Latest 9 Cases: Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department v. Las Vegas Review-Journal (Communications Law), Duong v. Fielden Hanson Isaacs Miyada ...

NYC’s Mandatory Collective Bargaining Agreements in Fast-Food Shops?

SAMUEL ESTREICHER, ZACHARY FASMAN

NYU law professor Samuel Estreicher and adjunct professor Zachary Fasman comment on two bills passed by the New York City Council that would mandate detailed and extensive labor protections for fast-food workers in New York City. Professors Estreicher and Fasman praise the intent behind the laws but explain why the City Council is not the place where binding agreements governing private workplaces in the City should be enacted.

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Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department v. Las Vegas Review-Journal

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 86

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Stiglich

Areas of Law: Communications Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court ordering the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (Metro) to disclose patrol officer unit assignments from 2014 through 2016, holding that the officers had a nontrivial privacy interest in their unit assignments. Las Vegas Review-Journal submitted a Nevada Public Records Act request Metro's officers' unit assignments from 2014 through 2016. When Metro refused to disclose the unit assignments, the Review-Journal petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus. The district court granted the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) courts should apply the test adopted in Clark County School District v. Las Vegas Review-Journal (CCSD), 429 P.3d 313 (Nev. 2018) whenever the government asserts a nontrivial privacy interest; and (2) the district court erred in determining that Metro's officers lacked a nontrivial privacy interest in their unit assignments.

Duong v. Fielden Hanson Isaacs Miyada Robison Yeh, Ltd.

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 87

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Cadish

Areas of Law: Contracts, Labor & Employment Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting a preliminary injunction based on a blue-penciled noncompetition agreement, holding that Golden Road Motor Inn, Inc. v. Islam, 376 P.3d 151, 159 (Nev. 2016), does not prohibit a district court from blue-penciling an unreasonable noncompetition agreement if the agreement allows for it. Defendants signed an employment contract containing a blue-penciling provision providing that, if any provision is found to be unreasonable by the court, the provision shall be enforceable to the extent the court deemed it unreasonable. When Defendants quit their employment and began work elsewhere, Plaintiff filed a complaint to enforce the agreement, alleging that Defendants violated the agreement's noncompetition clause. The district court found that the noncompetition agreement was overbroad and blue-penciled it. The court then granted Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction to enforce the revised agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the noncompetition agreement had a blue-penciling provision, the district court did not abuse its discretion by blue-penciling the noncompetition agreement and enforcing the revised agreement.

Mesi v. Mesi

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 89

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Stiglich

Areas of Law: Family Law

In this divorce action in which Wife filed first in California and Husband filed second in Nevada, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's order dismissing the Nevada case, holding the the district court erred by dismissing the case immediately after the judge made a personal phone call without providing the parties an opportunity to respond. The district court judge in this case called the California superior court judge, discussed the case with the California judge, and then after verifying that the California case was filed first, dismissed the Nevada case. Neither Husband nor Wife was present or represented during the call. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a district court may not independently investigate facts in a pending matter by communicating ex parte with another court without giving the parties an opportunity to respond; and (2) where the same action is filed in two courts, and a party contests the first court's jurisdiction, the second court should ordinarily stay the action to permit the first court to decide the issue of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions to enter a stay.

Associated Risk Management, Inc. v. Ibanez

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 91

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Stiglich

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Insurance Law, International Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court reaffirmed in this case that undocumented aliens who are injured while working for a Nevada employer may be eligible for monetary disability benefits, holding that these monetary benefits, paid by the insurer, do not conflict with federal law or undermine the Legislature's intent. Respondent, an undocumented Nevadan, was severely injured while working for High Point Construction and applied for permanent total disability (PTD) status. Associated Risk Management (ARM), High Point's insurance administrator, denied the request. An appeals officer reversed and granted Respondent PTD status pursuant to the "odd-lot doctrine." ARM petitioned for judicial review, arguing that the appeals officer committed legal error by granting PTD to an undocumented alien. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) undocumented aliens are not precluded from receiving disability benefits under Nevada's workers' compensation laws; (2) although federal law prohibits employers from knowingly employing an undocumented alien, it does not prohibit insurers from compensating undocumented aliens for injuries they sustain while working; and (3) the appeals officer's decision was based on substantial evidence.

Kosor v. Olympia Companies, LLC

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 83

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Kristina Pickering

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

In this defamation action, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's special motion to dismiss under Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.660, Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute, holding that each of Defendant's statements was "made in direct connection with an issue of public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum." See Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.637(4). The statements at issue were Defendant's criticisms of the homeowners' association and developers/managers of Southern Highlands in Clark County. Plaintiffs - Olympia Companies, LLC and its president - sued Defendant for defamation and defamation per se. The district court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case under section 41.660. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant met his prima facie burden to demonstrate that his statements were all made in public forums on a matter of public interest. The Court remanded the case with direction to consider whether Defendant made his communications in good faith.

Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc. v. Cash

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 88

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Stiglich

Areas of Law: Personal Injury

The Supreme Court held that when a tortfeasor settles with the plaintiff, the tortfeasor may then assert a claim for contribution against a doctor who allegedly caused new injuries in treating the original injury. Marie Gonzales was injured in an accident involving a truck driven by an employee of Republic Silver State Disposal. Dr. Andrew Cash treated Gonzales's original injury and allegedly caused further injuries. Gonzales sued Republic and its employee, and the parties settled. The settlement agreement expressly discharged Gonzales's claim against her medical providers and reserved Republic's rights under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.225-.305. Republic then sued Cash for contribution. The district court granted summary judgment for Cash, concluding that contribution was not available between successive tortfeasors. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the right of contribution exists when the two parties are jointly or severally liable for the same injury, and whether the parties are joint or successive tortfeasors is immaterial; and (2) because Republic and Cash were jointly or severally liable for the injuries Cash allegedly caused and Republic settled those claims, Republic may pursue an action for contribution against Cash.

Saticoy Bay, LLC Series 133 McLaren v. Green Tree Servicing LLC

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 85

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Stiglich

Areas of Law: Real Estate & Property Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court entering judgment for Green Tree Servicing, LLC in this action to quiet title brought after a homeowners' association (HOA) lien foreclosure sale upon finding that the first deed of trust had not been extinguished because there had been a valid tender, holding that Saticoy Bay LLC Series 133 McLaren took title subject to Green Tree's first deed of trust. Green Tree was assigned a deed of trust on certain property. The original homeowners because delinquent on their HOA assessments, and the HOA proceeded with a foreclosure sale. The property was sold to Saticoy Bay. Saticoy Bay brought an action to quiet title, and Green Tree counterclaimed for the same. The district court granted summary judgment for Green Tree. On appeal, Saticoy Bay argued that the district court erred in granting equitable relief because the recitals in the foreclosure deed proved that the superpriority portion of the HOA's lien was in default at the time of the sale. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) conclusive recitals of default in a foreclosure deed do not prevent a valid pre-sale tender from preserving a deed of trust; and (2) the valid tender by Green Tree's predecessor preserved the original deed of trust.

In re Estate of Horst Revocable Trust

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 90

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Cadish

Areas of Law: Trusts & Estates

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court concluding that a residual beneficiary's objection to the second and third amendments to the Ella E. Horst Revocable Trust was time-barred under Nev. Rev. Stat. 164.021(4), holding that the objection was timely. Following the settlor's death, Respondent, the trustee, sent notice of irrevocability to the Trust's beneficiaries pursuant to section 164.021. The notice included copies of the original Trust and the Trust's first three amendments. Sixteen months later, Respondent petitioned to confirm a purported fourth amendment to the Trust. Appellant, a residual beneficiary, filed an objection, alleging that the second through fourth amendments were the product of undue influence. The district court confirmed the original Trust and its first three amendments, concluding that Appellant's objection to the amendments was time-barred under section 164.021(4), which provides a window of 120 days from service of the notice of irrevocability for bringing an action to challenge a trust's validity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) to trigger the 120-day limitation period under section 164.021(4), the trustee's notice must include all trust provisions pertaining to the beneficiary; (2) because Respondent's initial notice to beneficiaries did not include the purported fourth amendment, the notice did not trigger the 120-day limitation period; and (3) therefore, Appellant's objection was timely.

In re Estate of Scheide

Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 84

Opinion Date: December 31, 2020

Judge: Silver

Areas of Law: Trusts & Estates

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying St. Jude children's Research Hospital's petition to probate Theodore Scheide, Jr.'s lost will, holding that St. Jude met its burden to show the will was in legal existence and satisfied Nev. Rev. Stat. 136.240(3)'s requirement that two witnesses prove the will's provisions. Theodore's original will disinherited his biological son, Chip, and left his estate to St. Jude. After Theodore died, the original will could not be found, so St. Jude petitioned to probate the lost will. Chip argued that Theodore revoked the will by destruction and that St. Jude's witnesses did not satisfy section 136.240(3). The district court denied the petition, leaving Chip free to inherit the estate through intestate succession. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the evidence supported the conclusion that the will was in legal existence at Theodore's death; and (2) section 136.240(3)'s two-witness requirement was satisfied in this case.