It’s now 101 days since the Hamas attack that started Israel’s war in Gaza. Since then, Israel has killed about 24,000 people, and about 85% of the Gazan population has been displaced. “It is unadulterated, brutal violence in Gaza,” said Jason Burke, who is currently reporting from Jerusalem. “But across the region, a lot of what has happened is performative – it is about actors sending messages in a very complex, constantly evolving situation.” There are still important factors holding back an escalation that spirals out of control. But, Jason said, “there is definitely more tension about the possibility than a couple of months ago. The situation feels much more volatile.” Here’s a primer on some of the reasons why. Damage to Houthis is limited – and they could seek to respond The US/UK strikes in Yemen, carried out with the support of the Netherlands, Australia, Canada and Bahrain, came in response to 26 attacks by the Iranian-backed Houthi militia on vessels passing through the Red Sea – jeopardising a major trade route linking Asia to Europe and the US. The Houthis say that the attacks will only stop when “the Israeli war on the people of Gaza stops”. The attacks have hit radar systems, drone storage and launch sites; according to the Houthis’ spokesperson, five of its members have been killed. The operation is intended to re-establish deterrence and offer some protection to commercial shipping, rather than wipe the Houthi forces off the map. But US officials quoted by the New York Times say that the Houthis retain about three-quarters of their ability to fire on shipping. “It’s almost impossible to completely eradicate those kind of capabilities with a couple of rounds of airstrikes,” Jason said. “These are mobile facilities in a big country – you’d need unbelievably good intelligence, fantastic accuracy, and quite a lot of luck.” That may mean more strikes in the coming days. “If you don’t act against the Houthis in the Red Sea, you are going to see more attacks,” David Cameron said yesterday. But in this piece, Patrick Wintour hears from analysts who fear the opposite impact. “The Houthis are far more savvy, prepared and well-equipped than many western commentators realise,” Farea al Muslimi, from the Chatham House Middle East programme, said. “Their recklessness and willingness to escalate in the face of a challenge are always underrated.” Tit-for-tat exchanges between Israel and Hezbollah could prompt a crisis Before 7 October, Israel’s chief security preoccupation was the situation on its northern border with Lebanon, where Hezbollah’s forces are massed and have long been engaged in low-level exchanges with IDF forces on the other side. In this piece, Jason calls the group “the biggest and most capable member of [Iran’s] ‘axis of resistance’”, the proxy forces across the Middle East under the influence of Tehran. “They are a more formidable foe than Hamas,” he said. “More soldiers, more experienced in something closer to conventional warfare, with a massive stock of more powerful and accurate weapons. They could effectively overwhelm Israeli missile defences if they launch enough of them at the same time.” About 80,000 Israelis have been evacuated from communities near the border amid fears of an incursion similar to Hamas’ attack in the south – and while that has not materialised, the increased frequency of rockets and artillery shells into Israel has made the evacuees’ return impossible. Israel’s targeted assassinations of senior Hezbollah commanders in Lebanon, as well as incidents including a guided missile attack by Hezbollah which killed two people yesterday, have been seen as potentially escalatory and a breach of the accepted “rules” of the ongoing skirmishes. Neither side has much appetite for the situation to deteriorate further, Jason said. “Realistically, Israel doesn’t have the capacity for another conflict – they have to draw down troops from Gaza to send them to the north, and there is a cost to that. Hezbollah don’t want a war yet, and the Iranians don’t want to see them badly degraded, which is the best case scenario.” But the more tit-for-tat incidents happen, the greater the chance of an accident which leaves the other side feeling forced to respond. The day after the funeral of one of the senior commanders killed by Israel last week, Hezbollah attacked Israel’s northern command base, Jason noted. No injuries or damage were reported in the incident – “But what would have happened if a senior general and a couple of his aides had been killed?” Iran has a history of avoiding confrontation – but accidents happen Central to all of this is Iran’s strategy of relying on semi-autonomous proxies across the region – staying at arm’s length from any violence while exercising its influence. “There is a long history of states using proxies in the region, going back decades,” Jason said. “But it’s quite hard to think of anything comparable to what Iran is doing today, in the region or around the world.” As well as Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis, Iranian-backed militias have targeted US forces in Iraq and Syria since 7 October. None have yet been killed, but Washington has responded with airstrikes against the militants. Israel also killed a top Iranian general, Seyed Razi Mousavi, in Damascus – and has been blamed for a blast in Beirut that killed a senior Hamas official, Saleh al-Arouri. “All of that is a message to Tehran,” Jason said. But there is still a desire on both sides to stay away from a direct confrontation: Joe Biden has been careful to separate the strikes against the Houthis from their Iranian sponsors, saying only that the US has sent a private message to Tehran that “we’re confident we’re well-prepared”. Iran itself has “been producing virulent and inflammatory rhetoric against ‘the great Satan’ – the US – and ‘the little Satan’ – Israel – for decades,” Jason said. “But they have also been careful to avoid direct conflict – there have been lots of opportunities, and Tehran has systematically turned away from that.” “It remains a fact that all of the main actors are reluctant to see an escalation – for now, anyway,” Jason said. “But the longer this continues, the greater the risk there is of something going badly wrong.” |