A Constitutional Commitment to Access to Literacy: Bridging the Chasm Between Negative and Positive Rights

EVAN CAMINKER

Michigan Law dean emeritus Evan Caminker discusses a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in which that court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause secures schoolchildren a fundamental right to a “basic minimum education” that “can plausibly impart literacy.” Caminker—one of the co-counsel for the plaintiffs in that case—explains why the decision is so remarkable and why the supposed dichotomy between positive and negative rights is not as stark as canonically claimed.

Read More

Caldera v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation

Docket: G057343(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Moore

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

Augustine Caldera was a prison correctional officer who sometimes stuttered when he spoke. In 2010, Caldera filed a lawsuit against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and his supervisor alleging disability discrimination. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding a stutter constituted a disability under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). A jury found in Caldera’s favor and awarded $500,000. The court granted a motion for new trial because it found the damage award excessive. The Court of Appeal reversed on procedural grounds. After nearly a decade of litigation, Caldera sought about $2.4 million in statutory attorney fees (a $1.2 million “lodestar” and a 2.0 “multiplier”). The court awarded a little over $800,000. Caldera appealed. The Court of Appeal determined Caldera could not find a local attorney to take his discrimination lawsuit, so he hired an out-of-town firm. But when calculating attorney fees, the court set the attorneys’ hourly rate based on a lower local rate, rather than a higher out-of-town rate. The court then applied the extrinsic "Ketchum" factors to the hourly rate, rather than applying a multiplier to the lodestar. "In sum, Caldera’s attorneys were not adequately compensated consistent with the purposes of the FEHA." Thus, the Court reversed the trial court’s order for attorney fees.

Gruber v. Gruber

Docket: B294617(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Brian M. Hoffstadt

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Where, as here, there is a dispute over what facts the previously suing parties knew at the time they brought suit, a trial court faced with an anti-SLAPP motion by those parties must decide whether the malicious prosecution plaintiff has shown that her allegation that those parties lacked probable cause has "minimal merit." The Court of Appeal held that a trial court should do so by (1) resolving all factual disputes regarding what the previously suing parties knew by accepting the plaintiff's evidence as true and (2) through that lens, evaluating whether the prior claim(s) were legally and factually tenable. In this case, the court held that plaintiff has proven that her malicious prosecution claim has minimal merit and that the trial court acted properly in denying the anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss that claim. Plaintiff alleged that defendants filed a 2016 suit against her to, among other things, exact vengeance on her for filing for divorce. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order denying the anti-SLAPP motions.

Patel v. Chavez

Docket: B291695(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Frances Rothschild

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Plaintiffs appealed the trial court's order granting defendant's motion to strike plaintiffs' complaint against defendant under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The Court of Appeal held that the Anti-SLAPP statute applies to 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims brought in state court. Therefore, the trial court correctly applied the anti-SLAPP statute to plaintiff's section 1983 claims. Under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the court held that all claims against defendant arose from protected conduct. Under the second prong, the court held that the trial court correctly concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish a probability of success on their claims against defendant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

California v. Torres

Docket: E073187(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Carol D. Codrington

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In May 2019, the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) recommended that defendant-appellant Tony Torres, be granted a “compassionate release” and his sentenced recalled under Penal Code1 section 1170(e) on the grounds he had less than six months to live and no longer posed a danger to society. Based on the Board’s recommendation, defendant filed a motion for compassionate release, which the trial court denied in July 2019. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court abused its discretion because the trial court found he had satisfied the requirements of section 1170(e), yet denied his motion because he “did not deserve compassionate release” due to his past and lack of remorse for his offense. Because it was undisputed defendant satisfied section 1170(e)’s requirements and the trial court denied his motion for improper reasons, the Court of Appeal reversed.

In re Hampton

Docket: C087151(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Andrea Lynn Hoch

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Jonathan Hampton was convicted by jury of second degree murder for shooting and killing Jonathan Giurbino. After an initial round of state and federal habeas corpus litigation resulted in denial of his petitions, Hampton initiated a second round of state habeas corpus litigation in 2014. Hampton asserted for the first time: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred and violated his federal constitutional rights by failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, with CALCRIM No. 570 on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter; (2) his trial counsel provided constitutionally deficient assistance in failing to request such an instruction; and (3) his appellate counsel provided constitutionally deficient assistance in failing to assert this instructional error claim in his direct appeal. According to Hampton, he was unaware of his entitlement to a heat of passion instruction until July 2014, when another inmate handed him a copy of the First Appellate District’s decision in California v. Thomas, 218 Cal.App.4th 630 (2013), holding on facts similar to the facts of this case that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request for a heat of passion instruction amounted to federal constitutional error and required reversal. The trial court granted the petition, concluding the original trial court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 570, and further concluding the "Thomas" decision amounted to a change in the law entitling Hampton to raise the instructional error claim in his habeas corpus petition despite having failed to do so on appeal. The State appealed; the Court of Appeal reversed, finding the trial court erred in determining there was an intervening change of law. The matter was remanded to the trial court for a determination regarding his remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). On remand, the trial court denied the habeas corpus petition as untimely. In this habeas petition (filed 2018), Hampton reasserted his IAC claims. The Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition. The California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its order denying the petition and to issue an order to show cause as to why Hampton was not entitled to relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (IAAC). Having done so, and having reviewed the return to the order to show cause, as well as Hampton’s traverse thereto, the Court of Appeal granted the petition, vacated the judgment of conviction, and remanded the matter to the Sacramento County Superior Court for further proceedings.

Carmel Development Co., Inc. v. Anderson

Docket: H041005(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Adrienne M. Grover

Areas of Law: Construction Law, Real Estate & Property Law

Carmel provided design and construction work for a luxury subdivision, Monterra, in Monterey County for more than 10 years under an oral contract with property owner Mills, the principal of Monterra LLC. Carmel recorded a mechanic’s lien and a site improvement lien against certain lots in Monterra after being informed that Monterra LLC would be unable to continue paying for the work. Carmel sued several of Monterra LLC’s investors with property interests in unsold lots in the development and Monterra LLC, alleging breach of contract and foreclosure of the mechanic’s and site improvement liens. Monterra stipulated to liability before trial; the investor defendants contested liability in a lengthy bench trial. The court of appeal reversed. Carmel applied the payments it received from Monterra LLC to debt that was not subject to liens, in effect increasing the amounts of the Water Lien and Site Improvement Lien. It was improper to allocate a water infrastructure lien only to certain benefited lots; the liens could not accrue contractual interest greater than the reasonable value of the improvements. The trial court applied an incorrect rate to calculate prejudgment interest. The court remanded with instructions to remove contractual interest from both liens, reapportion the water infrastructure lien, and recalculate prejudgment interest.

People v. Davis

Docket: F077426(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Charles S. Poochigian

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree burglary, unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle, and receiving a stolen motor vehicle. Defendant also pleaded no contest to misdemeanor domestic battery. The Court of Appeal held that remand pursuant to Senate Bill 1393 would be futile, and thus did not address the Attorney General's alternative argument that defendant's claim is non-cognizable in the absence of a certificate of probable cause. In this case, the record clearly indicates that the trial court would not have stricken the prior serious felony enhancement even if it had the discretion afforded by SB 1393. The court also held that defendant forfeited his challenge to fees imposed under sections 1202.4, 1465.8 and Government Code section 70373.

People v. Offley

Docket: B296139(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Frances Rothschild

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Defendants Offley and Keller challenged the trial court's denial of their petitions under Penal Code section 1170.951 for resentencing on their murder convictions. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred by denying defendants' petitions at the first stage of prima facie review. The court reversed the denial of Offley's petition because an enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) does not establish as a matter of law that a defendant acted with malice aforethought. The court also reversed the denial of Keller's petition because the trial court misinterpreted the record. In this case, Keller's enhancement was under section 12022.53, subdivision (e)(1) and showed only that a principal to the crime, not Keller himself, fired a weapon and caused the victim's death.

Marez v. Lyft, Inc.

Docket: A156761(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: April 30, 2020

Judge: Margulies

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

Gaurano, driving home from a day of working at the convention center in a vehicle rented through Lyft’s “Express Drive program,” struck the plaintiffs’ vehicles and caused significant injuries. The trial court granted Lyft summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed. Gaurano was not acting within the scope of his employment with Lyft at the time of the accident. The court rejected arguments that Lyft required drivers to drive the rental, that driving the rental was “ 'incident to [Gaurano’s] duties’ ” because he had to be in the rental to pick up rides, and that Lyft’s encouragement of personal driving in the rental made accidents more likely. As a matter of law, Gaurano had substantially deviated from any duties he performed for Lyft at the time of the accident. Gaurano had not worked for Lyft on that day and had no intention of doing so. The potential for Gaurano to log onto the Lyft platform, alone, is insufficient to bring all of his personal driving within the scope of his Lyft employment. Gaurano’s conduct was not foreseeable and Lyft derived no benefit from it. The court also rejected an argument that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the scope of a person most qualified (PMQ) deposition.