: 19-108 Opinion Date: December 10, 2020 Judge: Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Military Law |
| Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), a military offense, “punishable by death, may be tried and punished at any time without limitation,” 10 U.S.C. 843(a). Other military offenses are subject to a five-year statute of limitations. Three military service members, each convicted of rape at a time when the UCMJ provided that rape could be “punished by death” argued that the five-year limitations period barred their prosecutions because the Supreme Court held in 1977 (Coker v. Georgia) that the Eighth Amendment forbids a death sentence for the rape of an adult woman. Reversing the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, the Supreme Court held that the prosecutions were timely. The UCMJ is a uniform code. The most natural place to determine whether rape was “punishable by death” within the meaning of section 843(a) is section 920’s directive that rape could be “punished by death,” regardless of the UCMJ’s separate prohibition on “cruel or unusual punishment.” If “punishable by death” requires consideration of all applicable law, the deadline for filing rape charges would be unclear. That deadline would depend on an unresolved constitutional question about Coker’s application to military prosecutions, on "evolving standards of decency” under the Eighth Amendment, and on whether UCMJ section 855 independently prohibits a death sentence for rape. The ends served by statutes of limitations differ from those served by the Eighth Amendment or UCMJ 855. Factors legislators may find important in setting a limitations period—such as the difficulty of gathering evidence and mounting a prosecution—play no part in an Eighth Amendment analysis. |
| |
| Rijo v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 17-2213 Opinion Date: December 3, 2020 Judge: William Joseph Kayatta, Jr. Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Petitioner's habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, holding that defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance in deciding not to call two witnesses during Petitioner's trial and introduce certain documents. After a trial, Petitioner was found guilty of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms of cocaine and of aiding and abetting others to do so as well. Thereafter, Petitioner field a timely habeas petition, arguing that his right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment was violated by deciding not to call two witnesses during trial. The district court denied the petition. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that even if counsel's performance was deficient, Defendant's ineffective assistance claim failed because there was no reasonable probability that the results of the trial would have been different had counsel called the two witnesses. |
| |
| United States v. Forty-Febres |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-2106 Opinion Date: December 8, 2020 Judge: Sandra Lea Lynch Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of one count of stealing a motor vehicle and one count of brandishing a firearm, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of his allegations of error. Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the conviction; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to compel Defendant's co-defendant to testify and by denying Defendant's motion to delay the trial until after Defendant's co-defendant was sentenced; and (3) precedent foreclosed Defendant's argument that the jury's verdict was inconsistent and his conviction should be vacated. |
| |
| United States v. Ramirez-Romero |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-1863 Opinion Date: December 4, 2020 Judge: Boudin Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of unlawfully possessing a machine-gun, holding that the district court did not err in sentencing Defendant. In sentencing Defendant, the district court sentenced Defendant to sixty months, which was outside the guidelines range. The First Circuit largely affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err when it calculated Defendant's guideline sentencing using other relevant conduct; (2) the sentencing court did not improperly rely on an arrest that was unsupported by probable cause; and (3) the district court did not err when it denied Defendant access to the written Statement of Reasons (SOR) but erred when it denied counsel access to the SOR. The Court remanded the case to give defense counsel access to the SOR. |
| |
| United States v. Tirado-Nieves |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-2053 Opinion Date: December 3, 2020 Judge: Kermit Victor Lipez Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence of eighty-six months' imprisonment after pleading guilty to two firearms counts, holding that the sentence was not procedurally unreasonable. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court (1) committed clear error by applying the four-point enhancement under Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B); and (2) failed to provide the notice required by Rule 32(h) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure before imposing a sentence that departed from the Guidelines. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by applying the four-point enhancement; and (2) because the district court imposed a "variance," not a "departure," it did not violate Rule 32(h). |
| |
| United States v. Gadsden |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 19-3139 Opinion Date: December 8, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for a reduced sentence under Section 404 of the First Step Act. While the court agreed with defendant that he was eligible for relief, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion. The court explained that it was permissible for the district court to consider the fact that defendant received a below-Guidelines sentence and to consider the statements the judge made at his resentencing. Furthermore, the district court did not consider these factors to the exclusion of others. Rather, the district court made several other considerations, including defendant's past engagement in violent conduct, his offsetting exemplary conduct while incarcerated, and the relevant 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The court also concluded that a district court is not categorically required to hold a hearing at which the defendant is present before denying a motion for a sentence reduction under Section 404. Therefore, defendant was not entitled to a hearing at which he was present. |
| |
| Young v. Antonelli |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-7176 Opinion Date: December 10, 2020 Judge: Quattlebaum Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Petitioner seeks relief from his sentence, which was enhanced based on the "death results" provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, USSG 2D1.1(a)(1), based on the Supreme Court's decision in Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014). Petitioner argues that he meets the four-part test for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 from the court's decision in United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2018). The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the petition, concluding that because Burrage had not previously been applied to the Sentencing Guidelines, petitioner's invocation of Burrage was premature. The Fourth Circuit agreed and concluded that neither the Supreme Court nor this circuit had applied Burrage's statutory interpretation to the Sentencing Guidelines. However, the court now concludes that Burrage's interpretation does, in fact, apply to the "death results" provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, at least those in effect prior to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Accordingly, while the court found no fault with the district court's dismissal of the petition, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings based on its decision today. |
| |
| Mendoza-Tarango v. Flores |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-10588 Opinion Date: December 8, 2020 Judge: Don R. Willett Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Immigration Law |
| Plaintiff, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a mandamus action in the district court, seeking an order to compel USCIS officials to travel to federal prison in order to administer the oath of citizenship to him. Plaintiff alleged that USCIS unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed the administration of his oath under section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim for relief and denial of his subsequent motion for reconsideration. Contrary to defendant's contention, the district court did consider defendant's APA claim before dismissing it. The district court dismissed after determining that his section 706(1) claim could not proceed. The court explained that when plaintiff appears before USCIS officials, they must administer the oath to him. But the manner in which USCIS administers the oath, including where within the United States that administration occurs, is left to the agency's discretion. In this case, plaintiff cannot show a clear right to relief and thus he is not entitled to a writ of mandamus. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. |
| |
| United States v. Dubin |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Dockets: 19-50891, 19-50912 Opinion Date: December 4, 2020 Judge: Rhesa Hawkins Barksdale Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed Defendants William Joseph Dubin and David Fox Dubin's convictions and sentences for charges arising from a scheme to defraud Texas’ Medicaid program. William, a licensed psychologist, formed a corporation that was an enrolled Medicaid provider. David, William's son, worked for the corporation. The court held that David waived his challenge to the Government's amended indictment by failing to raise his defense until a post-trial motion for ineffective assistance of counsel; the evidence was sufficient to support David's conviction for conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, aggravated identity theft, and aiding and abetting; and the evidence was sufficient to support William's conviction for conspiracy to pay and receive healthcare kickbacks, offering to pay, and paying, illegal remunerations. The court also upheld the legality of the restitution award and forfeiture orders. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err by failing to adjust William's sentence downward based on a lower restitution amount. |
| |
| United States v. Lipscomb |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-11168 Opinion Date: December 8, 2020 Judge: Edith Brown Clement Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in granting defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion and vacated the district court's order, directing the district court to reinstate its original judgment. In this case, defendant moved for release under section 2255, based on the Supreme Court's holding in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 597 (2015), that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act's (ACCA) violent felony definition violated due process. The court explained that case law has crystalized in this area and held that defendant's prior robbery convictions designated him an armed career criminal at the time of his sentencing. |
| |
| United States v. Hill |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-2229 Opinion Date: December 9, 2020 Judge: John K. Bush Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Hill drove Henderson, to a controlled drug buy, where Henderson sold an undercover officer 83.5 grams of methamphetamine. Two weeks later, Henderson met an undercover investigator at a hotel for another controlled purchase and called Hill to bring the drugs to the hotel. Hill’s sister drove Hill to the hotel, where police surrounded their vehicle. They recovered five ounces of crystal methamphetamine from Hill’s person. Hill pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, stipulating that he had been convicted of felonies under Michigan law, that he served over 12 months in prison for each felony, and that his release from prison for each offense was within 15 years of the charged offense. He acknowledged that he had “at least one 'serious drug felony’ conviction” under 21 U.S.C. 802(57). Hill unsuccessfully objected to the PSR’s imposition of the career-offender enhancement and failure to apply the mitigating-role adjustment. The court calculated Hill’s initial guideline range as 262-327 months, applied a downward departure based on substantial assistance, and imposed a sentence of 144 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Hill should not have been classified as a career offender because his past Michigan convictions do not qualify as controlled substance offenses under USSG 4B1.1 and that he should have been given an offense-level reduction for being a minor participant under USSG 3B1.2. |
| |
| United States v. Hogsett |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-3465 Opinion Date: December 7, 2020 Judge: KANNE Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| During a 2005 traffic stop, officers searched Hogsett’s vehicle and discovered crack cocaine and a firearm. A jury convicted Hogsett of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), possessing with intent to distribute 0.5 grams of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and possessing a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1). The court found that Hogsett’s relevant conduct was approximately 21.5 grams of crack cocaine (0.5 grams from the vehicle search and 21 grams from prior, noncharged instances of trafficking) and sentenced him to 355 months’ imprisonment: 295 months on Count 1, 240 months concurrently on Count 2, and 60 months consecutively on Count 3. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 subsequently reduced the crack-to-powder penalty disparity from 100:1 to 18:1; Congress made this reduction retroactive in the First Step Act of 2018, permitting district courts to reduce the sentences of defendants convicted of a “covered offense” before August 3, 2010. In 2019, Hogsett sought resentencing. The district court denied his motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) is a covered offense. |
| |
| United States v. LaGrange |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-2307 Opinion Date: December 9, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his person and vehicle after his arrest. Defendant conditional pleaded guilty to drug trafficking and firearms offenses. The court concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant unlawfully possessed a firearm, which justified an investigative seizure. In this case, the informant's tip contained a detailed description of a weapon allegedly in defendant's possession and the officers were able to corroborate elements of the informant's tip. Furthermore, defendant's furtive behavior in the parking lots further supported reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. |
| |
| Does v. Wasden |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 19-35391 Opinion Date: December 9, 2020 Judge: Kathleen Cardone Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Plaintiffs, 134 men and women registered as sex offenders in Idaho, filed suit claiming that the retroactive application of Idaho's Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-to-Know Act (SORA) is unconstitutional. The district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss. The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in dismissing the ex post facto claim on the basis that SORA was civil in intent and not punitive in effect. The panel explained that the district court erred by applying plaintiffs' ex post facto claim as an as-applied challenge; erred by applying the "clearest proof" standard at the motion to dismiss stage; and erred in finding the outcome of the Smith factors analysis controlled by precedent. Because the district court predicated its dismissal of the Eighth Amendment and double jeopardy claims on its dismissal of the ex post facto claim, the panel held that those judgments were also in error. The panel also held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' free exercise claim because the district court erred in finding that plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to plead a plausible claim under Idaho's Free Exercise of Religion Protected Act (FERPA). In this case, plaintiffs have alleged facts showing that the challenged policy substantially burdens the exercise of their religious beliefs. The panel found no error in the district court's analysis of plaintiffs' vagueness, Free Association, Equal Protection, Contracts Clause, Takings, Separation of Powers, and state Police Power challenges. Therefore, the panel affirmed the dismissal of those claims. The panel remanded for further proceedings. |
| |
| United States v. Ruiz Gainza |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Dockets: 19-10430, 20-10009 Opinion Date: December 8, 2020 Judge: M. Margaret McKeown Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit vacated defendants' sentences imposed after they pleaded guilty to multiple offenses, including conspiracy to possess unauthorized access devices, access device fraud, and aggravated identity theft. Defendants' convictions arose from their installation of cameras and skimmers at ATM machines to film fingers as PINS were entered and to record the information of inserted cards. The panel held that the record does not support the conclusion that defendants obtained 852 and 754 account numbers respectively. The panel explained that, while there is evidence that defendant hoped to obtain account information for each ATM customer, there is insufficient evidence that they succeeded in doing so. Therefore, the district court clearly erred by applying a twelve-level increase to defendants' base level under USSG 2B1.1(b)(1) based on its conclusion that defendants obtained account information for each person who visited the ATMs while the cameras and skimmers were installed. In this case, while the government showed how many people used the ATMs while the skimmers were installed, it did not provide any evidence of the skimmer success rate, either for these transactions or even for hypothetical transactions. |
| |
| United States v. Sineneng-Smith |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 15-10614 Opinion Date: December 8, 2020 Judge: Tashima Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions on two counts of encouraging and inducing an alien to remain in the United States for the purposes of financial gain in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and 1324(a)(1)(B)(i)). Defendant, who operated an immigration consulting business, continued to sign retainer agreements and inform clients that they could obtain green cards via a labor certification program under Section 245i of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which defendant knew had expired. The panel rejected defendant's contention that the conduct charged is beyond the scope of Subsection (A)(iv) and held that the fact that engaging in the underlying section 245i process may have yielded some legitimate benefit to defendant's clients does not detract from her culpability under Subsection (A)(iv). The panel also held that defendant did not lack fair notice that her conduct violated the law and her prosecution did not violate due process; the Subsection (A)(iv) charges against defendant were not impermissibly vague, and the district court did not err by refusing to dismiss them; and, because defendant's conduct was not protected by the First Amendment, the district court did not err by denying her motion to dismiss the charges on First Amendment grounds. Finally, the panel held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant encouraged or induced her clients to remain in the United States. |
| |
| United States v. Delano |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-5103 Opinion Date: December 7, 2020 Judge: Michael R. Murphy Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant-Appellant Johnny Delano was convicted in 1993 of armed bank robbery, sentenced to 262 months in prison, and ordered to pay $11,558 in restitution. The restitution was ordered pursuant to the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (“VWPA”). After Delano was released from prison, he began serving a five-year term of supervised release. Delano’s supervised release was revoked in 2017 and he was sentenced to serve an additional twenty-seven months’ incarceration. He was also ordered to pay the unpaid balance of the restitution imposed in 1993. Delano challenged the restitution portion of his current sentence, arguing his obligation to pay restitution under the VWPA expired twenty years after his original sentence was imposed and the plain language of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”) precluded the district court from reviving or reimposing restitution. The Tenth Circuit concluded, in light of the plain language of the MVRA, Congress clearly stated that the MVRA had only prospective application. The district court’s error was therefore plain, and the Court reversed the part of Delano’s sentence ordering him to pay restitution in the amount of $5,159.59. |
| |
| Santos v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-14291 Opinion Date: December 10, 2020 Judge: Marcus Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Petitioner challenges the application of an Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement to his 1994 sentence for the unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition as a convicted felon. Petitioner claims that he was sentenced under the ACCA's residual clause, which the Supreme Court has since held to be unconstitutionally vague. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition, concluding that petitioner cannot meet his burden of proving it is more likely than not that in fashioning his sentence, the district judge relied solely on the residual clause. Furthermore, petitioner could not meet this burden on any remand. In this case, the district court already examined the record and correctly found that it does not reveal which clause the sentencing judge relied on. Nor would any other obvious source of information provide any helpful information. Therefore, remand would be futile. |
| |
| United States v. Graham |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 18-15299 Opinion Date: December 4, 2020 Judge: Grant Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for passing a fictitious financial instrument, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 514(a)(2), and of corruptly endeavoring to obstruct the administration of the Internal Revenue Code, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7212(a). Defendant's conviction stemmed from his attempt to satisfy his tax obligations with a fraudulent $3.6 million check known as an international bill of exchange. The court held that the IRS' collection activity qualifies as a "particular administrative proceeding" and thus satisfied the nexus requirement in Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1109 (2018). In this case, there was sufficient evidence of a nexus between his actions and an administrative proceeding to support defendant's conviction. The court rejected defendant's numerous objections to the district court's evidentiary rulings. |
| |
| United States v. Taylor |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-12872 Opinion Date: December 9, 2020 Judge: Grant Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Taylor pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least five kilograms of a mixture containing a detectable amount of cocaine hydrochloride (powder cocaine) and at least 50 grams of a mixture containing a detectable amount of cocaine base (crack cocaine), 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Section 841(b) then provided that an offense involving either 50 grams or more of crack or five kilograms or more of powder cocaine carried a mandatory minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment and a maximum of life in prison. The court calculated Taylor’s Guidelines range as life in prison and “reluctantly” applied the Guidelines as mandatory. The Eleventh Circuit vacated. On remand, in 2005, the district court resentenced Taylor to 360 months’ imprisonment. The 2010 Fair Sentencing Act increased the quantity of crack cocaine required to trigger a 10-year mandatory minimum from 50 grams to 280 grams. The 2018 First Step Act allows—but does not require—courts to reduce an eligible prisoner’s sentence as if the drug-quantity changes were in effect at the time the prisoner committed his offense. The district court denied Taylor’s motion for resentencing, finding that Taylor’s was not a “covered offense” because it involved five kilograms or more of powder cocaine, “a sufficient quantity to trigger the mandatory minimum sentence.” The Eleventh Circuit vacated. A federal drug crime involving both crack cocaine and another controlled substance can be a “covered offense” under the First Step Act. |
| |
| United States v. Knight |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Docket: 19-3016 Opinion Date: December 8, 2020 Judge: Judith Ann Wilson Rogers Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendants Knight and Thorpe were convicted on a ten-count indictment for charges related to armed robbery and kidnapping. Knight was sentenced to more than 22 years' imprisonment and Thorpe was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment. Defendants were originally given a plea offer with a lesser sentence of two to six years' imprisonment, but Knight's counsel erroneously advised him that the offer came with ten years' imprisonment. Because Knight rejected the offer, the plea was no longer available to both defendants. On appeal, defendants argued that they had been denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The DC Circuit concluded that defendants' claims were colorable and remanded the case. The district court then denied relief. The DC Circuit now reverses in part, holding that Knight satisfied his burden under both prongs of the standard for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court explained that the performance by Knight's counsel did not meet minimal professional standards, and the district court's determination that Knight suffered no prejudice rested on subsidiary factual findings that ignored the direct effect of his counsel's deficient performance on Knight's ability to intelligently assess his options and therefore were clearly erroneous. Viewed properly, the court explained that the contemporaneous evidence and Knight's testimony at the evidentiary hearing sufficed to establish a reasonable probability that Knight would have accepted the plea offer but for his counsel's ineffective assistance. However, the court agreed that Thorpe's counsel was not ineffective and there was no violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part. The court remanded to the district court for further proceedings. |
| |
| Cervantes v. Kelley |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 391 Opinion Date: December 3, 2020 Judge: Karen R. Baker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying and dismissing Appellant's pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying and dismissing the petition on the basis that issues surrounding parole eligibility are not cognizable in habeas proceedings. Appellant appeared before the parole board on September 5, 2019 and was denied parole for two years. The parole board affirmed the two-year denial. In his petition for writ of habeas corpus Appellant argued that the parole board's actions were illegal and in violation of Ark. Code Ann. 16-93-615. The circuit court denied and dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not meet his burden of establishing probable cause that he was detained without lawful authority. |
| |
| Millsap v. Payne |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 401 Opinion Date: December 3, 2020 Judge: Rhonda K. Wood Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that the grounds raised in Appellant's petition were not grounds for habeas relief. Appellant pleaded guilty to capital murder, first-degree terroristic threatening, and second-degree battery. Appellant later petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The circuit court denied relief, concluding that none of the allegations were cognizable in a habeas proceeding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying habeas relief on Appellant's claims. |
| |
| Owens v. Payne |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 413 Opinion Date: December 10, 2020 Judge: Hudson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant failed to state a claim for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus because he failed to demonstrate that his sentence was illegal on its face. Appellant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and kidnapping and was sentenced to life imprisonment. In his habeas petition, Appellant argued that his sentence of life imprisonment for first-degree murder was illegal because the order did not abide by the requirements set forth in Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-804. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances, section 16-90-804 does not apply; and (2) Appellant was not entitled to habeas relief on the claims presented. |
| |
| Rainer v. Director, Arkansas Department of Correction |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 416 Opinion Date: December 10, 2020 Judge: Womack Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant failed to state a ground on which the writ could issue. Appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced as a habitual offender to eighty years' imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. In his petition for writ of habeas corpus Appellant alleged that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment sentencing him as a habitual offender and that the judgment was illegal on its face because he was convicted under a habitual offender statute that was not in effect when he committed the murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's allegations were not cognizable in habeas proceedings. |
| |
| Rogers v. Kelley |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 403 Opinion Date: December 3, 2020 Judge: Wynne Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) miscalculated his parole eligibility, holding that the circuit court failed to address Appellant's primary claim that the ADC erred in applying a 2007 amended version of Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-120(e) requiring defendants sentenced to a firearm enhancement to serve seventy percent of the enhanced sentence. Defendant was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment for aggravated robbery and an additional fifteen years' imprisonment for use of a firearm in the robbery pursuant to section 16-90-120. In dismissing Appellant's mandamus petition, the circuit court agreed with the State's argument that Ark. Code Ann. 16-93-911(a)(1)(c) authorized the ADC to require Appellant to serve seventy percent of his aggregate sentence of forty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that remand was required for the circuit court to address whether the seventy-percent requirement was applicable to the fifteen-year sentence enhancement and to address the language found in the amendment to section 16-90-120. |
| |
| Smith v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 408 Opinion Date: December 10, 2020 Judge: Kemp Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's pro se third petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate in the petition that the writ should issue. Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree. The court of appeals affirmed. In his third coram nobis petition Petitioner argued that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose favorable treatment granted to a key witness in exchange for her trial testimony and by failing to disclose the transcript of a 911 call made by the witness, and that exculpatory findings from his codefendant's trial would have changed the outcome in Petitioner's trial. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the writ should issue and that some of his claims were successive. |
| |
| Smith v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 410 Opinion Date: December 10, 2020 Judge: Hudson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court's denial of Appellant's petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5, holding that Appellant's trial attorneys were ineffective. Appellant was convicted of capital murder, kidnapping, and abuse of a corpse. In his petition for postconviction relief, Appellant argued, among other things, that trial counsel was ineffective because they abandoned their objection to instructing the jury that the death of the victim's unborn child could be considered an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes. The circuit court rejected Appellant's claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court erred in presenting to the jury the death of the victim's unborn child as an aggravating factor, and Appellant's trial attorneys were ineffective when they abandoned their objection to this instruction; and (2) there was a reasonable probability that the fact-finder's decision would have been different absent counsels' errors. |
| |
| Ward v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 386 Opinion Date: December 3, 2020 Judge: Kemp Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Appellant's petition for writ of error coram nobis, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it treated the petition as an untimely Rule 37.1 petition and denied it because the grounds raised in the petition were distinctly covered by that Rule. Appellant pleaded guilty to several offenses and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 300 months' imprisonment. In his coram nobis petition, Appellant argued that his counsel conspired with the prosecutor to mislead him with respect to the sentences he received for his guilty pleas and that his trial counsel acted in bad faith. The circuit court treated the petition as an untimely Rule 37.1 and denied it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's ruling that Defendant's allegations should have been raised in a timely petition under Rule 37.1 was a correct statement of law. |
| |
| California v. Martin |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: E074315(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: December 7, 2020 Judge: Raphael Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeal held in California v. Schaffer, 53 Cal.App.5th 500 (2020) that a parolee exposed to a 180-day jail term for a parole violation resulting from non-criminal conduct was not entitled, under United States v. Haymond, 139 S.Ct. 2369 (2019), to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether he had violated his parole. Defendant and appellant Tyrel Martin was convicted in 2014 of committing a lewd and lascivious act with a child by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear, for which he was sentenced to a 5-year prison term. He was released on parole in 2018. In August 2019, the Division of Adult Parole Operations of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DAPO) petitioned to revoke Martin’s parole, alleging that he failed to report to his parole agent upon release from custody, that he failed to register as a sex offender, and that he did not participate in electronic monitoring. As part of a compromise with the DAPO, Martin admitted the allegations regarding failure to report and failure to participate in electronic monitoring, and he was ordered to serve a 180-day jail term with credit for time served. A month later, the trial court set aside Martin’s admissions, vacated the sentence, and set a formal revocation hearing, having been notified that the case should have been governed by Penal Code section 3000.08 (h), providing that, for certain parolees, a parole violation meant that the parolee will be sent back to prison, with the Board of Parole Hearings responsible for determining future parole consideration. Following a contested revocation hearing, the trial court found that Martin violated parole by failing to report to his parole agent upon release from custody. Martin was ordered to return to prison. Martin contends on appeal, as he did in trial court, that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Haymond entitled him to have a jury determine whether he violated parole beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeal concluded Martin was not entitled to have a jury make findings using the beyond a reasonable doubt standard under Haymond, despite the possibility he faced a lengthy prison sentence for his parole violation. |
| |
| People v. Azcona |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: H045676(Sixth Appellate District) Opinion Date: December 10, 2020 Judge: Grover Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Azcona fired multiple shots at a man sitting on a porch, hitting the victim in the arm, while riding past on a bicycle. Police recovered 13 nine-millimeter casings from the scene. Two weeks later, Robles was a passenger in a car when Azcona rode up on his bike, pulled out a gun, and started firing, killing Robles. The driver was also hit. Police found 15 nine-millimeter casings in the area. Two days later, someone matching Azcona’s description, riding a bike, approached a car occupied by two men and brandished a gun. Days later, Azcona tried to rob a teenager, hitting the boy with a gun on the face. Azcona’s final victim was Herrera, whose body was found on a Chinatown road with nine bullet wounds. Most of the surviving victims either identified Azcona in a photo lineup or provided a description consistent with his appearance; surveillance videos placed Azcona near the Chinatown murder around the time of the shooting. Azcona was convicted of premeditated murder, attempted premeditated murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, negligent discharge of a firearm, and attempted robbery, with multiple enhancements. The court of appeal reversed in part. The trial court committed multiple errors related to the firearms expert testimony, allowing the expert to testify to conclusions not supported by the material on which he relied, and violating Azcona’s constitutional right to confrontation by allowing the expert to testify that his findings were reviewed and approved by a supervisor. Those errors were prejudicial as to one of Azcona’s attempted murder convictions and the related convictions for negligently discharging and possessing a firearm. |
| |
| People v. Booker |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B295128(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: December 10, 2020 Judge: Feuer Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendants Booker and Lewis appealed from judgments of conviction entered after a jury trial for first degree murder; attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder; and shooting at an occupied vehicle. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal addressed defendants' contentions that the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury on the "kill zone" theory of concurrent specific intent to prove the attempted murder in light of the Supreme Court's holding in People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 596-597. In Canizales, the Supreme Court held that a jury may convict a defendant under the kill zone theory only when the jury finds that: (1) the circumstances of the defendant's attack on a primary target, including the type and extent of force the defendant used, are such that the only reasonable inference is that the defendant intended to create a zone of fatal harm—that is, an area in which the defendant intended to kill everyone present to ensure the primary target's death—around the primary target and (2) the alleged attempted murder victim who was not the primary target was located within that zone of harm. The court agreed with defendants that this is not one of the relatively few cases in which the kill zone theory will be applicable and an instruction appropriate. Therefore, it was prejudicial error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the kill zone theory. The court reversed defendants' convictions of attempted murder and remanded for further proceedings. |
| |
| People v. Joaquin |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A152786A(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: December 4, 2020 Judge: Simons Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In March 2017, Joaquin fired a shotgun at the victim. He was charged with premeditated attempted murder with an allegation that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, possessing a firearm having been previously convicted of a felony, and assault with a firearm. The complaint also included a firearm use allegation and a prior prison term allegation. (Penal Code 12022.5(a), 667.5(b).) The prior prison term was based on a conviction for infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant. Joaquin pled no contest to attempted murder without premeditation and admitted a firearm use allegation and a prior prison term. The parties stipulated to a 12-year sentence: the seven-year middle term for unpremeditated attempted murder, the four-year middle term for the firearm use allegation, and one year for the prior prison term. The trial court accepted the plea. The court of appeal remanded with directions to strike the one-year prior prison term enhancement. Senate Bill 136, effective January 1, 2020, applies retroactively and prohibits the imposition of the prior prison term enhancement except for a prior prison term served for a sexually violent offense. On remand, the parties may enter into a new plea agreement but, if they do, the court may not impose a longer sentence than that in the original agreement. |
| |
| People v. Johnson |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A158081(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: December 9, 2020 Judge: Petrou Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2006, Johnson was convicted of receiving stolen property. He was released on a three-year parole term in June 2007. In August 2007, he was convicted of grand theft and possession of controlled substances for sale. The court deemed Johnson’s sentences served but placed him on a new, overlapping three-year parole term. Johnson’s parole was scheduled to end on August 16, 2010. After his release, Johnson absconded from parole supervision 11 times, for a total of 3,215 days, and was in jail on parole violations nine times, for a total of 699 days. In May 2019, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) filed a petition to revoke Johnson’s parole. The court asked why CDCR was “keeping him on parole” when he had not “committed any felonious conduct” in many years. A parole officer responded that Johnson had not completed parole because of “time stops.” The court terminated his parole after obtaining an admission from Johnson that he violated parole by absconding “since 2013.” The court granted CDCR’s motion for reconsideration stating it “acted in excess of jurisdiction” and that the new parole discharge date was September 8, 2019. The court“modifie[d] the conditions of [Johnson’s] parole to include no supervision.” The court of appeal reversed, finding that the court miscalculated Johnson’s parole discharge date and had no authority to terminate Johnson’s “parole supervision.” |
| |
| People v. Mackreth |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: H046266(Sixth Appellate District) Opinion Date: December 9, 2020 Judge: Elia Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Ward called 911 and reported that she “run off the road.” Sunnyvale Officer Meyer responded outside a store and spoke to Ward and Megoloff, a bystander. Megoloff said: “The guy ran in the store and was stuffing all kinds of shit down his pants" and identified Makreth behind the counter. Meyer was concerned that Makreth might have a weapon and that a robbery was planned. Meyer was wearing a police uniform; his badge was “readily apparent.” Mackreth ran into the storeroom and slammed the door. Meyer called for backup with lights and sirens. Mackreth emerged with keys and “something else in his hands.” Meyer drew his taser and yelled, “Get on the ground.” Mackreth looked “puzzled” and responded “Yes, sir” but was not compliant. Meyer thought Mackreth was “delusional.” Eventually, he got on the ground. He subsequently “popped up.” Meyer fired his taser. Mackreth ran around, despite Meyer’s efforts to stop him. Two more officers arrived, wearing uniforms and badges. Several struggles ensued, during which the officers were injured. Megoloff “didn’t see any excessive type actions by the police.” Mackreth was under the influence of methamphetamine at an “abuse level.” Methamphetamine was found in his car. Mackreth was placed on probation after he was convicted of misdemeanor resisting arrest, vandalism, and being under the influence of methamphetamine. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting his argument that the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury that he could be convicted of resisting arrest if he knew or “should have known” that the person he resisted was a police officer. |
| |
| People v. Rodriguez |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B303099(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: December 7, 2020 Judge: Dennis M. Perluss Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Penal Code section 1170.95 requires the prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of first or second degree murder under current law to establish a petitioner's ineligibility for relief under that statute. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that the superior court here used an improper standard, concluding he was ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 because the record could support a finding of express malice murder beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than based on its own finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant would be guilty of murder within the meaning of sections 188 and 189, as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437. Accordingly, the court reversed the order denying defendant's petition to vacate his murder conviction and for resentencing, remanding for a new evidentiary hearing on defendant's eligibility for relief. |
| |
| People v. The North River Insurance Co. |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: F080749(Fifth Appellate District) Opinion Date: December 8, 2020 Judge: Smith Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After Surety posted a bail bond for the release of a criminal defendant, he failed to appear for a scheduled hearing and the trial court ordered bail forfeited, later entering summary judgment on the bond. Surety contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion to vacate the void summary judgment. For purposes of the appeal, the Court of Appeal assumed without deciding that the criminal defendant has "sufficient excuse" for not appearing at the scheduled hearing and that the trial court lacked the "jurisdictional prerequisite" to declare a forfeiture of bail. The court published this opinion to set forth its interpretation of what the Supreme Court meant when it referred to the absence of a sufficient excuse as a jurisdictional prerequisite. The court concluded that the trial court had fundamental jurisdiction because, when it declared the forfeiture of bail, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the bail bond and forfeiture proceeding and had personal jurisdiction over Surety. Consequently, the order declaring the forfeiture of bail was, at most, an act in excess of the statutory authority conferred by Penal Code section 1305, subdivision (a). Accordingly, the forfeiture order was not void and the subsequently entered summary judgment was not void. The court affirmed the judgment. |
| |
| Colorado v. Arellano |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 84 Opinion Date: December 7, 2020 Judge: Gabriel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics |
| The issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review in this interlocutory appeal was whether the district court abused its discretion in disqualifying the Fourth Judicial District Attorney's office. Erica Arellano was charged with second degree murder for shooting and killing her boyfriend, M.H. Arellano claimed that, during the relationship, M.H. perpetrated domestic violence on her and that self-defense would be a critical issue and the crux of Arellano’s defense. A.H. was an employee of the district attorney’s office and was married to, but separated from, M.H. at the time of his death. A.H. was a potentially significant witness in this case because she had (and already provided to the district attorney’s office) information tending to undermine Arellano’s claim of self-defense. In light of A.H.’s relationship with the district attorney’s office and the significance of her testimony to this case, Arellano filed a motion to disqualify the district attorney’s office under section 20-1-107(2), C.R.S. (2020). The district court held a hearing on this motion and, in a lengthy and detailed bench ruling, found that, on the facts presented, special circumstances existed making it unlikely that Arellano could receive a fair trial. The court thus granted Arellano’s motion to disqualify. The State then filed this interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court determined the district court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying the district attorney's office, thus affirming the court's order and remanding this case for further proceedings. |
| |
| Colorado v. Kent |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 85 Opinion Date: December 7, 2020 Judge: Samour Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics |
| The issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review in this interlocutory appeal was whether the district court abused its discretion in disqualifying the Fifth Judicial District Attorney's office. The district attorney and the elected coroner of Lake County, Colorado, Shannon Kent, did not get along. Brown prosecuted Kent for perjury, a class 4 felony, and second degree official misconduct, a class 1 petty offense. After the case had been pending for approximately nine months, Kent filed a motion to disqualify Brown’s office, arguing that he was unlikely to receive a fair trial based on Brown’s personal interest in the case and the existence of special circumstances. Following briefing and an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the motion. The trial court determined each special circumstance, “in and of itself,” did not warrant disqualification, but “viewed as a totality,” sufficed for the exceptional remedy sought by Kent. The Supreme Court determined the district attorney's office should not have been disqualified, finding the trial court failed to adequately explain how the circumstances in question, though individually inadequate to warrant disqualification, justified the extraordinary relief requested when considered together. "And the record before us reflects that Kent plainly failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that he would be unlikely to receive a fair trial if Brown’s office continues prosecuting this case. ... Even assuming the circumstances at issue 'may cast doubt' upon Brown’s 'motives and strategies' in this case, 'they do not play a part in whether [Kent] will receive a fair trial.'" |
| |
| White v. Delaware |
| Court: Delaware Supreme Court Docket: 467, 2019 Opinion Date: December 10, 2020 Judge: Karen L. Valihura Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Dwayne White faced a lengthy sentence of incarceration at Level V, followed by various levels of probation after a jury convicted him of twenty-one felony charges. On appeal, White challenged his conviction and sentence on a number of grounds that were not raised in the proceedings below. Before the Delaware Supreme Court, White contended: (1) several of the counts of which he was convicted and separately sentenced merged under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Delaware and United States Constitutions; (2) the trial court committed plain error by placing the accomplice liability instructions at the end of the instructions for the felony conspiracy offenses; (3) his conviction for conspiracy to commit Drug Dealing Cocaine was invalid because it relied on an indictment containing a numbering error; (4) the trial court erred by failing to bar the State from eliciting testimony from White’s attorney regarding the scope of the attorney’s representation of members of the criminal enterprise; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to specify adequately its reasons for imposing a sentence in excess of the SENTAC guidelines and by relying upon certain factual predicates which he challenges on various grounds. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed White's conviction. |
| |
| Hojan v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC18-2149 Opinion Date: December 3, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's two sentences of death imposed during a resentencing that the Supreme Court ordered as a result of a Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), error, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims. Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and other crimes and sentenced by a jury to death. The Supreme Court affirmed. Defendant later filed a motion for postconviction relief, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's death sentences due to Hurst error. At the conclusion of a new penalty phase trial, the resentencing jury voted to recommend that Defendant be sentenced to death for both of his murder convictions. The trial court followed the resentencing jury's recommendation and sentenced Defendant to death as to both counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) even assumed that the trial court erred by limiting the scope of voir dire by restricting Defendant's use of a hypothetical question, any error was harmless; and (2) the trial court's other rulings with respect to voir dire were not improper. |
| |
| State v. Maisonet-Maldonado |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC19-1947 Opinion Date: December 10, 2020 Judge: Ricky Polston Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court answered in the negative a certified question asking whether the single homicide rule found in House v. State, 474 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1985), precludes separate convictions of vehicular homicide and fleeing and eluding causing serious injury or death that involve the same victim. Defendant stabbed his girlfriend and ran over her with a car, resulting in her death. During a high-speed chase with law enforcement officers after fleeing the scene, Defendant crashed into another vehicle, killing two passengers. Defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree murder with a weapon, three counts of fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer causing serious injury or death, and two counts of vehicular homicide. On appeal from the denial of Defendant's postconviction motion, the Fifth District Court of Appeals concluded that Defendant's convictions were prohibited under the single homicide rule. The Supreme Court quashed the Fifth District's decision, holding that Defendant's dual convictions for vehicular manslaughter and fleeing or eluding causing serious injury or death are not prohibited under the same-elements test codified in Fla. Stat. 775.021(4). |
| |
| State v. Marsh |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC18-1108 Opinion Date: December 10, 2020 Judge: Ricky Polston Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal concluding that Defendant's dual convictions for driving under the influence (DUI) with serious bodily injury and driving while license suspended (DWLS) with serious bodily injury as to the same victim were prohibited, holding that Defendant's dual convictions were not prohibited. Relying on its decision in Kelly v. State, 987 So. 2d (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), the Second District concluded that Defendant's convictions violated the single homicide rule. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the appropriate analysis for whether dual convictions for DUI with serious bodily injury and DWLS with serious bodily injury are prohibited under the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is the same-elements test in Fla. Stat. 775.021; and (2) therefore, dual convictions for these offenses do not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. |
| |
| Beck v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1152 Opinion Date: December 7, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Dallas Beck was convicted of felony murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime in connection with the 2012 shooting death of Corey Liverpool. In Beck’s previous appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, the Court remanded the case for the trial court to review his claim that jurors considered extrajudicial information regarding sentencing. The trial court rejected that claim on remand, and Beck appealed again. In addition to raising the juror issue, Beck argued the trial court erred by refusing to admit carious evidence about the victim, and by failing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter. Because the Supreme Court deferred to the trial court’s finding that the testimony about juror misconduct was not credible, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Beck’s juror misconduct claim. The Supreme Court also concluded the trial court properly refused to give a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter because no evidence supported it, and that any error by the trial court in limiting evidence about the victim was harmless. |
| |
| Carter v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1367 Opinion Date: December 7, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Marquerius Dandre Carter was convicted of malice murder and two firearm offenses in connection with the shooting death of Sarferaz Khan. Around 1:00 a.m. on February morning in 2016, Khan was closing the grocery store he owned. Two of his employees, Lynda Rowe and her son Otis, were helping. While the Rowes were outside the store’s doors locking up, Khan picked up trash in the parking lot. Otis saw a person coming around the corner of the store, and both Otis and Lynda heard a man yell, “Don’t move, don’t move,” followed by multiple gunshots. Surveillance video recordings of the parking lot show the man, later identified as Appellant, running into the parking lot with a white t-shirt wrapped around his face and a gun in his hand. Appellant ran toward Khan and fired at least two shots at Khan as Khan ran away, drew his own gun, and fired at least one shot. The Rowes testified that after the two men fell, they struggled on the ground. Appellant had dropped his .380 pistol; he tried to regain control of it, but Lynda, who had run toward the men, grabbed it, pointed it at Appellant, and told him, “Don’t move.” After Otis called 911, Lynda handed him Appellant’s gun, and Otis started repeatedly kicking Appellant. Lynda and Otis also took the t-shirt off Appellant’s face. Appellant told Otis, “I’m sorry Bro. I’m sorry. I didn’t mean to do it.” Meanwhile, Lynda checked on Khan, saw his .40-caliber pistol, picked it up, and kept it until she went to the police department later that morning. Khan was not moving or speaking when Lynda checked on him. Emergency medical personnel found Khan laying face down in the parking lot with no detectable pulse. He took three or four gasping breaths, but then he stopped breathing and could not be revived. Khan had been shot three times: once in the chest, once in the left thigh, and once in the right knee. Appellant disputed the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, arguing that the Rowes were not credible witnesses and that the State failed to prove that he killed Khan with malicious intent rather than in self-defense. Finding the evidence sufficient to support Appellant's conviction, and that his counsel did not render constitutionally ineffective assistance, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction. |
| |
| Clark v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1151 Opinion Date: December 7, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Eddie Clark pleaded guilty to felony murder and other crimes in connection with the stabbing death of Elizabeth Hutcheson. Years later, he filed a motion for out-of-time appeal, which the trial court summarily denied without a hearing. Clark alleged in his motion for out-of-time appeal that his failure to file a timely appeal resulted from his plea counsel’s constitutionally ineffective assistance. If Clark could prove this allegation, he would be entitled to an out-of-time appeal. However, the trial court denied Clark’s motion without conducting a factual inquiry into his claim of ineffective assistance. Accordingly, as the State conceded, under the circumstances presented in this case, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded “for the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and determine whether plea counsel’s ineffective assistance was responsible for [Clark’s] failure to pursue a timely appeal.” |
| |
| Cole v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1377 Opinion Date: December 7, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Bobby Jay Cole appealed the trial court’s summary denial of his motion for out-of-time appeal of his murder and armed robbery convictions. Because the trial court did not hold a hearing to determine whether Cole was deprived of his right to appeal due to the constitutionally ineffective assistance of his plea counsel, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the court’s order and remanded for such a hearing. |
| |
| Davis v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1318 Opinion Date: December 7, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Detrik Davis appealed pro se a superior court order denying his motion for an out-of-time appeal. The superior court found that Davis failed to carry his burden of showing that the lack of an appeal from the judgment of conviction entered following his guilty plea was the result of counsel’s ineffective assistance. Davis contended he was “forced to improperly proceed pro se on his first appeal from his conviction based on a guilty plea.” He also argued he was entitled to appointed counsel to assist him with his motion for an out-of-time appeal. Finding no merit to these claims of error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
| |
| Gardner v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1183 Opinion Date: December 7, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Reggie Gardner was convicted by jury of felony murder in connection with the shooting death of Franklin Wright. Gardner appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial, contending that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to request a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. The Georgia Supreme Court determined the trial court did not err in finding that counsel’s performance was not constitutionally deficient because counsel chose to present an “all-or-nothing” defense, which was reasonable given that the evidence did not show the irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation required to support a charge on voluntary manslaughter. Therefore, judgment was affirmed. |
| |
| Golden v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1273 Opinion Date: December 7, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Malik Golden appealed his conviction for felony murder for the death of Donell Hawkins during an attempted robbery. Golden argued the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. He also challenged the trial court’s admission of his custodial statement on the ground that it was not made freely and voluntarily. And he argued the court erred in admitting hearsay evidence and in denying his motion for a mistrial when his co-indictee testified that Golden had committed a previous robbery. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court determined the evidence was sufficient to support Golden’s conviction and the trial court committed no reversible error. Judgment was affirmed. |
| |
| Heinze v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1353 Opinion Date: December 7, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Guy William Heinze, Jr. was convicted by jury for the malice murders of Brenda Flanagan, Guy Heinze, Sr., Russell Toler, Sr., Chrissy Toler, Russell Toler, Jr., Michael Toler, Michelle Toler, and Joseph West; the aggravated assault of B. J., a child; and two drug possession offenses. Heinze lived with his father and several members of the Toler family. In late 2009, Heinze told a coworker about a dispute with his father over money that his father planned to give to other members of his family. Heinze said, “Man, my daddy ain’t never done nothing for me and my brother. Man, I’m going to kill him, I’m gonna kill 'em all.” Heinze had also gotten into a fight with Russell Toler, Jr., about his car and had told his coworker that he was going to beat Chrissy Toler if she did not arrange a date for him with her friend. According to the medical examiner, the victims had been severely beaten, each sustaining head injuries with a blunt, cylindrical object similar in shape to a gun barrel. On appeal, Heinze argued only that the trial court erred by improperly removing a juror during deliberations and replacing that juror with the first alternate juror. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. |
| |
| Lanier v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1192 Opinion Date: December 7, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Antonio Lanier appealed his convictions for malice murder and other offenses in connection with the shooting deaths of Auda and Gerald Anne Love. Lanier contended the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because it was based on his co-defendants’ uncorroborated testimony, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, and that the trial court erred by admitting crime scene and autopsy photographs and by improperly excusing certain potential jurors. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. |
| |
| Lopez v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1208 Opinion Date: December 7, 2020 Judge: Carla Wong McMillian Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Nicolas Lopez was convicted of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of Robert Moon. After his convictions, Lopez waived his right to the assistance of counsel. Representing himself, Lopez appealed, arguing: (1) his trial counsel labored under a conflict of interest; (2) he otherwise received ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) the trial court erred in failing to ensure an accurate transcription of the trial; (4) the trial judge erred in failing to recuse himself; and (5) the trial court erred in recharging the jury. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
| |
| Schell v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1383 Opinion Date: December 7, 2020 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Eugenia Schell challenged her 2016 convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the death of her mother, Willie Jo Vaughn. Appellant had a demonstrated history of abuse and violence towards her mother. This pattern of behavior led to a permanent protective order being issued against Appellant on February 9, 2011. Sometime later, Vaughn invited Appellant to live with her at her home. In October 2014, however, Vaughn initiated eviction proceedings against Appellant. Vaughn went to stay with her youngest daughter, and Appellant was given a timeframe to vacate Vaughn’s home. Vaughn had the locks changed and a spare key for the new locks hidden somewhere outside the house by her grandson. In March 2015, people accustomed to seeing or hearing from Vaughn did not. Vaughn did not report to work or to services at the church that weekend. Neighbors, who had a good view of her home and regularly interacted with her, did not see Vaughn’s car in her driveway after March 26. On that date, Vaughn was seen in the backseat of her own car, driven by Appellant. On April 3, Vaughn’s vehicle was found submerged at the bottom of a boat ramp at Upper County Landing in Wayne County, Georgia. Vaughn was discovered in the back seat, a plastic bag near her head, and a white, vinyl-type material was found draped over her body. Large rocks taken from the banks of the boat ramp had been placed on the trunk of the vehicle to keep it from floating. In her sole enumeration of error, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her convictions. Specifically, Appellant argued that evidence of her mere presence with Vaughn on March 26, 2015, did not prove her involvement in the murder. Appellant also argued there was no evidence that Vaughn was prevented from leaving or was taken from one location to another without her permission to support the kidnapping conviction. The Georgia Supreme Court found the evidence sufficient to support Appellant's conviction and affirmed the trial court's judgment. |
| |
| Thrift v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A1182 Opinion Date: December 7, 2020 Judge: Carla Wong McMillian Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Craig Thrift was convicted of felony murder in connection with the death of Terry Rouse. On appeal, Thrift challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction; the denial of his motion for new trial on the general grounds; the denial of five motions for mistrial; the admission of certain evidence presented by the State; the exclusion of certain evidence offered by the defense; and the restriction of his attorney’s cross-examination of one of the State’s witnesses. Additionally, Thrift argued he was entitled to a new trial under a cumulative error analysis. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Thrift's conviction. |
| |
| Villados v. State |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-15-0000111 Opinion Date: December 9, 2020 Judge: Mark E. Recktenwald Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the denial of relief and dismissal of Appellant's Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40 petition, holding that Appellant was entitled to appropriate relief because Appellant's counsel was ineffective. Appellant was convicted of promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree and prohibited acts related to drug paraphernalia. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. After the deadline had passed for filing a writ of certiorari, Appellant filed an application for writ of certiorari challenging the ICA's decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the application because it was untimely. Appellant then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 40, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because appellate counsel failed timely to apply for writ of certiorari despite assuring Appellant that she would do so. The circuit court denied relief. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) appellate counsel was ineffective; and (2) appropriate relief in this case was allowing Appellant to refile an application for writ of certiorari in his original case so that the Supreme Court can decide to accept or reject it on the merits. |
| |
| Idaho v. Huckabay |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 48109 Opinion Date: December 3, 2020 Judge: Bevan Areas of Law: Animal / Dog Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant John Huckabay appealed his criminal conviction of felony unlawful possession of a moose. A couple heard a gunshot as they were packing up to leave their cabin by Mica Bay on Lake Coeur d'Alene in October 2014. They encountered a large truck with a cow moose hoisted in the back on a metal frame. A man beside the truck introduced himself as John Huckabay. At their inquiry, Huckabay told the couple he had a tag for the moose. The driver, still in the truck, introduced himself as “Bob” later identified as Bob Cushman, a local butcher and the owner of the vehicle. As the couple departed, the wife looked up Idaho’s moose hunting season on her phone. Concerned of a potential hunting violation, the couple proceeded to the Idaho Department of Fish and Game’s (“IDFG”) regional office where they reported the shooting of an antlerless moose by a man named Huckabay. While Huckabay did not give the IDFG officers information about Cushman or details about who specifically shot the moose, Huckabay accompanied a third officer to the area where the moose had been killed. Officers obtained Cushman’s address and visited his residence. With Cushman’s permission, the officers checked inside a walk-in cooler on the premises and found a skinned and quartered cow moose, which lacked the requisite tag. The officers also noted that the carcass was still “very warm,” showing it had only recently been placed in Cushman’s cooler. A grand jury indicted Huckabay for felony unlawful killing or possession of a moose. Huckabay moved to dismiss his indictment, arguing the evidence was insufficient to establish probable cause and the indictment lacked essential elements of the crime. He also filed additional motions to challenge a lack of jurisdiction. Each of these issues hinged on his argument that the plain language of Idaho Code section 36-1404(c)(3) required more than one animal to warrant a felony charge. The district court denied Huckabay’s motions, finding that the indictment was sufficient to establish probable cause that Huckabay possessed the moose even if there was insufficient evidence to establish he killed the moose in question. The Idaho Supreme Court concurred with the district court that Idaho Code section 36-1401(c)(3) could plainly apply to the unlawful killing, possessing, or wasting of a single animal, and affirmed Huckabay's conviction. |
| |
| Idaho v. Quigle |
| Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal Docket: 46107 Opinion Date: December 3, 2020 Judge: Moeller Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Robert Farrell-Quigle appealed his judgment of conviction for two counts of lewd conduct. He contends that the use of a shielding screen at trial during the testimonies of the alleged victims deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial, violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him, and failed to comply with Idaho’s laws on alternative methods for child witness testimony. Leading up to trial, the State filed a motion seeking permission for both daughters to testify by alternative methods to avoid “increased emotional and mental trauma” from testifying in Farrell-Quigle’s presence. After review of the trial court record, the Idaho Supreme Court determined the use of the screen deprived Farrell-Quigle of his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial, finding specifically that use of the screen was inherently prejudicial, and did not serve an essential state interest. "the district court’s decision to use the shielding screen instead of CCTV, which this Court had previously found does not result in inherent prejudice where necessity has been shown, was at its core a decision borne out of convenience. Convenience alone cannot outweigh a defendant’s constitutional rights. " Judgment was vacated and the matter was remanded for a new trial. |
| |
| Loehrlein v. State |
| Court: Supreme Court of Indiana Docket: 20S-CR-376 Opinion Date: December 9, 2020 Judge: Steven H. David Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of murder and attempted murder of his family members, holding that one of the jurors committed gross misconduct but that it was not likely that Defendant was harmed by the misconduct. The juror at issue wrote "N/A," meaning not applicable, in response to jury questions on her jury questionnaire regarding her past criminal history and whether she had herself been a victim of a crime. The juror, however, had in fact been charged with a crime and had been the victim of domestic abuse. The court of appeals reversed the convictions, finding that the trial court erred in not finding that the juror's false answers amounted to gross misconduct that probably harmed Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, despite the jurors gross misconduct, it was unlikely that Defendant was harmed. |
| |
| State v. Gales |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 119302 Opinion Date: December 4, 2020 Judge: Dan Biles Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals rejecting Defendant's illegal sentence claim and vacated Defendant's sentence, holding that the district court erred when it looked beyond the elements of Defendant's prior 1976 California juvenile adjudication for burglary to score the adjudication as a person offense. Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and arson. Defendant later moved to correct his sentence, arguing that his prior California burglary adjudication was improperly scored as a person felony. The court of appeals upheld the person classification. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded his case to the district court for resentencing with the burglary adjudication to be scored as a nonperson offense, holding that the district court erred when it scored Defendant's burglary adjudication as a person offense. |
| |
| State v. Ochoa-Lara |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 112322 Opinion Date: December 4, 2020 Judge: Marla J. Luckert Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for identity theft stemming from his use of personal identifying information belonging to someone else to obtain employment, holding that Defendant failed to preserve for appeal his argument that his convictions were multiplicitous. The State split Defendant's identity theft into two charges to cover the time periods before and after the identity theft statute changed in 2012. On appeal, Defendant argued that his state prosecution for identity theft was preempted by federal law and that his convictions were multiplicitous. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to preserve his multiplicity argument for appeal. |
| |
| State v. Parks |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 121832 Opinion Date: December 4, 2020 Judge: Dan Biles Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence, holding that the sentence imposed conformed to the applicable statutory provisions. In 1997, Defendant pled no contest to first-degree murder for the 1978 killing of his wife. At sentencing, the district court classified a prior New Mexico conviction for an attempted first-degree murder as a person crime when calculating his criminal history score for the Kansas conviction. Defendant later filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that when he committed the Kansas murder the law did not distinguish between person and nonperson crimes, and therefore, his conviction for his "unclassified felony" should be scored as a nonperson crime for the purpose of determining his criminal history. The district court summarily denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's life sentence conformed to the statutory provision for Class A felonies at the applicable time of conviction. |
| |
| State v. Vonachen |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 118361 Opinion Date: December 4, 2020 Judge: Dan Biles Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of first-degree murder, one count of attempted first-degree murder, and one count of aggravated arson, holding that no error occurred in the proceedings below. Defendant was fourteen years old when he committed the crimes for which he was convicted. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the court's certification to try him as an adult violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not err when it denied Defendant's motion to suppress incriminating statements Defendant made to police; (2) there was no prosecutorial error; (3) Defendant's Apprendi issue was unpreserved for appeal; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying Kan. Stat. Ann. 38-2347(e) and authorizing adult prosecution; and (5) the court abused its discretion in applying the factors set out in K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38- 2347(e) to authorize a juvenile's adult prosecution. |
| |
| Garcia v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12749 Opinion Date: December 3, 2020 Judge: Gaziano Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the single justice denying Defendant's petition filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 seeking to remove the conditions of GPS monitoring and home confinement on Defendant's release, holding that the conditions were constitutional. Defendant was convicted of trafficking narcotics. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial and sought to stay the execution of her sentence while her motion was pending. The trial judge granted the stay and imposed the conditions of release at issue. Defendant then filed a petition in the county court seeking relief from the conditions. The single justice denied relief. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the condition of home confinement was not a seizure because it was imposed pursuant to a valid conviction and lawful sentence; and (2) the imposition of GPS monitoring was a search, but it was reasonable under the circumstances. |
| |
| Michigan v. Brown |
| Court: Michigan Supreme Court Docket: 158663 Opinion Date: December 3, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Legal Ethics |
| At issue before the Michigan Supreme Court in this case was whether defendant, Troy Antonio Brown, was entitled to a new trial because the detective who conducted defendant’s police interview testified falsely against him. The Court concluded: (1) the detective’s testimony against defendant was false; (2) the prosecutor failed to correct the false testimony; and (3) there was a reasonable likelihood that the uncorrected false testimony affected the judgment of the jury. Therefore, judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, defendant’s conviction was vacated, and the matter remanded to the trial court for a new trial. |
| |
| Brown v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2018-DR-01256-SCT Opinion Date: December 10, 2020 Judge: Griffis Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A jury found Joseph Patrick "Peanut" Brown shot and killed a convenience store clerk during a robbery. He was sentenced to death, and had been on death row since 1994. Brown filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief in which he raised numerous issues. Most of the claims raised at this point were subject to the time bar, the successive-writ bar, and/or were barred by res judicata. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined the remaining issue was without merit. The successive petition was therefore denied. |
| |
| Keller v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2019-CA-01347-SCT Opinion Date: December 10, 2020 Judge: Josiah D. Coleman Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Jason Keller robbed and murdered Hat Nguyen in her Biloxi, Mississippi convenience store. A jury later convicted him of capital murder and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the conviction. On May 25, 2017, the Court granted Keller’s motion for leave to proceed in the trial court with a petition for post-conviction relief. Keller argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and discover significant mitigating evidence. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge entered an order denying Keller’s request for a new sentencing hearing before a newly empaneled jury. Keller appealed. Based on the strong presumption that trial counsel provided adequate assistance and on the highly deferential standard of review, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined trial judge did not clearly err by finding that trial counsel provided adequate assistance. "[T]he trial judge did not ignore evidence or conjure a tactical decision for trial counsel. Any error in conducting factual research beyond what was in the record was harmless error." |
| |
| McGraw v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2019-KA-01770-SCT Opinion Date: December 10, 2020 Judge: Michael K. Randolph Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Andrew McGraw appealed his conviction for forcible rape. The victim, SR, was a thirty-three-year-old woman with a standing condition of bacterial meningitis. She contracted bacterial meningitis as a two-year-old; the infection was "neurologically devastating." SR weighed less than fifty pounds, and spent most of her time bent in a fetal position. Muscles in her upper and lower body were severally underdeveloped. SR could not walk or talk. She required twenty-four-hour care and supervision. After SR's mother took SR to the hospital for a checkup, it was discovered SR was pregnant. Some time after SR’s admittance, her mother requested that SR’s child be terminated. The hospital Ethics Committee met and found this was an appropriate course of action. Three days later, SR was induced into labor. The child was born unresponsive. Individuals with access to SR's home were identified; in addition to the DNA samples from five men, DNA samples were also taken from the deceased child. After testing the samples, the laboratory was able to say with 99.999999998 percent certainty that Andrew McGraw fathered his daughter’s child. McGraw was indicted on one count of forcible rape and one count of incest; he was tried and convicted on both counts. He appealed only the rape charge, arguing the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that his victim was incapable of consenting to intercourse. After examining the record, the Mississippi Supreme Court found there was sufficient evidence and affirmed McGraw's conviction. |
| |
| Wilson v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2019-CA-01328-SCT Opinion Date: December 3, 2020 Judge: Josiah D. Coleman Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| William Wilson was charged with capital murder and felonious child abuse. A trial court set aside William Wilson's death sentence, but not his guilty plea. Wilson did not appeal that decision in the time allowed under Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 4. Wilson argued that the failure to file an appeal was through no fault of his own and that good caused existed to grant his out- of-time appeal. The circuit court found that it did not have jurisdiction to grant the out-of- time appeal or, in the alternative, that Wilson had failed to demonstrate that good cause existed to grant an out-of-time appeal. Wilson appealed. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined Wilson’s attorney failed to advise him regarding his right to appeal the trial court’s refusal to set aside his guilty plea. The attorney also advised him that he was no longer his attorney. Wilson, therefore, not knowing he could appeal the refusal to set aside the guilty plea, and believing that he did not have an attorney, failed to timely perfect his appeal. The Supreme Court granted Wilson’s application for an out-of-time appeal and allowed the case to proceed on the merits. |
| |
| State v. Smith |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 304 Opinion Date: December 8, 2020 Judge: Gustafson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of solicitation of witness tampering and sentencing him to prison for ten years with four years suspended, holding that the district court made numerous errors during trial amounting to cumulative error requiring reversal. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that Defendant's conviction resulted, at least in part, from the prejudice of the irrelevant and extrinsic bad acts evidence erroneously admitted from void dire through the entire evidentiary presentation and that Defendant did not receive a fair trial as a result of the district court's erroneous rulings, mandating reversal of Defendant's conviction under the doctrine of cumulative error. |
| |
| In re Petition of Aragon |
| Court: Supreme Court of Nevada Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 75 Opinion Date: December 3, 2020 Judge: Cadish Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Appellant's petition to seal his criminal records stemming from a guilty plea to open or gross lewdness, a gross misdemeanor, holding that Appellant was entitled to the presumption in favor of sealing criminal records under Nev. Rev. Stat. 179.2445 and that no interested person provided evidence to rebut the presumption. In denying Appellant's petition to seal his criminal records, the district court concluded that the records could not be sealed under section 179.2445 because the underlying offense related to a crime against a child. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) misdemeanor open or gross lewdness is not an offense for which Defendant's records cannot be sealed; and (2) the presumption in favor of sealing Appellant's criminal records applied and was not rebutted. |
| |
| New Hampshire v. Gates |
| Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court Docket: 2019-0371 Opinion Date: December 9, 2020 Judge: James P. Bassett Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant John Gates appealed his convictions for arson, attempted arson, two counts of burglary, being a felon in possession of a dangerous weapon, and use of a Molotov cocktail. He challenged a superior court order denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained when, without a search warrant, the police entered the vestibule and utility closet of his apartment building located on his family’s farm. At trial court, defendant argued that the warrantless search violated his rights under Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The trial court applied the two-part framework established in New Hampshire v. Goss, 150 N.H. 46 (2003), which provided that, for a warrantless search to be unlawful, an individual must have a legitimate expectation of privacy — both subjective and objective — in the place searched. The trial court found that defendant lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in both the vestibule and the utility closet and concluded that the officers’ warrantless entry into those areas was lawful. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court's conclusions was wrong as to both rulings. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with defendant that, under Part I, Article 19 of the State Constitution, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the utility closet, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. |
| |
| In re M.H. |
| Court: Supreme Court of Ohio Citation: 2020-Ohio-5485 Opinion Date: December 3, 2020 Judge: Sharon L. Kennedy Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that a child-abuse investigator employed by a county children-services agency need not give the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), before questioning a child suspected of committing child abuse, holding that the questioning in this case violated neither Miranda nor the suspect's federal due process rights. The trial court in this case granted the suspect's motion to suppress, finding that the suspect's statement to the agency had been obtained in violation of his due process rights. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where the evidence demonstrated that the child-abuse investigator who interviewed the suspect was neither a law enforcement officer nor acting under the direction or control of the police and where the suspect's confession was not causally related to any conduct of the police, the court of appeals correctly concluded that the confession resulting from the questioning was admissible at trial. |
| |
| State v. Quinones Rodriguez |
| Court: South Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 S.D. 68 Opinion Date: December 9, 2020 Judge: Kern Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder and other offenses, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of his allegations of error. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) if the circuit court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement, the error was harmless because the statements were cumulative to other evidence received; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion or commit prejudicial error by refusing to declare certain witnesses adverse; (3) Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated; and (4) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Defendant's guilty verdict on all counts. |
| |
| State v. Vortherms |
| Court: South Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 S.D. 67 Opinion Date: December 2, 2020 Judge: Jensen Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of vehicular homicide, one count of vehicular battery, and driving while under the influence of alcohol, holding that the circuit court did not commit error in the proceedings below. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress a warrantless blood draw and asked the Supreme Court to review his ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it denied Defendant's motion to suppress his warrantless blood draw; and (2) Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not cognizable on direct appeal. |
| |
| Haggard v. Texas |
| Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Docket: PD-0635-19 Opinion Date: December 9, 2020 Judge: Barbara Hervey Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The issue presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether the Confrontation Clause was violated when the trial judge allowed Suzanne DeVore, a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE), to testify against appellant James Haggard, from Montana, using a two-way video system. The Court concluded based on the trial court record that admitting DeVore's remote testimony violated the Confrontation clause. The Court reversed the court of appeals, and remanded the case for a new harm analysis. |
| |
| Evans v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Supreme Court of Virginia Docket: 190846 Opinion Date: December 3, 2020 Judge: McCullough Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendants' convictions of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, holding that Va. Code 19.2-294 does not preclude a conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon when the defendant was convicted in a prior prosecution of carrying a concealed weapon. Both defendants in these appeals were previously convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and argued that section 19.2-294 parried their prosecution for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. The Supreme Court disagreed after clarifying the proper test governing the application of the successive prosecution bar found in section 19.2-294, holding that the statute did not bar Defendants' prosecutions for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. |
| |
| Cox v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 147 Opinion Date: December 7, 2020 Judge: Gray Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of one count of sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree, holding that the admission of Wyo. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence was not prejudicial error. On appeal, Defendant argued that the State introduced improper Rule 404(b) evidence by eliciting testimony from the victim about an earlier incident when she and Defendant were wrestling. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the testimony regarding the wrestling incident implicated Rule 404(b); but (2) Defendant was not prejudiced because there was no reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more favorable had the wrestling incident evidence not been admitted. |
| |
