Latest 8 Cases: Tilkey v. Allstate Ins. Co. (Civil Procedure), California v. Barton (Constitutional Law), California v. Jones (Constitutional Law)

In the Pandemic, Only the Rich Get a Safety Net

JOSEPH MARGULIES

Cornell law professor Joseph Margulies debunks the notion that the poor are poor because they are lazy, while the rich are rich because they are industrious. Margulies distinguishes the stock market, in which 84 percent of all stocks owned by Americans are held by the wealthiest ten percent of American households, from the general economy and point out that for the poorest half of Americans—roughly 160 million people—the stock market is meaningless.

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Tilkey v. Allstate Ins. Co.

Docket: D074459A(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 26, 2020

Judge: Richard D. Huffman

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Labor & Employment Law

While Michael Tilkey and his girlfriend Jacqueline Mann were at her home in Arizona, the two got into an argument. Tilkey decided to leave. When he stepped out onto the enclosed patio to collect his things, Mann locked the door behind him. Tilkey banged on the door to regain entry, but Mann called police. Police arrested Tilkey and charged him under Arizona law with criminal damage deface and other charges; domestic violence charges were attached to the criminal damage and disorderly conduct charges. Tilkey pled guilty to the disorderly conduct charge only, and the other charges were dropped. After Tilkey completed a domestic nonviolence diversion program, the disorderly conduct charge was dismissed. Before the disorderly conduct charge was dismissed, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), for whom Tilkey had worked for over 30 years, terminated his employment based on his arrest and his participation in the diversion program. Allstate informed Tilkey it was discharging him for threatening behavior and/or acts of physical harm or violence to another person. Following the termination, Allstate reported its reason for the termination on a Form U5, filed with Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and accessible to any firm that hired licensed broker-dealers like Tilkey. Tilkey sued Allstate for wrongful termination in violation of California Labor Code section 432.7 and compelled, self-published defamation. At trial, Allstate presented evidence that it would have terminated his employment based on after-acquired evidence that Tilkey had circulated obscene and inappropriate e-mails using company resources. A jury returned a verdict in Tilkey’s favor on all causes of action. Allstate appealed, contending: (1) it did not violate section 432.7; (2) compelled self-published defamation per se was not a viable tort theory; (3) it did not defame Tilkey because there was not substantial evidence its statement was not substantially true; (4) punitive damages were unavailable in compelled self-publication defamation causes of action; (5) the defamatory statement was not made with malice; and (6) the punitive damages awarded here were unconstitutionally excessive. The Court of Appeal agreed Allstate did not violate section 432.7 when it terminated Tilkey’s employment based on his plea and his participation in an Arizona domestic nonviolence program and reversed that judgment. However, the Court concluded compelled self-published defamation was a viable theory, and substantial evidence supported the verdict that the statement was not substantially true, so the Court affirmed that portion of the judgment. While the Court concluded punitive damages were available in this instance, the punitive damages awarded here were not proportionate to the compensatory damages for defamation. The Court remanded this matter to the trial court with directions to recalculate punitive damages.

California v. Barton

Docket: D072639A(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 26, 2020

Judge: Richard D. Huffman

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Jeffrey Barton was convicted by jury on five counts of forcible oral copulation, and one count of forcible sodomy. The jury reached its verdict only after the trial court discharged a holdout juror (Juror No. 12), after it found she was refusing to deliberate. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Barton to a prison term of 48 years. Barton appealed, contending, inter alia, the trial court abused its discretion by discharging Juror No. 12 on the basis that she was refusing to deliberate. Barton contended the other jurors’ testimony demonstrated only that Juror No. 12 disagreed with the other jurors, who found her to be unfriendly and unable to offer persuasive explanations for her opinion, not that she was unable or unwilling to deliberate. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed: under the heightened standard of review that applies to a trial court’s decision to discharge a holdout juror for refusing to deliberate, the Court concluded the trial court’s decision to discharge Juror No. 12 was not manifestly supported by evidence. Accordingly, the Court did not address Barton’s other contentions on appeal, other than his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and reversed the judgment.

California v. Jones

Docket: E072961(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 26, 2020

Judge: Slough

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Henry Jones appealed the denial of his petition to vacate his murder conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95, the resentencing provision of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) In 2000, Jones was convicted of attempted murder and first degree felony murder, and the jury also found true the robbery-murder special circumstance, which authorized a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for “a major participant” in a felony murder who acted with “reckless indifference to human life.” The trial court summarily denied Jones’s section 1170.95 petition on groundd that his special circumstance finding rendered him ineligible for relief as a matter of law. On appeal, Jones argued the trial court erred by denying his petition without the benefit of briefing from his counsel. He argued he could demonstrate a prima facie case for relief because his special circumstance finding no longer supported a felony-murder conviction after the California Supreme Court’s decisions in California v. Banks, 61 Cal.4th 788 (2015) and California v. Clark, 63 Cal.4th 522 (2016), which clarified the meaning of “major participant” and “reckless indifference to human life.” California appellate courts have split over whether such a pre-Banks/Clark special circumstance finding rendered a petitioner ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 as a matter of law. The Court of Appeal agreed with the line of decisions in California v. Gomez, 52 Cal.App.5th 1 (2020) and California v. Galvan, 52 Cal.App.5th 1134 (2020), which held that a petitioner with a pre-Banks/Clark finding was ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 as a matter of law. The Court therefore affirmed.

California v. Shaw

Docket: D076124(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 26, 2020

Judge: Dato

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In a previous appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed defendant Shaun Shaw’s convictions for burglary, assault with a deadly weapon, and making a criminal threat, but remanded to allow the trial court to exercise its new authority pursuant to Senate Bill No. 1393 (Senate Bill 1393) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013) to consider striking Shaw’s five-year enhancement for his serious prior felony conviction. At resentencing, the trial court again imposed the enhancement. Shaw challenged that decision and further arged that he was again entitled to resentencing, this time in light of Senate Bill No. 136 (Senate Bill 136) (Stats. 2019, ch. 590). After review, the Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion in the decision not to strike the five-year enhancement imposed under section 667(a)(1). Nevertheless, resentencing was necessary to permit the trial court to strike the prison priors pursuant to recently enacted Senate Bill 136.

Truck Insurance Exchange v. AMCO Insurance Co.

Docket: B298798(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 26, 2020

Judge: Audrey B. Collins

Areas of Law: Insurance Law

In the underlying action, two restaurant patrons filed suit against the restaurant owner and his landlords after a vehicle accident caused a car to crash through the restaurant, injuring the patrons. The patrons alleged that the property lacked safety measures that would have protected them from this type of injury. Summary judgment was granted for the restaurant owner but denied for the landlords, who later settled with the patrons. The landlords' insurer, Truck Insurance, then filed suit against the restaurant's insurer, AMCO, for equitable contribution. The "additional insured" provision in the restaurant's AMCO policy covered the landlords' liability "arising out of" the restaurant owner's "use" of the premises. The trial court found that the landlords' liability arose from the restaurant owner's use of the premises and was therefore covered under the AMCO policy. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the phrase "arising from" in a general liability insurance policy requires only a minimal causal connection, which existed here, and the respective liability of the parties is irrelevant to the additional insured provision. Because AMCO failed to assert that the trial court's 50 percent apportionment was erroneous, the court found this argument forfeited.

Chacon v. Union Pacific Railroad

Docket: B299031(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 26, 2020

Judge: Elwood G.H. Lui

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

Plaintiff filed suit against Union Pacific under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), alleging that he developed a sarcoma as a result of his exposure to diesel fumes and other carcinogenic substances while working as a diesel mechanic for Union Pacific (and for a predecessor, Southern Pacific) for 31 years. Plaintiff previously filed suit against Union Pacific for damages arising from an unrelated 2007 accident and the parties settled that case in 2010. As part of the settlement, plaintiff executed a release of all claims arising from his employment, including any claims concerning exposure to toxic chemicals or fumes. The Court of Appeal held that the "bright line" rule in Babbitt v. Norfolk & W. Ry. (6th Cir. 1997) 104 F.3d 89, best conforms to the governing statute and to the United States Supreme Court opinions interpreting it. Under the rule, which the court partially adopted, a release of a FELA claim is valid only to the extent that it applies to a "bargained-for settlement of a known claim for a specific injury." In this case, plaintiff's settlement of claims from an accident in 2007 did not validly release claims in 2018 for alleged exposure to carcinogenic substances. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that the release at issue here purported to extend to future claims unrelated to the particular injury that plaintiff previously settled. To that extent, the court held that the release is invalid.

Dix v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc.

Docket: B289596(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 26, 2020

Judge: Dillon

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

After Katie Dix ingested an illegal drug and collapsed while at a Live Nation electronic music festival, she was later pronounced dead from Ecstasy-related dehydration. Katie's parents filed suit against Live Nation for negligence and other causes of action. The trial court granted summary judgment for Live Nation. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because Live Nation owed a duty of care to music festival attendees and that triable issues of material fact exist on their negligence cause of action. The Court of Appeal reversed and held that, because of its special relationship with festival attendees, an operator of electronic music festivals like Live Nation owes a duty of reasonable care to festival attendees. The court explained that Live Nation's argument that it did not owe Katie a duty because she voluntarily consumed an illegal drug and died from acute drug intoxication may be relevant to causation or comparative fault, but not duty. Furthermore, after examining the Rowland factors, the court held that the foreseeability factors and policy factors weigh against finding an exception to the legal duty of ordinary care for operators of electronic music festivals. Finally, triable issues of fact for the jury to decide preclude summary judgment regarding breach of duty and causation.

Tiburon/Belvedere Residents United to Support the Trails v. Martha Co.

Docket: A157073(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: October 26, 2020

Judge: Burns

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

Before the 1972 effective date of Civil Code section 1009(b), the California Supreme Court held that an implied by law dedication is established when “the public has used the land 'for a period of more than five years with full knowledge of the owner, without asking or receiving permission to do so and without objection being made by anyone.’” Since the 1920s, Martha has owned 110 acres of undeveloped land on the Tiburon peninsula, which has views of Angel Island, San Francisco, and the Golden Gate Bridge. In 2017, TRUST filed suit to quiet title, in favor of the public, to recreational easements over trails on the property, arguing that, nearly 50 years ago, the public’s use of trails on Martha’s property established a recreational easement under the doctrine of implied dedication. The court of appeal affirmed judgment in favor of Martha. Substantial evidence supports a finding that Martha’s attempts to deter trespassers showed it did not acquiesce to public dedication. There was “a running battle between some users, who took down signs and fences”, and owners, who repaired them, indicating both that the users did not believe that they had a right to use the property and that the owner made bona fide efforts to deter them.