The Selfie Coup: How to Tell If Your Government Is Plotting to Overthrow Itself

DEAN FALVY

Dean Falvy, a lecturer at the University of Washington School of Law in Seattle, describes how to tell whether a government is plotting to overthrow itself—a phenomenon he calles a “Selfie Coup.” Falvy explains the difference between a Selfie Coup and creeping authoritarianism by providing examples of both and argues that the more aware civil society is of the possibility of a Selfie Coup, the more likely it can prepare its defenses in time to prevent it.

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State Farm Lloyds v. Richards

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 18-10721

Opinion Date: July 20, 2020

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Insurance Law, Personal Injury

State Farm filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the insureds in the underlying action. In the underlying action, Jayden Meals' mom filed a personal injury suit against his paternal grandparents, the insureds, after Jayden, who was 10 years old, died in an ATV accident. The district court found that the extrinsic evidence satisfied both the motor-vehicle exclusion and the insured exclusion. The Fifth Circuit certified a question of Texas law to the Texas Supreme Court, which answered that the policy-language exception to the eight-corners rule is not a permissible exception under Texas law. Therefore, the district court erred by applying the policy-language exception in this case. The court held that the eight-corners rule applies here; the underlying third-amended complaint contains allegations within its four corners that potentially constitute a claim within the four corners of the policy; and thus the court reversed the district court's holding that State Farm does not have a duty to defend the insureds. The court stated that State Farm has a duty to defend, so the exception to non-justiciability does not apply. Because the underlying suit remains pending, the court reversed the district court's holding that State Farm has no duty to indemnify.

Johnson v. Monsanto Co.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A155940(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 20, 2020

Judge: Jim Humes

Areas of Law: Personal Injury, Products Liability

Johnson, a school district’s grounds manager and a heavy user of Roundup herbicides made by Monsanto, sued Monsanto after contracting non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. The jury found that Monsanto failed to adequately warn of its products’ potential dangers and that its products had a design defect. It awarded Johnson around $39.3 million in compensatory damages and $250 million in punitive damages. The court denied Monsanto’s motion for a new trial on the condition that Johnson accept a reduced award of punitive damages. The court of appeal affirmed in part. Monsanto was liable on the failure-to-warn claims because substantial evidence was presented that Roundup’s risks were “known or knowable” to Monsanto. The trial court did not err in allowing Johnson to proceed on a consumer expectations theory of design defect. Johnson presented abundant—and certainly substantial— evidence that the ingredients in Roundup, caused his cancer. Johnson’s causes of action were not preempted under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. 136. Monsanto has not established that the trial court erred in admitting or excluding evidence. The court reversed in part. The evidence does not support the entire award for future noneconomic damages. Johnson was entitled to punitive damages, but they should be reduced commensurate with the reduction of future noneconomic damages.

Wolf v. Weber

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A157937(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: July 17, 2020

Judge: Tucher

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

Wolf and her husband were walking with their dog in Tilden Regional Park. Dogs are allowed off-leash in this area, under their owners’ control. Weber and Cenek were walking on the same trail with Luigi, a “large” Argentinian Mastiff-Boxer mix. Both dogs were off-leash. Luigi wandered toward Wolf’s party. Weber and Cenek heard Wolf yell that she was afraid. Weber called for Luigi several times. Luigi began to return to Weber but Wolf turned away from Luigi. Something struck her in the back of her knee; she fell, dislocating her ankle and breaking two leg bones. Weber admitted that Luigi was not under perfect control. Wolf sued Weber, alleging negligence and negligence per se. Wolf alleged Weber breached his duty of care “by failing to leash or otherwise control Luigi.” The negligence per se action contended Weber violated the ordinance by failing to keep his dog under control. The court granted Weber summary judgment, finding that Wolf assumed the inherent risk of “being bumped by a dog.” The court of appeal reversed, finding that the primary assumption of risk doctrine did not apply. Given the duties and expectations that the park's ordinance establishes, being knocked over by an unleashed dog with which a person has sought no interaction is not an inherent risk. Controlling one’s dog is part of the “fundamental nature” of hiking on the park's leash-optional trails.

Beam v. WSI et. al.

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 ND 168

Opinion Date: July 22, 2020

Judge: Gerald W. VandeWalle

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

North Dakota Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI) appealed a district court judgment reversing an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision terminating Gregory Beam’s benefits. Beam was injured in 2016 while working for his employer, Gagnon, Inc. (Gagnon), installing sheets of metal. At the time Beam applied for workers compensation benefits, Gagnon submitted a job description for machinist as Beam’s position with the company at the time of his injuries. A Functional Capacity Evaluation identified Beam could occasionally climb ladders and kneel, but was unable to crouch or crawl. After completion of the evaluation, WSI identified Beam’s transferable skills and physical capabilities. WSI determined Beam’s pre-injury occupation was that of a sheet metal worker, not a machinist as submitted by Gagnon. WSI forwarded a list of job descriptions to Beam’s treating physician, Dr. Kelly, for approval. The description for the physical requirements of a machinist stated the position required “[o]ccasional stooping, kneeling and crouching;” the description for a sheet metal worker were "“[f]requent stooping, handling and reaching & occasional fingering.” Dr. Kelly did not approve Beam returning to work as a machinist, stating, “I don’t think the knee will tolerate the potential kneeling.” Dr. Kelly did approve Beam returning to work as a sheet metal worker. Based on Dr. Kelly’s approval for Beam to return to work as a sheet metal worker, WSI determined Beam could return to work in the same occupation, any employer, and discontinued Beam’s benefits. The ALJ found the job description of a machinist did not match Beam’s pre-injury profession. The ALJ found the preponderance of the evidence established Beam could return to the occupation of sheet metal worker, but could not return to his pre-injury position with Gagnon. The district court determined the ALJ’s findings of fact were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence and reversed. Applying its deferential standard of review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded there was evidence in the record from which a reasoning mind could have reasonably concluded WSI’s rehabilitation plan would return Beam to substantial gainful employment. It therefore reversed the district court and reinstated the ALJ's decision.

Schroeder, et al. v. North Dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2020 ND 167

Opinion Date: July 22, 2020

Judge: Jerod E. Tufte

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Personal Injury

Duane and Lynae Schroeder, parents of Brooke Schroeder, and Lynae Schroeder, as personal representative of the Estate of Brooke Schroeder, appealed the grant of summary judgment dismissing their action against the State of North Dakota related to a car accident, which resulted in their daughter’s death. In January 2017, Brooke was driving a vehicle eastbound on Interstate 94 in Barnes County. Before crossing an overpass at 109th Avenue Southeast, the vehicle drifted out of the eastbound passing lane, hit a snowbank adjacent to the guardrail on the overpass, and vaulted over the guardrail. Brooke was injured in the accident and died. The Schroeders sued the State for economic and non-economic damages, alleging the State’s negligence or gross negligence in performing its winter road maintenance and snow removal obligations caused the accident, Brooke's injuries, and ultimately her death. They claimed the snowbank adjacent to the guardrail eliminated any safety or protection provided by the guardrail and created an unreasonably dangerous condition. On appeal, the Schroeders argued the district court erred in granting summary judgment and determining their claims were precluded because the State was immune from liability under statutory public duty and snow and ice immunities. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court properly determined statutory immunity precluded the Schroeders’ claims.

Maas v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr.

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 7 WAP 2019

Opinion Date: July 21, 2020

Judge: Dougherty

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Health Law, Personal Injury

A mental health patient lived in a forty-unit apartment building and repeatedly told his doctors and therapists he would kill an unnamed “neighbor.” He ultimately carried out his threat, killing an individual who lived in his building, a few doors away from his own apartment. In subsequent wrongful death litigation filed by the victim’s mother, the providers argued they had no duty to warn anyone about their patient’s threats because he never expressly identified a specific victim. The trial court rejected this argument and denied the providers’ motion for summary judgment, allowing the case to proceed to trial. On appeal, the Superior Court agreed, and finding no reversible error, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed.

Temple v. Providence Care Center

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Docket: 21 WAP 2019

Opinion Date: July 21, 2020

Judge: Wecht

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Medical Malpractice, Personal Injury

In 2008, Elma Betty Temple (“Elma”), who suffered from Alzheimer’s disease, became a resident of Providence Care Center, a nursing home located in Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania. Providence Care Center, LLC (“Providence”) owned and operated the facility, while Grane Healthcare Company (“Grane”) provided management services. In November 2011, Elma, then aged 81, fell while walking on a ramp. She suffered a fracture in her right humerus, a fracture in her right pelvis, and a laceration to her right elbow. Providence apparently was not supervising Elma at the time; the only witness to the incident, a hospice chaplain, was not a designated caregiver. In 2012, Emla's son, James Temple (“Temple”), filed a complaint on Elma’s behalf against Providence and Grane, alleging negligence and corporate negligence, and sought punitive damages. Temple alleged that Providence should have known that Elma required supervision, because of two previous falls in 2011. Temple further claimed that the facility was understaffed, and that Providence failed to provide needed safety measures. In this case, a panel of the superior court concluded that, even though Providence had waived its opportunity to ask for a mistrial, the trial court nonetheless possessed and invoked its inherent authority to grant a new trial sua sponte for the same reasons that Providence raised in its post-trial motions. In so ruling, the superior court affirmed the trial court’s grant of a new trial. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that a trial court possesses "the very limited and restrained authority to halt proceedings and compel them to begin anew based upon that unpreserved error. But in such a circumstance, a trial court may only use its sua sponte authority to grant a new trial where 'exceedingly clear error' results in 'manifest injustice,' of a constitutional or structural nature." Because Providence did not preserve its request for a mistrial and because the trial court did not grant, and could not have granted, a new trial sua sponte based upon the unpreserved request for a mistrial, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s order and remanded for further proceedings.

Walsh v. BASF Corporation et al.

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Dockets: 14 WAP 2019, 15 WAP 2019, 16 WAP 2019, 17 WAP 2019, 18 WAP 2019

Opinion Date: July 21, 2020

Judge: Donohue

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury, Products Liability

Appellants, the manufacturers of various pesticides, appealed a Superior Court decision reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in their favor following the trial court’s determination that the testimony of the experts proffered by Appellee, the Executor of the Estate of Thomas J. Walsh, failed to satisfy the test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). For nearly forty years, Walsh served as a groundskeeper and golf course superintendent at several Pittsburgh area golf courses. His work involved the regular application of various pesticides (primarily insecticides and fungicides) on the golf courses. Over this time, Walsh kept a detailed record of his activities regarding the pesticides he used, including a detailed log of the specific products and the dates of their applications. In 2008, Walsh was suffering from fever, chills, and a cough when he arrived at an emergency room. A bone marrow biopsy resulted in a diagnosis of Acute Myelogenous Leukemia (“AML”). Cytogenetic testing revealed significant chromosomal aberrations. On February 2, 2009, Walsh died. His treating oncologist, James Rossetti, D.O., later opined that Walsh’s extensive exposure to pesticides raised a high degree of suspicion that said exposure played a significant role in the development of his AML. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling, but gave instructions that on remand to the trial court, the Appellants should be given the opportunity to renew their Frye motions.