Why It is Unconstitutional for State Bars, When Doling out Bar-Exam Seats, to Favor In-State Law Schools

VIKRAM DAVID AMAR

Illinois law dean Vikram David Amar explains why it is unconstitutional for state bars to favor in-state law schools when deciding who may sit for the state bar exam while complying with social distancing requirements, based on the Supreme Court’s precedents on the dormant Commerce Clause.

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Porter v. United States

Docket: 18-5091

Opinion Date: May 20, 2020

Judge: Thapar

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Over a six-week period, Porter robbed nine different Louisville-area businesses, often using a pistol-grip shotgun. Porter eventually pled guilty to nine counts of Hobbs Act robbery, brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), 1951(a). The district court sentenced him to 30 years’ imprisonment, based on the Armed Career Criminal Act. Section 924(c) creates the substantive offense of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a “crime of violence.” Section 924(e) creates a sentencing enhancement for those who possess a firearm after three prior convictions for a “violent felony.” The district court found that both sections applied to Porter because of his convictions for Hobbs Act robbery and three prior convictions for Georgia armed robbery. Since then the Supreme Court has held that the residual clauses in both sections are unconstitutionally vague. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Porter’s sentences. His convictions still qualify as “violent felonies” or “crimes of violence” based solely on the elements clauses in sections 924(c) and 924(e). Georgia armed robbery has “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Hobbs Act robbery also qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause.