| Banister v. Davis |
| Court: US Supreme Court Docket: 18-6943 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: Elena Kagan Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Banister was convicted by a Texas court of aggravated assault and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment. After exhausting his state remedies, he unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. Banister timely filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which allows a litigant to file a motion to alter or amend a district court’s judgment within 28 days from the entry of judgment, with no possibility of an extension. That motion was denied. Banister filed a notice of appeal in accordance with the timeline for appealing a judgment after a Rule 59(e) denial. A timely Rule 59 motion suspends the finality of the original judgment for purposes of appeal. The Fifth Circuit construed Banister’s Rule 59(e) motion as a successive habeas petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244(b), and dismissed his appeal as untimely. The Supreme Court reversed Because a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a habeas court’s judgment is not a second or successive habeas petition, Banister’s appeal was timely. The phrase “second or successive application” does not simply refer to all habeas filings made successively in time, following an initial application. Rule 59(e) applies in habeas proceedings, deriving from courts’ common-law power to alter or amend their own judgments before any appeal. The purposes of AEDPA--reducing delay, conserving judicial resources, and promoting finality--are served by Rule 59(e), which offers a narrow window to seek relief; limits requests for reconsideration to matters properly raised in the challenged judgment; and consolidates proceedings into a single final judgment for appeal. |
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| Bartolomeo v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-1621 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Kermit Victor Lipez Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Petitioner's successive federal habeas petition, holding that the sentencing judge did not rely on Petitioner's career-offender designation in setting Petitioner's term of imprisonment. In 1998, pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison for drug dealing. The above-Guidelines sentence reflected Petitioner's role in two uncharged violent crimes. In 2018, Petitioner filed his successive federal habeas petition claiming that his status as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines impacted his sentence. Basing his argument on intervening Supreme Court caselaw holding the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) unconstitutional, Petitioner claimed that the new precedent on the ACCA also invalidated the Guidelines classification and requested resentencing to a lesser term of imprisonment. The habeas court denied the petition for habeas relief for failure to show actual prejudice. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the habeas court did not commit clear error that Petitioner had not shown a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different absent the career-offender designation. |
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| United States v. Rivera-Morales |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 17-1258 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Selya Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction for production of child pornography, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress a video on his cellphone under the private search doctrine. When Defendant's wife was looking through pictures on Defendant's cellphone she discovered a video of the couple's daughter masturbating Defendant. The wife brought the cellphone to law enforcement authorities and directed their attention to the video. Defendant was subsequently indicted on a charge of production of child pornography. Defendant moved to suppress the video and his ensuing confession, arguing that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by accessing the video without a warrant and prior to obtaining his consent. The district court denied the motion to suppress. Defendant was subsequently convicted and sentenced to a 360-month term of immurement. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances, the officers initially could not be said to have conducted a "search" of Defendant's cellphone, and two reexaminations of the video fell within the protections of the private search doctrine; and (2) there was no procedural error at Defendant's sentencing, and the sentence was substantively reasonable. |
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| Oberlander v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-3485 Opinion Date: June 3, 2020 Judge: Richard J. Sullivan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Respondent challenged the district court's orders denying his motion to quash various grand jury subpoenas and directing him to comply with the subpoenas on pain of coercive monetary sanctions. The subpoenas related to respondent's conduct with respect to the public disclosure of sealed information about an undercover government witness. The Second Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enforce a subpoena issued without a sitting grand jury; the district court retained jurisdiction to oversee a subpoena involving the same subject matter that was subsequently issued by a newly impaneled grand jury; and the district court ceased to have jurisdiction to enforce the validly issued subpoena after the issuing grand jury's term expired. Nevertheless, because yet another grand jury has been impaneled and has issued an identical subpoena, the court has jurisdiction to reach the merits of respondent's motion to quash the subpoena and found that the subpoena was neither overbroad nor issued with an improper purpose, and that it did not infringe upon respondent's First or Fifth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. |
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| United States v. Tucker |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-181 Opinion Date: June 2, 2020 Judge: Leval Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| The Second Circuit affirmed defendants' convictions on fourteen counts including collection of unlawful usurious debt, and conspiracy to do so, wire fraud, and money laundering, arising out of defendants' operation of a payday lending business. The court held that, even assuming that the charge with respect to Counts 2-4 was erroneous, the error did not affect the verdict, and thus defendants have not satisfied the requirements of plain error; the jury necessarily found in rendering a guilty verdict on Count 1, for which an undisputedly correct willfulness instruction was given as to the conspiracy element, that defendants were aware of the unlawfulness of their making loans with interest rates that exceeded the limits permitted by the usury laws; and the evidence of defendants' willfulness was overwhelming. The court also held that defendants' other contentions are without merit. Finally, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant Tucker's application to stay the execution of the forfeiture order entered against him following his conviction. |
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| United States v. Zapatero |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-3829 Opinion Date: June 3, 2020 Judge: Joseph Frank Bianco Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to reduce his sentence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), based upon Amendment 782 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines for drug offenses. The court held that the plain language of the statute, and its incorporated Guidelines provisions, preclude a district court from reducing a sentence, pursuant to section 3582(c)(2), below the amended Guidelines range based on a section 5G1.3(b) adjustment at the original sentencing. |
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| United States v. Fruit |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Dockets: 19-1326, 19-1038 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Hardiman Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Pennsylvania Trooper Ramirez stopped a car for speeding after running the license plate and learning the car was owned by Enterprise. It lacked typical rental stickers. Each vent had an air freshener clipped to it. The driver, Fruit, gave Ramirez his license and rental car agreement, identifying his passenger, Garner. The rental agreement listed Fruit as the authorized driver but limited to New York and appeared to have expired 20 days earlier. Ramirez questioned Garner; 12 minutes into the stop, Ramirez put their information into his computer and learned that neither man had outstanding warrants, although Fruit was on supervised release. Both had extensive criminal records, including drug and weapons crimes. Enterprise confirmed that Fruit had extended the rental beyond the listed expiration date. Ramirez resolved to ask permission to search the vehicle but waited for backup, which arrived 37 minutes into the stop. Fruit declined permission to search. Ramirez stated that he was calling for a K-9 and Fruit was not free to leave. "Zigi" arrived 56 minutes into the stop, alerted at the car, then entered the vehicle and alerted in the back seat and trunk. A search revealed 300 grams of cocaine and 261 grams of heroin. Both men were indicted for conspiracy to possess (and possession) with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine. The district court denied their motion to suppress, ruling that Ramirez had “an escalating degree of reasonable suspicion” that justified extending the stop. In a consolidated appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. Ramirez had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop based on information he obtained during the first few minutes of the traffic stop before he engaged in an unrelated investigation; no unlawful extension of the stop occurred. |
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| United States v. Rogers |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-4366 Opinion Date: June 2, 2020 Judge: Pamela Harris Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit reversed defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that 22 of his conditions for supervised release are inconsistent with his oral sentence and therefore void. In this case, the written judgment's 22 "standard" conditions are not part of defendant's sentence because the district court did not pronounce them orally at his sentencing hearing. The court explained that the requirement that discretionary conditions be pronounced in open court gives defendants a chance to object to conditions that are not tailored to their individual circumstances and ensures that they will be imposed only after consideration of the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. 3583(d). |
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| United States v. Calzada Vega |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 16-41663 Opinion Date: June 4, 2020 Judge: Stephen Andrew Higginson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry after deportation. Both parties agree that the merit's of defendant's appeal are foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Quarles v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872 (2019). At issue is whether defendant's release from custody mooted his challenge to the presentencing report's calculation of his sentencing guidelines. The court applied United States v. Lares-Meraz, 452 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2006), and held that defendant's appeal of the eight-level sentence enhancement under USSG 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) is not moot because he remains subject to a term of supervised release. |
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| United States v. Guidry |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 19-30347 Opinion Date: June 4, 2020 Judge: Jerry E. Smith Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute marijuana and conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine. The court held that the district court did not err by applying two-level enhancements to defendant's offense level under USSG 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice and USSG 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a firearm during the commission of the offense. The court also held that the district court did not err by adding three criminal history points for defendant's prior drug offense, rejecting his claims under USSG 4A1.2(k)(1) and the rule of lenity. |
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| United States v. Maes |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Docket: 18-60881 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: Carl E. Stewart Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fifth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence stemming from a methamphetamine distribution and money laundering conspiracy. The court held that the district court plainly erred in limiting an inmate's testimony; the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the prosecutor to ask a few pointed questions about defendant's arrest for possessing marijuana in California when he had essentially testified that he believed his dealings in California were entirely legal; any error in allowing the testimony did not affect his substantial rights and was harmless; the district court did not plainly err by failing to immediately issue a limiting instruction about defendant's arrest during his cross-examination; the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a defendant to remain shackled during trial where nothing suggested the shackles were visible to the jury and particularized needs justified the shackling; defendant failed to show that the district court plainly erred in calculating his Guidelines range; and defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable. |
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| United States v. Alam |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 20-1298 Opinion Date: June 2, 2020 Judge: Jeffrey S. Sutton Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2016, Alam pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit health care and wire fraud for his role in a roughly $8,000,000 Medicare kickback scheme. He received a 101-month sentence. Alam, now 64, suffers from obesity, poorly controlled diabetes, sleep apnea, coronary artery disease, kidney stones, and bladder issues. In March 2020, fearing the health risks created by the COVID-19 pandemic, Alam sent a letter to the prison warden requesting compassionate release. Without waiting for a response, Alam sought emergency relief in federal court. Alam had not complied with the compassionate-release statute’s administrative exhaustion requirement, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). The district court dismissed Alam’s claims without prejudice. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The exhaustion requirement serves valuable purposes (there is no other way to ensure orderly processing of applications for early release) and it is mandatory, with no exception. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons did not move for compassionate release and Alam waited just 10 days after the warden’s receipt of his request to file his motion, not the required 30 days. While nothing in the administrative exhaustion requirement clearly limits the court’s jurisdiction, it remains a mandatory condition. |
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| United States v. Boulding |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Dockets: 19-1590, 19-1706 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: Jane Branstetter Stranch Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2008, Boulding was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute, 50 grams or more of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base. His PSR found Boulding responsible for 650.4 grams of crack cocaine. The district court accepted this finding over Boulding’s objection. The PSR also applied sentencing increases for possession of a dangerous weapon, for Boulding’s role as an organizer, and for obstruction of justice. Boulding’s attorney objected but did not seek a judicial determination because the statutory mandatory minimum (life in prison) controlled Boulding’s sentence. The court stated that the enhancements were justified. Boulding had two prior felony drug convictions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Boulding’s life sentence. In 2018, Boulding sought a reduction of his sentence under the First Step Act. The court imposed a reduced sentence of 324 months but denied Boulding a de novo resentencing hearing and an opportunity to address previously-frivolous objections to sentencing enhancements. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that Boulding is eligible for resentencing and remanded. Because the Act’s definition of a “covered offense” ties eligibility to the statute of conviction, the court held that eligibility for resentencing under the First Step Act is a categorical inquiry governed by the statute of conviction rather than the defendant's conduct. Eligible defendants are not entitled to plenary resentencing, but discretion to deny resentencing is not unfettered. An eligible defendant is entitled to an accurate amended guideline calculation and renewed consideration of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and must be allowed to raise objections. |
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| United States v. Buie |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-6185 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Readler Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| While pursuing an outstanding warrant for Buie, Columbia police officers learned that Buie had recently pawned firearms. Viewing surveillance footage from the shops, police saw Buie in possession of a rifle and a shotgun, each of which he exchanged for money. In additional footage, police saw Buie pawn another rifle and another shotgun. Buie pleaded guilty to two counts of felonious possession of a firearm. The PSR found that five of Buie’s past Tennessee convictions qualified as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA): second-degree burglary, arson, voluntary manslaughter, and two counts of aggravated burglary. Buie conceded only that his voluntary manslaughter conviction so qualified. The court excluded his aggravated burglary convictions under Sixth Circuit precedent (Stitt) but rejected Buie’s arguments that his arson and second-degree burglary convictions were not ACCA predicates because Tennessee’s definitions of those crimes were broader than their common-law counterparts—second-degree burglary on the entry element, and arson on the mens rea and act elements. The court found Buie imposed ACCA’s mandatory minimum 180-month sentence. The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the “Stitt” decision, holding that the locational element of aggravated burglary under Tennessee law corresponded with generic burglary, bringing Buie’s aggravated burglary convictions back into play, under ACCA. Buie then argued that the entry element of his burglary convictions was overbroad and that his arson conviction was overbroad. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Buie has committed three violent felonies under ACCA. |
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| United States v. Richardson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-5759 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In 2001, Richardson pled guilty to multiple federal crimes involving crack cocaine. Federal law then punished crack-cocaine offenses much more severely than powder-cocaine offenses. The district court sentenced Richardson to five years in prison followed by four years on supervised release. Richardson served his custodial sentence but during his supervised release, Richardson stabbed someone in the chest. The district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to another 18 months in prison following his state sentence for first-degree assault. While Richardson was serving his state sentence, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act to reduce the disparity between crack and powder cocaine, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372; later, the First Step Act made the new sentencing rules retroactive,18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(B). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Richardson’s petition for relief under the Act. While Richardson was eligible for consideration of a reduced sentence, the district court properly considered the motion along with “the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), took into account “defense counsel’s objections,” and explained how Richardson’s history and characteristics (including his post-incarceration conduct) weighed against granting the motion. |
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| United States v. Tatum |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Dockets: 19-1422, 19-1166, 19-1292 Opinion Date: June 3, 2020 Judge: Suhrheinrich Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Confidential informants told Grand Rapids DEA agents that brothers Phillips and Lee bought and sold kilogram-level quantities of heroin and cocaine in Grand Rapids, Benton Harbor, and Kalamazoo. The investigators conducted surveillance of the brothers moving packages between “stash houses,” recovered drug-related products from “trash pulls” at those locations, and made controlled buys of drugs from their associates, and concluded that they got their drugs from interstate semi-truck shipments. They obtained authorization to tap the brothers' cell phones. Based on the wiretaps, the government observed the brothers arranging additional shipments of drugs and ultimately arrested 17 members of the alleged conspiracy and executed 20 search warrants, uncovering approximately $1,300,000, 13 kilograms of cocaine, 19 kilograms of heroin, 1.5 kilograms of fentanyl, 50 pounds of marijuana, three handguns, and an assault rifle. The brothers cooperated and provided evidence against Castro, Howard, and Tatum. Castro sold Phillips heroin, cocaine, and marijuana in kilogram-level quantities and used long-haul truck drivers to move drugs from California to Grand Rapids. A truck driver also agreed to cooperate. The brothers sold drugs to Howard and Tatum. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Castro, Howard, and Tatum for conspiring to distribute heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. The district court properly authorized the wiretaps, properly admitted evidence obtained from them, properly concluded that the evidence supported the convictions, and properly sentenced Castro to 504 months’ imprisonment, Howard to 120 months, and Tatum to 84 months. |
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| United States v. Woodson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 19-1906 Opinion Date: June 3, 2020 Judge: Readler Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Over four months, Woodson and his accomplices targeted 14 Jared stores in Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Illinois, and New Jersey. While inside a Jared store, Woodson would ask a clerk to see a diamond. An accomplice would then cause a disturbance, drawing the clerk’s attention. With the clerk distracted, Woodson would replace the diamond with cubic zirconia, leave the store with the diamond, and then fence the stolen item to a buyer in Toledo, Cleveland, or New York. The group stole roughly $90,000 worth of diamonds before targeting multiple Grand Rapids area Jared stores on the same day and diverting from their routine, to pry open a display case. A clerk called 911. Officers broadcast descriptions of the men to law enforcement and jewelry stores. Later that day, Woodson was identified leaving another Jared store. When police stopped his vehicle, they found Woodson and his accomplices plus several pieces of diamond jewelry. Woodson pled guilty to conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, 2314, 2315. The district court calculated Woodson’s Guidelines range as 21-27 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 24-month sentence, upholding the imposition of a two-level sentencing enhancement based on a finding that a central part of Woodson’s scheme was perpetual relocation to avoid law enforcement (U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(10)(A). The court rejected Woodson’s argument that his practice of returning to his “home base” in Toledo meant he never “relocated” the scheme. |
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| United States v. Jones |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Dockets: 19-1768, 19‐1287, 19‐2049 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: HAMILTON Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In trials before the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Rehaif” decision, three defendants were separately convicted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g), which prohibits convicted felons and several other classes of people from possessing firearms or ammunition. Before Rehaif, federal courts held that section 922(g) required the government to prove a defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition, but not that the defendant knew he belonged to one of the prohibited classes. In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held that the statute requires the government to “show that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and also that he knew he had the relevant status when he possessed it.” On appeal, the defendants asserted a missing element in their indictments and jury instructions and a denied motion for a judgment of acquittal. Employing plain‐error review, the Seventh Circuit affirmed two sentences but vacated the third, based on a “Tapia error,” imposing a longer prison term for purposes of rehabilitation through prison programs. Rehaif does not impose a willfulness requirement on section 922(g) prosecutions. The court noted the important difference between requiring knowledge of status and knowledge of the criminal prohibition and reasoned that the Supreme Court would not have adopted the broader reading without saying so with unmistakable clarity. The court noted that none of the defendants objected to his indictment or his jury instructions and concluded that none of them were prejudiced by the omission of a reference to knowledge of his status. |
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| Spann v. Lombardi |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1768 Opinion Date: June 3, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Plaintiff filed suit against several prison officials in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging a disciplinary adjudication, conditions of confinement, adequacy of medical treatment, and alleged retaliatory acts. The district court denied motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit held that officials were entitled to a ruling on their defense of qualified immunity as to the Eighth Amendment claims in Count II. Because the order granting the motion for reconsideration effectively denied the officials' motion to dismiss without ruling on qualified immunity, the court remanded the case for further proceedings to address the question of qualified immunity on Count II. As to the remaining claims, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the officials failed to properly plead or carry their burden of proof as to any defenses of privileges and immunities. Accordingly, the court rejected the challenge to the order denying summary judgment on the remaining counts. |
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| United States v. Box |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1366 Opinion Date: June 2, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant's prior Arkansas convictions for possession of child pornography qualified as prior convictions under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(b)(1). The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to receipt of child pornography. The court held that defendant's contention that the Arkansas statute punished more conduct than its federal counterpart is foreclosed by this court's decision in United States v. Mayokok, 854 F. 3d 987 (8th Cir. 2017). In this case, defendant's prior convictions related to the possession of child pornography. |
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| United States v. Carter |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Dockets: 19-1153, 19-1172, 19-1177, 19-1344, 19-1345 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Kobes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed five defendants' sentences imposed after they each pleaded guilty to charges related to their involvement in a prostitution and sex trafficking conspiracy. The court held that the district court did not clearly err by applying a sentencing enhancement for exerting undue influence over a minor victim; for an offense involving the commission of a sex act or sexual contact under USSG 2G1.3(b)(4)(A); and for an offense involving the commission of a sex act or sexual contact under USSG 2G1.3(b)(4)(A). The court also held that Defendant Carter and Coleman's sentences were substantively reasonable and the district court did not commit procedural error in sentencing them. Furthermore, the district court did not err in setting the base offense levels for Defendants Sarina, Ronzell, and Brown. The court found no error in defendants' sentences and rejected their claims to the contrary. |
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| United States v. Franklin |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3630 Opinion Date: June 3, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of drug trafficking and firearms offenses. The court held that the district court's jury instructions adequately covered the substance of defendant's proposed instruction on "mere presence" and the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting defendant's proposed instruction. In this case, defendant's proposed mere presence instruction would have been largely duplicative, and the instructions as a whole already conveyed that the government must prove more than proximity to the gun and drugs in order to convict. |
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| United States v. Harlan |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1160 Opinion Date: June 4, 2020 Judge: William Duane Benton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for two counts of assaulting an intimate partner by strangling, one count of assault with a dangerous weapon, and one count of domestic assault by an habitual offender. Assuming without deciding that defendant did not waive his right to appeal the issue, the court held that defendant failed to show justifiable dissatisfaction with his attorney and the magistrate judge did not err in denying his request for substitute counsel. The court also held that the magistrate judge did not err by continuing the trial over defendant's objection and excluding the time from calculations under the Speedy Trial Act; the district court did not err by denying defendant's mid-trial request to proceed pro se; and the district court properly considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and did not abuse its discretion by imposing an within-Guidelines sentence. |
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| United States v. Lee |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-3618 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After the district court granted defendant's motion to stay the execution, the execution date passed, and the government appealed. Defendant argued that the government's appeal is moot because the execution date has passed and the execution has not been rescheduled. The Eighth Circuit held that there is a live controversy over the validity of the district court's ongoing injunction. Furthermore, that another district court also had enjoined defendant's execution on different grounds, does not preclude the government from appealing this order too. The court held that the district court applied the incorrect legal standard in relying on Chambers v. Bowersox, 197 F.3d 308 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), to justify a stay of execution pending a decision by the Supreme Court in Banister v. Davis, No. 18-6943. Therefore, an appreciable chance that Banister could allow for additional judicial consideration of defendant's previously denied Rule 59(e) motion was not sufficient to justify a stay of execution. The court vacated the district court's order. |
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| United States v. Nevatt |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3555 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and six related gun and money laundering counts. The court held that the inventory search of defendant's motorcycle was lawful and the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence. In this case, the inventory search was not a pretext for an investigatory search where the district court did not clearly err in crediting the officer's testimony that he towed the motorcycle because defendant lacked the proper endorsement and had no insurance. Furthermore, the officer towed the vehicle because defendant could not lawfully drive the vehicle and the vehicle was a safety hazard on the street. The court also held that defendant's 460 month sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court discussed the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. Although the district court did not expressly discuss defendant's mental health and emotional issues as mitigating factors, the court indicated that it had reviewed his sentencing memorandum that identified these mitigating factors. |
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| Lepe Moran v. Barr |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 18-73167 Opinion Date: June 2, 2020 Judge: Susan Graber Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law |
| The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for review of the BIA's determination that petitioner's conviction for felony vehicular flight from a pursuing police car while driving against traffic, in violation of California Vehicle Code section 2800.4, is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude that made him removable. The panel applied the two-step process in determining whether California Vehicle Code section 2800.4 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude by first reviewing the elements of the statute de novo and then by deferring, to some extent, to the BIA's conclusion that a crime involves moral turpitude. The panel concluded that it need not decide the appropriate level of deference because, even affording only minimal deference, the BIA's interpretation was correct. |
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| United States v. Andres |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-10823 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: Lagoa Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence for distribution of methamphetamine, conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, and possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The court held that defendant failed to establish good cause sufficient to overcome the untimely filing of his motion to suppress. The court also held that the district court did not plainly err by denying defendant's motion to suppress where the officer had probable cause to stop defendant's vehicle for a traffic infraction because the vehicle was following too closely to another vehicle. Furthermore, the investigating officers' collective knowledge of the ongoing criminal investigation justified the stop of defendant's vehicle. Finally, the court held that there was no clear error in the district court's finding that defendant did not accept responsibility for purposes of USSG 3E1.1. |
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| United States v. McGregor |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-10163 Opinion Date: June 3, 2020 Judge: Marcus Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment overruling defendant's objection to the admission of the firearm evidence. The court rejected defendant's contention that the probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice where the firearm was found in close proximity to the personal identifying information (PII) in a small closet, it tied defendant directly to the PII, and it had substantial probative value in proving that defendant actually possessed the PII. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that firearms are not so inherently prejudicial as to substantially outweigh the probative value here. |
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| Johnson v. Wilson |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Docket: 18-5350 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Katsas Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the direct appeal of his murder conviction in D.C. Superior Court. Appellant alleged that his appellate counsel labored under two conflicts of interest and failed to argue that the government withheld exculpatory evidence. The court rejected appellant's claims that a conflict arose from counsel's prior representation of another individual present at the time of the murder where counsel had forgotten his prior representation of the individual and thus lacked an actual conflict. Consequently, appellant's second claim of conflict also failed. The court further held that counsel was not ineffective by declining to pursue a losing Brady claim. Moreover, appellant's final argument that counsel was ineffective on appeal in failing to argue that he had been ineffective at trial simply repackaged the losing Brady argument. Therefore, appellant was not denied effective assistance of appellate counsel. |
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| Abernathy v. Kelley |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 228 Opinion Date: June 4, 2020 Judge: Wynne Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying and dismissing Appellant's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant stated no ground on which the writ could issue under Arkansas law. Appellant was found guilty of two counts of the rape of two children. Appellant was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment on each of the two counts of rape. In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Appellant alleged that the sentence imposed was excessive and based on "junk science"; (2) inadmissible testimony was allowed in the sentencing phase; and (3) he was denied the right to allocution before the sentence was imposed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that none of Appellant's claims stated a ground for the writ. |
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| Barnett v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 222 Opinion Date: June 4, 2020 Judge: Kemp Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's pro se third petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a writ of error coram nobis, holding that this petition was an abuse of the writ. Petitioner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. In his pro se third petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a writ of error coram nobis Petitioner alleged that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that Petitioner abused the writ in this instance because he alleged no fact sufficient to distinguish his claims from the claims in his first two petition. |
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| McKinney v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 226 Opinion Date: June 4, 2020 Judge: Wynne Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's pro se petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to allow him to file a petition for writ of error coram nobis in his criminal case, holding that neither of Petitioner's claims established cause to permit Petitioner to proceed in the trial court with a coram nobis petition. Petitioner was found guilty of multiple drug-related offenses. As grounds for the writ, Petitioner alleged that (1) while his criminal case was on remand from the court of appeals, a third party confessed to him that he was the owner of drugs and scales seized in the search of Petitioner's house, and (2) neither Petitioner's trial attorney nor his appellate attorney afforded him effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) Petitioner's petition with respect to the third-party confession was not timely filed; and (2) Petitioner's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel were not cognizable in a coram nobis proceeding. |
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| Williams v. State |
| Court: Arkansas Supreme Court Citation: 2020 Ark. 224 Opinion Date: June 4, 2020 Judge: Kemp Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's petition for writ of error coram nobis, holding that reversal was not warranted because Appellant failed to establish a meritorious Brady claim. In 1994, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2015, Appellant filed a petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the circuit court to consider his petition for error coram nobis on the ground that the State had suppressed exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The circuit court ultimately denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's error coram nobis petition. |
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| In re Scott |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D076909(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 4, 2020 Judge: Judith L. Haller Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 1984, petitioner Lionel Scott pleaded guilty to third degree assault in Minnesota and admitted during his plea colloquy that he personally and intentionally pressed a warm or hot iron against his victim's face, inflicting a discernible burn mark that required medical treatment and was still somewhat visible four months later. In 1999, Scott was convicted in California of several sex offenses. The sentencing court imposed a Three Strikes law sentence of 75 years to life based, in part, on the court's finding that Scott's earlier Minnesota conviction constituted a "serious felony" (and therefore a "strike") because Scott "personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon" (the iron) in the commission of the offense. In making this finding, the trial court relied solely on the elements of the Minnesota offense and the plea colloquy establishing the factual basis for Scott's guilty plea. In 2019, Scott petitioned for habeas relief, arguing he was entitled to relief under California v. Gallardo, 4 Cal.5th 120 (2017), which held that a sentencing "court considering whether to impose an increased sentence based on a prior qualifying conviction may not"—consistent with a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial—"make disputed findings about 'what a trial showed, or a plea proceeding revealed, about the defendant's underlying conduct.' " The California Supreme Court issued an order to show cause directing the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to show why Scott was not entitled to relief pursuant to Gallardo, and why Gallardo should not have applied retroactively on habeas corpus to final judgments of conviction." Persuaded by In re Milton, 42 Cal.App.5th 977 (2019), the Court of Appeal concluded Gallardo did not apply retroactively. Nonetheless, the Court would have concluded Scott was not entitled to relief under Gallardo because the sentencing court based its findings regarding Scott's Minnesota conviction on undisputed facts "admitted by [Scott] in entering [his] guilty plea," a practice expressly permitted by Gallardo. Accordingly, Scott's petition was denied. |
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| People v. Best |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A155459(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Tucher Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A man parked his car in San Francisco's Sutter-Stockton Garage, leaving his dog in the car. When he returned, he saw his dog had been brutally killed. A security guard viewed video clips from the incident and recognized Best, who was charged with second-degree burglary of a vehicle; killing, maiming, or abusing an animal; and vandalism of the vehicle, plus four misdemeanors. The trial court declared a doubt about Best’s competency; Best apparently refused to face the judge in order to avoid having her image recorded. Experts evaluated Best; the court found Best mentally competent to stand trial. The matter was continued for a Faretta hearing. A different judge confirmed that Best had read and initialed each portion of an “Advisement and Waiver of Right to Counsel” and inquired into Best’s education and awareness of the charges. The court engaged in extensive questioning. Some of Best’s responses betrayed a lack of understanding of legal concepts and procedures. When the court asked Best about possible defenses, her discussion verged on incoherence. Best gave clear, accurate answers to simpler questions. The court denied her motion. Best was convicted. The court of appeal reversed; the trial court erred in denying Best the right to represent herself on the grounds she had not knowingly and voluntarily made that choice. The court rejected arguments that the Faretta motion was untimely and that Best was disruptive and disobedient and noted that the transcript does not show Best was advised of the maximum punishment she faced. |
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| People v. Sanchez |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: F076908(Fifth Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 3, 2020 Judge: Jennifer R.S. Detjen Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in an action where defendant entered a West plea to involuntary manslaughter and child endangerment with great bodily injury. The court held that the jury verdict of not guilty of murder did not preclude, on collateral estoppel grounds, a second trial on assault on a child causing death because the jury's verdict did not necessarily resolve an ultimate fact in defendant's favor as to the latter; the People's amendment to the information to add a charge of child endangerment with enhancements for personally inflicting great bodily injury did not give rise to a presumption of vindictiveness; and Penal Code section 654 did not preclude a subsequent trial on the first amended information. |
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| People v. Tarkington |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B296331(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: June 2, 2020 Judge: Lee Anne Edmon Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, with a finding that he personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon, a knife. After the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437, defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, which the trial court summarily denied. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that defendant is ineligible for section 1170.95 relief as a matter of law because the record shows that defendant was the actual killer and was not tried using the natural and probable consequences doctrine or the felony murder rule. The court also held that defendant was not entitled to appointed counsel at the first prima facie review stage, and defendant's remaining arguments lack merit. |
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| Colorado in Interest of R.D. |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 44 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: Monica M. Márquez Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Internet Law, Juvenile Law |
| The issue this case case, which stemmed from a late-night argument on Twitter among several high school students, presented to the Colorado Supreme Court centered on the applicable framework for distinguishing a true threat from constitutionally protected speech in the "cyber arena." R.D., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent for harassment by communication based on those tweets directed at another student that took place in the wake of a local school shooting. Put differently, the question was whether R.D.'s statements were "true threats." The Supreme Court held a true threat is a statement that, considered in context and under the totality of the circumstances, an intended or foreseeable recipient would reasonably perceive as a serious expression of intent to commit an act of unlawful violence. In determining whether a statement is a true threat, a reviewing court must examine the words used, but it must also consider the context in which the statement was made. Particularly where the alleged threat is communicated online, the contextual factors courts should consider include, but are not limited to: (1) the statement’s role in a broader exchange, if any, including surrounding events; (2) the medium or platform through which the statement was communicated, including any distinctive conventions or architectural features; (3) the manner in which the statement was conveyed (e.g., anonymously or not, privately or publicly); (4) the relationship between the speaker and recipient(s); and (5) the subjective reaction of the statement’s intended or foreseeable recipient(s). Because neither the juvenile court nor the court of appeals had the benefit of the framework announced by this case, the Supreme Court reversed judgment and remanded for reconsideration. |
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| Colorado v. Jones |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 45 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: William W. Hood, III Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Andre Jones was convicted by jury of shooting and killing his estranged and pregnant wife. Although she died, medical personnel managed to deliver her severely injured baby. The jury found Jones guilty of many crimes related to the shooting, including first degree murder of his wife and child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury. The court of appeals reversed, determining: (1) the trial court erred by excluding Jones’s parents from the courtroom during the testimony of two witnesses; and (2) in a split decision, Jones could not be retried for child abused because an unborn fetus, even if later born alive, was not a "person" under the child abuse statute. The division reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court on both issues, but on slightly different grounds with respect to the child abuse issue. The Court concurred the trial court's exclusion of Jones' parents constituted a partial closure of the courtroom that violated Jones' Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Because that error was structural, Jones was entitled to a new trial. With regard to the child abuse issue, the Court could not discern the legislature's intent regarding a defendant's liability under the child abuse statute. Under the rule of lenity, the Court vacated Jones' conviction and concluded he could not be retried on that charge. |
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| Halaseh v. Colorado |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 35M Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: Coats Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Public Benefits, White Collar Crime |
| Petitioner John Halaseh petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court to review a court of appeals' remand order to his underlying appeal, which directed the district court to enter four convictions for class 4 felony theft in place of the single conviction of class 3 felony theft that was reflected in the charge and jury verdict. The appellate court reversed the class 3 felony on grounds that when the statutory authorization for aggregating separate acts of theft was properly applied, there was insufficient evidence to support a single conviction for theft of $20,000 or more. It also found, however, that there was sufficient evidence to support four separate convictions for aggregated thefts with values qualifying as class 4 felonies, and that substituting these four class 4 felony convictions for the vacated class 3 felony conviction was necessary to fulfill what it understood to be its obligation to maximize the effect of the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court disapproved of the appellate court's judgment, finding no theft offense required the aggregation of two or more separate instances of theft, whether that aggregation were to be based on commission within a period of six months or on commission as a single course of conduct, was a lesser included offense of the class 3 felony of which Halaseh was actually charged and convicted. Further, no such offense was implicitly found by the jury, and therefore none could be entered in lieu of the reversed conviction without depriving the defendant of his right to a jury trial. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. |
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| Richardson v. Colorado |
| Court: Colorado Supreme Court Citation: 2020 CO 46 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: William W. Hood, III Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Gary Richardson was convicted by jury of multiple crimes. The jury venir included the trial judge's wife ("Juror 25"). During trial, the judge at times "casually tossed a spotlight" on his relationship to Juror 25: He joked about what was for dinner and forcing his wife to spend more time with him. He also told counsel that he thought his wife would be a “fine juror” and at another point asked them to “[b]e nice” to her. However well-intentioned, the Colorado Supreme Court surmised the fanfare around Juror 25 created "fairly predictable questions" on appeal: had the judge at least inadvertently conferred a special status on his wife to which defense counsel and the other jurors were expected to defer? Should the judge have excused his wife or himself, even without being asked to do so? The Supreme Court concluded that by failing to object, Richardson waived his challenge to Juror 25. The Supreme Court also concluded the trial judge did not have a duty to excuse Juror 25 from the jury or recuse himself in the absence of any contemporaneous objection. "While the trial judge could have handled this unusual situation in a more restrained manner, his failure to do so did not create reversible error." |
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| McDonald v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC19-635 Opinion Date: June 4, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court summarily denying Petitioner's fourth postconviction motion filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that the circuit court did not err in summarily denying Petitioner's Giglio claim and newly discovered evidence claim. In his motion, Petitioner raised claims based on a letter used by the United States Department of Justice that criticized portions of the of the testimony provided by an FBI forensic hair analyst during Petitioner's joint trial with a codefendant. The circuit court summarily denied the claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner's reliance on the letter to establish a Giglio violation was misplaced; and (2) the letter was not of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. |
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| Patrick v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC19-140 Opinion Date: June 4, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the postconviction court denying Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to challenge a biased juror, holding that the postconviction court's finding that defense counsel had a reasonable, strategic basis for not challenging the juror was supported by competent, substantial evidence. Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and robbery. Appellant was sentenced to death for the murder. Appellant later filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging, among other things, ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to challenge a biased juror. After the Supreme Court remanded the issue for an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied the claims, finding that counsel had chosen not to challenge the juror as part of a reasonable trial strategy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that competent, substantial evidence supported the finding that counsel made a reasonable decision not to challenge the juror; and (2) this strategy was objectively reasonable from the perspective of believing that it would operate to Defendant's advantage in this particular trial. |
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| Valentine v. State |
| Court: Florida Supreme Court Docket: SC18-1102 Opinion Date: June 4, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court denying Appellant's successive motion for postconviction relief filed under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that the trial court properly denied relief. In his postconviction motion, Appellant raised a claim relating to the legal name of one of his victims, to whom he had been married, and sought relief pursuant to Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 S. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016). The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's claim regarding the legal name of one of his victims was untimely and procedurally barred; and (2) Hurst relief did not apply to Appellant because he waived his right to a penalty phase jury. |
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| Dixon v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0857 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Stanley Dixon was convicted by jury of malice murder for the shooting death of Cedrick Clark. He was also convicted of aggravated assault, possession of a handgun by an underaged person, and multiple counts of participating in criminal gang activity. On appeal, Dixon contended the evidence was insufficient as to all counts of participating in criminal gang activity and that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. In addition, he contended the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the offense of participating in criminal gang activity and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Dixon's convictions. |
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| Georgia v. Heath |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S19G0967 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: McMillian Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Kristine Heath was convicted by jury of homicide by vehicle in the first degree based on reckless driving; homicide by vehicle in the second degree; five counts of serious injury by vehicle; and failure to stop at a stop sign. The Court of Appeals reversed Heath’s convictions, except for the stop sign conviction, after concluding that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to demur to the fatally defective felony counts in the indictment. The Georgia Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for certiorari to consider whether trial counsel's failure to file a general demurrer resulted in prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The Supreme Court determined Heath demonstrated prejudice under Strickland, thus affirming the Court of Appeals' reversal of the trial court's denial of Heath's motion for a new trial as to the vehicular homicide and serious-injury-by-vehicle convictions. |
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| Hamilton v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0483 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Rodney Hamilton was convicted by jury of felony murder predicated on aggravated battery, in connection with the death of his three-year-old adopted daughter. On appeal, Hamilton argued the evidence submitted against him at trial was insufficient, and the trial court erred in admitting certain expert testimony of the child's brain injury. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction. |
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| Lyons v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0536 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Joseph Lyons was convicted by jury for the felony murder of Tony Lyons, two counts of aggravated assault, one count of home invasion, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On appeal, Lyons argued the trial court made numerous errors by: (1) allowing certain state exhibits to go to the jury during deliberations in violation of the continuing witness rule; (2) improperly instructing the jury on aggravated assault; (3) permitting the State to elicit hearsay testimony; (4) admitting photographs of Lyons in possession of a gun; (5) sentencing Lyons on the aggravated assault counts; and (6) admitting gang-related evidence. Lyons also argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because: (1) trial counsel failed to object to certain witness statements; and (2) trial counsel failed to object to the admission of inadmissible hearsay statements. The Georgia Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in sentencing Lyons for the aggravated assault of Tony Lyons (Count 7), and accordingly vacated that sentence. However, with respect to Lyons’ remaining assertions, the trial court’s judgment was affirmed. |
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| Newton v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0259 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: Keith R. Blackwell Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Cedric Newton, Jr. was tried by jury and convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the 2010 fatal shooting of Udondra Hargrove. On appeal, Newton claimed the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence of two out-of-court identifications. He also contended he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Norris v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0500 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: Harold D. Melton Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Melissa Norris was convicted by jury of malice murder and a related firearm offense in connection with the shooting death of her father, Charles. Norris and her father had a strained relationship based on Norris’s refusal to follow her parents’ rules. In late 1995, Norris, then fifteen years old, told a friend she had been arguing with her father. Sometime after the call, Norris took a gun from her brother's room, walked down stairs to where her father was sitting, pointed a gun to the back of his head and pulled the trigger. Norris called her friend again, wherein she admitted to shooting her father. The pair did not call for help or notify law enforcement; instead, they met up and walked down the street to the friend's aunt’s house for dinner. The aunt noticed that the girls were acting “giggly” and whispering back and forth throughout dinner. After providing numerous conflicting stories to law enforcement, including telling officers that her brother had shot the victim and that she was not at home when the shooting occurred, Norris eventually admitted that she shot her father in the back of the head. She testified at trial she did not know whether the gun was loaded, and that she was "just being stupid, horsing around" when the gun went off. On appeal of her conviction, Norris argued the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on mistake of fact. Finding no such error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed her conviction. |
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| Rouzan v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0414 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Seth Joseph Brian Rouzan challenged his 2013 convictions for malice murder and another crime in connection with the shooting death of Joseph Williams, Jr. Appellant claimed: (1) the trial court applied the wrong legal test in admitting other-acts evidence; (2) committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury that an accomplice’s testimony was not sufficient to establish a fact unless corroborated; and (3) abused its discretion in denying his request to continue the hearing on his motion for new trial based on his motion-for-new-trial counsel’s admitted failure to prepare for the hearing. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in applying an obsolete legal standard to allow the State to introduce the other-acts evidence. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for the trial court to apply the correct test under the current Evidence Code and to exercise its discretion on whether other-acts evidence should have been admitted. |
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| Shealey v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0185 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Dextreion Shealey and his co-defendant Kelvin Hurston were found guilty of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the 2016 gang-related shooting death of Daven Tucker. Appellant’s only contention on appeal of his conviction was that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding from evidence statements that his co-indictee Charles Lovelace made during Lovelace’s guilty plea hearing. Seeing no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Stinchcomb v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0355 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: McMillian Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| At a 2004 trial, a jury found Appellant Mario Stinchcomb guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in connection with the shooting death of Jakesha Young. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Stinchcomb’s convictions on direct appeal. In 2018, Stinchcomb filed an extraordinary motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, which the trial court denied without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court thereafter granted Stinchcomb’s application for discretionary appeal to consider whether the trial court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing before ruling on his motion. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court did err, and, accordingly, the Court vacated the order denying Stinchcomb’s motion and remanded this case for an evidentiary hearing. |
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| Thompson v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0245 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Timmy Thompson was found guilty by jury of murder in connection with the death of his wife, Peggy Thompson. Peggy’s cause of death was determined to be blunt-force injuries to her head in conjunction with asphyxia, and her death was ruled a homicide. She had injuries to her head, face, scalp, neck, upper chest area, and arms consistent with blunt-force trauma and strangulation, but not consistent with a fall. Peggy’s injuries were determined to have been caused between one and four hours before her death. Oral and rectal buccal swabs collected from Peggy at the scene tested positive for male DNA matching Thompson. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred by: (1) by allowing improper testimony regarding other alleged acts of violence committed by Thompson against his stepdaughter, stepson, and daughter to be admitted at trial; and (2) by not applying the rule of sequestration to these other-acts witnesses. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed judgment. |
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| Treadaway v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0410 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: McMillian Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Dora Treadaway was convicted of felony murder in connection with the death of her husband Claude “Randy” Treadaway. On appeal, Treadaway argued: (1) the trial court’s order denying her motion for new trial should have been vacated and remanded for additional factual findings; (2) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Treadaway committed any unlawful act that proximately caused Randy’s death; (3) the trial court’s jury instructions on causation were erroneous; and (4) that trial counsel was ineffective in relying on cross-examination of the State’s medical expert rather than calling a defense expert witness and in failing to request the proper charge on causation. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Treadaway's convictions. |
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| State v. Bright |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-16-0000833 Opinion Date: June 3, 2020 Judge: Mark E. Recktenwald Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for violating a protective order for coming within 100 feet of the complainant while at his place of work, holding that Defendant's place of work was not a "neutral location" under the terms of the protective order. The order for protection at issue prohibited Defendant from coming within 100 feet of the protected party at a "neutral location." Defendant was convicted of violating the order of protection after he encountered the protected party on the steps of the Fifth Circuit courthouse, where he worked as a documents clerk. On appeal, Defendant argued that the courthouse was not a "neutral place" because it was his place of employment. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the order for protection is ambiguous and must therefore be construed in favor of Defendant; (2) in accordance with the rule of lenity, a "neutral location" is a place that is unaffiliated with either party; and (3) because Defendant's workplace was not a neutral location Defendant did not violate the order for protection. |
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| State v. Miranda |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-17-0000660 Opinion Date: June 4, 2020 Judge: Richard W. Pollack Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of assault in the second degree, holding that Defendant's constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses was violated when the circuit court prevented defense counsel from cross-examining the complainant about a potential source of bias. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred in precluding the defense from cross-examining the complainant about disciplinary action the complainant might have faced as a United States Marine for instigating a fight in violation of its code of conduct provisions. Defendant further argued that the court erred in allowing a police officer to testify as to the contents of a security video that recorded the altercation but that had subsequently been destroyed. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the defense was prevented from questioning the complainant about a potential source bias, the jury did not have sufficient information from which to make an informed appraisal of the complainant's motives or bias. The Court also provided guidance concerning the admissibility of other evidence as to the contents of a destroyed video recording under Haw. R. Evid. R. 1004 and 403. |
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| State v. Thompson |
| Court: Supreme Court of Hawaii Docket: SCWC-17-0000427 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated the intermediate court of appeals' judgment on appeal (ICA) inasmuch as the opinion implicitly affirmed the circuit court's calculation at resentencing of Defendant's credit for time served under his 2001 sentence without accurately applying Haw. Rev. Stat. 706-671(2), holding that Defendant's 2017 resentencing failed to give him full credit for time he served on his 2001 sentence. In 2001, Defendant was convicted and sentenced for seven counts of sexual assault in the first degree and other offenses. Defendant later filed a habeas corpus petition, which the federal district court granted. The court vacated Defendant's 2001 sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that the 2001 sentence violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In 2017, Defendant was resentenced. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred in calculating his credit for time served. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the circuit court erred in calculating Defendant's credit for time served. |
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| People v. Coty |
| Court: Supreme Court of Illinois Citation: 2020 IL 123972 Opinion Date: June 4, 2020 Judge: Lloyd A. Karmeier Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Coty, who is intellectually disabled, was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and aggravated criminal sexual abuse for conduct committed against a six-year-old. Because Coty had a prior conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault of a nine-year-old, the court had no discretion and sentenced him to the statutorily prescribed term of mandatory natural life in prison. Coty argued that the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment and the Illinois Constitution because it categorically forbade the sentencing judge from considering his intellectual disability and the circumstances of his offense. He also argued that the statutory scheme, as applied to him, violated the Illinois Constitution's proportionate penalties clause. The appellate court found the mandatory sentencing statute unconstitutional as applied. On remand, Coty, who was then 52 years old, was sentenced to 50 years in prison. The appellate court vacated, finding that the sentence amounted to an unconstitutional de facto life sentence, violating Illinois’s proportionate penalties clause. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the sentence. The original sentence of natural life imprisonment did not violate the proportionate penalties clause. The penalty challenged in Coty’s initial appeal was not, as applied to him, clearly in excess of the legislature’s constitutional authority to prescribe. Some of the diminished capacity factors that the Supreme Court in Atkins found reduced culpability make Coty a continuing danger to re-offend. The purpose of the mandatory, natural life sentence for repeat sex offenders is to protect children by rendering it impossible for the incorrigible offender to re-offend. |
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| State v. Damme |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 19-1139 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Thomas D. Waterman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence for theft after Defendant pleaded guilty, holding that "good cause" under the newly amended Iowa Code 814.6 means a "legally sufficient reason," and the good cause requirement is satisfied when the defendant appeals a sentence that was neither mandatory nor agreed to in the plea bargain. Defendant pleaded guilty to two separate charges of theft in the third degree. The court sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate term of two years of incarceration for each case to run concurrently. Defendant appealed, arguing that the sentencing court abused its discretion by considering improper factors when imposing her sentence. The State responded that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction over Defendant's appeal without a showing of good cause under the newly amended Iowa Code 814.6. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant satisfied the good-cause requirement to proceed with her appellate challenge to the sentence; and (2) on the merits, Defendant's challenge to her sentence failed. |
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| State v. Henderson |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 19-1425 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence for indecent contact with a child, holding that Defendant satisfied the good-cause requirement to challenge his sentence as an abuse of discretion but that, on the merits, his challenge failed. Defendant pleaded guilty to indecent contact with a child. The court sentenced Defendant to two years in prison and to ten years' special parole after completion of his prison term. The court further ordered Defendant to register as a sex offender for ten years and complete the sex offender treatment program. Defendant appealed. The State filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that entering an Alford plea is not good cause to appeal. The Supreme Court held that Defendant had shown good cause but failed to establish that any alleged errors warranted resentencing. |
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| State v. Cott |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 120075 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Eric S. Rosen Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Defendant's postsentence motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty to two counts of premeditated murder, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion and did not commit reversible error. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to two premeditated murder charges for the death of his wife and the unborn child she was carrying. The district court accepted the terms of the agreement and sentenced Defendant to two concurrent hard fifty terms of life imprisonment. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that manifest injustice warranted voiding the plea agreement. The district court denied the motion after a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not demonstrate that the district court's findings were arbitrary or unreasonable, were based on an error of law, or were based on an error of fact. |
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| State v. Limary |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 83 Opinion Date: June 4, 2020 Judge: Horton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of manslaughter and aggravated assault, holding that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) the trial court erred in denying his request to pose questions regarding self-defense and defense of another in the juror questionnaire, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Defendant's actions - rather than subsequent medical treatment - caused the victim's death. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) while the court could have included an appropriate question regarding self-defense and defense of another, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to include such a question; and (2) based on the evidence in there record, the jury could rationally have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim's death would not have occurred but for the conduct of Defendant and that the medical care was not clearly sufficient to cause the victim's death. |
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| State v. Mackin |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 78 Opinion Date: June 2, 2020 Judge: Andrew M. Mead Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for manslaughter, holding that the evidence admitted at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant caused the child victim's death. Defendant was convicted of manslaughter for the death of a seven-month-old infant. The sentencing court sentenced Defendant to eleven years' imprisonment, with all but five years and six months suspended, and four years' probation. On appeal, Defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court was justified in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant, acting with criminal negligence, caused the child's death. |
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| State v. McLaughlin |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 82 Opinion Date: June 4, 2020 Judge: Humphrey Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of one count of Class B theft by deception and one count of Class C theft by deception, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) the trial court erred by failing to include a “nexus” element in its instruction to the jury on the charge of theft by deception, (2) the evidence was insufficient to convict him of theft by deception, and (3) his actions constituted a breach of contract, not a criminal offense. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury rationally could have found beyond a reasonable doubt each element of theft by deception based on the testimonial and documentary evidence presented at trial and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict; and (3) Defendant waived his ability to challenge the jury instructions on appeal. |
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| Foster v. Commissioner of Correction (No. 1) |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12935 Opinion Date: June 2, 2020 Judge: Gaziano Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the Department of Correction (DOC) from housing prisoners in facilities where the population exceeds its design-rated capacity and from housing prisoners areas where they must live within six feet of another person, holding that, despite the COVID-19 pandemic, Plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim for violations of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiffs, incarcerated inmates serving sentences or individuals who were civilly committed under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 35, commenced a class action alleging that their conditions of confinement exposed them to unreasonable risks from the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants' failure to take steps to reduce the incarcerated population so as to permit adequate physical distancing constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and violated substantive due process requirements. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction in their claims for unconstitutional conditions of confinement because of the risk of a disease. The Supreme Judicial Court denied the motion, holding that Plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim. The Court then transferred the case to the superior court for a final adjudication on the merits. |
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| Foster v. Commissioner of Correction (No. 2) |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12935 Opinion Date: June 2, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In this case brought by incarcerated individuals challenging the conditions of confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic the Supreme Judicial Court allowed the parole board's motion to dismiss only with respect to the claims of the individuals civilly committed and allowed the Governor's motion to dismiss, holding that the Governor was not liable under the facts alleged. The complaint alleged that by confining Plaintiffs under conditions that put them in grave and imminent danger of contracting the COVID-19 virus and by failing to reduce the incarcerated population, Defendants were violating Plaintiffs' right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and their right to substantive due process. Further, Plaintiffs alleged that confining persons who have been civilly committed under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 35 in correction facilities violates the individuals' rights to substantive due process. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) granted the Governor's motion to dismiss, holding that the Governor's presence was not necessary to provide any relief that a court may order in this case; and (2) allowed the parole board's motion to dismiss only with respect to the claims of individuals civilly committed, holding that if Plaintiffs' constitutional claims were to prevail, the parole board would be a logical and necessary party to accomplish a reasonable remedial process. |
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| Vazquez v. Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Norfolk |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12939 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court dismissing as moot Petitioner's petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not abuse her discretion. Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life in prison. While he was still in prison, Petitioner filed his Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition asking the Supreme Judicial Court to order his release because the Department of Correction allegedly failed in its duty to timely release him after granting him medical parole. While Petitioner's petition was pending, Petitioner was released. The single justice thereafter dismissed the petition as moot. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the single justice did not abuse her discretion in not addressing the substantive merits of Petitioner's petition. |
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| State v. Balandin |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A19-0625 Opinion Date: June 3, 2020 Judge: Lorie Skjerven Gildea Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part Defendant's convictions for first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree domestic abuse murder, and second-degree intentional murder, holding that the district court violated Minn. Stat. 609.04 when it entered convictions on the offenses of first-degree domestic abuse murder and second-degree intentional murder in addition to the conviction for first-degree premeditated murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the jury's verdicts but remanded the case to the district court to vacate the convictions for first-degree domestic abuse murder and second-degree intentional murder, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdicts; (2) the district court did not commit reversible error in admitting statements Defendant made during interviews with police; but (3) the district court erred by convicting Defendant of first-degree domestic abuse murder and second-degree intentional murder in addition to first-degree premeditated murder. |
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| State v. Newbary |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 148 Opinion Date: June 2, 2020 Judge: Beth Baker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, holding that, despite the Montana Legislature's later repeal of the Boot Camp Incarceration Program, Defendant's plea was voluntary at the time of sentencing. Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and sexual intercourse without consent. In exchange for Defendant's plea, the State agreed to recommend placement in the boot camp program. The court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment and recommended that Defendant be placed in the boot camp program upon completion of the first four years of his sentence. The Legislature later repealed the statutes authorizing the boot camp program. Defendant filed a motion to withdraw guilty plea based on the repeal of the boot camp program. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Legislature's repeal of the boot camp program did not retroactively render Defendant's plea involuntary or constitute good cause for withdrawal; (2) Defendant's plea was voluntary, and the State fulfilled its obligations under the plea agreement despite the Legislature's repeal of the boot camp program; and (3) the repeal of the boot camp program did not constitute an ex post facto law. |
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| State v. Anderson |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 305 Neb. 978 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Freudenberg Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's plea-based conviction for third degree domestic assault, attempted tampering with a witness or informant, and violating a protection order, holding that Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, Defendant asserted that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move to continue the plea in abatement, failing to file a plea in abatement, failing to move the trial court to require the State to produce the alleged victim for deposition and exclude the alleged victim as a witness, failing to move to suppress Defendant's statement, and counseling Defendant to enter a plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to show that his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. |
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| State v. Benson |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 305 Neb. 949 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Funke Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for second degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and other crimes, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress or in declining to sever certain charges and that sufficient evidence supported the convictions. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err in failing to suppress statements Defendant made to law enforcement and cell phone data acquired pursuant to a search warrant; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Defendant's motion to sever the two counts of tampering with a witness from the other charges; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support the verdicts. |
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| State v. Parnell |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 305 Neb. 932 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Funke Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing, holding that the trial court erred in determining that one of Appellant's claims was procedurally barred but that, nonetheless, Appellant was not entitled to relief. Appellant was convicted of first degree murder, attempted first degree, murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a weapon by a prohibited person. The Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal. In his postconviction motion, Appellant asserted claims of trial court error, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The district court dismissed the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, concluding that all of Appellant's claims were procedurally barred because they were known or knowable at the time of his direct appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in determining that Appellant's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims were procedurally barred, but Appellant failed to show that appellate counsel was ineffective; and (2) the district court did not err in dismissing the remaining claims without an evidentiary hearing. |
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| State v. Pope |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 305 Neb. 912 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Michael G. Heavican Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for two counts of first degree murder, two counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and one count of possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person, holding that Defendant's assignments of error either were without merit or were not adequately preserved for appellate review. On appeal, Defendant argued that two of the district court's jury instructions were incorrect, that the affidavit relied upon by law enforcement to obtain a warrant to collect a sample of Defendant's DNA was insufficient to support probable cause, and that the identification of Defendant by one of the State's witnesses was unreliable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant either waived his right to assert the allege errors on appeal or that his arguments on appeal were without merit. |
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| Belcher v. State |
| Court: Supreme Court of Nevada Citation: 136 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 31 Opinion Date: June 4, 2020 Judge: James W. Hardesty Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed one of Defendant's convictions for robbery but affirmed the judgment of conviction in all other respects after adopting factors to guide the Court in deciding whether to consider an error's harmlessness despite the State's failure to argue it, holding that the district court's error in denying Defendant's motion to suppress was harmless. Defendant was found guilty of two counts of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, murder with the use of a deadly weapon, and other crimes. The jury sentenced Defendant to death. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made during an interview with detectives before his arrest. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court did err by denying Defendant's motion to suppress. The Court then adopted three factors to help determine whether the Court should consider an error's harmlessness when the State has not argued harmlessness in a death penalty case. After weighing those factors, the Court held (1) sua sponte harmless error review was appropriate in this matter, and the complained-of error was harmless; (2) one of the convictions for robbery was not supported by sufficient evidence; and (3) no other issue warranted relief. |
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| New Mexico v. Widmer |
| Court: New Mexico Supreme Court Citation: 2020-NMSC-007 Opinion Date: March 19, 2020 Judge: Thomson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Officers from the Albuquerque Police Department (APD) approached Defendant Ronald Widmer in a Walgreens parking lot in the late evening. Defendant, accompanied by a woman, was trying to start a motor scooter. APD had received an anonymous tip concerning two persons and a scooter with an ignition that “appeared to be tampered with.” The officers suspected that the scooter was stolen. After briefly speaking with Defendant and the woman, officers ran Defendant’s personal identification information and the scooter’s vehicle identification number (VIN) through the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) to check for outstanding warrants and any stolen vehicle reports. NCIC did not return a stolen vehicle report but did report Defendant’s outstanding felony warrants for trafficking drugs. Officers placed Defendant in handcuffs while they awaited confirmation that the warrants were valid. While Defendant was in custody, but before he was advised of his Miranda rights, an officer asked him, “Is there anything on your person that I should know about?” Defendant responded, “I have meth.” Officers collected a white powder from inside a pill container hanging from Defendant’s belt loop and placed it in a plastic evidence bag. After officers recovered the physical evidence, Defendant muttered, “Well, I’m gonna have another charge now.” The white powder recovered from Defendant’s belt loop tested positive for methamphetamine. As a result, Defendant was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance. At issue before the New Mexico Supreme Court was whether the officer's question to Defendant was sufficiently related to protecting officer safety to qualify for the public safety exception to the admissibility requirements of Miranda, announced in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). The Court of Appeals determined that the question in this case did not qualify for the Quarles public safety exception, reversed Defendant's conviction for possession of methamphetamine, and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the Quarles public safety exception applied in this case because of the need to determine whether Defendant was armed or carrying potentially harmful drug paraphernalia before officers performed a pat-down search. The Court of Appeals was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. |
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| North Dakota v. McGowen |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 121 Opinion Date: June 2, 2020 Judge: Daniel J. Crothers Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| James McGowen, a/k/a James McGowan, appeals from the amended criminal judgment finding him guilty of two counts of simple assault on a corrections officer and ordering $1,855.31 in restitution. McGowen was brought from a holding cell at the Burleigh-Morton County Detention Center into the booking area. McGowen became angry and agitated. The two correctional officers walked around the corner to assist the booking officer, and one tried to restrain McGowen. The officer felt something hit him in the face and believed McGowen punched him. The other officer tackled McGowen to the ground, while McGowen was still attacking the first officer. On the ground, McGowan continued to flail and swing punches. McGowen argues evidence was insufficient to convict him, and the district court abused its discretion by continuing the restitution hearing, and by ordering $1,855.31 in restitution. |
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| North Dakota v. Powley |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 124 Opinion Date: June 2, 2020 Judge: Gerald W. VandeWalle Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Richard Powley appealed after a jury found him guilty of three counts of gross sexual imposition (GSI). Powley was on parole at the time of his arrest. Detectives believed there was evidence of communications between Powley and the victim of the aggravated assault on Powley’s cell phone. As part of the warrantless search of Powley’s cell phone, detectives discovered videos of Powley sexually assaulting an adult woman. These videos led to the GSI charges. On appeal, Powley argued the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained the warrantless search of his cell phone. The North Dakota Supreme Court had held previously that warrantless searches of supervised probationers based on reasonable suspicion were not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. "'By virtue of their status alone, parolees have 'everely diminished expectations of privacy.'" The Court concluded the district court did not err in denying Powley’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search of his cell phone because the search of Powley’s cell phone was not in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. |
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| North Dakota v. Selzler |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 123 Opinion Date: June 2, 2020 Judge: Jon J. Jensen Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The State appealed the suppression of evidence in criminal proceedings initiated against Jordan Selzler and Kelsey Jankowski. The criminal charges against Selzler and Jankowski stemmed from evidence gathered during the same traffic stop, the hearing on the motions to suppress evidence was held jointly, and the cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal. The State argued the district court incorrectly found the traffic stop was unlawful because law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the suppression of the evidence gathered after the traffic stop. |
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| North Dakota v. Soucy |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 119 Opinion Date: June 2, 2020 Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Tara Soucy appealed after a jury found her guilty of child neglect. On appeal, Soucy argued the district court erred by refusing to take judicial notice of a related conviction of the children’s father. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to take judicial notice. Though the Court affirmed the conviction, it remanded for the trial court to correct the judgment to accurately reflect the statutory citation for child neglect. |
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| North Dakota v. Washington |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 120 Opinion Date: June 2, 2020 Judge: Jon J. Jensen Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Anthony Washington appealed a district court's judgment entered following Washington’s conditional guilty pleas to fleeing from a law enforcement officer and preventing arrest. Washington was stopped for speeding. During the traffic stop, at the request of the officer, Washington produced a Michigan driver’s license. While producing his driver’s license Washington informed the officer his license had recently been reinstated, explained the Michigan records may not have been up-to-date, and noted the records may not reflect the reinstatement of his license. After being informed Washington’s driving privileges were under suspension, the officer returned to Washington’s vehicle to place him under arrest for driving with a suspended license. Washington again tried to explain his belief his license was valid. After an unsuccessful attempt to convince the officer his license was valid, Washington fled the scene. Washington argued on appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because his arrest was illegal. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| North Dakota v. Yoney |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 118 Opinion Date: June 2, 2020 Judge: Lisa K. Fair McEvers Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Travis Yoney appealed a district court amended judgment after a jury found him guilty of attempted murder, burglary, reckless endangerment, and terrorizing. According to testimony at trial, in August 2018 Yoney fired a .22 caliber rifle into John and Jane Doe’s house. He then broke into the house and pointed the rifle at John Doe. John Doe tackled Yoney, and the rifle fired into the ceiling. Yoney argued on appeal that the jury convicted him of a non-cognizable offense, attempt to knowingly commit murder, and the State did not provide evidence he threatened to commit a crime. Further, he contended the jury gave an inconsistent, compromised verdict by finding him guilty of attempted murder and reckless endangerment. He claimed the evidence may support either charge individually, but it could not support the same conduct with different culpabilities for the same victim, John Doe. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed Yoney's conviction. |
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| Oregon v. Ulery |
| Court: Oregon Supreme Court Docket: S067084 Opinion Date: June 4, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Adrian Ulery was charged with two counts of first-degree sexual abuse, and he exercised his right to trial by jury. He did not object to the jury being instructed that it could return a nonunanimous guilty verdict; his list of requested jury instructions included the uniform criminal jury instruction for a verdict in a felony case, an instruction that, consistent with Oregon law, informed the jury that ten votes to convict, from a jury of twelve, were sufficient for a guilty verdict. The jury convicted defendant of both counts. At defendant’s request, the jury was polled, revealing that both verdicts were nonunanimous. The trial court, without objection from defendant, received the verdicts. Defendant appealed, assigning error to the jury having been instructed that it could return a nonunani- mous verdict and to the receipt of nonunanimous verdicts. Defendant acknowledged that he had not preserved the issue in the trial court, but he requested plain error review. In Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020), the United States Supreme Court held that, contrary to longstanding practice in Oregon, the United States Constitution required “[a] jury must reach a unanimous verdict in order to convict.” After Ramos issued, the state, through a letter to the Oregon Supreme Court and a notice filed in this case, conceded that, because defendant’s convictions were based on nonunanimous verdicts, they could not be sustained in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Ramos. The state also conceded that the issue would qualify as plain error under ORAP 5.45(1) and advised the Oregon Court that, if it were to exercise its discretion to correct the unpreserved error, the Court should reverse defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial. The Oregon Supreme Court accepted the state’s concession, exercised its discretion to review the error, and reversed defendant’s convictions. |
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| Oregon v. Williams |
| Court: Oregon Supreme Court Docket: S066872 Opinion Date: June 4, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Olan Williams was charged with two counts of first-degree sodomy. The jury was instructed that it could return a nonunanimous guilty verdict. Defendant did not object. The jury acquitted defendant of one count and convicted him of the other. The trial court polled the jury, revealing that the guilty verdict was nonunanimous. The trial court received both verdicts without objection by defendant. After defendant was sentenced, he moved for a new trial, challenging Oregon’s nonunanimous jury law, as applied to him, on Equal Protection Clause grounds. In Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S Ct 1390 (2020), the United States Supreme Court held that, contrary to longstanding practice in Oregon, the United States Constitution required “[a] jury must reach a unanimous verdict in order to convict.” Many Oregon convictions based on nonunanimous verdicts were on appeal in a variety of procedural postures. In this case, the state conceded that, notwithstanding problems with defendant’s presentation of the issue to the trial court and to the Court of Appeals, the Oregon Supreme Court should have reversed defendant’s conviction, so long as it exercised its discretion to consider the error. The Oregon Supreme Court exercised its discretion to consider the error and accepted the state’s concession. The petition for review was allowed, limited to the issue of the appropriate disposition of this case in light of Ramos v. Louisiana. The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. The judgment of the circuit court was also reversed, and the case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. |
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| State v. Parrillo |
| Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court Docket: 18-14 Opinion Date: June 2, 2020 Judge: Maureen McKenna Goldberg Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of one count of felony assault and one count of simple assault, holding that none of the trial justice's rulings challenged on appeal was erroneous. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) because Defendant never questioned the trial justice's impartiality when it was appropriate to do so Defendant waived his argument that he was deprived of his right to trial by a neutral and detached arbiter; (2) the trial justice’s finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on each count did not constitute an impermissible pyramiding of inferences; (3) Defendant's argument that he was deprived of his right to fair notice of the crime for which he was convicted and prejudiced by the timing of the introduction of the theory of aiding and abetting was without merit; and (4) because each of the individual allegations of error lacked merit, the cumulative effect doctrine did not apply. |
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| South Carolina v. Phillips |
| Court: South Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 27978 Opinion Date: June 3, 2020 Judge: Few Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Billy Phillips was convicted of murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. At trial, a DNA analyst testified Phillips could not be excluded as a contributor to a mixture of DNA recovered from two samples taken from the crime scene. The analyst conceded, however, the statistical probability that some other randomly selected and unrelated person also could not be excluded as the person who left the DNA was, for one of the samples, only one in two. Furthermore, the State failed to explain to the trial court or the jury three fundamental concepts underlying the DNA testimony the analyst gave in this particular case. Finally, in several instances, the State presented information to the trial court and the jury that was simply wrong. Taking all of this into consideration, the South Carolina Supreme Court held the trial court erred in not sustaining Phillips' objections to this testimony. The conviction was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. |
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| State v. Bridgewaters |
| Court: Utah Supreme Court Citation: 2020 UT 32 Opinion Date: May 28, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In this case where Defendant was charged with two separate instances of violating a protective order the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to quash his bindover to stand trial, holding that the magistrate properly bound over Defendant to face both counts to the extent they were based on a previously issued ex parte order. In moving to quash the bindover Defendant argued that he had not been properly served with the protective order he was accused of violating and that the ex parte order had expired. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the protective order was served pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 5, it was not properly served; (2) the district court correctly determined that the ex parte order was still in effect at the time of the alleged violations; and (3) therefore, to the extent that the charges against Defendant were based on alleged violations of the ex parte order, the bindover is affirmed. |
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| Vermont v. Ferguson |
| Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2020 VT 39 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Beth Robinson Areas of Law: Animal / Dog Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendants Thomas and Katherine Ferguson appealed their respective convictions for animal cruelty and a judgment for animal forfeiture, both arising from the conditions in which they kept over twenty animals in their care. In September 2017, defendants’ landlord entered their trailer to check the smoke detectors. He found the interior of the residence smelled strongly of urine and ammonia, and he observed more than two dozen animals in “questionable living conditions.” Numerous dogs were crowded into small crates and lacked access to food and water, including a nursing mother and her puppies. Birds were kept in dirty cages and their water was viscous and filled with feces, food, and feathers. Landlord took photographs and a video of some of the animals, including three dogs sharing one travel crate. Landlord, his family, and other contractors continued to do maintenance work on the property for the next month, during which time the animals remained in similar conditions. One of landlord’s contractors eventually contacted the police regarding the animals’ conditions. Defendants challenged their ultimate convictions on the basis that the affidavit prepared by a police officer in support of the search warrant that led to the charges relied on information obtained from a prior illegal search, and therefore the court should have excluded all evidence obtained as a result of the warrant. They challenged the forfeiture order on the ground that the court improperly admitted hearsay statements in the forfeiture hearing. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed as to the criminal convictions because even if the information from the challenged prior search was stricken, the remaining portions of the affidavit were sufficient to support the search warrant that led to the charges. The Court agreed that the court improperly allowed hearsay evidence in the forfeiture proceeding, and remanded for the court to reconsider its ruling without the objectionable evidence. |
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| Vermont v. Kandzior |
| Court: Vermont Supreme Court Citation: 2020 VT 37 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Carroll Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Loren Kandzior challenged his conviction on one count of sexual assault on two grounds: (1) that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of a prior false rape allegation; and (2) that his right to a fair trial was violated because the jury was exposed to “extraneous, highly prejudicial information” - namely, the substance of an undetermined number of bench conferences that occurred during the three-day trial. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the trial court committed plain error by failing to investigate when it became aware that the jury may have overhead numerous bench conferences during defendant’s trial. Accordingly, defendant’s conviction was vacated and the matter remanded for a new trial. |
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| State v. Bleck |
| Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 18-0481 Opinion Date: June 1, 2020 Judge: Jenkins Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed an order of the circuit court sentencing Defendant for one count of assault in the commission of a felony and one count of burglary, holding that Defendant waived his sole assignment of error on appeal. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court erred during his sentencing hearing in considering a previously expunged charge in its decision to incarcerate him instead of placing him on probation. In response, the State argued that Defendant failed timely to object in the proceeding below. The Supreme Court agreed with the State, holding that that Defendant waived his assignment of error. |
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| State v. Woodrum |
| Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 18-1043 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Walker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the decision of the circuit court denying Petitioner's motion for a new trial, holding that the circuit court's jury instruction on the crime of kidnapping was incomplete. A jury found Petitioner guilty of kidnapping, malicious assault, commission of an assault during the commission of a felony, and domestic battery. Petitioner moved for a new trial, arguing that the circuit court incorrectly instructed the jury on kidnapping because the court erroneously omitted from its instruction that "transport" is an element of kidnapping under W. Va. Code 61-14a-2(a)(2). The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying Petitioner's motion for a new trial on kidnapping and commission of an assault during the commission of a felony and remanded the case for entry of an order granting a new trial to Petitioner, holding that the circuit court's instruction on kidnapping was fundamental error. |
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| State v. Gutierrez |
| Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court Docket: 2017AP002364-CR Opinion Date: June 3, 2020 Judge: Dallet Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of conviction entered against Defendant, holding that the court of appeals erred in reversing the circuit court's exercise of discretion in excluding unidentified DNA evidence. Defendant was convicted of sexual assault and enticement of his stepdaughter. Defendant filed a postconviction motion, which the circuit court denied. Defendant appealed the denial of his postconviction motion and, by direct appeal, also challenged the circuit court's decision to exclude unidentified DNA evidence and to allow other acts evidence. The court of appeals reversed the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that (1) the court of appeals erred in reversing the circuit court's exercise of discretion in excluding unidentified DNA evidence; (2) the court of appeals properly affirmed the circuit court's admission of other acts evidence; and (3) Defendant was not denied his right to an impartial jury or his right to effective assistance of counsel. |
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| Pickering v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 66 Opinion Date: May 29, 2020 Judge: Gray Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions on three counts of second-degree attempted murder, thirteen counts of aggravated assault and battery, and one count of interference with a peace officer, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below. Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court’s finding of no discriminatory purpose in the State’s exercise of peremptory challenges was not clearly erroneous; (2) Defendant's right to a fair trial was not violated when the district court refused to individually query jurors about their exposure to pretrial publicity; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant’s pretrial motion for a continuance; (4) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal; (5) Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel; and (6) because there was no error, cumulative error did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial. |
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