| Kansas v. Glover |
| Court: US Supreme Court Docket: 18-556 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Clarence Thomas Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A deputy ran a license plate check and discovered that the truck belonged to Glover, whose driver’s license had been revoked. The deputy stopped the truck, assuming that Glover was driving. Glover was driving and was charged with driving as a habitual violator. The trial court granted his motion to suppress all evidence from the stop. The Kansas Supreme Court agreed that the deputy violated the Fourth Amendment by stopping Glover without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The Supreme Court reversed. When the officer lacks information negating an inference that the owner is driving the vehicle, an investigative traffic stop made after running a vehicle’s license plate and learning that the registered owner’s driver’s license has been revoked is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. An officer may initiate a brief investigative traffic stop when he has “a particularized and objective basis” to suspect wrongdoing. The level of suspicion required is less than necessary for probable cause and depends on “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life.” The deputy’s common sense inference that the owner of a vehicle was likely its driver provided reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. Empirical studies demonstrate that drivers with suspended or revoked licenses frequently continue to drive. Officers, like jurors, may rely on probabilities in the reasonable suspicion context. The presence of additional facts might dispel reasonable suspicion but this deputy possessed no information to rebut the reasonable inference that Glover was driving his own truck. |
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| United States v. Garcia-Mojica |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 18-1265 Opinion Date: April 9, 2020 Judge: Torruella Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence of 100 months of imprisonment imposed for his convictions of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person and illegal possession of a machine gun, holding that the sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. A probation officer recommended a sentence of forty-one to fifty-one months for Defendant's offenses under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. At sentencing, the Government requested a sentence of at least sixty-three months' imprisonment or, in the alternative, an upward variance. The district court adopted the Guidelines' calculation and then imposed an upward variance of forty-nine months' imprisonment for a total of 100 months' imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the sentence was procedurally sound and substantively reasonable. |
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| United States v. Smith |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit Docket: 19-1615 Opinion Date: April 8, 2020 Judge: William Joseph Kayatta, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The First Circuit reversed the order of the district court denying Defendant's request for a sentence reduction under Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, holding that the district court erred in finding that Defendant was ineligible for a reduction on the grounds that his offense was not a "covered offense" under the First Step Act. Specifically, the district court concluded that because the penalties for the quantity of controlled substances attributed to Defendant remained the same after passage of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, he was not convicted for "a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified." The First Circuit reversed and remanded the case, holding that Congress intended to provide potential relief to persons like Defendant whose penalties were dictated by 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(C), and therefore, Defendant was convicted for a "covered offense" under Section 404. |
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| United States v. Adams |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-3650 Opinion Date: April 7, 2020 Judge: Richard J. Sullivan Areas of Law: Criminal Law, White Collar Crime |
| Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for various tax offenses, including making and subscribing to a false tax return, tax evasion, and attempting to interfere with the administration of the internal revenue laws. Defendant's charges stemmed from his efforts, over the course of 14 years, to engage in a concerted campaign to obstruct the IRS's efforts to collect his delinquent tax payments and to secure overdue tax returns. The Second Circuit held that the district court lacked authority to require restitution payments to begin immediately following defendant's sentencing. However, the court held that, in assessing tax loss under USSG 2T1.1 application note 1, the district court was permitted to rely on uncharged relevant conduct constituting "willful evasion of payment" in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7201 and "willful failure to pay" in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7203. The court held that defendant's remaining claims were unavailing and affirmed the judgment as modified. |
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| United States v. Doka |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Docket: 18-3311 Opinion Date: April 8, 2020 Judge: Jose A. Cabranes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019), did not undermine, let alone overrule, the Second Circuit's precedent on the validity of 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3). Haymond held that judicial factfinding authorized by a different supervised-release provision, section 3583(k), violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment's right to jury trial. The court held that judicial factfinding authorized under section 3583(e)(3) remains lawful. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment of revocation following defendant's three violations of supervised release. |
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| United States v. Folk |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 18-1865 Opinion Date: April 3, 2020 Judge: Porter Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Folk was convicted of distribution and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, two counts of using a firearm to further a drug trafficking offense, and of felon in possession of a firearm. The PSR deemed Folk a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 because he had prior felony convictions for “crimes of violence” and recommended enhancing Folk’s Guidelines range from 384-465 months to between 420 months and life imprisonment. The district court discussed Folk’s previous convictions: two robberies in 2001, simple assault in 2003, and terroristic threats in 2003, and adopted the PSR’s recommended range but sentenced Folk to 264 months’ imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed; Folk did not challenge his sentence or his career-offender designation. A subsequent 28 U.S.C 2255 motion argued that Folk's career-offender designation was invalid because the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Johnson” decision rendered section 4B1.2(a) void. The district court denied the motion. The Third Circuit affirmed. A challenge to an incorrect career-offender designation under the Guidelines is not an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure and is not cognizable under section 2255. An incorrect designation that results in a sentence within the statutory maximum is not a fundamental defect inherently resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice. The court denied Folk’s motion to expand the certificate of appealability because he does not satisfy the standard for a second 2255 motion. |
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| United States v. Raia |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Docket: 20-1033 Opinion Date: April 3, 2020 Judge: Smith Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| While running for office in Hoboken, New Jersey, Raia directed campaign volunteers to bribe voters with $50 payments to vote for him by absentee ballot and support a measure he favored. Convicted of conspiring to use the mails to promote unlawful activity, Raia was sentenced to three months imprisonment. With the government’s appeal of the sentence pending, Raia reported to the federal correctional institute. Shortly thereafter, he asked the Bureau of Prisons to move for compassionate release on his behalf. Before BOP responded, and before 30 days passed, Raia filed his own motion for compassionate release given the COVID-19 pandemic. Raia claimed he faces heightened risks because he is 68-years old and suffers from Parkinson’s Disease, diabetes, and heart issues. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the pending appeal divested it of jurisdiction. Raia then asked the Third Circuit to decide his compassionate-release motion or to return jurisdiction to the district court by dismissing the government’s appeal. The Third Circuit rejected the motion. The First Step Act empowers criminal defendants to request compassionate release for “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” 18 U.S.C 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), but those defendants must first ask the BOP to do so on their behalf, give BOP 30 days to respond, and exhaust available administrative appeals before submitting their motion to “the [sentencing] court.” |
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| In re: John Moore |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-2076 Opinion Date: April 9, 2020 Judge: Pamela Harris Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit denied a petition for writ of mandamus relief seeking to direct Judge Robert J. Conrad to recuse himself from presiding over petitioner's criminal trial. Judge Conrad had prosecuted petitioner successfully for bank robbery in 1989. Although the court shared petitioner's concern that there could come a point at which recusal might be required, and certainly would be appropriate, the court held that the extraordinary relief of mandamus is not warranted now. In this case, petitioner failed to show a clear and indisputable right to immediate recusal based on grounds that involve a future sentencing and may never materialize. |
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| United States v. Fall |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 18-4673 Opinion Date: April 3, 2020 Judge: Quattlebaum Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for receipt, possession, and transportation of child pornography. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during the search of defendant's computer where, even if the search was not proper under the private search exception, the denial of the motion to dismiss should be affirmed under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The court rejected defendant's multiplicity claim, holding that any overlap between counts 3, 4, and 5 and count 7 was much too small to warrant the finding that the offense conduct charged in count 7 was in fact the same as that charged in the receipt counts. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that defendant transported a pornographic video under count 6, and for receipt of child pornography in counts 3, 4, and 5. |
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| United States v. Keene |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Docket: 19-4609 Opinion Date: April 9, 2020 Judge: Barbara Milano Keenan Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendants were charged under 18 U.S.C. 1959, which imposes criminal penalties for committing "violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity" (the VICAR statute), in three counts with the enumerated federal offense of committing assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of the Virginia prohibition against brandishing a firearm set forth in Virginia Code 18.2-282. The Fourth Circuit held that the portion of the VICAR statute under which defendants were charged is not subject to analysis under the categorical approach. The court explained that, unlike the numerous other statutory provisions, nothing in the statutory language at issue suggests that Congress intended an element-by-element comparison of the enumerated federal offense with the specified state offense. The court held that the statutory language at issue requires only that a defendant's conduct, presently before the court, constitute one of the enumerated federal offenses as well as the charged state crime. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to reinstate the dismissed VICAR charges alleging Virginia brandishing. |
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| Reiner v. Woods |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-1413 Opinion Date: April 7, 2020 Judge: Richard Allen Griffin Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Reiner’s convictions arose from a 2011 Macomb County home invasion. Eisenhardt, age 69, was stabbed in the neck; jewelry was taken from her house, including a ring from Eisenhardt’s finger. Eisenhardt survived but suffered declining health after the stabbing and died months later. Police in New York apprehended Reiner days after the incident, on unrelated suspicion of driving a stolen vehicle. At his Michigan murder trial, the court admitted the statements to the police, in which a pawnbroker identified Reiner as having pawned Eisenhardt’s ring. The pawnbroker died before trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld Reiner’s conviction, finding the Sixth Amendment error harmless. The Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The evidence presented at trial “paints the picture of a circumstantial case lacking physical evidence or eyewitness testimony placing Reiner at the crime scene.” The statements that caused the Sixth Amendment violation were the linchpin of the government’s case, connecting Reiner to the fruits of the crime in a way no other evidence could. Without those statements, the prosecution’s case would have been significantly weaker, such that “grave doubt” exists as to whether their admission had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” |
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| United States v. May-Shaw |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Docket: 18-1821 Opinion Date: April 8, 2020 Judge: Bush Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Grand Rapids police received tips from an organization that receives anonymous information from the public, describing vehicles May-Shaw was using to transport drugs and a specific bag where he kept drugs, money, and a gun. May-Shaw had one felony firearm conviction and two felony drug convictions. The Department began investigating and, for 23 days, watched a parking lot near his apartment building and a covered carport next to that building, where May-Shaw parked his BMW, one of his several vehicles. The surveillance used a camera affixed to a telephone pole on a public street and cameras in a surveillance van parked in the parking lot. After witnessing May-Shaw engage in several suspected drug deals, the police used a drug-detecting dog to sniff the BMW. The dog indicated the presence of narcotics. Officers then obtained a search warrant for May-Shaw’s apartment and all of his vehicles. They found evidence of drug distribution, including cash, wrappers, and cocaine. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his to suppress the evidence from his apartment and vehicles. May-Shaw did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the carport such that police surveillance constituted a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Nor was the carport within the curtilage of his apartment such that the dog sniff was unconstitutional. |
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| Gish v. Hepp |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1476 Opinion Date: April 3, 2020 Judge: Scudder Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Gish pleaded guilty to first-degree reckless homicide for the 2012 stabbing death of Litwicki, the mother of his children. He appealed, claiming that his attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate an involuntary intoxication defense. Police found Gish delirious on the night of the killing. He claimed that rare side effects from taking prescription Xanax affected his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected the claim. Gish initiated federal habeas proceedings. The district court held an evidentiary hearing but denied relief, finding that defense was so unlikely to succeed that Gish still would have pleaded guilty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While trial counsel admitted that he never assessed a Xanax-based involuntary intoxication defense, that defense had no reasonable prospect of success. Gish told a nurse that he sold his pills and no longer had any and told a detective that he last took Xanax “[a] couple days” earlier. The police found no trace of Xanax in Gish’s home. Even if Gish had taken Xanax the day of the homicide, it was unlikely that he was the rare patient who would have experienced such extreme effects; his expert on that point lacked credibility. Gish confessed to how he went about killing and abusing Litwicki and had a motive--he suspected Litwicki was cheating on him and would take his kids away |
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| Schillinger v. Kiley |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-2404 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Diane S. Sykes Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Schillinger, a Wisconsin prisoner, was assaulted by another inmate as the prisoners were returning to their housing unit after recreation. He suffered a fractured skull, broken teeth, cuts, and other serious injuries. Schillinger sued three guards under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district judge screened the complaint and permitted Schillinger to proceed on a claim that the officers failed to take preventive action after learning of hostility between Schillinger and his attacker during the recreation period shortly before the attack. The judge later ruled that Schillinger had not exhausted his administrative remedies on that claim and entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Schillinger’s arguments that the judge should have gleaned from his complaint two additional factual grounds for a failure-to-protect claim: that the officers did not respond fast enough to an alarm about a medical emergency on his unit once the attack was underway and they stood by without intervening to stop the attack. Upholding the exhaustion ruling, the court reasoned that while Schillinger pursued a complaint through all levels of the prison’s inmate-complaint system, he never mentioned the claim he raised in litigation: that the officers were aware of threatening behavior by the attacker before the assault and failed to protect him. |
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| United States v. Godinez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 19-1215 Opinion Date: April 9, 2020 Judge: Kenneth Francis Ripple Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Godinez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and to possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(i). The prosecution notified the court under 21 U.S.C. 851 that Godinez had a prior Ohio conviction for possession of cocaine. The district court determined that this prior state conviction made Godinez eligible for a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment rather than the otherwise applicable five-year mandatory minimum. The Seventh Circuit vacated the Sentence, citing the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5194 enacted after the signing of Godinez’s plea agreement but before his sentencing. By failing to recognize the changes implemented by the Act, including the heightened thresholds that must be met for a court to impose increased mandatory minimums for certain drug offenses, the district court premised its sentencing calculations on a mandatory minimum that was twice what it should have been. The oversight constitutes plain error and requires resentencing. |
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| United States v. Young |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Docket: 18-3679 Opinion Date: April 7, 2020 Judge: Barrett Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Young promoted the prostitution of high-school-aged minors, taking some of the money that they were paid for sex. Young showed the minors the website Backpage.com and taught them how to post advertisements for “escort services,” sometimes taking revealing photos and posting them himself. Young set the hourly rates, reserved the hotels, and provided the victims with condoms and cell phones. He provided housing for one victim and drove the victims to and from their calls. Sometimes he personally demanded sex from them. He was indicted under 18 U.S.C. 1591. Weeks before Young’s trial was set to begin, Young elected to represent himself. The government presented substantial evidence of Young’s guilt. Young testified in his own defense, admitting that he had been trying to start an adult escort business, that he knew some of the victims, and that he gave them rides. He denied facilitating their prostitution and posting their ads, stating that he did not know that they were minors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Young's convictions and 21-year sentence. Rejecting arguments the district court erred in instructing the jury on “interstate commerce” and that the evidence was insufficient on that element, the court noted the evidence of interstate advertising. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Young’s third motion for a continuance. Young was warned of the consequences of representing himself. The court upheld the decision to exclude evidence of the minor victims’ past sexual conduct. |
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| Mayfield v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-2185 Opinion Date: April 8, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court's denial of defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his sentence on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations before trial. In this case, defendant alleged that his attorney's performance was constitutionally deficient because counsel advised defendant to decline a plea offer based on a sentencing enhancement that any reasonable counsel should have known was inapplicable. The court held that the record did not conclusively refute defendant's claim at this juncture in the proceedings. Furthermore, the question is not developed on the question of prejudice. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. |
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| Silk v. United States |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-1908 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Steven M. Colloton Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to vacate his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 117 for the crime of domestic assault by a habitual offender in Indian country. The court held that defendant's prior 2013 conviction under Bismarck Municipal Court for simple assault was for an offense which, if subject to federal jurisdiction, would qualify as an assault against an intimate partner under section 117(a)(1). Consequently, defendant cannot show that he is "actually innocent" of the offense to which he pleaded guilty, and his challenge to the sentence is procedurally defaulted. |
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| United States v. Bradshaw |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3728 Opinion Date: April 7, 2020 Judge: Grasz Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. The court held that the district court did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice by denying the motion to continue the trial and to substitute counsel. In this case, there was no evidence of a sudden exigency or unforeseen circumstances which would weigh in favor of continuing the trial. Furthermore, the last-minute nature of defendant's motion, without some compelling justification, undermines the district court's interest in the orderly administration of justice. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions. |
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| United States v. Eller |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1759 Opinion Date: April 9, 2020 Judge: Lavenski R. Smith Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court held that defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing a fair and just grounds for withdrawal and thus the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion. In this case, the plea hearing transcript belies any contention that defendant did not knowingly and voluntarily enter his plea, the record contained no evidence that defendant's medication had an effect on his competency, and the timing of defendant's attempted withdrawal was after the presentencing report was prepared. |
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| United States v. Loomis |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1616 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Raymond W. Gruender Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine. The court held that, even if the district court erroneously admitted evidence, the errors did not affect defendant's substantial rights as required by the plain-error standard because the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. |
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| United States v. Morris |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3668 Opinion Date: April 8, 2020 Judge: Kobes Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The court held that the district court did not err, plain or otherwise, in applying a criminal offender enhancement under USSG 4B1.1(a). The court held that when a defendant has more than four prior sentences that could be counted, the plain language of the Guideline gives the district court discretion to choose among them. Because there is no ambiguity here, the court held that the rule of lenity is not applicable. |
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| United States v. Sainz Navarrete |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-3170 Opinion Date: April 8, 2020 Judge: Jane Louise Kelly Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, money laundering, and two counts of conspiring to launder money. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions; the court was not convinced that the district court's drug-quantity finding was mistaken; and there was no error in imposing sentencing enhancements for defendant's role in the offense under USSG 3B1.1(a) and for committing the offense as a part of a pattern of criminal conduct engaged in as a livelihood under USSG 2D1.1(b)(15)(E). |
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| United States v. Sanchez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-1890 Opinion Date: April 3, 2020 Judge: Melloy Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence recovered during a traffic stop. The court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion based on several specific and interrelated facts to extend the stop. In this case, the officer saw an out-of-state truck with paper tags driving in the middle of the night; he discovered neither adult in the vehicle had a driver's license and the paper tags were expired; there was some confusion as to the name of the owner; the purported purpose for the trip was a two-to-three-day painting job, but no supplies were present other than one can of paint; he learned all of this after having his suspicion piqued by the fact that defendant and his partner gave different names; and he thought it unusual that an unlicensed driver would bring small children and an unlicensed partner/significant other with him for the midnight travel in the unlicensed vehicle for a short term out-of-state job. The court also held that, absent a physical trespass and during an otherwise lawfully extended stop, an officer may look at the undercarriage of a vehicle without probable cause. Finally, the officer had probable cause and had a legal basis for the subsequent seizure of the black plastic bag located above a spare tire. |
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| United States v. Shavers |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 18-2810 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Bobby E. Shepherd Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction; the district court's jury instructions did not constructively amend, or vary from, count one of the superseding indictment; the district court did not err in refusing to give buyer-seller and mere-presence instructions; the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the government to elicit testimony showing that defendant and his coconspirator knew one another when they were incarcerated in state prison and that the coconspirator helped defendant while the two were in prison; the district court did not err in applying the murder cross-reference under USSG 2D1.1(d)(1); and defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable. |
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| United States v. Williams |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Docket: 19-1827 Opinion Date: April 9, 2020 Judge: Raymond W. Gruender Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his vehicle. The court held that the officers lawfully continued their investigation after they determined defendant was not carrying a gun because, during the pat down, defendant admitted that he had threatened to shoot a woman. In this case, the officers' request for defendant's identification was a reasonable and lawful extension of their initial investigatory stop. The court also held that the officers then had probable cause to search defendant's vehicle because one of the officers smelled marijuana when defendant opened the car door. |
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| United States v. Dominguez |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Docket: 14-10268 Opinion Date: April 7, 2020 Judge: Barry G. Silverman Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Ninth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted Hobbs Act robbery. In this case, the evidence overwhelmingly showed that defendant had the specific intent to commit the robbery and had taken a "substantial step" toward its completion − arming himself with a handgun and driving to within about a block of the planned robbery with his accomplice, turning around only because he got ensnared in the fake crime scene. In light of recent Supreme Court cases, the panel reiterated its previous holding that Hobbs Act armed robbery is a crime of violence for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A). The panel also held that when a substantive offense is a crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A), an attempt to commit that offense is also a crime of violence. The panel agreed with the Eleventh Circuit that attempted Hobbs Act armed robbery is a crime of violence for purposes of section 924(c) because its commission requires proof of both the specific intent to complete a crime of violence, and a substantial step actually (not theoretically) taken toward its completion. The panel reversed defendant's conviction of money laundering in Count Four and affirmed the remainder of the judgment. |
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| United States v. Mayville |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-4008 Opinion Date: April 7, 2020 Judge: Baldock Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant–Appellant John Mayville pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, and possession of an unregistered firearm silencer. Exercising his right under the plea agreement, Defendant challenged the district court’s denials of his motions to suppress evidence of drugs and firearms seized from his car by Utah Highway Patrol troopers during a traffic stop. On appeal, Defendant argues the troopers violated his Fourth Amendment rights described in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), because they unjustifiably prolonged the traffic stop beyond the time needed to complete the tasks incident to the stop’s mission. The Tenth Circuit affirmed. "This is because reasonableness—rather than efficiency—is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment." Because the Court determined the traffic stop here did not exceed the time reasonably required to execute tasks relevant to accomplishing the mission of the stop, Defendant's nineteen-minute roadside detention did not offend the Fourth Amendment. |
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| United States v. Samora |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Docket: 19-4070 Opinion Date: April 8, 2020 Judge: Baldock Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Fernando Samora borrowed his ex-girlfriend's care and drove it alone to a restaurant. When Defendant left the restaurant and approached the vehicle, the officers from a multi-agency task force converged to arrest him on an outstanding warrant. Defendant fled on foot and a chase ensued. After the officers caught and arrested Defendant, they searched the vehicle he had been driving and found a loaded firearm inside the center console. The Government charged Defendant with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant proceeded to trial where the district court gave an erroneous instruction on constructive possession. A jury returned a guilty verdict and Defendant appealed, arguing: (1) the Government presented insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction; and (2) even if the Government presented sufficient evidence, the failure to properly instruct the jury constitutes plain error requiring remand for a new trial. The Tenth Circuit concluded after review that the trial court plainly erred in its jury instructions. It therefore reversed and remanded for a new trial. |
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| United States v. Caniff |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-12410 Opinion Date: April 9, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Upon reconsideration, the Eleventh Circuit sua sponte vacated its prior opinion and substituted the following opinion. The court held that defendant's private, person-to-person text messages asking an individual he thought was a minor to send him sexually explicit pictures of herself cannot support a conviction for making a "notice" to receive child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(d)(1). The court also held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that defendant believed the victim was thirteen years old, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the detective's challenged testimony. Therefore, the court reversed defendant's conviction under section 2251(d)(1) and affirmed his convictions under sections 2422(b) and 2251(a). |
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| United States v. Maher |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 19-10074 Opinion Date: April 8, 2020 Judge: William Holcombe Pryor, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Defendant appealed his convictions for conspiring to defraud the United States by committing mail fraud; wire fraud; and receiving, concealing, and retaining money of the United States, as well as receiving, concealing, and retaining money of the United States. Defendant's charges stemmed from his involvement in a fraudulent scheme to obtain federal grant money. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for conspiracy because he does not dispute that he committed two of the three alternative objectives of the conspiracy within the limitation period. The court also affirmed defendant's conviction for receiving, concealing, and retaining government money on the ground it is a continuing offense for which he was timely indicted. |
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| United States v. Oliver |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Docket: 17-15565 Opinion Date: April 8, 2020 Judge: Charles R. Wilson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Eleventh Circuit vacated its prior opinion and substituted the following opinion. The court held that a conviction for making terroristic threats under O.C.G.A. 16-11-37(a) is indivisible and overbroad under Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016), and therefore a violation of that statute categorically does not constitute a predicate offense under the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Therefore, the court held that defendant did not have three qualifying predicate offenses, as required to support the application of an enhancement under the ACCA. The court remanded for resentencing. |
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| In re: Federal Bureau of Prisons Execution Protocol Cases |
| Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Docket: 19-5322 Opinion Date: April 7, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The DC Circuit vacated the district court's preliminary injunction enjoining four plaintiffs from being executed. Plaintiffs claimed that the 2019 execution protocol and addendum violate the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 (FDPA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the Controlled Substances Act, and the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution. Each member of the panel had a different view of what the FDPA requires. Plaintiffs' primary claim under the FDPA, on which the district court found they were likely to succeed, involves the requirement to implement federal executions in the manner provided by state law. Judge Katsas and Judge Rao both rejected that claim on the merits; Judge Katsas concluded that the FDPA regulates only the top-line choice among execution methods, such as the choice to use lethal injection instead of hanging or electrocution; Judge Rao concluded that the FDPA also requires the federal government to follow execution procedures set forth in state statutes and regulations, but not execution procedures set forth in less formal state execution protocols; and Judge Rao further concluded that the federal protocol allows the federal government to depart from its procedures as necessary to conform to state statutes and regulations. On either of their views, plaintiffs' claim was without merit and the preliminary injunction must be vacated. Plaintiffs contend in the alternative that the federal protocol and addendum reflect an unlawful transfer of authority from the United States Marshals Service to the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Judge Katsas would reject the claim on the merits, and Judge Rao would hold that it was forfeited. Judge Katsas and Judge Rao resolved the notice-and-comment claim because it involves purely legal questions intertwined with the merits of the FDPA issues at the center of this appeal. Judge Katsas and Judge Rao concluded, on the merits, that the 2019 protocol and addendum are rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice exempt from the APA's requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking. Therefore, judgment for the government must be entered on this claim. Finally, the court declined to reject plaintiffs' claims under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Controlled Substances Act. The court remanded for further proceedings. |
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| People v. Maya |
| Court: Supreme Court of California Docket: S255371 Opinion Date: April 9, 2020 Judge: Tani Cantil-Sakauye Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeal affirming the judgment of the trial court denying Appellant's request for expungement of his misdemeanor conviction under Cal. Penal Code 1203.4a, subd. (a), holding that a person may live "an honest and upright life" even if that person has been in custody since completing the sentence imposed for the misdemeanor. Defendant completed his term of imprisonment for his misdemeanor conviction in 2012 and had been in federal immigration custody up until he brought his action. While in immigration custody, Defendant sought expungement of the conviction under section 1203.4a(a), alleging that he had obeyed all laws since being convicted and had participated in fire camp and Alcoholics Anonymous. The trial court denied the request, concluding that custodial time did not qualify as honest and upright living for expungement purposes. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that conduct while in custody is relevant to determining whether a defendant has satisfied the honest and upright life requirement of section 1203.4a. |
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| California v. Williams |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D074098(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Patricia D. Benke Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| A jury found defendant Jeremiah Williams guilty of first degree robbery, four counts of making a criminal threat, two counts of forcible rape, sexual penetration by use of force, forcible oral copulation, burglary of an inhabited dwelling, battery and assault, as lesser offenses of sodomy by use of force, assault with a deadly weapon, and false imprisonment by violence. The first eight counts were committed against Jane Doe 1; the remaining counts against Jane Doe 2. The jury found defendant committed all counts but one: forcible sexual offenses against more than one victim. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 100 years to life plus 86 years two months. It also imposed a $10,000 restitution fine, and a matching suspended parole revocation restitution fine (and other fees and assessments). Defendant raised six enumerations of error at trial, but finding none, the Court of Appeal affirmed. |
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| California v. Williams |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: D074647(Fourth Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 9, 2020 Judge: Patricia D. Benke Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Defendant Arnell Williams appealed after a trial court denied his motion to dismiss a petition for revocation filed by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Defendant contended the court erred when it confirmed the prerelease determination of CDCR that he was a "high-risk sex offender" requiring him to be supervised by parole under Penal Code section 3000.08(a)(4), and not be placed in postrelease community supervision (PRCS) under section 3450 et seq. After review, the Court of Appeal independently concluded defendant was subject to parole supervision as a result of his 1984 convictions for forcible rape, rape in concert, and robbery, which qualified as serious and/or violent felonies within the meaning of subdivision (a)(1) and (2) of section 3000.08, respectively. As such, the Court deemed it unnecessary to determine whether defendant was also subject to such supervision as a result of his high-risk sex offender classification. Therefore, it affirmed the trial court's denial. |
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| Garcia v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B302119(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 8, 2020 Judge: Laurie D. Zelon Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Petitioner sought a petition for writ of mandate, contending that his motion to dismiss should have been granted because the failure to hold a timely preliminary hearing violated the statutory time requirements of Penal Code section 859b and his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The Court of Appeal granted the petition, holding that, where an in-custody defendant is arraigned on an amended complaint, section 859b requires that the preliminary hearing be held within 10 court days of that arraignment unless there is a personal time waiver by the defendant or good cause for a continuance. In this case, petitioner was not held within the 10-day period prescribed by section 859b and he did not personally waive his right to a preliminary hearing within that time period. Therefore, section 859b mandates dismissal of the amended complaint against him. |
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| In re David C. |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A157151(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 8, 2020 Judge: Frank Y. Jackson Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| Based on allegations that the minor exposed himself to (Penal Code 314.1) and solicited sex from his 14-year-old female classmate and touched another classmate in a sexual manner (Penal Code 242), the juvenile court placed the minor on probation with multiple conditions. The court of appeal struck an electronics search condition. Nothing in the record establishes that the electronics search condition is valid as “reasonably related to future criminality,” and a treatment provider’s finding of “therapeutic necessity” at some later date is not equivalent to a finding that the burden imposed is proportional to the legitimate interests served by the condition. The court modified conditions relating to fees, the possession of materials or items that have a primary purpose of causing sexual arousal, and the minor’s proximity to the campus or grounds of any school unless enrolled, accompanied, or authorized. The court upheld conditions relating to psychological evaluations and polygraph testing, |
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| Jennifer K. v. Shane K. |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A155111(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 7, 2020 Judge: Kline Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Family Law |
| Jennifer and Shane are the parents of a daughter they have jointly parented since her birth in 2009. In 2017, 10 years after a “dating” relationship ended, Jennifer sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) from the San Francisco County Superior Court, stating that Shane “has been verbally abusive and physically violent with me since I met him … our daughter is the product of a rape … having endured his abuse for many years, abuse which continues.” The court denied the request for a DVRO, dissolved a temporary restraining order, and explained the bases of its determinations at considerable length. The court of appeal affirmed, upholding a finding that one of Shane’s alleged prior acts, punching a refrigerator close to Jennifer’s head, did not constitute “abuse” under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act. The court reasoned that the issue was credibility and deferred to the trial court’s finding that the act was not “an intentional or reckless act that causes or attempts to cause bodily injury.” The court rejected an argument that gender bias disqualified the judge as a matter of due process. “An objective assessment of Judge Darwin’s conduct reveals it to be exemplary in every respect.” |
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| People v. Arce |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: A153460(First Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 9, 2020 Judge: Sanchez Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| Arce and Burk were charged with the first-degree murder of Hamilton (Penal Code 187(a)), with a special circumstance allegation that Arce committed the murder while actively participating in a criminal street gang (section 190.2(a)(22)). Arce was also charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm (29800(a)(1)). The indictment further alleged the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (186.22(b)(1)) and that Arce personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (12022.53). Arce’s prior convictions included a 2011 conviction for carrying a concealed firearm and a 2012 conviction for discharging a firearm with gross negligence. The indictment also included prior strike and prison term allegations. Convicted, Arce was sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole. The court of appeal affirmed. The court rejected arguments that the criminal street gang special circumstance statute is unconstitutionally vague; that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter under a theory of imperfect self-defense; that the court improperly instructed the jury on the consideration of accomplice testimony; and of cumulative error. The government conceded that the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the imposition of a concurrent term for the firearm conviction. |
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| People v. The North River Insurance Co. |
| Court: California Courts of Appeal Docket: B292411(Second Appellate District) Opinion Date: April 9, 2020 Judge: Brian M. Hoffstadt Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| After defendant obtained a bail bond but did not appear as ordered, the trial court forfeited the bond and entered summary judgment on the bond against the bond's surety. Almost two years later, the surety moved to set aside the summary judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), based on the ground that the trial court's failure to inquire into defendant's ability to pay when setting bail rendered the bond (and hence the summary judgment) "void." The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of the surety's motion, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying relief. The court reasoned that the trial court would have abused its discretion had it awarded the relief the surety sought. The court published to explain the many reasons why the surety's argument must be rejected as a matter of law. |
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| Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction |
| Court: Connecticut Supreme Court Docket: SC20233 Opinion Date: April 7, 2020 Judge: Richard N. Palmer Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of the habeas court denying Petitioner's amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the Appellate Court improperly raised and decided the unpreserved issue of waiver without first providing the parties with an opportunity to be heard on that issue. Petitioner pled guilty under the Alford doctrine to one count of home invasion. Thereafter, Petitioner commenced this habeas action alleging that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to discuss the home invasion charge. The habeas court denied the petition. The Appellate Court affirmed on an alternative ground, concluding that Petitioner waived his ineffective assistance claim by virtue of the entry and acceptance of his Alford plea. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that because the parties were not provided an opportunity to be heard on waiver it was improper for the Appellate Court to raise and decide that issue. |
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| Chavis v. Delaware |
| Court: Delaware Supreme Court Docket: 520, 2018 Opinion Date: April 7, 2020 Judge: Traynor Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Dakai Chavis was indicted by grand jury on four counts of trespassing with the intent to peer or peep, four counts of burglary in the second degree, three counts of burglary in the second degree, and one count of theft of a firearm. A jury acquitted Chavis on all but one of the charges, finding him guilty of the second degree burglary of an apartment at 61 Fairway Road in Newark, Delaware. At that address, unlike the other residences identified in the indictment, the police had obtained a DNA sample from a bedroom window. The police sent that sample to an out-of-state laboratory for analysis, and when they later arrested Chavis and swabbed his mouth for DNA, they sent that sample to the same lab. According to one of the lab’s analysts, the evidentiary sample taken from the bedroom window at the burglary scene matched the reference sample taken from Chavis. It was undisputed that several analysts from the lab handled and performed steps in the analytical process on both samples. Even so, before the trial, the State moved in limine for an order declaring that the out-of-state laboratory’s DNA findings would be “admissible via the testimony of [the lead analyst], and that no one else from [the laboratory] needs to appear for trial.” Chavis opposed the motion, citing the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause and 10 Del. C. sec. 4331. The Superior Court agreed with the State and granted its motion. Finding no reversible error in the Superior Court's judgment, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Wiggins v. Delaware |
| Court: Delaware Supreme Court Docket: 46, 2019 Opinion Date: April 7, 2020 Judge: Montgomery-Reeves Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| In 2018, Appellant Darren Wiggins was arrested for possession of drugs; a vial containing an amber liquid with brown chunks suspended in the liquid. The State’s chemist tested the amber liquid, which tested positive for phencyclidine (“PCP”); she did not test or otherwise identify the brown chunks. The chemist also weighed the liquid PCP and brown chunks together and determined that they weighed 17.651 grams. The chemist did not weigh the liquid or the brown chunks separately. At trial, the State presented no evidence regarding the nature of the brown chunks or their relation to the liquid PCP other than their co-location within the same vial. Nonetheless, the jury found Wiggins guilty of Aggravated Possession of PCP under Delaware’s Uniform Controlled Substances Act. Relevant here, possession of 15 grams or more of PCP, or of any mixture containing any such substance, was classified as a Class B Felony and carried a minimum sentence of two years at Level V incarceration. The parties’ sole focus in this appeal is on whether a rational jury could have concluded that the State met its burden to prove that the liquid PCP and brown chunks in Wiggins’s vial constituted a “mixture” under the statutory scheme. The Delaware Supreme Court held that the meaning of “mixture” within Delaware’s statutory scheme required a showing that the mixture was marketable or usable. As the State presented no evidence concerning what the brown chunks were, that they were in any way associated with liquid PCP, or that they were conventionally sold or used with PCP mixtures, the State made no showing that the liquid PCP and unidentified brown chunks were a marketable or usable drug mixture. Therefore, the Court vacated the conviction for Aggravated Possession of PCP and remanded for sentencing for the lesser-included offense of Misdemeanor Possession of PCP. |
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| Dresbach v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0153 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Irwin Dresbach appealed his convictions for felony murder and other crimes in connection with the 2014 shooting death of Jennifer Gatewood. Dresbach argued on appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to explain adequately the strength of the evidence against him, causing Dresbach to proceed to trial instead of accepting the State’s plea offer. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, finding that Dresbach failed to establish a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the State’s plea offer but for trial counsel’s alleged deficiency. |
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| Ensslin v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0252 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Gary Ensslin was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Stephen Wills. Ensslin contended on appeal that in denying his motion for new trial, the trial court erred by ruling that the improper admission at his trial of statements that investigators elicited from him after he invoked his right to remain silent was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed Ensslin's convictions. |
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| Frazier v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0226 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: David E. Nahmias Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Appellant Michael Frazier, Jr. was convicted as a party to the crimes of felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of one of his accomplices, Quenterious Griner. Appellant’s sole contention on appeal was that the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Finding the evidence sufficient, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Georgia v. Holland |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0082 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Gary Holland was charged with first-degree vehicular homicide predicated on a hit- and-run. Holland moved to bar his prosecution for that offense. The trial court granted his motion, declaring OCGA 40-6-393(b) unconstitutional under the equal protection and due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The State appealed the trial court’s order. The finding that the trial court erred in finding the statute unconstitutional, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed. |
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| Hall v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0268 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Bethel Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Deante Hall was found guilty of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, criminal attempt to commit malice murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in connection with the shooting death of Tony Butler and an assault on Levar Andrews.Hall challenged the sufficiency of the evidence as to each offense of which he was convicted. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Hall's convictions. |
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| Hatney v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0202 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Cornelius Hatney was convicted by jury of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault in connection with the beating death of Etate Essang. Hatney appealed, contending that the trial court erred in refusing to give a requested jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of the charges of malice murder and felony murder. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed Hatney's conviction. |
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| Hudson v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0218 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Peterson Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Phell Hudson, Jr. appealed his convictions for malice murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and making a false statement, all stemming from the shooting death of Michael Allen. Hudson argued the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter and insanity at the time of the alleged crimes. He also argued the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of a witness. The Georgia Supreme Court determined Hudson's jury instruction claims failed because the evidence presented at trial did not include even slight evidence to support either charge. And his cross- examination claim failed because any error was harmless. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Hudson's convictions. |
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| Martin v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0273 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Marquez Martin was convicted by jury of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting deaths of James Wood and Russell Jacobs. On appeal, Martin contended his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to object to the trial court’s omission of certain language trial counsel had requested for the jury charge on defendant’s good character. Because Martin has failed to establish that his trial counsel was deficient in not objecting to the omission of the requested language, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, but vacated in part to correct a sentencing error. The trial court sentenced Martin to concurrent life sentences on all four felony murder convictions. But because there were only two murders, it was error for the trial court to sentence Martin on four murder counts. |
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| McGarity v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0104 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Ellington Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Amy McGarity was convicted by jury of murder and other crimes in connection with the kidnapping and strangulation death of Kayla Weil. McGarity contended that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a new trial, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for murder and that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of her bad character. Because neither of these claims had merit, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| Roseboro v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0159 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Warren Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Raekwon Roseboro was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2015 shooting death of Willie Deandre Jackson and the aggravated assault of Kendrick Ellison. On appeal, Roseboro argued he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction. |
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| Watts.v. Georgia |
| Court: Supreme Court of Georgia Docket: S20A0251 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Boggs Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| After the trial court granted his motion for new trial, Laurence Watts was retried before a jury in 2010 and again found guilty of malice murder and related offenses in connection with the 2003 shooting death of Brent Ogletree. His amended motion for new trial after the retrial was denied, and he appealed, claiming as his sole enumeration of error ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| State v. Folkers |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 18-1999 Opinion Date: April 3, 2020 Judge: McDonald Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of child endangerment, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction. During trial, the State was required to prove Defendant had custody of her child and that she knowingly acted in a manner that created a substantial risk to her child's health or safety. The district court concluded that the State met its burden of production and persuasion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's failure to remove her child from a physical environment that caused a risk of fire was sufficient to establish that Defendant had knowledge she had created or allowed her child to remain in a physical environment that posed a substantial risk to her child's physical health and safety. |
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| State v. Ross |
| Court: Iowa Supreme Court Docket: 19-0939 Opinion Date: April 3, 2020 Judge: Christensen Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's guilty plea to possessing a tool with the intent to use it in the unlawful removal of a theft detection device under Iowa Code 714.7B(3), holding that there was no factual basis to support Defendant's guilty plea to this charge. Defendant's conviction arose from his act of using bolt cutters to cut the padlock off of a steel cable wrapped around a riding lawn mower on display outside of a Mills Fleet Farm. Defendant pled guilty violating section 714.7B(3). On appeal, Defendant argued that the padlock-steel cable combination device he cut with bolt cutters was not a "theft detective device" under section 714.7B, and therefore, his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty to this charge.The Supreme Court agreed and vacated Defendant's guilty plea, holding (1) the padlock-steel cable combination did not constitute a "theft detective device" under the statute, and therefore, there was no factual basis to support Defendant's guilty plea; and (2) Defendant's counsel was ineffective for allowing Defendant to plead guilty. |
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| State v. Coleman |
| Court: Kansas Supreme Court Docket: 115293 Opinion Date: April 3, 2020 Judge: Dan Biles Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In this consolidated appeal challenging sentences imposed for crimes occurring both before and after statutory amendments in 2015 to the revised Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA), Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-6801, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision scoring a prior 1992 Kansas involuntary manslaughter conviction as a person felony for criminal history purposes. Defendant's direct appeal concerned two 2015 thefts committed after changes to the revised KSGA. Defendant's probation revocation appeals concerned sentences imposed thefts that occurred before 2015. The Supreme Court held that, as to the direct appeal, this Court adopts the identical-or-narrower test from State v. Wetrich, 412 P.3d 984 (2018), which should also be used for Kansas crimes committed before the sentencing guidelines used the person or nonperson designations. Using the Wetrich test, the Court held that the district court correctly classified a 1992 Kansas involuntary manslaughter conviction as a person felony in the sentencings for the 2015 thefts. As to the probation revocation appeals, the Supreme Court could held that no relief was available. |
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| Louisiana in the interest of D.T. |
| Court: Louisiana Supreme Court Docket: 2019-KA-01445 Opinion Date: April 3, 2020 Judge: Genovese Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| Louisiana charged D.T. with aggravated battery committed with a firearm, and sought to divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction and to prosecute D.T. as an adult pursuant to Louisiana Children’s Code Article 305(B)(2)(j). In response, D.T. filed a motion with the juvenile court to declare La. Ch.C. art. 305(B)(2)(j) unconstitutional. The juvenile court granted D.T.’s motion. On the state's application to the Louisiana Supreme Court, the Supreme Court concurred with the trial court that La. Ch.C. art. 305(B)(2)(j) was indeed unconstitutional, concluding the legislature exceeded its constitutional authority in creating an exception allowing divesture of juvenile court jurisdiction for a child charged with aggravated battery committed with a firearm, where that charge is not among the crimes enumerated in La. Const. art. V, sec. 19. |
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| Louisiana v. King |
| Court: Louisiana Supreme Court Docket: 2019-KK-01332 Opinion Date: April 3, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Officers placed defendant Tre King in handcuffs during a traffic stop after they smelled marijuana in the vehicle and determined that he had outstanding warrants for his arrest. They advised him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. Defendant indicated that he understood his rights. A search of the vehicle revealed marijuana in the passenger side door and a gun beneath a jacket. Defendant claimed that the marijuana, jacket, and gun all belonged to him. Defendant was arrested and charged with possession of a firearm by a person convicted of certain felonies, and illegal carrying of a weapon while in possession of a controlled dangerous substance. After initially denying defendant’s motion to suppress his statements, the district court ultimately granted defendant’s motion to exclude his statements from trial. The State sought supervisory review from the court of appeal, which denied writs because it found, consistent with prior rulings in that circuit, that the Miranda warning was deficient because it fit not advise defendant of the temporal aspects of his right to an attorney (i.e., that he had a right to an attorney both before and during any questioning). The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review in this case to determine whether the warning that “you have the right to an attorney, and if you can’t afford one, one will be appointed to you,” without further qualification, was a sufficient advisement of the right to counsel under Miranda. The Court determined that a general advisement like that given in this case was sufficient, and that a statement need not be suppressed because of the failure to qualify the warning with an additional advisement that the right to counsel exists both before and during questioning. Accordingly, the Court reversed the rulings of the lower courts, denied defendant's motion to exclude his statements, and remanded for eh district court for further proceedings. |
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| Louisiana v. Williams |
| Court: Louisiana Supreme Court Docket: 2019-K-00490 Opinion Date: April 3, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Juvenile Law |
| On March 25, 2013, the 18-year-old defendant Clifford Williams shot and killed 15-year-old Ralphmon Green in the 2100 block of Allen Street in New Orleans. The victim was struck by bullets four times and defendant continued to fire at him after he fell to the ground. Eight shell casings found at the crime scene matched a semiautomatic handgun that was later found at defendant’s residence. Several eyewitnesses to the shooting testified that the victim was unarmed. Before trial, the defense was prohibited from introducing evidence of the victim’s juvenile arrest for illegal carrying of a weapon. At trial, the defense unsuccessfully attempted to introduce other evidence of the victim’s character. Specifically, the defense sought to introduce a photograph that depicted the victim holding a gun, evidence that the victim had threatened defendant on social media, and testimony of a witness that the victim had previously threatened defendant. In rejecting defendant’s claim on appeal that the district court erred in excluding this evidence, the court of appeal found that defendant failed to introduce appreciable evidence of a hostile demonstration or overt act on the part of the victim at the time of the offense charged, as required by La.C.E. art. 404(A)(2)(a). Defendant contended the court of appeal erred because testimony of an eyewitness constituted appreciable evidence of an overt act by the victim, and the district court overstepped its bounds in evaluating the credibility of that witness to find the evidence was not appreciable because the witness was not credible. To this point, the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed. However, the Court found the evidence was otherwise inadmissible, and therefore affirmed the conviction and sentence. |
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| State v. Hansen |
| Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court Citation: 2020 ME 43 Opinion Date: April 7, 2020 Judge: Humphrey Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence for two counts of unlawful sexual contact, holding that sufficient evidence supported the conviction and that there was no error or abuse of discretion in the proceedings below. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of unlawful sexual contact (Class B). Defendant was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment on the first count and a consecutive term of ten years, suspended, with five years of probation on the second count. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions; (2) the prosecutor's use of leading questions during the direct examination of the child victim did not violate Defendant's right to a fair trial; (3) testimony by the victim's mother did not violate the first complaint rule; and (4) the sentences imposed were not excessive or disproportionate, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. |
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| State v. Zadeh |
| Court: Maryland Court of Appeals Docket: 25/19 Opinion Date: April 3, 2020 Judge: Hotten Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing Defendant's conviction of second-degree murder, holding that non-mutually admissible evidence was admitted at trial, prejudicing Defendant, and the seizure of a cell phone from Defendant's person exceeded the parameters of the Fourth Amendment and Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Defendant was tried in the circuit court along with a co-defendant for murder. Both defendants were convicted of second-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argued that his trial should have been severed from that of his co-defendant since a substantial amount of the evidence against the co-defendant was not admissible against him. Defendant further argued that the trial court erred in failing to suppress a cell phone that was seized from his pocket. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that (1) the trials should have been severed because the joint trial unfairly prejudiced Defendant, and the resulting prejudice could not be cured; and (2) in the absence of a valid search and seizure warrant for the search of Defendant's person or an applicable exception to the warrant requirement, the seizure of the cell phone was unlawful. |
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| Committee for Public Counsel Services v. Chief Justice of Trial Court |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12926 Opinion Date: April 3, 2020 Judge: Gaziano Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court held that, due to the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, pretrial detainees who have not been charged with an excluded offense are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of release on personal recognizance and a hearing within two business days of filing a motion for reconsideration of bail and release. To decrease exposure to COVID-19 within correctional institutions, Petitioners sought the release to the community of as many pretrial detainees and individuals who have been convicted and are serving a sentence of incarceration as possible. The Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the risks inherent in the COVID-19 pandemic constitute a changed circumstance within the meaning of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58, tenth paragraph, and the provisions of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 57; (2) any individual who is not being held without bail under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, 58A and who has not been charged with an excluded offense as set forth in Appendix A to this opinion is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of release; and (3) to afford relief to as many incarcerated individuals as possible, the parole board and Department of Corrections are urged to work with the special master to expedite parole hearings and the issuance of parole permits. |
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| Commonwealth v. Andre |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12060 Opinion Date: April 2, 2020 Judge: Lowy Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation and three related charges, holding that there was no reversible error in this case. Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the motion judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence; (2) the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in admitting evidence of a document under the business records exception to the rule against hearsay; (3) the judge's failure to provide guidance to the jury regarding how it should weigh the business records constituted error, but the error did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (4) even if the judge erred in admitting testimony concerning firearms, the error would not have prejudiced Defendant; (5) the trial judge's jury instruction regarding the firearms testimony did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice; (6) there was no error in the prosecutor's improper statements made in his closing argument; and (7) there was no basis for reducing sentence on the murder conviction or ordering a new trial under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E. |
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| Deal v. Massachusetts Parole Board |
| Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Docket: SJC-12746 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Budd Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court entering judgment in favor of the parole board on Plaintiff's appeal from the denial of his application for parole, holding that the board did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff's application. Plaintiff was seventeen years old when he committed murder in the second degree. Plaintiff was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder. Plaintiff later applied for parole, but the board denied the application. Plaintiff sought review, alleging that the board abused its discretion by failing properly to analyze the distinctive attributes of youth in making its determination. A superior court judge granted the board's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied Plaintiff's cross motion for the same. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the board based its decision on the statutory standard of rehabilitation and compatibility with the welfare of society, and the board adequately considered the distinctive attributes of youth. |
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| Griffin v. State |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Dockets: A18-1002, A19-1083 Opinion Date: April 8, 2020 Judge: Hudson Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the district court denying Appellant's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim raised in his first petition for post conviction relief and the claims raised in his second petition for postconviction relief, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's claims. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree felony murder, attempted first-degree felony murder, and second-degree assault. The Supreme Court affirmed. In his first petition for postconviction relief, Appellant raised some of the same issues addressed in his direct appeal but also claimed that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court ordered an evidentiary hearing only on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim and, after a hearing, denied the claim. Appellant then filed a second petition for postconviction relief, which the district court summarily denied. The Supreme Court affirmed both of the district court's orders, holding (1) Appellant did not satisfy the first prong of Strickland on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim; and (2) all of Appellant's claims in his second petition were time barred. |
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| State v. Alger |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A18-1000 Opinion Date: April 8, 2020 Judge: Lorie Skjerven Gildea Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's sentences in connection with his conviction for two counts of violating an order of protection (OFP) under Minn. Stat. 518B.01, subd. 14(d)(1), holding that the multiple-victim rule authorized two sentences in this case and that Defendant's consecutive sentences did not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of his behavior. A temporary OFP prohibited Defendant from contacting either his infant son or his son's mother. After Defendant had contact with both his son and the mother at a hotel, the State charged Defendant with two counts of violating an OFP. Defendant pleaded guilty to both counts, and the district court sentenced him to two permissive consecutive sentences. The court of appeals affirmed the sentences, concluding that Minn. Stat. 609.035, subd. 1 did not prohibit the district court from imposing multiple sentences for crimes that were committed during a single behavioral incident. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the multiple-victim rule applied in this case because Defendant made in-person contact with two protected persons, and therefore, there were two victims of the OFP-violation crime; and (2) Defendant's sentences did not exaggerate the criminality of his behavior. |
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| State v. Dexter |
| Court: Minnesota Supreme Court Docket: A18-0761 Opinion Date: April 8, 2020 Judge: Chutich Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the district court's denial of Defendant's request for non-identifying information about a confidential reliable informant's relationship with police and the informant's information-gathering activities, holding that the State's common law privilege to withhold the identity of an informant does not protect non-identifying information. Defendant was charged with drug possession and sale crimes. Defendant filed discovery and suppression motions seeking information about a confidential reliable informant, on whose observations the State relied to obtain a warrant to search Defendant's home. The district court denied the motions, concluding that Defendant was not entitled to discover the informant's identity or any other information about the informant. Defendant was convicted of fifth-degree sale of a controlled substance. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the State's common law privilege did not protect non-identifying information. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals (1) properly concluded that the State's common law privilege does not apply to non-identifying information; and (2) did not err in concluding that the non-identifying information Defendant requested related to the case, as required by Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01. |
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| City of Vicksburg v. Williams |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2019-CA-00209-SCT Opinion Date: April 9, 2020 Judge: Griffis Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| In the early morning hours of February 7, 2013, Vicksburg Police Officers Russell Dorsey and Diawardrick Grover were dispatched to Herbert Williams’s residence as a result of a 911. Williams called 911 because he discharged his firearm at his neighbor’s dog. After Officer Dorsey arrived at Williams’s house, Williams explained his reasons for discharging his firearm. Williams stated that he shot at the ground near the dog in an attempt to prevent an attack by the dog. Officer Grover arrived a few minutes after Officer Dorsey, and he interviewed Jacqueline Knight Holt, the owner of the dog. Officer Grover observed the dog, and he described the dog as "small and scared." After Officers Dorsey and Grover conducted an investigation, Officer Dorsey arrested Williams for unnecessarily discharging a firearm in the city in violation of Vicksburg’s city ordinance. In July 2014, Williams filed a complaint against the City under the MTCA in the Circuit Court of Warren County. Williams alleged that “said Police Officers grossly and negligently arrested Plaintiff for no good cause, causing Plaintiff damages physically and psychologically.” Williams sued the City of Vicksburg (City) for injuries he allegedly sustained after his arrest. The Circuit Court, sitting without a jury under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA), entered a judgment in favor of Williams. However, because the City was entitled to immunity, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed. |
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| Nash v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2018-KA-01587-SCT Opinion Date: April 9, 2020 Judge: Maxwell Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| A jury found Willie Nash guilty of possession of a cell phone in a correctional facility. Nash did not appeal the jury’s verdict. He only challenged the sentence: twelve years in prison. He claimed the twelve-year sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime and thus violated the Eighth Amendment. Though harsh, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined Nash’s sentence fell within the statutory range of three to fifteen years. And the judge based his sentencing decision on the seriousness of Nash’s crime and evidence of Nash’s criminal history. Because Nash has not shown that a threshold comparison of the crime committed to the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality, the Court performed no further analysis, and affirmed the conviction and sentence. |
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| Willis v. Mississippi |
| Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation: 2018-KA-01509-SCT Opinion Date: April 9, 2020 Judge: Michael K. Randolph Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Michael Willis (Willis) appealed his conviction for aggravated assault. Counsel for his codefendant and nephew Kedarious Willis filed a Lindsey brief averring there were no meritorious arguments for appeal. Charges arose over a fight in 2027 Kedarious got into with Travell Moore: Kedarious alleged Travell stole a radio from Willis' car. After the fight broke up, Kedarious and Willis drove to a relative's house on Jordan Street. Travell was playing dominoes outside surrounded by a large crowd of people by the time Kedarious and Willis drove by the house. Travell removed his shirt and went out in the street to confront Kedarious and Willis. Witness testimony was divided over whether Willis then got out of the car and argued with Travell before they reached Kedarious’s grandmother’s home or if Travell followed them down to Kedarious’s grandmother’s home. Regardless, the confrontation between Travell and Willis was renewed in front of Kedarious’s grandmother’s home. Travell claimed that at some point he turned his back to Willis and then heard Willis say, “shoot, shoot.” Travell tried to run but was struck by several bullets, falling at the next-door neighbor’s driveway. Travell was taken to University of Mississippi Medical Center where he was treated for a collapsed lung and a lacerated liver. His spinal cord was severed, resulting in paralysis. Willis was sentenced to twenty years in prison as a habitual offender. After reviewing Willis' contentions of error at trial, the Mississippi Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed his conviction. |
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| State v. Brandt |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 79 Opinion Date: April 7, 2020 Judge: Beth Baker Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed all but one of Defendant's convictions for six felonies stemming from a Ponzi scheme he devised that defrauded investors of $2 million, holding that one of the convictions violated the "multiple charges statute," Mont. Code Ann. 46-11-410, but the rest of the convictions may stand. Defendant was convicted of exploitation of an older person (common scheme), theft by embezzlement, (common scheme), failure to register as a securities salesperson (common scheme), failure to register a security (common scheme), fraudulent practices (common scheme), and operating a pyramid promotion scheme (common scheme). Defendant appealed, arguing that section 46-11-410(2)(a) precluded his convictions on five of the six counts with which he was charged because they were "included offenses" or "specific instances" of fraudulent practices. The Supreme Court held (1) Defendant's conviction for theft by embezzlement violates section 46-11-410 and must be vacated; but (2) Defendant's remaining convictions do not violate the multiple charges statute. |
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| State v. Jardee |
| Court: Montana Supreme Court Citation: 2020 MT 81 Opinion Date: April 7, 2020 Judge: James A. Rice Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Defendant's request for credit for time served while he was released on bail during the pendency of his probation revocation proceeding, holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in denying credit for "street time" served under the sentence. Defendant was sentenced for two counts of felony partner or family member assault. Later, the district court found that Defendant had violated the terms of his suspended sentence. Defendant requested that the district court grant him credit against his sentence under Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-203(7)(b) for four months of "street time" he had served on his sentence between his release on bond and sentencing. The district court denied the request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by denying street time credit because there was evidence in the record that Defendant committed a violation of his sentence during the relevant period. |
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| State v. Hessler |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 305 Neb. 451 Opinion Date: April 3, 2020 Judge: Stacy Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing, holding that Defendant's postconviction claims were time barred. In his motion for postconviction relief, Defendant alleged that his death sentence was invalid because Nebraska's capital sentencing statutes violate his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. Defendant's motion relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida, __ U.S. __ (2016). Citing State v. Lotter,, 917 N.W.2d 850 (2018), in which the Supreme Court held Hurst was not a proper triggering event for the one-year limitations period of the Nebraska Postconviction Act, the district court denied the motion, concluding that it was time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly held that Defendant's postconviction claims were time barred; and (2) because there was not merit to Defendant's postconviction claims, the district court did not err in denying the postconviction motion without an evidentiary hearing. |
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| State v. Valdez |
| Court: Nebraska Supreme Court Citation: 305 Neb. 441 Opinion Date: April 3, 2020 Judge: Funke Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| In Defendant's appeal from his conviction and sentence the Supreme Court remanded the cause with direction for a new enhancement and sentencing hearing, holding that the district court erred when it enhanced Defendant's sentence for motor vehicle homicide absent evidence of a prior conviction. Defendant pled guilty to enhanced motor vehicle homicide. The court accepted Defendant's guilty plea subject to enhancement. At the sentencing hearing, no evidence was adduced on the matter of enhancement, nor was the matter addressed. The court, however, treated the offense as enhanced when sentencing Defendant. Defendant appealed, asserting that the district court erred in failing to receive evidence of a prior conviction, as is statutorily required to subject him to enhancement penalties. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) the trial court did not receive evidence necessary to subject Defendant to the enhanced penalties under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-306(3)(c), and therefore, his sentence was illegal; and (2) the proper remedy is to remand the cause with directions for another enhancement and sentencing hearing. |
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| New Hampshire v. Carrier |
| Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court Docket: 2018-0575 Opinion Date: April 7, 2020 Judge: Anna Barbara Hantz Marconi Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| The State appealed a trial court's order suppressing two statements made by defendant Dominic Carrier. The trial court ruled defendant was subject to custodial interrogation at the time he gave the first set of statements, and, because he was not given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), those statements were obtained in violation of his right against self-incrimination. The court suppressed the second set of statements because it found that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant gave them voluntarily. After review of the statements and the trial court record, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. |
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| State v. Conley |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 75PA19 Opinion Date: April 3, 2020 Judge: Davis Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing judgments entered by the superior court convicting and sentencing Defendant on five separate counts for violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-269.2(b) based on an incident in which he was discovered on the grounds of a school in possession of five guns, holding that, under the rule of lenity, Defendant could only lawfully be convicted on one firearm count. Defendant's convictions arose from an incident in which he was discovered on the grounds of a school in possession of five guns. At issue was whether section 14-259.2(b) was ambiguous as to whether multiple convictions are permitted for the simultaneous possession of more than one firearm on a single occasion. The Supreme Court invoked the rule of lenity and held that Defendant could be convicted of only a single violation of the statute. |
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| State v. Copley |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 195A19 Opinion Date: April 3, 2020 Judge: Robin E. Hudson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals awarding Defendant a new trial after he was convicted of first-degree murder, holding that the trial court did not commit prejudicial error when it overruled Defendant's objections to the State's closing argument. A jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder by premeditation and deliberation and/or by lying in wait. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to sustain his objections to comments made by the prosecutor during closing argument about race. The court of appeals agreed, holding that the trial court committed prejudicial error by overruling Defendant's objections to the prosecutor's comments and by failing to instruct the jury to disregard the comments or to declare a mistrial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, assuming without deciding that the prosecutor's comments were improper, Defendant was not prejudiced by the error. |
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| State v. Golder |
| Court: North Carolina Supreme Court Docket: 79PA18 Opinion Date: April 3, 2020 Judge: Robin E. Hudson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court modified and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions, holding that Defendant preserved his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for appeal but that the State presented sufficient evidence to support the convictions. A jury found Defendant guilty of obtaining property worth less than $100,000 by false pretenses, accessing a government computer, altering court records, and unlicensed bail bonding. On appeal, Defendant argued that the State presented insufficient evidence that he aided and abetted another and that he obtained a thing of value. The court of appeals concluded that Defendant waived his challenge to the sufficiency of the State's evidence of aiding and abetting and that Defendant waived his right to appellate review to the sufficiency of the State's evidence that he obtained a thing of value. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) Defendant preserved each of his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence; and (2) the State presented sufficient evidence that Defendant aided and abetted another and that he obtained a thing of value. |
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| North Dakota v. Craig |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 80 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Daniel J. Crothers Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Russell Craig appealed a trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to murder. In 2006, Craig was charged with murder. A year later, he was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Craig testified when he arrived at the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DOCR) he received a case plan stating he was eligible for parole in 20 years based on his life expectancy of 67 years less his then-current age of 44. In 2007 Craig wrote a letter requesting reduction of his sentence. In the letter Craig wrote the district court “Currently on a life sentence [I] have to [s]erve 85 [percent] of 30 years. I would be able to see the p[a]role board in 26.5 years . . . .” The court treated the letter as a motion for reduction of sentence and denied the requested relief. In 2017, the district court clerk sent Craig a letter regarding a statutory change requiring a calculation of life expectancy for life sentences with the possibility of parole. In 2018, Craig filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he believed he was eligible for parole after 20 years as outlined on his DOCR case plan which calculated his remaining life expectancy at 23 years, and not 85 percent of his remaining life expectancy of 33.8 years under the State’s calculation based on N.D. Sup.Ct. Admin. R. 51. Craig argues his sentence was illegal, the district court violated the prohibition on ex post facto punishment, and the district court erred by denying Craig’s motion to withdraw his plea. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, finding the evidence established Craig understood his plea deal, including that he had to serve a minimum of 30 years less reduction for good conduct. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding a manifest injustice did not exist. |
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| North Dakota v. Krogstad |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 74 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Jerod E. Tufte Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Jeffrey Krogstad was convicted by jury of gross sexual imposition on a six-year-old victim. Krogstad argued on appeal that: (1) admission of video of the victim’s forensic interview violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation; (2) the district court abused its discretion in admitting the video under N.D.R.Ev. 803(24); and (3) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the guilty verdict. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. |
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| North Dakota v. West |
| Court: North Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 ND 74 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Gerald W. VandeWalle Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Frank West appealed after he conditionally pled guilty to possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance. West moved to suppress evidence alleging it was obtained during an unconstitutional search. The district court denied his motion holding the search was a valid probationary search and West lost his opportunity to seek suppression because he did not object at the time of the search. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. |
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| State v. Ware |
| Court: South Dakota Supreme Court Citation: 2020 S.D. 20 Opinion Date: April 8, 2020 Judge: David Gilbertson Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury found Defendant guilty of aggravated assault, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. After a trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of aggravated assault. Defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the circuit court denied. The court sentenced Defendant to a seven-year term of imprisonment, suspended in favor of probation for three years. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State proved every element of aggravated assault, and a rational trier of fact could have found Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. |
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| In re Cumberland Bail Bonding |
| Court: Tennessee Supreme Court Docket: M2017-02172-SC-R11-CD Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Clark Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of criminal appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court suspending a bonding company for violating a local rule of court requiring an agent of the bonding company to be present at court appearances of defendants for whom the bonding company serves as surety, holding that the local rule is valid and enforceable. The bonding company in this case conceded that it violated the local rule but asserted that the local rule was inconsistent with Tennessee statutes and was arbitrary and capricious. The court of criminal appeals concluded that the part of the local rule requiring an agent of the bonding company to attend all court appearances was arbitrary, capricious, and illegal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the local rule does not conflict with state statutes and is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; and (2) the trial court did not err by suspending the bonding company for violating the local rule. |
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| Ex parte Rodney Rodgers |
| Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Docket: WR-89,477-01 Opinion Date: April 8, 2020 Judge: Yeary Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law |
| Applicant Rodney Rodgers alleged he was illegally sentenced for a felony driving-while-intoxicated (DWI) offense when he should have been sentenced only for a misdemeanor DWI. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals filed and set this case to determine: (1) whether Applicant was estopped from claiming that his sentence was illegal; and (2) whether the harm analysis the Court has applied to claims of illegal enhancements pursuant to Ex parte Parrott, 396 S.W.3d 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013), should extend to enhancements that elevate an offense from a misdemeanor to a felony, also known as jurisdictional enhancements. After review, the Court held Ex parte Parrott applied and that Applicant did not show he was harmed. The Court therefore denied relief on those grounds without addressing whether he was estopped from raising the claim. |
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| Caldwell v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Supreme Court of Virginia Docket: 190541 Opinion Date: April 9, 2020 Judge: LeRoy F. Millette, Jr. Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of defrauding a hotel restaurant when she obtained food from the restaurant without paying, holding that a rational trier of fact could not have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant was convicted of violating Va. Code 18.2-188(b)(2), which makes it unlawful for any person who "without paying therefor, and with the intent to cheat or defraud the owner or keeper to...obtain food from a restaurant or other eating house." On appeal, Defendant argued that the plain language of section 18.2-188(b)(2) requires proof of specific intent to defraud at the time the benefit is received and that the Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient to prove she possessed the intent to defraud at the time she obtained the meal. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 18.2-188(b)(2) required proof that Defendant had the intent to cheat or defraud the hotel restaurant at the time she gained possession of the food; and (2) the trial court did not find the essential element of specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt - that Defendant possessed the intent to cheat or defraud the hotel restaurant at the time she obtained the food. |
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| Jefferson v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Supreme Court of Virginia Docket: 180993 Opinion Date: April 9, 2020 Judge: Per Curiam Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing as untimely Defendant's appeal of his convictions, holding that Defendant's immediate appeal was untimely. Defendant was convicted of abduction and assault and battery of a family member. Because the original sentencing order contained a scrivener's error the court entered an amended order adding handwritten notations on the first and last pages. Defendant appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely, noting that the original order was the final appealable order and that the amended order was entered to correct a scrivener's error. Defendant appealed, arguing that the court of appeals erred in holding that the amended order was not the final order for purposes of noting his appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the original order, and not the amended order, was the final appealable order in this case and that, therefore, Defendant's appeal was untimely. |
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| Lambert v. Commonwealth |
| Court: Supreme Court of Virginia Docket: 190439 Opinion Date: April 9, 2020 Judge: Charles S. Russell Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's convictions for aggravated involuntary manslaughter and driving while intoxicated, holding that the Commonwealth presented evidence sufficient to support jury verdicts finding that Defendant had, prior to the accident, self-administered intoxicants that impaired his ability to drive safely. At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, Defendant moved to strike it on the ground that the Commonwealth had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the drugs in his blood were self-administered. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury found Defendant guilty. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's assignments of error relating to the question of whether the drugs found in his blood had been self-administered were without merit. |
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| Dreyfuse, In re Application to Present Complaint to the Grand Jury |
| Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 18-0271 Opinion Date: April 3, 2020 Judge: Armstead Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioner's private citizen application to present a complaint to the grand jury, holding that a circuit court may refuse a private citizen's application to present a complaint to the grand jury if it determines that such application constitutes an abuse of process, but the circuit court in this case failed to set forth any findings of fact or conclusions of law when it denied Petitioner's application. Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and burglary. After seeking both state and federal habeas relief Petitioner filed an application to present a complaint to the grand jury. In his application, Petitioner asserted that during the grand jury proceedings that resulted in his indictments, a police officer perjured himself and the prosecuting attorney suborned perjury. The circuit court denied the application. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, because the circuit court's denial of Petitioner's application did not include any findings of fact or conclusions of law, it was necessary to remand this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings. |
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| Meadows v. Mutter |
| Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia Docket: 18-0418 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Jenkins Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief. Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder, death of a child by a guardian or custodian, and child abuse resulting in injury. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. Petitioner then filed a self-represented petition for writ of habeas court, alleging, primarily, that his counsel provided him with ineffective assistance. The circuit court ultimately denied the habeas corpus petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in finding that Defendant failed to show prejudice under the second prong of Strickland/Miller; and (2) there were no errors in the trial court's proceedings that would warrant application of the cumulative doctrine to the facts of this case. |
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| Springstead v. State |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 47 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Gray Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court imposing the maximum sentence of four and one-half to five years in connection with Defendant's plea of guilty to failure to register as a sex offender, holding that Defendant's failure to comply with the bond conditions contained in the plea agreement released the State from its obligation to recommend a reduced sentence. Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State where, in exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed to recommend a two-to three-year sentence, suspended in favor of two years of probation. The agreement incorporated Defendant's bond conditions requiring that he not be arrested or cited for a violation of the law. Before he was sentenced, Defendant received two citations for criminal trespass and one for false reporting. At sentencing, the State recommended that Defendant be sentenced to four to five years in prison. After he was sentenced, Defendant appealed, arguing that the State breached the plea agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's breach of the plea agreement released the State from its obligation to recommend a reduced sentence. |
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| State v. John |
| Court: Wyoming Supreme Court Citation: 2020 WY 46 Opinion Date: April 6, 2020 Judge: Boomgaarden Areas of Law: Criminal Law |
| The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the State's case against him, holding that the district court applied the incorrect burden and standard when adjudicating Defendant's motion to dismiss, but the error was harmless. Defendant was charged with one count of first degree murder. The district court dismissed the case under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-2-602(f), which the legislature had recently added to the self-defense statutes. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for writ of review to address matters of first impression regarding the statute's meaning and application. The Supreme Court held (1) section 6-2-602(f) is a mandatory immunity provision carrying with it a judicial gatekeeping function after the preliminary hearing; (2) the accused must present a prima facie showing that section 6-2-602(f) applies, and if the accused satisfies this minimal burden, the burden shifts to the State to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that section 6-2-602(f) does not apply; and (3) while the district court applied a different burden and standard when it adjudicated Defendant's motion to dismiss, its error was harmless. |
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